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CHAPTER  ONE 
THE  FIRST  STAGE 
INQUIRY  INTO  PRICES  AND  MARK-UPS The  aim of the research 
There  is one  introductory question which  obviously demands  an  immediate  answer: 
why  set up  this extensive and  costly research programme? 
We  might begin by  recalling the general objective of the studies the Commission 
has undertaken since 1970,  namely  to inform Parliament as well as public opinion,  the inter-
ests concerned  and  the Commission  itself of the various patterns of development of concen-
tration,  competition and  prices in the various industries,  markets and  countries covered by 
the research. 
But  is it really necessary to set up  such  a  far-reaching  research programme  simply 
to disseminate some  fairly straightforward,  albeit important economic  (and  econorno-political) 
information? 
The .studies clearly have  a  deeper purpose.  We  must  not lose sight of the 
instrumental and  operative nature of the research programme  as it relates to the tasks con-
ferred on  the Commission  by  Articles 85  (restrictive practices)  and  86  (abuse of dominant 
positions)  of the Treaty establishing the European  Economic  Community. 
Article  85 
1.  The  following  shall  be  prohibited  as  incompatible  with  the 
common  market:  all  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by 
association<::  of  undertakings  and  concerted  practices  which  may 
affect  trade  between  Member  States  and  which  have  as  their object 
or  effect the  prevention,  restriction or  distortion of  competition 
within  the  common  market,  and  in  particular those  which: 
(a)  directly or  indirectly fix  purchase  or  selling prices or  any 
other  trading  conCi tions: 
(b)  limit or  control  production,  markets,  technical  develop111ent, 
or  investment; 
(c)  share  markets  or  sources  of  supply; 
(d)  apply  dissimilar conditions  to  equivalent  transactions  with 
other  trading  parties,  thereby  placing  them  at a competitive 
disadvantage; 
(e)  make  the  conclusion  of contracts  subject  to  acceptance  by 
the  other  parties of  supplementary  obligations which,  by 
their nature  or  according  to commercial  usage,  have  no 
connection  with  the  subject  of  such  contracts. 
2.  Anv  agreements  or  decisions  prohibited  pursuant  to  this 
Article  shall  be  automatically  void. 
7 Article  85  (continued) 
3.  The  provisions  of  paragraph  1 may,  however,  be  declared 
inapplicable  in  the  case  of: 
any  agreement  or  category  of  agreements  between  under-
takings; 
any  decision  or  category  of  decisions  by  associations 
of  undertakings; 
any  concerned  practice or  category  of  concerned  practices; 
which  contributed  to  improving  the  production  or  distribution of 
goods  or  to  promoting  technical  or  economic  progress,  while 
allowing  consumers  a fair share  of  the  resulting  benefit,  and 
which  does  not: 
(a)  impose  on  the  undertakings  concerned  restrictions which  are 
not  indispensable  to  the  attainment  of  these  objectives; 
(b)  afford  such  undertakings  the  possibility of  eliminating 
competition  in  respect  of  a substantial  part of  the  products 
in  question. 
Article  86 
Any  abuse  by  one  or  more  undertakings  of a dominant  position  within 
the  common  market  or  in  a substantial  part  of  it shall  be  prohibited 
as  incompatible  with  the  common  market  in  so  far  as  it may  affect 
trade  between  Member  States. 
Such  abuse  may  in  particular,  consist  in: 
(a)  directly or  indirectly imposing  unfair  purchase  or  selling 
prices  or  other  unfair trading  conditions; 
(b)  limiting  production,  markets  or  technical  development  to 
the  prejudice  of  consumers; 
(c)  applying  dissimilar conditions  to  equivalent.transactions 
with  other trading  parties,  thereby  placing  them  at  a 
competitive  disadvantage; 
(d)  making  the  conclusion  of cantracts  s·:bject  to  acceptance 
by  the  other  parties  of  supplementary  obligations  which, 
by  their nature  or  according  to  commercial  usage,  have 
no  connection  with  the  subject  of  such  contracts. 
8 The  fundamental  importance of prices - both as a  market-regulating mechanism  and 
as a  basic indicator of the degree of competition actually prevalent on  the market - to 
Eurcpe' s  economy,  is beyond  dispute.  It follc:Ms,  then,  that the  system embcdied  in 
Articles 85  and  86  rests heavily on  the principle of familiarity with and  studies of prices; 
without this familiarity and  without these studies the possibility of giving practical effect 
to Article 85,  and  more  especially to Article 86,  would  be  seriously compranised  from  the· 
outset. 
Let us at this point quote an  important passage from  the Introduction to the 
Commission's  Seventh Report of Competition Policy  (Brussels/Luxembourg,  April 1978,p.l0  in 
the English version}: 
"Market  structure  have  been  a  priority concern  of competition  policy  during 
the  year  1g77.  The  work  of  analysing  degree  of  concentration,  competition 
and  price  formation  has  been  extended,  the  object  being  to  highlight  the 
underlying  causes  of the  poor  functioning  of  competition.  About  a hundred 
markets  have  been  identified in  which  the  most  important  undertaking  holds 
more  than  a half-share.  It has  also  been possible  to  establish  that  there 
is a strong  tendency  towards  concentration  in  the  distribution field  and  that 
there  are  some  important  price  differences  for  the  same  product  at  all  levels 
even  on  the  purely  local  level. 
The  Commission  has  the  firm  intention of systematically applying  Article  86 
against  undertakings  in  a dominant  position  which  directly or  indirectly 
impose  discriminatory  or  unfair prices.  It is not  the  Commission's  object-
ive  to  set  itself up  as  a price control  organization,  nor  to  put  an  end  to 
price  variations  which  are  an  essential  part  of  the  competitive  process, 
but  solely  to  attack  practices  which  become  illegal  when  they  are  carried 
out  by  undertakings  in  a  dominant  position;  the  reason  is the  injury  which 
these  practices  can  cause  to  the  user  and  the  consumer. 
The  Commission  considers  that  the  recent  Decision  in  the  United  Brands  case 
is of  great  importance  for  the  development  of  an  effective policy  regarding 
the  control  of  abuse  of  dominant  position.  The  considerations  expounded 
by  the  Court  of  Justice  have  given  concrete  form  to  the  question  of the 
applicability of Article  86  to  abnormal  price  situations.  Though  it may 
remain  very  difficult to  specify  in  general  terms  the  criteria which  enable 
one  to  define  an  unfair  price,  nevertheless  the  Court  has  provided  highly 
valuable  pointers  which  will  guide  the  Commission 1 s  work .n 
This passage highlights the aims  of the competition policy and  the reasons and 
criteria underlying our  research programme,  namely  to provide the Commission  with a  coherent 
set of economic  studies covering an  increasingly wide  range of industries and  markets and 
bringing out the aims,  the salient features,  and  the effects of any  industrial strategies 
or actual practices which  might  affect trade between Member  States to the detriment of the 
Community  conswner. 
9 For  this very purpose - to bring out the  ai~,the salient features and  above all 
the effects of such strategies and  practices - the programme  includes a  set of dynamic  and 
international comparative studies of price structures covering a  precise and  clearly defined 
series of products and  markets  in all Community  countries. 
Final consumer  prices provide the critical "therrrometer"  for determining  the  forJ:Il 
and  structure of each  study.  The  studies should not be  seen as an  "inquisition",  since they 
require' only the voluntary collaboration of the undertakings  themselves.  It is in the best 
interest of every economic  operator  (consumers  as well as undertakings)living and  working  in 
the Community  to have  a  more  transparent picture of market structures. 
The  conclusion to this report  (Section 2.10 - "The  crucial points of the research") 
demonstrate point by  point the extent to which  the programme  really does attain its objectives. 
10 Stages of the survey 
'Ihe  Sixth Report on Corrpeti tion Policy1  stated that the provisional and  partial 
results of the pilot surveys on  the structure and  evolution of prices and  mark-ups  in the 
distribution of processed food  products  indicated that: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
these surveys are of the greatest interest both 
for  assessing the actual working of the competition 
mechanism  and  for  the  information and  guidance of 
consumers  and  households; 
detailed basic data are available which  can reasonably 
be  considered  indispensable for  the continuation 
and  extension of the prices mark-ups  surveys; 
both the  immediate  and  ultimate targets of the long-
term research programme  should be  expanded  and  clearly 
defined as a  matter of urgency by  incorporating  them 
into a  more  systematic and  complete methodological 
framework.  For  a  further  in-depth extension of the 
multiple analyses,  a  distinction should be  made 
between  two  fundamental  stages and  aspects of the 
research: 
1)  First stage  (Chapter  One) :  survey on prices 
and  mark-ups:  aims  and criteria of the 
research programme  - computer  programming 
requirements; 
11)  Second  stage  (Chapter  Two) :  thepower  interplay 
between  retailers and  producers. 
Generally speaking,  the first stage aims  to collect a  much  greater quantity of 
detailed information on  specific,  actual prices and  mark-ups,  in order  to build up  a  fairly 
representative picture of "price galaxies" at different levels  (final retail prices,  buying 
prices for  retailers, etc.,)  and  of their variations  (according  to sales point,  country, 
products  brand and  size) • 
In this context,  implementation of the first stage calls for  an  extension of the 
sample of shops  (or  sales points)  covered by  the survey and  also a  very substantial extension 
of the sample of products to include more  brands and  more  sizes(packages). 
1.  Third part,  paragraph  4,  No.319 
II The  second  stage of research aims  at identifying and  analysing the forms  and 
effects of interplay between  the laws  and  factors governing variations of the price galaxies 
mentioned  above. 
In concrete terms  ,  therefore,  the aim will be  to analyse the evolution of comp-
etition as  regards relationships: 
(a) 
(b) 
by  describing: 
Between  retailers and  consumers; 
Between  retailers and  producers; 
the salient features of the power  relationships underlying  the 
negotiating powers  and  actual behaviour of the selected major 
retailers and  manufacturers,  and 
the  immediate  and  ultimate effects of the retail prices paid by  the 
consumer  on his freedom of choice and  decision. 
Clearly,  the first stage is the prerequisite basis for  the second  stage of res-
earch,  which  is based on selection,  from  arrong  the large quantity of atoms of information 
provided by  the first stage,  of those elements which  are of the greatest significance and 
value for  a  more  advanced  and  concentrated analysis. 
In fact,  the selection operated during  the second  stage of research has the 
effects of focusing attention on a  more  restricted sample of: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
products; 
retailers; 
manufacturers. 
During  the second  stage,  to be described in Chapter Two,  account will have  to be 
taken not only of the quantitative data resulting from  computer  elaborations but also of all 
financial,  economic  and  legal information which  may  be  ascertainable. 
* 
*  * 
The  present chapter deals more  particularly with the following: 
(a) 
(b) 
the tables 
the various operational criteria for  the collection,  processing,  i.e. 
regrouping and  classification of the thousands  (or millions)  of atoms 
12 (c) 
of information required to achieve the targets and  goals in relation 
to our basic problem of jdentifying firstly the relationships exist-
ing  between  structures and  behaviour  and  secondly the practical con-
sequences  for  the practical working  of competition; 
the more  technical and  specific commentaries  explaining each of the 
tables covered by  the present chapter. 
The  layout of the chapter is,  therefore,  as follows: 
I 
II 
III 
Series of detailed tables:  "Prices mark-ups". 
Criteria for  regrouping and  reclassifying data - Relationships 
between concentration and  price. 
Commentaries  on  tables. 
13 l.l 
l.l.l. 
CRITERIA  FOR  REGROUPING  AND  CLASSIFYING  DATA  - RElATIONSHIPS  BEIWEEN 
CONCENTRATION  AND  PRICES 
The  criteria 
The  new  programme  lays down  a  number  of criteria for  regrouping  and  therefore 
comparing  and  analysing  the data collected,  which  are mainly  the selling prices but also 
include the buying prices for  each specific  item covered by  the survey. 
The  18  criteria adopted are listed below,  but it has not yet been possible to 
apply many  of them. 
1.1.2.  Criterion No.1.:  Unit Price 
Products are classified according  to unit price.  This operation assumes  prior 
standardization of brands,  sizes and  packages  for  any  given product,  to enable unit prices 
comparison of different brands and  sizes of the same  product.  The  determination of unit price 
is fundamental  because there are large numbers  of own  labels and  commercial brands,  as well as 
several sizes and  packages,  not only  in each country considered but also at every sales point. 
In practice,  the quality and  content of these numerous  items are frequently  the same  and 
this is why  they have  to be compared  on  the basis of unit price.  See  Tables 1,  8  and  10 
compiled  from  the computer  print outs. 
1.1.3.  Total Price and  Unit Price 
Labels on packages offered for  sale on  the shelves of big stores often show: 
(a)  Total Price; 
(b)  Weight; 
(c)  Unit Price; 
For  other products,  the exact quantity sold is sometimes  fixed at the express 
request of the consumer;  this applies to fresh meat,  vegetables and  fresh fish. 
Here.  two  principles will be applied: 
I) 
II) 
when  the unit price is displayed,  it will be used and  not the total 
price of a  given size of weight; 
A total quantity of 1 will then be  shown,  i.e.  total price and  unit 
price will coincide; 
14 1.1.4. 
III)  if the price differs substantially according  to weight or package 
IV) 
(e.g.  a  240  gramme  piece of Finnish Emmenthaler  cheese costs Bf.25 
per 100  grammes  while a  3  kg.  block costs Bf.l80 per kilo),  two 
different units of measurement  (100  grammes  and  l  kg)  will have  to be 
used  to show  this fact; 
in describing  the  items considered,  therefore,  the particular size and 
form will be  stated(in our  example,  blocks of Finnish Emmenthaler 
cheese in packages of 100  grammes  and  multiples of 100  grammes  or  in 
packages of l  kg  and  multiples of l  kg) • 
Criterion No.2  the 22  groups of food  products,  beverages and  tobacco 
The  mass  of data obtained by  enquiry are classified by  "groups of related prod-
ucts",  i.e. we  consider  a  number  of products which  are related either by  similar manufact-
uring processes or  by  their final use by  consumers.  On  this basis all the products consid-
ered - food  products,  beverages and  tobacco - are classified into 22  main  groups. 
later stage: 
A) 
The  aim  is to measure  and  identify: 
differences in price between  the shops  included  in the sample,  for  each group 
of products so defined and,  in particular, 
- differences in price movements  between  surveys,  for  each of the above  mentioned 
groups of products,  as between  the shops  included  in the sample. 
This is a  very difficult operation,  from  which  it is intended to compile at a 
Several specific price indices for  each of the 22  groups of food  products, 
beverages and  tobacco,  programmed  into the computer,  as follows: 
I)  "CON"  (canned  fish,  meat,  vegetables and  fruit); 
II)  "EI:\JF"  (baby  foods); 
III)  "SOU"  (soups}; 
IV)  "LEG"  {packet vegetables); 
V)  "EPI"  (meat  extracts and  seasonings); 
VI)  "GRA"  (edible oils and  fats,  margarine); 
VII)  "BIS"  (biscuits,  cakes,  "bakery products",  confectionery and 
chocolates); 
VIII)  "FAR"  (crispbreads,  crackers,  cake mixes,  flour,  salt,  sugar  and 
jellies); 
IX)  "CER"  (cereals); 
X)  "MAR"  (jams  and  marmalades); 
15 XI) 
XII) 
XIII) 
XIV) 
XV) 
XVI) 
XVII) 
XVIII) 
XIX) 
XX) 
XXI) 
XXII) 
"BOI"  (beverages,  coffee,  tea,  soft drinks,  mineral waters); 
"IAI"  (dairy and  related products,  milk,  eggs,  butter and  various 
kinds of cheese); 
"FRO"  (frozen foods,  including  ice cream); 
"SPA"  (pasta,  spaghetti,  macaroni,  etc.,  ready-cooked dishes,  pizza, 
ravioli,  spaghetti in sauce and  so on); 
"BIE"  (beer); 
"ALC"  (alcoholic·beverages:  whisky,  brandy,  Martini,  wine etc.,); 
"CHA"  (ham,  delicatessen meats,  cured meats); 
"PAI"  (bread); 
"FRU"  (bananas,  pineapples,  grapefruit,  lemons,  oranges,  apples, 
peaches,  pears etc.,), i.e.  fresh fruit traded  internationally 
on  a  large scale; 
"VIA"  (meat,  poultry,  game) ; 
"POI"  (fresh fish,  shellfish  (crustaceans,  nnlluscs,etc));1 
"TAB"  (various brands and  types of cigarettes and  tobacco). 
Criterion No.  2a,  setting the storage limit,  (shelf life)  for  each group of prod-
ucts is very closely linked with the above classification.  At  the present stage,  however,  no 
return on this point will be  required.  Later on,  it will be covered by  the following gradings: 
1=  no  set storage limit; 
2=  over  three years, 
3=  over one year, 
4=  over six months,  etc., 
B)  ~ general food  price index recording changes  in the price of a  set "basket"  rnde 
up  of items  included and  analysed  in the 22  groups of products enumerated  above.  See Tables 
4,  6,  7  and  9  compiled  from  the computer print outs. 
It should be noted that provision has also been made  for  the alphabetical coding 
of groups of products which  are not food  products but are fairly often sold at supermarkets 
and  hypermarkets selling food  products:  examples  are detergents and  household cleaning mat-
erials. 
1.1.5.  Calculation of Price Indices 
Two  alternative criteria can be applied for  the computation of price indices: 
1.  It should be  noted  that deep frozen fruit(e.g.  strawberries) ,meat and  fish come  under  the 
heading of frozen products  (Group  XIII:"FRO") .On  the other hand,  meat  and  fish which  are 
frozen for  long  storage and  are  imported  in large quantity, will be  included  in the appro-
priate group  (XX  or XXI).  In any  case,  the Institutes which  carry out the survey will 
have to give full explanations,  in a  detailed note attached to the coding  sheets  so that 
the correct quality and  characteristics of the products can be accurately assessed. 
16 Either: 
a)  Start with the unit price for each  item  (brand  and  size)  of each product  (e.g.  all 
varieties,  brands and  package sizes of  "salrron"),  then conpute the arithmetic mean  for  the 
product concerned on  the basis of the unit price  (taken from  Table 8); 
b)  then calculate the overall price for  each of the 22  groups of products  (e.g.  one 
for group  "CON",  one  for  group 
11ENF
11
,  and  so on),  on  the basis of the unit price for  each 
product computed  as described under ( 
1 a 
1 
)  ; 
c)  calculate the arithmetic mean  of the 22  price price indices,  corresponding to the 
overall price for  each group of products; 
d)  finally,  compute  the above-mentioned overall and  mean  prices for  two different 
periods,  in order to establish the price index. 
Or: 
a)  calculate directly the overall price for  each of the 22  groups of products on the 
basis of the single items  taken separately,  i.e. on  the basis of the total price at each  time 
and,therefore,  ignoring  the unit prices computed  for  the various products; 
b)  compare  the above overall prices at two different times  in order  to establish the 
corresponding  index. 
At  this stage of the enquiry it is preferable to adopt the second method.  Overall 
and  mean  prices  ,  and  the price variations to appear  in Tables 1,2,3,4,  7  and  9 will,  there-
fore,  be calculated directly from  the data for  each  item  (each  brand and  size). 
However,  for  Table  8 which  has a  special purpose,  the first method will be  used 
for  stage  (a)  because the groups covered by  this table are not the 22  "groups of related 
products  ..  but"single products"  only  (e.g. 
11Salrron"  only and  not  "CON"). 
1.1.6.  Criterion No.3  type of brand 
The  data are classified by !~of  brand sold to the consumer,  namely; 
1=  manufacturer  brand 
2=  commercial brand 
3=  own  label  (i.e.  exclusive marketing brand) 
In Table 3,  the type of brand will be entered just below  the  "number  and  name  of 
product".  Table 4 will shaw  more  particularly the share of each  type of brand  in the overall 
cost of the basket as well as percentage price variations for  the whole  basket,  by  type of 
brand.  Lastly,  the last part of Table 9  also gives useful information classified by  type of 
brand. 
17 1.1.7.  Criterion No.4  Origin of Product  (imported,  home  produced,  etc.,) 
This is defined according  to the geographical origin of the product,  namely; 
1=  national product  (home-produced  goods); 
2=  imported products; 
3=  mixed  products  (the final manufacturing price is made  up  partly of value added 
in the country and  partly of value added  abroad); 
4=  product of undefined origin. 
Tables 3,  4  and  9 contain information classified according  to this criterion,  to-
gether with similar  information on the  type of brand  (see Criterion No.7). 
1.1.8.  Criterion No.  S:Pricing 
The  code  number  allocated indicates whether  the price for  a  given brand is a 
special or a  promotional price,namely; 
1=  normal price of product; 
2=  special offer as part of an advertising campaign; 
3=  non-defined methods  of pricing. 
The  information given under  "Pricing,.  in Tables 1,2,5 and  10,  indicates the 
strategy adopted  for  any  given  item  (normal price,  specialoffer  or non-defined method  of 
pricing) •  In practice it should be noted that: 
1.1.9. 
a)  It is not always possible to determine whether  the price charged is a 
special price or not; 
b)  As  a  rule,some  big retailing groups use 
11Special offers"  for  a  limit-
ed period,  on  a  planned basis,  so that a  number  of items are at all 
times offered to the consumer  as special offers. 
Criterion No  6:  Importance of a  Product in the Family Budget 
The  code  number  allocated indicates whether  the product in question is an  essen-
tial item of consumption or not,  namely: 
1=  product which  is an essential item in the pattern of household consumption; 
2=  product which  is a  non-essential,  or little used  item in household consumption. 
3=  product with variable interest. 
This approach  should allow a  new  typical price  index to be worked  out,  which  would 
18 be roughly homogenous  for all Member  States.  Table 1  contains a  column  for  tbis entry. 
1.1.10.  Criterion No.  7.  Nationality of Manufacturer or Producer 
The  code number  allocated indicates the nationality of the manufacturer which  is 
that of the country where  the decision centre of the group is located. 
1=  Federal Republic of Germany 
2=  France 
3=  Italy 
4=  Netherlands 
5=  Belgium 
6=  United Kingdom 
7=  Ireland 
8=  Denmark 
9=  Greece 
lO=Spain 
ll=Portugal 
12=Switzerland 
13=Austria 
14=Sweden 
15=United States 
In the case of an unprocessed product  (e.g.  fresh fruit:  bananas,  lemons,  etc.,) 
the nationality of the producer will be  entered,  i.e. not the place of origin of the product 
but the country where  the decision centre of the group is located. 
a) 
b) 
c) 
The  note to the coding sheet  (Annex  1)  will give full explanatory details for: 
identifying the quality and  characteristics of the various products; 
giving a  full picture of the structure of the producing group and  its subsid-
iaries,  as well as of import and  export flows generated by  the group's activ.ities; 
showing  the place of origin on production of the product,  so that the overall 
policy of the producing group can be assessed. 
There may  be cases where  the name  and  location of the manufacturer  are not known 
but the country of origin or production of the product is known  (e.g.  Hong  Kong).  The  name 
of the country concerned will be given in the explanatory note referred to above  and  annexed 
to the coding sheet,  in which  no  country name  will then be entered.1• 
1.  The  information in this explanatory note will be particularly valuable during  the second 
stage of the survey which  is dealt with in Chapter II. 
19 1.1.11.  Criterion No.  8:  Manufacturing  (or producing)  Group 
The  code number  allocated identifies the name  of the group which  manufacturers or 
distributes  (if the manufacturer  is not known)  the product in question.  Code  numbers  are all-
ocated according  to nationality  (criterion No.7).  One  hundred code  numbers  are available for 
each nationality,  except for  the United States for which  there are 500  numbers.  Thus,numbers 
from  101  to 200  indicate German  firms,  from  201  to 300  French  firms  and  from  1501  to 2000 
American  firms.  The  names  of big retailers using awn  labels will be  followed  by  the initials 
"O.L."  and  will be  numbered  from  8000  onwards  on  the coding sheet. 
In the case of a  product which  is not processed  (fresh fruit such  as bananas  and 
lemons,  etc.,)the name  of the producing group will be entered.  A detailed note,  like that 
described under  the previous point  ("10.  Criterion No.  7'·')will be  attached to the coding 
sheet. 
1.1.12.  Criteria Nos.9,  10  and  11  negrees of Concentration 
Three different criteria are applied according  to the degree of concentration. 
Taking  for  exarrple,  the  index  *C4  (''standard
11  concentration ratio), we  shall have  four  types 
of structure according  to the value of the  index,  as follows: 
- 1  = red zone  (of  the overall national structure) 
- 2 = orange  zone 
- 3  = yellow zone 
- 4  = green zone 
It will be possible for  apply the  index  *C4  to at least three different definit-
ions of the 
11Structure
11  to be considered: 
I) 
II) 
III) 
at 
11Specific product market
11  level  (e.g.  tinned salmon); 
at the level of 
11Combined  markets  for  related products" (f'~.g.  tinned 
fish); 
at 
11 sub -sector 
11  level  (e.g. 
11 tinned  fa:::rl")  • 
The 
11Standard ration
11*C4 will,  as a  rule,  be higher at the first level and  lower 
at the third. 
However,  the drop  in the cumulative percentage represented by  the concentration 
ration  (following the elimination of one  or more  firms)  partially  offsets the rise of the 
index  throu:,h  the application of the standardizing mechanism  (in accordance with  the diff-
erent hypothesis:  (a),  (b)  and  (c)). 
Consequently,  although fairly sensitive,  the standard  index maintains a  fairly 
regular  trend. 
20 1.1.13.  Concentration of Manufacturers  (or  producers)  and  Working  of Competition 
Even  if the leading firm has a  very large share of a  particular market or sector 
(index Cl),  e.g.  over  40%,  it should not be concluded  that: 
a) 
b) 
the firm in question has an oligopolistic or even a  monopolistic market power; 
the firm in question uses this situation to impose  excessive prices and  thereby 
earn monopoly  profits. 
In practice,  the manufacturer or producer cannot deal direct with final consumers 
but has to sell his products to retailers or even wholesalers  (importers or exporters in some 
cases). 
His selling price will therefore be determined by  his bargaining power  in relation 
to his purchasers.  However,  as already noted: 
1.1.14. 
I)  there are purchasing groups and  large distributing firms  (large 
stores)  which  have  very substantial bargaining power; 
II)  this bargaining power  cannot be  simply measured  at the level of nat-
ional  concentration  because  the  strength of these major  retailers 
lies in: 
a)  the dominant position which  they hold over retail sales in certain 
regions and  ~ities; 
b)  the substantial extent of their centralised cumulative demand, 
which  no  ~anufacturer or producer can ignore; 
c)  their consequent ability to buy  enormous  quantities from  anybody 
and  anywhere. 
Relationships between Degree of Concentration and  Price Movements 
It follows  from  what  has been said that the following  information must  be avail-
able in order  to assess the working of competition: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
not only the degree of market power  held by  any  one manufacturer or producer; 
but also selling prices to retailers,  i.e.  the actual buying prices negotiated 
by  retailers; 
a  significant and  objective "parameter"  for  assessing the relevance of those 
prices,  i.e. a  basis for  affirming that these prices demonstrate that either the 
supplier  (manufacturer or producer)  or  the buyer  (large retailer or  importing 
or exporting wholesaler)  has strong bargaining power. 
21 Clearly,  the problem of assessing the relevance of a  price comes  back  to that of 
determining a  fair price for  each market from  which  any divergence or deviation would const-
itute abuse.  While  the solution to this problem is no  easier that the discovery of the 
"philosophers'  stone",  there is nevertheless a  "magic  key"  which can be used  {key  no.2: 
international - and  interregional - comparison of price movements  and  of the other magnitudes 
analysed).  This will be discussed  in Chapter  II. 
In practice,  by  making  an international - and  interregional - comparison of all 
the available data,  i.e.: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
comparison of the degrees of concentration for  a  particular  industry in the 
various countries and,  in particu~ar, comparison.of the market share· of each 
major  manufacturer or producer  in each country; 
comparison of levels of buying prices  {producer-manufacturer price)  negotiated 
between  the supplier and  the buying retailer,  in each country and  region; 
comparison of retail price levels; 
comparison of the trend of all the above data; 
it is at least possible to deduce  the regions,  countries and  products for which  positions of 
dominance or bargaining strength exist,  in favour either of certain manufacturers  {or  prod-
ucers)  or more  particularly for certain big retailers. 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
1.1.15. 
In this respect,  it would  appear obvious that: 
even if there is no  automatic relationship between  the degree and  trend of con-
centration on the one  hand,  and  the fixing of "domination prices"  and  the 
acquisition of "domination profits" on  the other; 
it must be known  whether or not dominant or even monopoly  positions exist before 
being able to conclude that such domination prices and  profits also exist; 
consequently,  the degree of concentration of manufacturers or producers must  be 
analysed before the results of analyses of the movements  of the different prices 
can be  interpreted  (producers'  prices,  i.e.  buying price for  retailers and  retail 
prices); 
in particular,  this knowledge  (and  measurement)  is essential in order to explain 
and  understand  the pricing policy: 
of the principal manufacturers or producers; 
of the principal retailers. 
Price Variations and  Concentration of Markets  Frequency,  Extent and  Speed  of 
Price Adjustments 
The  modern  theory of oligopolies has frequently emphasised  the rigidity of_prices 
in highly concentrated structures,  characterised by  confrontation between or, better,  the 
22 "peaceful co-existence" of what  is in fact a  very small nwnber  of large firms.1 
The  current theory is that,  for  fear of starting a  competitive price war  (descr-
ibed as "ruinous")  these oligopolistic units tend: 
a) 
b) 
to link price levels with  the level of a  given set of variable costs  (full cost 
.  .  1  ) 2  pr1nc1p e  ; 
to hold their prices relatively stable and  hence  to raise or lower  their prices 
as infrequently as possible  (Hitch,  Hall and  Sweezy's hypothesis of the "bent 
demand  curve") 2. 
One  of the aims  of the price and  mark  up  analyses forming  the subject of this 
research programme  should be  to determine the actual behaviour of big oligopolistic units 
operatingin highly concentrated markets. 
a) 
b) 
In other words,  price policy has to be described and  analysed: 
in the present period of inflationary pressures; 
in periods of price controls which  are imposed  more  or less regularly by  the 
countries worst hit by  inflation; 
In order  to assess and  measure  the  impact of such price policies - and  of action 
taken by  governments - on  the growth  and  spread of inflation. 
In the last analysis,  a  three sided reciprocal causal relationship has to be 
established between: 
- market power; 
- domination prices and  profits 
inflation; 
distinguishing clearly the respective §hares of manufacturers  (or  producers)  and  large 
retailers in market power,  domination profits and  responsibility for  the triggering and  growth 
of inflation.  In particular,  more  than one  hundred  questions put to the Research  Institutes 
in Chapter!! of the research programme  seek  to determine and  define all the facts of the 
l.  See:  P.Sylos-Labini,  "Oligopolio e  progresso tecnico"(Oligopoly and  technical progress), 
Giuffre,  Milan 1957  and  in particular:Part One,Chapter  1:  "L'oligopolio"·{The oligopoly) 
and  Einaudi,  Turin 1961. 
R.  Linda,  "Concurrence oligopolistique et planification concurrentielle internationale". 
(Oligopolistique,  corrpetition and  international competition planning)in "Economie 
Appliquee,  Archives of the  !SEA  1972,  Nos.2-3,  Librairie Droz,Geneva,  pages  325  et seq. 
and  in particular pages  357  to 369. 
2 •.  See P.Sylos-Labini,  op.cit.Chapter 1,  sections 1-6;  R.L.Hall-c.J  .Hitch, "Price Theory  and 
Business Behaviour"  in "Oxford  Studies in the Price Mechanism",Oxford  l95l,pp.l06-138; 
P.M.Sweezy,"Demand  under  conditions of oligopoly"  in "Readings  in Price Theory",  Allen 
and  Unwin,London,l953,  pp.404-409.  These works  are quoted  in note  (6)on page  27  of the 
cited works  by  P.Sylos-Labini. 
23 problem with which  we  are concerned. 
For  a  better understanding of the practical importance of this set of problems,  it 
may  be helpful to adopt  the following working  hypothesis,  which  of course,  is not necessarily 
related in any  way  to real cases and  situations. 
Strict price controls are  imposed  for  one year  in a  country suffering from 
galloping  inflation.  The  effects of this action might be as follows: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
1.1.16. 
Working  on  the premise that two  extreme  types of structure exist in the country 
concerned: 
(a) 
(b) 
competitive and  more  or  less atomistic; 
unbalanced oligopolistic,  because one or two  firms have dominant 
power. 
The  first effect of government price controls is to discourage  new  investment by 
firms operating  in both  the competitive structure  (a)  and  the unbalanced oligop-
olistic structure  (b) .  This is not necessarily a  positive effect.  Quite the 
reverse 
The  other effects depend  on  the form  and  application of price controls:  freeze, 
increases requiring government  approval,  limitation of the frequency of price 
changes: 
I)  Price freeze. 
II)  Increases subject to prior approval by  the relevant government 
department. 
III)  Limitation by  government of the frequency of increases. 
First Hypothesis  Price Freeze and  its Effects 
A price freeze can only be  temporary;  it penalizes competitive firms and  structu-
res which  by  definition tend to keep prices and  costs as low  as possible.  If such  firms can 
no  longer adjust their prices to demand  conditions and  to the constraints imposed  by  their 
cost curves,  some  will go bankrupt and  will leave the market,  thus  increasing the degree of 
concentration.  Against this,  a  freeze will "upset"  the dominant  firms much  less because their 
market power  has already enabled them  to fix their prices at a  comfortable,  relatively high 
level.  Here  again,  a  price freeze will lead to a  greater concentration by  favouring  the 
dominant  firms and  the more  concentrated structures. 
But this is not sufficient. 
However  paradoxical it may  seem,  a  price freeze triggers off a  whole  series of 
consequences which all have  the perverse but systematic effect of prolonging,  stimulating and 
accentuating inflation.  There is nothing better than a  price freeze for  unleashing and  per-
petuating  the vicious circle of inflation. 
24 First effect of a  price freeze:  no  firm will reduce its prices and  this applies 
particularly to dominant  firms,  which,  in order to hide their profits from  the government 
and  the public, will prefer to take on  unnecessary administrative and  managerial staff with 
nothing  to do  and  to grant excessive  bonuses  and  rise to their managers,  foremen,  office 
staff -~nd wage  earners.  Wage  increases will in particular start a  general  "follow-my-leader" 
reaction,  which  will trigger off wage  increases even  in sectors and  firms where  they ~ 
scarcely be  justified on grounds of productivity.  This will have  two  consequences,  incompa~­
ible with  (a}  their production pattern and  (b)  market conditions;  and  consequently,  a  further 
fresh  increase in concentration;  a  fresh  impetus  is given to the spread of inflation by  the 
artificial and  forced  increase in labour  and  production costs:  these are known  as "cost-push 
pressures." 
This is a  vital point which  must  be  strongly emphasised. 
The  effective,  normal  working of market mechanisms  implies as a  "natural and 
continuing consequence"  that prices can fall. 
One  look  around  is enough.  Competition leads to big price reductions.  What  else 
are special offers  (Section 8:  Criter.ion No.5}  and  the other promotional measures  adopted  by 
the big firms when  they can operate in a  "competitive environment"? And  it would  be wrong  to 
ignore the extent and  the  impact - on  the trend of prices and  the cost of living - of these 
special offers and  price reductions even when  they are only temporary. 
However,  the most  disastrous effect of a  price freeze  is that it specifically 
discourages any  possibility of price reductions because it must  be appreciated that the 
unhealthiest aspect of inflation is not the rise in prices but the irreversibility of the 
trend. 
In the dialectics of the market economy,  prices must  vary but the changes  should 
be "reversible"  sometimes  upwards  and  sometimes downwards.  Inflation appears when  price 
reductions no  longer  take place because of a  perverse factor  such as a  price freeze. 
It has,however,  just been stated that the most disastrous consequence of a  price 
freeze is that it rules out any  chance of price reductions.  Why?  And  how? 
The  answer  is simple.  We  must go  back  to the main,  specific causes of inflation1, 
1.  '!he  four  "classical" causes are: 
a)  demand  pressures; 
b)  cost-push pressures,  set up  mainly by  trade union wage  claims; 
c)  the expectation cause  (anticipating future  inflation}; 
d)  international causes,  linked with international prices and  exchange  rates. 
On  inflation_ proolems  and  the role of.  a  Price ~ission, reference  .. may  be made  to the 
excellent  report by  Stephen IDfthouse  (of Capel  -cure Myers  Ltd.)" The  New  Price 
Conmission:  A Microeconomic  approach  to price control",  IDndon  1977. 
25 which  include the  "expectation cause".  This means  that operators in the economy  expect and 
anticipate the future growth of inflation and,  therefore,  put up  their prices in advance even 
if such an  increase is in no  way  justified by  the existing structure of costs and  the market. 
a) 
b) 
There  is no  practical difference between: 
increasing a  price without economic  justification; 
not reducing  the same  price ·when  existing conditions suggest that there should be 
a  reduction. 
When  price controls are imposed  no  firm will reduce its prices precisely because 
of this expectation cause.  Moreover,  what more  damaging  admission can there be of inability 
to check  inflation than the adoption of the desperate measure of a  price freeze?  When  a  gov-
ernment makes  this admission,  firms  and  economic operators know  only too well what  to do: 
they hold their selling prices at the highest possible level  (or  even raise them)  so that, 
whatever happens,  they lose nothing and  are absolutely sure of not being overtaken by  rising 
inflation, without  thought for  the fact that by  acting  in this way  they generate and  increase 
inflation. 
But price freezes have  an even worse  and  more  disastrous inflationary effect 
because  they trigger off inflationary demand  pressures. 
Indeed,  everyone is very well aware  of two  essential facts concerning price 
freezes  and  this awareness  is the knell of doom  which  condemns  such a  policy in advance: 
1)  The  price freeze will be lifted one day; 
2)  The  price freeze will be re-introduced some  day. 
Let us  take the first "fact":  a  measure which  is so anti-economic in character 
it can only be  temporary  and  when  the freeze  is lifted, prices which  have  been artificially 
frozen  too long,  so that they are squeezed  and  held down,  will leap upwards  causing an 
inflationary explosion. 
Hence: 
1)  large quantities of products which  are expected to rise in price must  be 
purchased and  held  in stock.  This means  that purchases must cover  not only 
products subject to the price freeze but also others which  may  be affected by 
a  similar measure  and  yet others which  can be expected to be carried along 
on  the wave  of rising  inflation. 
2)  Money,  therefore,  has  to be  borrowed  to finance  these speculative purchases 
and,  consequently,  money  not used  for productive  investment will be  used  to 
fuel speculation and  inflation.  Money  will become  dearer  thus further dis-
26 1.1.17. 
couraging demand  for productive investment which  has already been weakened 
and hit by  the measures  taken in connection with  the price freeze.  Any  ob-
stacle to productive investment of course constitutes an  autonomous,  indirect 
factor which helps to prolong and  spread inflation. 
3}  Even  if price reductions were  theoretically possible in a  highly competitive 
sector for very special reasons  inherent in the workings of the market,  it 
will no  longer  take place precisely because of the general,  inflationary 
pressure of demand.  In the short run,  prices are not cut when  demand  is high. 
This applies in both competitive and  monopoly  conditions. 
Effects of the Anticipation of a  Price Freeze 
Everyone  is aware  of the second essential "fact":  once  a  government  has added 
the price freeze to its arsenal of economic  measures,  the freeze will be  reimposed  some  day, 
even after it has first been lifted, whenever  the authorities are faced with public anxiety 
at the growth of inflation ana are left with no  other escape hatch. 
In these circumstances,  a  price freeze has a  further effect.  Even  when  there is 
no  freeze,  firms  tend to set their selling prices artificially high.  How  do  they do this? 
By  applying  the full cost principle,  that is,  by  adding  to a  set of variable or direct costs, 
a  fixed margin  (q)  to cover  the firm's overheads and  profits.  Here  the modern  theory of 
oligopolies  {propounded  by  P.  Sylos-Labini  and  others}  seems  to be confirmed  by  experience 
during  the present bout of inflation and  price controls.  But  the perverse mechanism  inter-
venes  in the fixing of prices at the stage of calculating direct costs,  i.e.  the whole  set of 
variable costs.  In practice,  if the firm has the power  to do so,  it will not take account of 
current variable costs but will seek  to anticipate the  imposition of a  new  price freeze for a 
certain time.  From  this it automatically follows that: 
a} 
b) 
the selling price will have  to be  high enough  to withstand a  price freeze of 
varying  length without loss of money; 
the probable increase in variable costs,  and  of wages  in particular, will have  to 
be  estimated to allow for  the foreseeable  rise in the rate of  inflation and  in 
particular for  the inflationary explosion which  will precede,  accompany  and  fol-
-low  the  imposition of a  price freeze,  in accordance with the example  we  have 
just described. 
But  an  even  more  perverse feature of this perverse mechanism  is that this opport-
unity of setting excessively and  artificially high prices is offered gratis to big firms  in 
particular  (manufacturing,  distributing or both)  with a  strang enough  market power  to impose 
their prices. 
This fixing of prices at an artificially high  level will inevitably help: 
a}  to add  still farther  to inflation; 
27 b)  to penalize yet again and  as always,  firms operating within competitive 
structures and  under  competitive conditions,  which,  as purchasers,  will have  to 
suffer the artificially high prices set by  the dominant  undertakings  and  will also 
be  exposed  to pressure from  trade unions  (for higher wages  and  salaries) ,  but will 
not themselves be  able to charge artificially high prices  (as a  hedge  against 
the future growth  of inflation)  because  the machinery of competition in the 
markets where  they operate does not allow  them  to charge such prices  (by  defin-
ition of the concept of competition itself). 
The  final result is the disappearance of a  number  of competing  firms  and  a  higher 
degree of concentration.  In other words,  the perverse mechanism  underlying this perverse 
process is simple:  concentration stimulates inflation and  inflation helps to increase concen-
tration. 
a) 
b) 
The  following  hypothesis must  be checked: 
Is not inflation highest in countries with a  high degree of concentration? 
Are  not inflation and  concentration highest in countries which  are currently 
applying price controls? 
In our  research programme  and  more  particularly in the set of 140  plus questions 
listed in Chapter 11,  an attempt will be  made  to test these and other working  hypotheses 
empirically. 
1.1.18.  Second  Hypothesis  Increases  Subject to Prior Authorization 
When  a  price  freeze is lifted,  there is generally a  price explosion for products 
to which  the freeze applied: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
the rate of increase is increased by  the fact that everyone  knows  that he  must 
hurry to make  money  as much  as possible before the next freeze  (see Section 19); 
it is also increased in proportion to the market power  of firms to impose  such 
high prices; 
it is also increased in proportion to the degree of concentration and  non  campet-
itivity of the sector. 
Then,  faced with such a  catastrophe,  which is easily foreseen but no  less 
disastrous for  that,  the government has no  option but to: 
i) 
ii) 
introduce a  system of prior authorization of price increases; 
limit by  law  the frequency with which prices can be  changed. 
Let us first consider  the system of prior authorization which  is accompanied  by 
two  countervailing factors in one: 
28 First perversity of the system:  immediately  a  price increase is sanctioned,i.e.  in practice 
a  maximum  price,  this becomes  a  sole price, which  is also by  definition the maximum  price 
possible because: 
a} 
b) 
firms able to sell only at a  higher price will be  forced out of the market  thus 
increasing the degree of concentration of the structure,  with all the perverse 
effects already enumerated; 
the most efficient and  profitable firms,  which  could sell at a  lower  price,  are 
quite happy  to align themselves on  this maximum  price and  to increase their prof-
its with government blessing;  this of itself will be  a  co-factor  in inflation 
(see Section 21,  however}. 
In any  event,  firms with market power  - and  therefore operating  in concentrated 
structures - will consistently apply the maximum  price which  will therefore,  tend 
to become  the sole ['rice. 
In conclusion:  the mechanism of competition will no  longer  be able to fulfil its 
role of establishing a  system of multiple, differentiated equilibrium prices,  fixed at the 
lowest level possible in the specific individual conditions of the various markets and  struc-
tures. 
Second  perversity of the system:  in order to obtain prior sanction for price increases,  it is 
clearly in the interests of firms  to inflate total variable costs artificially, because this 
is the total figure that the authorities will consider  in granting price increases,  in accor-
dance with the full cost principle. 
The  reasoning  is even  simpler  than its statement:  if the authorities approve  a 
rate  (q}  of  30%  on  total variable costs,  the selling price will be 130  if the original total 
is over 100  and  there will be a  gain  (gross margin}  of 30;  but if the total is inflated to 
200,  permission to sell at 260  will be given and  the gain  (gross margin}  will be  60.  And 
Mr.  Palisse would  say that it is better to gain 60  than 30. 
It is obvious that managers  controlling big firms with market power  will find it 
in their interest: 
a} 
b) 
to grant all trade union claims for wage  increases,  resulting in the common  but 
paradoxical situation that a  workman  (steelworker,  electrician or engineer}gains 
twice as much  as a  teacher; 
to profit themselves  from  such  increases in two  ways: 
• directly,  insofar as their salaries are increased; 
•  indirectly,  insofar as they are entitled to bonuses  and  shares based on  company 
profits. 
29 1.1.19.  Structural prerequisites for  competition to operate 
The  perverse mechanism described above  is triggered by  the joint action of 
concentrated  (and  dominant)  oligopolies and  price controls  imposed  by  government.  In any 
analysis of modern  structures,  however,  care must  be  taken to avoid the axiomatic general-
isations and  traps of economic  determinism. 
Thus,  even  in this "perverse mechanism"  there are "stops"  and canpetition can 
emerge  even with price controls,  if certain basic conditions are fulfilled. 
In this context,  the expression "effective and efficient working of corrpetition" 
is used  simply to describe its most  salient and  significant effect  (and  result)namely,  the 
possibility that prices lower  than the maximum  prices fixed by  the authorities may  be 
recorded  in certain sectors and  markets. 
If this is to happen,  the heads of certain firms operating  in certain markets must 
of course have  the will to compete. 
If this spirit of competition is lacking - and  it sometimes does not enter the 
thoughts of managers of certain dominant  firms  (  both public and  private)  - very little can 
be done,  but it is still of interest to know: 
a) 
b) 
the conditions which  generally tend  to inspire this "spirit of competition"; 
the  instruments available to the government  to activate and  stimulate these 
competitive factors which will induce  firms  to compete. 
We  shall consider exclusively objective structural conditions in which compet-
ition can work.  They  are: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
a) 
b) 
the presence of numbers  of  independent economic  operators; 
the existence of a  certain balance of power  between economic  operators; 
the existence of highly elastic demand,  to bring down  prices; 
the existence of major  economies of scale,  both technological and  commercial 
(arising therefore  from  the structure of the distribution system),  and/or of 
excess production and/or distribution capacity,  i.e.  unused capacities; 
the existence of a  compatible,  clear and definite legal framework  (legal certain-
ty)  in relation to the working of the market economy. 
Brief consideration must  be given to these conditions: 
plurality of economic  operators,  and, 
balance of power 
are the linchpin of any  competitive mechanism,  in the sense that: 
i)  there is no  possibility of competition where  there is absolute monopoly  or where 
30 ii) 
c) 
d) 
a  dominant position is held by  a  firm which  is so powerful that any  spirit of 
competition in other firms  is discouraged  from  the start.  It then becomes 
necessary to determine the critical  ceiling of disequilibrium,  as measured  by 
the various Linda  indices1,  because as the qegree of concentration  (and  imbalance) 
approaches this ceiling, competition tends to be  snuffed out; 
the  independence of these economic  operators must  also be ensured and  kept under 
scrutiny,  because  the conclusion of various types of agreement  (specialisation, 
market-sharing,  etc.,)  can lead to at least the  temporary  elimination of the 
plurality of operators which  is obviously the essential pre-condition for compet-
ition to work. 
It is clear that the other  two  conditions -
elasticity of demand,  and, 
economies of scale -
can act as an  extremely powerful stimulus to price competition even when  prices are ·control-
led,  always  provided the first two  conditions  (a)  and  (b)  are fulfilled. 
The  example of special offers by  big stores and  retail groups  speaks for  itself. 
It must  again be stressed that government price controls, particularly the fixing of maximum 
prices,  is liable to divert such competitive action,  which  should naturally be directed to 
selling prices,  towards more  modern  forms  of competition of much  less benefit to consumers 
and  to the economy  in general,  namely; 
- advertising; 
-very frequent changes  in products  (brands,  packaging,  weight,  etc.,) 
The  heartbreaking fact is that even when  imposed  on  a  competitive structure, 
maximum  prices fixed by  the government  by  their nature constitute a  barrier to price compet-
ition. 
Conversely,  they are an  incentive to modern  forms  of competition which,  as we 
have  stressed,  can be  a  source of inflation and  waste,  as  in the case of advertising and 
2  constant product changes  . 
More  accurately,  the government  assumes  the role of price leadership or delegates 
this role tacitly to the biggest firm in each market,  the  reference price then being  the maxi-
mun _ price fixed  by  the government. 
l.  "Methodologie",  op.cit. Chapters II and  VII,  section 56  et.seq.and our  report "Domination, 
Concurrence et concentration des marches  dans  la structure industrielle de  la Communaute" 
published  in "La  reglementation du  comportement des monopoles  et des entreprises dominan-
tes  en  droit  communautaire",  De  Tempel,  Tempelhof,  Bruges  1977,  pages  29-109. 
2.  For  comments  on  the sterility of certain strategies and  certain weapons  of competition-
which  are a  pure waste of resources for  the community  at large- see R.Linda  "Concurrence 
oligopolistique et planification concurrentielle internationale",  op.cit.pp.443 to 449. 
See also the paper,  read at the Bruges  Symposium  ("Domination,concurrence et concentra-
tion des marches  dans  la structure industrielle de la Communaute") ,pp.67  to 71. 
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Lastly,  as regards the last condition, 
legal framework, 
it is quite clear that the fixing of maximum  prices introduces an  element of uncertainty into 
that framework.  What  could be more  arbitrary and discretionary than a  maximum  price - more 
or less fiscal in nature - which  can be  fixed or changed at any  time by  a  simple government 
order? 
In these circumstances,  it becomes  impossible to make  any  economic  forecast for 
the conditions governing  the working  (>f  the market or  for  the focmatim of the different 
equilibrium prices. 
The  normal market machinery gives way  to arbitrary government  intervention - and 
this new  form  of taxation.  This is serious,  because the workings of the market can be  analy-
sed,  and  interpreted and  can,  therefore,  be evaluated  and  managed  to some  extent,  whereas  the 
striking power  of the authorities is unknown  and  cannot be  evaluated;  it cannot be anticip-
ated,  is formidable  and  is  (too often)  affected by  pressures from certain dominant pressure 
~roups  (economic,  financial,  social, political, etc.,)  whose  role is even more  difficult to 
evaluate. 
It may  therefore,  be wondered  whether  the fixing of maximum  prices does not amount 
to an  admission that competition does not work  and  that the government  can do nothing about 
it. 
Is this a  question of"power"  or of "imagination"? 
In answer  to the second question,we believe that the government  in fact has at 
its disposal many  means  of activating and  stimulating the factors of competition without 
taking direct action on prices1 
a) 
b) 
c) 
the systematic provision of full  information to consumers  and  all economic  oper-
ators so that they have  equal access to knowledge  of structures, markets and 
products; 
the liberalisation of international trade in sectors and  markets where dominant 
(or even monopolistic)  positions exist at national level; 
in general,  all measures designed to break down  barriers to entry preventing 
any  extension of the oligopolistic arena(e.g.  permission to set up  new  "indepen-
dent"  large stores,  liberalisation of patent laws,  banning of exclusive sales 
contracts,  etc  •••• ); 
1.  On  these points see paper  to the Bruges Symposium  1977,  mentioned earlier:  "Domination, 
concurrence et concentration des marches dans la structure industrielle de la Communaute", 
pages 71  to 85. d) 
e) 
f) 
g) 
h) 
prohibition or penalisation of the  systematic,  excessive or abusive use of 
certain·competitive  weapons  and  strategies,  such  as advertising or constant 
product changes,  because the introduction of what  are  represented to be  new 
products and/or models  is designed solely to deceive the consumer  by  preventing 
him  from  comparing qualities and  prices; 
the prohibition or penalisation of the abusive use of patent rights; 
the banning  of certain agreements  and  practices; 
the scrutiny of all mergers,  concentrations and  acquisitions of holdings; 
a  series of special provisions  ("rules and  regulations")  for all large firms, 
dominant  firms,  diversified and  multinational groups,  requiring  the  regular 
supply of  information  (covering  financial and  economic  data,  wages  and  salaries, 
investments and  prices)  to the authorities.1•2• 
These  are only examples. 
Another  possible measure,  applied directly to prices but with  same  justification 
in the theory of competition,  is goverDE.ent  limitation of the frequency of price increases. 
1.1.20.  Third Hypothesis  Government  Limitation of the Frequency of Price Increases 
In our  view,  this is the only form  of price intervention which  in certain circum-
stances may  have more  advantages  than disadvantages from  the point of view of competition 
policy. 
It is easy to apply:  an order  is made  under  the  terms of which  every undertaking, 
2 
operating in a  given sector of market,  or of a  specified size  is only allowed to raise its 
prices every three  (or  six or nine)  months.  But every undertaking can: 
a) 
b) 
increases. 
lower  its prices as and  when  it wishes; 
fix the rate of price increase without restriction. 
A fixed  interval may  be  ordered for price reductions in the  same  way  as for 
As  a  result the machinery  of competition tends to become  much  more  rigid but at 
the same  time much  more  transparent because: 
both  governn~nt and  consumers  ca~ assess price increases more  accurately because 
l.  On  these points see the paper  read at the Bruges Symposium  1977  already referred to 
"Damination,concurrence et concentration des marches  dans la structure industrielle de la 
Communaute",  pages  71  to 85. 
2.  For  example,  these rules could apply to the first 900  manufacturing  and  service firms and 
to the first 500  distributing firms  in any  given country. 
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b) 
they  take place at pre-determined dates,  and 
a  "red warning  signal"  flashes,  particularly for  governments when: 
increases are particularly high; 
increases are made  by  big firms holding a  dominant position on certain markets. 
In this context,  the most  recent experience would  appear  to contradict the  theory 
of  the  rigidity of oligopoly prices1. 
In any country where  a  special formula is used  to restrict the frequency of price 
increases by  law,  the following conditions are observed: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
i) 
ii) 
the big firms,  which  dominate certain markets,  miss  no opportunity of raising 
prices and  if the  interval between  increases is set at,  for  example,  three months, 
they will therefore raise their prices regularly every  three months; 
the  increases charged by  these big  firms  are particularly high because  they are in 
a  position to exploit their market power,  whereas  smaller firms are compelled to 
follow,  being fully aware  that they would  not be able to oppose the dominant 
power  of the big  firms or to compete with  them; 
consequently,  the dominant  big firms act as price leaders;  and 
by  using  their market,  big firms  tend to increase their profit-earning capacity 
because they benefit from economies of scale and  are not handicapped by  dis-
economies of scale; 
conversely,  the profit-earning capacity of firms operating within competitive 
structures and markets is limited by  the existence of this machinery which  by  its 
nature  tends to stabilise prices at the lowest possible level. 
The  purpose of the foregoing  argument is to demonstrate that: 
the  relationship between concentration and price level is very close; 
consequently,  an active competition policy,  aimed  at checking excessive concen-
tration,  is an essential prerequisite for checkin<j'  the grON·th  and  spread of 
inflation. 
Once  again,  we  have confirmation of the practical value of our programme  of 
research which  seeks to link  the findings of studies on  the trend of concentration with 
those of studies on  the  trend of prices and  mark-ups. 
1.  Thus,  P.Sylos-Labini quoting  the observations of Hitch and Hall,  in Italian,  affirms that 
"il prezzo sara mantenuto sul livello segnato dal costo pieno e  non portato piu alto per 
timore dei possibili rivali potenziali"(the price will be held at the level set by  the 
full cost and will not be raised further for  fear of potential rivals) (1957  edition,p.33) 
and  again "se esso  (il prezzo)  e  fissato in un punto di un  ampio tratto,esso avra la tend-
enza a  restare li"(if the price is set at one point in a  broad  range,  it will tend to 
remain there). 
34 1.1.21.  Concentration of the Machinery of Distribution and  Barriers to Entry: 
Recapitulation 
The  power  of domination is not limited to production or manufacture,  but also 
extends to distribution;  in the latter case,  however,  its effects on  competition can be  much 
more  serious for  the following  reasons: 
a) 
b) 
the appropriate geographical dimension for  the machinery of retail distribution 
is local not national; 
consequently,  any  excessive growth  of concentration and  of dominant  power  in a 
city or a  region is liable to create a  barrier to entry. 
The  barrier to entry will be  greater and  more  formidable  if the big retailer 
who  dominates  the market  in a  city or  region also operates in other cities and  regions  in the 
same  Member  State,  because he  is then  in a  position to exert very heavy  poNer  on  producers, 
manufacturers or wholesalers who  are,or wish  to become,his  suppliers. 
The  bargaining power  considerably  increases domination over market outlets 
(retail sales)  by  discouraging  the entry of potential competitors,  who  would  not be  able to 
buy  on  such  favourable  terms. 
The  combination of all these factors shows  clearly that the perverse dialectic 
of domination and  inflation described  in the foregoing  pages finds very fertile soil in the 
field of distribution. 
The  social cost of these barriers to entry can be  measured  by  analysing  the act-
ual mark-ups  applied by  big retailers and  for  this purpose the real buying price paid by  such 
retailers will obviously have to be determined  (Chapter  II,  Section VII). 
It has already been  noted that the role of governments  is to try and  break dawn 
all barriers to entry  (Section 21)  which,  by  their nature,  interfere with the workings of 
competition.  Criteria for analysing distribution structures - with particular reference to 
big retailers- will be considered later(Chapter II,  Section IX). 
1.1.22.  Criterion No  15:  Regrouping  and  Classification of Sales Points 
Data are classified according to type of sales point.  A large number  of cat-
egories of sales point based on  size,  location and  function  (totalling 96)  are reclassified 
into six broad groups based exclusively on  size.  Using,  for  example,  the coding  system 
proposed by  Development Analysts Limited  the classification will be as follows,  overleaf: 
35 1.1.23. 
Broad Group  of Sales Points 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Detailed Categories of Sales Points 
HYPERMARKET  :50,000sq.ft.  or over 
06  - 12  - 18  - 24  - 30  - 36  - 42  - 48  -
54  - 60  - 66  - 72  - 78  - 84  - 90  - 96  • 
SUPERSTORE  :  25,000  sq.ft.  to 49,000  sq.ft. 
05  - 11  - 17  - 23  - 29  - 35  - 41  - 47  -
53  - 59  - 65  - 71  - 77  - 83  - 89  - 95  • 
LARGE  SlWERMARKET:  8,000  to 25,000  sq.ft. 
04  - 10  - 16  - 22  - 28  - 34  - 40  - 46  -
52  - 58  - 64  - 70  - 76  - 82  - 88  - 94 
SUPERMARKET  4,000  sq.ft.  to 7,999 sq.ft. 
03  - 09  - 15  - 21  - 27  - 33  - 39  - 45  -
51  - 57  - 63  - 69  - 75  - 81  - 87  - 93  . 
LARGE  SELF-SERVICE:2,000  to 3,999 sq.ft. 
02  - 08  - 14  - 20  - 26  - 32  - 38  - 44  -
50  - 56  - 62  - 68  - 74  - 80  - 86  - 92 
SMALL  SELF-SERVICE:less  than 1,999 sq.ft. 
01  - 07  - 13  - 19  - 25  - 31  - 37  - 43  -
49  - 55  - 61  - 67  - 73  - 79  - 85  - 91  • 
Criterion No.  16  Absolute or Total Price Variations 
The  increase  (or  decrease)  of the total price of the specific  items during  the 
reference period is taken into account.  We  refer to the following  tables: 
Table 3  is of particular interest.  It shows  the following  types of variation: 
a)  maximum  variation  (or  increase),  i.e.  the  rate of mark-up  applied by that sales 
point which,  of all the sales points in the sample,  has  raised its total selling 
price the most  over  the period in question; 
36 b) 
c) 
minimum  variation  (increase or reduction),  i.e.  the rate applied by  that sales 
point which,  of all the sales points in the sample,  has  increased its prices the 
least  (or  cut its prices the rrost)  over  the pericrl in question; 
the difference between  these two  variations giving: 
the absolute deviation as a  percentage  ( £As). 
The  table also shows  the sales point with the maximum  and  minimum  variation. 
The  products are ranked  according to the difference in the price variations  ( £As)between 
sales points over  the period in question. 
1.1.24.  Criterion No.  17:  Variations of Unit Prices 
This refers to the increase  (or  decrease)  of the unit price of products,  re-
grouped on  the basis on  standardisation of different brands and  size/weights  (see Criterion 
No.1). 
The  unit price is entered in a  column  of the right hand  side of Table 1.  All 
price variations covered by  Tables 2,  3,  4  and  9  relate to total prices and  not unit prices. 
Conversely,  Tables 8  and  9 give variations of unit prices. 
Clearly,  there is no  problem when  total and  unit prices coincide. 
1.1.25.  "Pathological"  and  "Concerted"  Price Variaticns 
A systematic study of price variations brings  to light valuable  information on  the 
actual working  of competition. 
considered: 
a) 
b) 
Here  a  distinction must  be  made  between  two  kinds of variations which  have  to be 
pathological variations; 
concerted variations. 
It will be recalled that in Table 4,  price variations over  the reference period 
are classified in decreasing order  for  each  item and  sales point  (the total number  of lines 
in the table is,  therefore,  the number  of different items multipli.ed by  the number  of sales 
points at which  they are offered). 
Pathological variations appear at the top of the table:  these are the biggest 
price increases  recorded during  the period covered.  The  table also gives prices at the start 
of  the period  (time  t)  and  at the end  of the period  (time  t  +  i)  as well as  the sales point 
involved.  If these pathological price increases are charged by  sales points which  already 
37 had  the highest retail prices,  it may  be  concluded that these outlets have dominant power 
in the area or district where  they are located.  It will then be essential to analyse their 
buying prices and  mark-ups.  In any  event,  the causes of these pathological variations will 
have  to be  explored by  the method  described  in Chapter  II. 
But Table  4  also switches on  another  "red warning  light"  for  concerted variations. 
Any  "identical" price variation,  i.e.an identical percentage for  the same  product 
at several points ~ot owned  by  the same  purchasing group or organisation  {operator group)  is 
always  suspect:  it is suspect even  if the percentage rise is small or a  price is reduced. 
It is the fact that the rate of variation is identical for  several shops which 
renders such a  variation suspect,  i.e.  the result of concerted action.  The  degree of susp-
icion will be  increased if prices at the start  (time  t)  and  the price at the end of the period 
(time  t  + i)  are very different before the change  and  therefore remain  so afterwards,  as 
between  the different sales points.  And  yet the shops concerned vary their prices by  exactly 
the same  amount.  This would  be  impossible without priorcancerted action. 
Table  3a  shows  clearly,  not only price variations but also the price before and 
after,  together with  the sales points concerned. 
Table 3a,  therefore,  brings to light restrictions on competition and  concerted 
practices affecting not only price levels at a  given time but also levels of price variations. 
Retailers who  engage  in such concerted practices have probably concluded an  in-
formal agreement  to base their price policy on  a  specified rate  (or  increase of decrease) 
which  is either fixed case by  case,  or,  is automatically determined on  the basis of a  special 
formula of which it would  be  interesting to have details. 
Quite obviously,  a  practice of this kind is a  very powerful and  destructive 
factor  in the spread and  growth of inflation. 
This would  seem  to be  further confirmation of the view  that the findings of this 
research programme  can make  an  effective contribution to the fight against inflation. 
Two  practical examples willhelp  to illustrate the circumstances described above. 
FIST  EXAMPLE  One  product,  one brand  (I) 
We  will take a  single product  (rice)  costing respectively Lit.500,  600,  700,  800, 
900  or 1000  at six different sales points  (A,  B,  C,  D,  E,  F,)  on  15th January 1977. 
We  then assume  that six months  later,  the unit price for  the same  product of the 
same  type,  brand and  size are as follows: 
38 Sales Point  Unit  price  in  lire.  Price  increase 
15.1.  77  15.6.77  (%) 
A  500  550  +  10  % 
B  600  660  +  10  % 
c  700  770  +  10  % 
D  800  880  +  10  % 
E  900  990  +  10  % 
F  1000  1100  +  10  % 
Without prior agreement between  the six retailers involved,  is it possible that 
variations should be  identical for  such widely differing selling prices?  The  question 
answers  itself. 
Price can therefore differ,  even  to a  very considerable extent,  even when  their 
movements  are the result of a  retailers'  price agreement;  at first sight this may  appear  some-
thing of a  paradox. 
SECOND  EXAMPLE  One  product,  three brands  (I,  II,  III) 
Instead of a  single brand,  let us next take the case of three different brands 
of the same  product,  made  and  marketed  by  three different producers.  The  position as at 15th 
January 1977  and  15th July 1977  is summarised  in the table below: 
Sales Point 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
I 
500 
600 
700 
800 
900 
1000 
Unit price in 
15.1.  77 
Brand 
II  III  I 
520  600  550 
600  560  660 
650  600  770 
800  700  880 
850  750  990 
1000  800  1000 
lire  Pr1ce  Increase 
15.6.77  (%) 
Brand  Brand 
II  III  I  II  III 
572  660  +10%  +10%  +10% 
660  616  +10%  +10%  +10% 
715  660  +10%  +10%  +10% 
880  770  +10%  +10%  +10% 
935  825  +10%  +10%  +10% 
1100  880  +10%  +10%  +10% 
A table like this suggests the existence of a  network  of agreements  and  concerted 
practices, quite certainly involving  the six retailers  (A,B,C,D,E,F)  and  also most  probably 
the three "independent"  producers of the three different brands  (I,  II,  III).  Otherwise,what 
explanation is there for  the perfect synchronisation of the changes  in retail prices, all 
fixed at the absolutely identical rate of 10%  despite the substantial differences between  the 
prices charged at the six sales points? 
To  sum  up,  Table  3a can act as a  "red warning"  giving  the signal for  thorough  and 
39 promising  investigations of restraints on  competition. 
1.1.26 
a) 
b) 
c) 
Criterion No.l8:  Classification of Sales Points on  the Basis of Mark-Ups 
The  mark-up  (q.x)  on  each specific item covered by  each survey is calculated. 
J 
A column  in Table  l  gives: 
selling price; 
b  .  .  l  uy1ng  pr1ce  ; 
mark-up  expressed as  the percentage of the buying price which  has  to be added  to 
that price in order to arrive at the selling price. 
However,  differences  in the mark-ups  for  each  item and  for  each  type of business 
are to be  found  in Table 5,  in which  the  items are listed in decreasing order  according  to 
percentage mark-up.  The  same  table also gives the sales points with  the maximum  and  minimum 
mark-up  for  each  item in the sample. 
In a  period of inflation and  steep price increase,  a  very high mark-up  rate is to 
be expected and  the mark-up  then includes the retailer's speculative profit. 
Mention  should also be made  of Table Sa which  acts as a  "red warning"  in the same 
way  as Table  3a  (see comments  in Section 27).  This table will classify in decreasing order 
real,  actual mark-ups  for  each  item and  each sales point  (the total number  of lines in this 
table will be  the total number  of  items multiplied by  the number  of sales points at which 
they are offered). 
The  prcrlucts,  i.e.  the specific items and  sales points at which  the mark-up 
("marge beneficiare brute")is greatest will appear at the top of the table while the  items 
and  sales points where  the mark-up  is lowest or is even a  mark-down(actual selling price less 
than the actual price paid for  a  given  item)  will appear at the bottom. 
1.1.27.  Scrutiny of Trends and  Concept of "Combined"  Tables:"Linda zones"(Tables ll & 12) 
The  combined  tables  (ll/A and  ll/B)  will be particularly helpful in tracking down 
the "critical" products which will have to be chosen for  in-depth analysis during the second 
stage of research  (Chapter  II) .  These  tables have  three essential features: 
l.  Buying  price is the seller's invoiced price for  each specific item covered,for delivery 
to a  retailer's shop or warehouse.  It is therefore the "real" price paid by  the retailer 
to buy  - at some  date which obviously prec.edes  the  time of the  s~rvey - each specific 
item on display in his shop.  Clearly therefore,  it is not the current buying price at 
the  time of the price survey which has to be considered. 
40 I. 
II. 
They  deal only with "critical" prc:ducts  and  sales points which  raise questions 
and  doubts regarding  the effectiveness of competition to which  such products and 
sales points are exposed. 
They  are concerned not with absolute values but with  "relative" magnitudes expre-
ssed as percentages.  For  example: 
(a)  t  +  i 
(b)  t  +  i 
(c)  *C 
4 
s. 
J 
q. 
J 
percentage variation of retail price over  a  given peric:d; 
percentage mark-up; 
degree of concentration of the market  for  the prc:duct 
in question,  at national level in the country concerned. 
Only  Table 11/A gives this figure. 
III.  In this way,  each combined  table sets out,  side by  side,  strictly comparable 
magnitudes  in the form of percentages relating to several countries and/or 
regions. 
These  tables should reveal not only restrictions at national or local level but 
alsorestrictionswhich may  result from  agreements or concerted practices between manufactu-
rers and/or  retailers in different countries and/or  regions. 
In the case of Tables 11/A  and  11/B,  the "flashing light" which  sets off the 
alarm signal is the rate of price increase  (t + i  sj)  over  the period under  consideratiGn
1and, 
to a  lesser extent,  the percentage mark-up  (  t  +  i  qj),  because a  higher figure for even  one 
of these percentages is always  a  disturbing symptom  as  regards the health of the machinery of 
competition for  the product or sales point involved. 
Consequently,  the classification criterion for  these tables is the "degree of 
danger"  to the working of competition in the market for  each product  (Table  11/A)and at each 
sales point  (Table 11/B)  in the national and/or  regional samples analysed.  The  tables are 
based on  the colours of the four  "Linda zones"1: 
a)  red  serious,  probable danger; 
b)  orange  serious or possible danger; 
c)  yellow  situation to be  kept under  scrutiny; 
d)  green  probably no  danger. 
How  is the appropriate colour  zone  for  a  given product or sales point decided? 
There are two  basic criteria: 
1.  See:  R.Linda  "Domination,  concurrence et concentration des marches dans la structure 
industrielle de la Camnunaute';  op.cit.  pp.  71  - 85. 
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b) 
the  "absolute" criterion of relative size; 
the "relative" criterion of relative size  (or criterim of the 
"quartile"  in the  statistical series). 
Relative size can in fact be expressed as a  percentage. 
The  absolute criterion has.  already been applied to the degree concentration  (see 
Section 12  above)  in stating,for example,  that all products with  a  standard concentration 
ratic  (*C4)  exceeding  80%  belong  to the "red zone"  by  definition.  This absolute criterion 
has been worked  out from great practical experience of  research into the evolution of concen-
tration and  canpeti  tim in all sectors and  markets in the EEC  Member  States.  1 
This criterion is,  therefore,  also applied to the third section of Table  10/A 
(*C4  concentration of  the product at national level) . 
This criterion cannot,  however,  be  applied to the other  two  sections of Table 
10/A  (variation of prices and  mark-ups)  because of the very complex  and  irregular nature of 
the phenomenon  of inflation in the case of price variations and  because of the equally  irreg-
ular  and  complex  effect of  inflation on  the rate of mark-up. 
Some  other criterion must  therefore be  sought because it is absolutely essential 
to be  able to rank  both products and  sales points in relation to each other  as regards danger 
to canpeti  tion. 
A relative criterion is therefore introduced by  sub-dividing  the statistical 
series  (assuming  2400  terms) 2  in Table 4  (price variations in decreasing order)into four 
"zones": 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
the first  (red  zone)  fran the maximum  value  (maximum  price increase) 
down  to the first quartile  (in our  example,  the  600  terms  showing  the 
biggest increase); 
the  second  (orange 
the median  value; 
the third  (yellow 
the  fourth  (green 
zone)  between  the value of the first quartile and 
zone)  between  the median  and  the last quartile; 
zone)between  the last quartile and  the minimum  value 
l.  A list of concentration studies can be  found  in Annex  2 of the "Methodolcgy". 
2.  The  example  is based on  an  "average"  hypothesis of  80  items  (on  average)sold by  30  sales 
points.  This gives a  total of  2400  toe>rms  or  lines in Table 3a.  However,  as products 
for which  no price variation falls within the red or  orange  zones  are not  included,  the 
total number  of  terms or  lines which will be  ranked  and  used  to produce Table 11/A will 
be  somewhere  between  1200  and  2400.  If all three sections of the table  (price variations 
and  mark  ups,  and  concentration)  sho,.v  tbat any  product  ( i tern)  always canes within the 
yello,.v  or  the green zone,  the product  (itern)  in question is not  included.  In the extreme 
case,  therefore,  the  same  products  (items)  could be  eliminated from  each  section,  so that 
the total number  of products  (items)  to be  considered  and  ranked would  autamatically drq:> 
to half  2400. 
42 (in our example,  the 600  terms  shaving  the lcwest increase,  or even a 
price reduction). 
Terms  belcw  the median  and  hence  the last two  zones will not be  included  in Table 
The  procedure is the same  for mark-ups,  using  the statistical series in Table  6. 
On  this basis it will be possible to count and  regroup all the products earning 
within each  zone  and  to enter the number  of cases in Table 11/A which  deals with products. 
Naturally,  each product  (item)  is taken separately for  each country,  even  though it is classi-
fied : and  entered in the same  table. 
Table 11/B  for sales points in compiled  in much  the  same  way  but is much  smaller 
than Table 11/A because in our  specimen  sample  of  30  sales points,  there will be only 15  to 
30  lines.  For  example only 15  sales points will be  included when  the  same  sales points fall 
in the  red  and  orange  zones for both price variations and  mark-ups. 
Table 11/B  has only two  sections instead of  three as in Table 11/A because it does 
not cover either the national concentration of products or - as might have  been anticipated 
because of the enonnous  technical obstacles - the inclusion of degrees of local concentration 
of sales points in the "classification into zones". 
Nevertheless,  when  the second  stage of the survey has been completed  (Chapter  II) 
it may  prove possible to add  the third section to Table 11/B. 
Finally,  it should be  noted that: 
a)  it will not be  easy to complete Tables 11/A  and  11/B  in full and  the 
total number  of cases coming  within each  zone will not be  entered for 
products and  sales points for which  it has not been possible to camr 
plete all sections of each  table; 
b)  Nevertheless,  even if they are completed  only  partially  and  incom-
pletely,  these tables have  very considerable practical value2 because 
they reveal significant _r_e~l_a_t_io~n_s~h~l~·p~s~·~--------------~~--~--~---
1.  The  example  is based  on  an  "average"  hypothesis of  80  items  (on  average)sold by  30  sales 
points.  This gives a  total of 2400  terms or lines in Table  3a.  However,  as products for 
which  no price variation  falls within the  red  or orange  zones are not  included,  the total 
number  of  terms or lines will be  ranked  and  used  to produce Table  11/A will be  somewhere 
between  1200  and  2400.  If all three sections of the table  (price variations,  mark-ups, 
concentration)  show  that any  product  (item)  always  comes  within the yellow or the green 
zone,  the product  (item)  in question is not  included.  In the extreme case,  therefore, 
the same  products  (items)  could be  eliminated from  each section,  so that the total number 
of products  (items)  to be  considered and  ranked would  automatically drop to half 2400. 
2.  This is why,  for  the correct interpretation of the tables,  a  detailed note will have  to 
be  appended  setting out criteria and  reservations concerning  the collection and  process-
ing of the data for certain products and  sales points.  In particular,the concept of mark 
up  adcpted and  the basis of evaluation used will have  to be  explained  in detail. 
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I)  between price increases and  rates of mark-up; 
II)  between price increases and  degrees of concentration of products at 
national level; 
III)  between  rates of mark-ups  and  degrees of concentration of products at 
national level. 
b)  As  regards sales points: 
i)  between price increase for all prcrlucts sold at each sales point; 
and 
ii)  general level of mark-ups  applied  (at the end  of the pericrl}at each 
sales point considered. 
This gives very valuable guidance an  any  increase in the market :power  of the 
sales points in the sample. 
1.1.28  "Identical data"  (either absolute or relative)  as a  sign of concerted practices 
Another  "flashing light" which  sets off the alarm system is to be  found  in ident-
ical price variations or mark-ups. 
It was  noted earlier in the discussion of concerted price variations  (Section 27 
above)  that prcrlucers and/or  retailers can very easily agree always  to vary their prices by 
exactly the same  percentage.  They  do  not fix an  absolute price but they do fix price varia-
tions.  This is very simple,  but the effect on  inflation can be decisive. 
Tables 12/A and  12/B will include only products  and  sales points affected by  such 
concerted variations. 
Three ccmnents have  to be made,  ho.vever,  concerning  the concept of "relative 
identity"  and  its interpretatioo,  the special position  of price controls and  the canputation 
and  interpretation of the mark-up. 
I)  Concept of relative identity and  its interpretation 
It may  be  assumed  that when  prcrlucers and/or  retailers reach agreement  on  fixing 
price variations or rates of mark-ups,  the parties to the agreement  are allowed  a certain 
latitude. 
The  concept of  "identical"  (in the absolute sense)  has,  therefore,  been  sanewhat 
extended and  adapted to actual conditions by  including deviations of not more  than  4%  from  the 
reference percentage.  Thus,  if an  "identical"  10%  variation of price is found  to have  been 
applied by  a  number  of sales points,  Tables 12/A and  12/B will also include other sales points 
44 applying a  price increase of between  10  and  10.4%  (the actual percentage will be  shown  in 
brackets beside the name  of the sales point). 
This will be  referred to as "relative identity". 
There  remains  the problem of interpreting the significance of such  "relatively 
identical variations". 
Reference is made  here to our earlier remarks  concerning pathological and  concer-
ted price variations  (Section 27  above).  But  these are identical variations in the absolute 
sense:  exactly 10%  ( or 20%  or  50%)  and  nothing more  or less  ! 
On  the other hand,  when  the variation  is 10.4%  instead of 10%,  haw  can we  exc-
lude the possibility that the rates  of variation may  have  been brought closer by  the stab-
alising effect of competition? 
It should  be borne in mind,  that surveys are carried out at six monthly  intervals. 
It is also possible,  therefore,  that a given retailer increases prices and  that,  under  the 
influence of the type of competition and  market pattern typical of oligopolistic structures, 
other retailers align on  the price charged by  the first who,  in that case,  would  play the 
role of price leader. 
These circumstances would  automatically lead to uniform prices.  But  three points 
have  to be  noted: 
First Point 
Uniform prices are the result of the working  of a  certain kind of competition, 
but do not in any  way  presuppose that a  genuinely competitive market mechanism will operate 
subsequently.  Far from  it.  The  existence of uniform prices is an  obstacle to the working 
of competition. 
Second  Point 
If,  starting from  a differential price system,  alignments result in a  system of 
uniform prices,  this amounts  to saying that price variations have  not been  uniform but 
differential.  This situation is not, therefore,  covered by  our hypothesis r(on  which  Tables 
11/A and  11/B  are based)  which  is founded  on  the existence of identical price variations. 
Third Point 
Lastly,  if we  have  a  combination of two  hypotheses: 
a) 
b) 
uniform prices to start with; 
identical price variations; 
45 the  result will be  the establiShment of a  new  balance based on 
uniform prices. 
All these aspects will be clearly demonstrated by  Tables 11/A and  11/B  and  enable 
us to conclude that,  in this case,  there are very severe  restraints on competition. The 
combination of agreement,  price leadership and  concerted practices results in uniform prices 
and  identical variations which  are concerted  in one  way  or another. 
Moreover,  these are not identical variations in the  relative sense but identical 
variations in the absolute sense,  because,  starting from  uniform  (initial)  prices they  result 
in new  and  equally uniform  prices. 
To  go further  into the problem of relative identity,  therefore,  we  must  take up 
again the hypothesis of Section 27  of this chapter,  which  is based an differential prices; 
it is,  therefore,  a  question not of the alignment  of prices,  but  something quite different, 
the  alignment  of variations of prices which  continue to differ between  sales point. 
It is clear,  however,  that when  variations are relatively identical  (deviations 
from  1  to 4%  above  the  identical reference rate)  there are few  grounds for  automatically 
concluding  that concerted practices exist  (as was  possible for  identical variations  in the 
absolute sense);  stage two  of the research will then have  to be  initiated and  the frequency 
of  surveys will have  to be  stepped up  to one  a  month  instead of one  every six months,  as is 
made  quite clear in Section 5  of Chapter II  (2.5.19;  2.5.20;  2.5.21). 
II)  Special position of price controls 
The  foregoing  arguments  once  again show  clearly how  disastrous the fixing of 
maximum  prices by  governments  is for  any  clear insight into the actual working  of competitive 
mechanisms. 
The  fixing  of maximum  prices has the effect of setting up  a  screen or throwing 
a  blanket of  fog  over the activities and  more  especially the aims and  motives of oligopoli-
sts.  No-one  can know  whether  they are bound  by  practices which  limit canpetition or whether 
they  simply align themselves on  the maximum  prices fixed by  the government. 
The  final outcome  is uniform initial prices + identical variations = new  uniform 
prices  stifling of competition,  with no chance for governments to intervene effectively. 
These conclusions confirm those of Sections 18  to 21  above  and  those of the Sixth 
Report on  Competition Policy  (Brussels- Luxembourg,  April 1977)  of the Conrnissian of the 
European Communities. 
This  report  quite rightly stressed the very serious danger which  any  government 
price-fixing policy carries for the spread of  inflation. 
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aligned on  the most  efficient sales points and  thus to eliminate from  the market  all marginal 
sales points with higher distribution costs and  prices,  or to fix uniform prices aligned  in 
the highest prices charged at the dearest sales points,  thus causing great economic  hardship 
for consumers  and  creating huge  "rents of position"  for  the most  efficient and  cheapest 
sales points,  which  is hardly likely to check  inflationary trends. 
These conclusions  reached  by  the Commission  of  the European  Communities are 
backed  by  the following  arguments.  On  the basis of  same  provisional results of surveys  now 
in progress,  it is reasonable to assume  that the size and  location of sales points have  a 
decisive effect on  the distribution costs and  profit-earning capacity of each sales point. 
Taking  the extreme case,  it becomes  possible to state the following  simpler hypothesis;  a 
small supermarket or a  small  independent  shop  in a  city centre may  have  a  cost structure for-
cing it to charge prices 40%  higher  than those of a  huge  supermarket  located on  the edge  of 
the country where  land is cheap,  near to the  interchange of several fast motorways  so that 
goods  are delivered more  easily and  are easier to store. 
On  the basis of this simplified hypothesis,  a  relative difference of 10  to 40% 
over minimum  prices can be  regarded as almost  a  normal  hypothesis  linked with  the very 
different cost structure of each sales point. 
This gives three hypotheses for price differences: 
a)  normal  hypothesis:  the difference between maximum  and  minimum  price is 
10%  or over but less than 40%; 
b)  hypothesis of divergence:  the difference is 40%  or over; 
c)  hypothesis of uniformity:  the difference is less than 10%. 
III)  Computation and  Interpretation 
Measurement  of mark-up depends  not only on  conditions of competition both up-
stream  (bargaining power  of the retailer in relation to the supplier)  and  downstream  (press-
ure of competition from  other retailers on  consumer  markets) ,  but also on  the nature of the 
product,  shelf life, storage time and  costs, cost of transport between  a  retailer's ware-
houses and  shops,  total quantity sold by  the retailer concerned etc,. 
As  was  quite correctly noted  in the Fifth Annual  Report of Competition Policy, 
these conditions vary considerably as between sales points  (see preceding page). 
Consequently: 
a)  a  very high mark-up  is no more  than a  disturbing symptom  of restrict-
ions on  competition and  even  then it has to be  interpreted with caut-
ion and  all kinds of reservations; 
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identical"  - applied at different sales points is a  much  more  disturb-
ing  symptom  of such restrictions on  competition because sales points 
operating  in different conditions would  naturally be expected to apply 
different mark-ups. 
The  practical value of Tables 11/A and  11/B  is thus further confirmed but there 
remains  the crucial problem of computing  the real mark-up at each sales point.  This involves 
the whole  problem of real purchase price and  real date of purchase. 
This problem is so complex  that it can only be dealt with exhaustively and 
systematically in the second  stage  (see Section VII  of Chapter  II} • 
It is therefore,  quite possible that the mark-up  section of Tables 11/A and  11/B 
cannot be completed until the results of the second  stage of the surveys are available. 
Meanwhile,  however,  it may  be possible to work  on  the basis of mark-up  ranges,  at least for 
certain products and  sales points,  so as to reveal any  signs of concerted action by  same 
sales points in the way  they set and/or vary their mark-ups. 
l.l.  29  General Points 
At  this stage it should be  noted that: 
a} 
b) 
the purpose of this section 0as been  to provide a  general survey of 
the background  to the  research,  and  in particular to identify the 
general idea,  behind Tables 1-11: 
the next step is to enumerate all the technical considerations 
required for  the computer  processing of these tables,  and  to explain 
the specific scope and  purpose of each  table. 
48 1.  2.  SERIES  OF  DETAILED  TABLES  PRICES  - MARK-UPS 
1.2.1.  Overall survey of the tables 
During  the fist stage  (Chapter  I)  of the survey,  a  series of tables must  be 
produced to indicate the reference points needed  for setting up  the next stage  (Chapter  II). 
The  first-stage tables cover all the products  (items)  and  all the sales points 
in the sample. 
TABLE  1 
TABLE  2 
TABLE  3 
TABLE  4 
TABLE  5 
TABLE  6 
TABLE  7 
TABLE  8 
We  can sub-divide the tables as follovs: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
Tables 1  - 8  ,  to be  compiled for each country and/or region studied; 
Table  9,  representing a  first attempt at a  country-by-country comp-
arison of prices; 
Tables 10  and  11,  representing a  possible subsequent stage during 
which  specific restrictions of competition will be  tracked down  and 
brought to light. 
Detailed results by  sales point and  product  ~ new  version suggested by  Mr  Allaya 
(r-Dntpellier) • 
Products  ranked  according to price differences  ( (Rp)  in per cent between sales 
points. 
Products ranked  according to differences in price variations  ( EAs)between  two 
given surveys. 
Ranking  by  decreasing order of price variations for all items and  all sales points 
covered. 
Products  ranked  according  to relative differences between  mark-ups  (  Eqj) 
Ranking  by  decreasing order of mark-ups  for all articles and  all sales points 
covered. 
Measurement  of price differences by  product group. 
Regrouping  of products/brands  (including own  labels)according to unit price and 
variations on  unit prices. 
49 As  noted,  these tables will be compiled for each country  (or region),  on the 
basis of a  very limited sample of sales points  (on  average  30  to 50  per country or region) • 
Tables 4  and  6,  however,  may  also be compiled  for  a  specific group of countries and/or 
regions.  The  tables should be fairly easy to interpret. 
Naturally,  only part of these tables will be published in the final reports;  the 
bulk of them will be used as raw  material for  summary  tables. 
TABLE  9 
prcrlucts. 
1.2.2. 
TABLE  10 
TABLE  11 
List of products comparable at international level on  the basis of unit price. 
This table illustrates price differences at Community  level for certain specific 
All the above  tables will be prepared by  computer. 
The  "Combined  Tables" 
These  tables consist of a  combination of: 
data relating to separate but linked phenomena,  for  which  it is important to 
determine any  correlation; 
- geographical coverage,  since data for different countries and/or  regions can be 
combined  in the same  table. 
Conbined  tables for  the "zones". 
A. 
B. 
Ranking  of products; 
Ranking  of sales points. 
Combined  tables for  "identical data". 
A. 
B. 
Ranking  of products; 
Ranking  of sales points. 
Tables 10  and  11  are already selective in that they cover only products and  sales 
points of interest for  the study of restrictions of competition,  the"critical" products and 
sales points,  as it were. 
These  tables cover  a  number  of products,  whereas  those planned  for Stage 2 
(Chapter  II)  will cover  only one  "critical" product or one  "critical" sales point at a  time. 
50 1.  3.  CCM-lENTS  ON  THE  PRICE  MARK -UPS  TABLES 
The  following  notes should be consulted before reading and  interpreting Tables 
1  - llB. 
1.3.1.  Table 1 
It should be  noted  that any  future analysis or study must  take Table 1  as its 
starting point.  Generally speaking,  it sets out the data as collected by  the researcher, 
and  indicates the mark-up,  that is,  the percentage added  to the buying price by  each retailer 
to give the retail price.  The  table also shows  the type of business  (e.g.  suburban super-
market)  for  each sales point in the sample  and  gives all the figures  (overall prices,  unit 
prices,  mark-ups)  not only for  the most  recent survey but also for  an earlier survey,  for 
comparison purposes. 
Table 1  gives detailed figures for  both the sales point and  for  each product, 
that is,  for  each  item  (brand/size).  It should be  noted that the table gives a  number  of 
~rtant  details for  each product: 
a)  the product group  :  the product is placed in one of the 22  product 
groups according to Criterion No.2.  (alphabetical code,  i.e.: 
"CON",  "ENF",  "SOO",  "Lffi",  etc.,) 
This  information  is to be supplied by  the Research  Institute. 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
f) 
The  importance of the  item in question -(according to Criterion No.6): 
i.e.  (1)  essential item; 
(2)  non-essential  item; 
(3)  item of varying  importance. 
The  origin of the product,  i.e. home-produced,  imported or partly 
home-produced  (see Criterion No.4) 
The  method  of pr1c1ng:  usual price of special offer, or other 
unspecified methods  (see Criterion No.5). 
The  size of packaging,  generally indicating the exact net weight,  in 
grammes  or kilos  (drained net weight for certain types of preserved 
and  tinned foods). 
The  brand  name  under  which  the product is marketed  in the country  in 
question. 
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g) 
h) 
i) 
j) 
k) 
1) 
m) 
The  type of brand,  that is,  the manufacturer's brand,  trademark or 
distributor's own  label  (see Criterion No.3). 
The  name  and  nationality of the manufacturer,  or,  if the manufacturer 
is unknown,  the name  of the commercial group or sole distributor(awn 
label)  (see Criterion No.8). 
Selling price and  buying  price:  this is the total price paid for  a 
given article,  i.e.  for  each  brand~ type,  size and  weight of the 
product in question.In the case of bulk  buying  and  selling,  the sell-
ing  and  buying  prices must  be  those of the same  item. 
Overall mark-up:  this is the difference between  the total selling 
price and  total buying price. 
Coefficient:  this is the clearly-defined quantity  (e.g.  kg)  to which 
the overall price refers. 
Unit price:  this is normally obtained by  the computer  by  dividing the 
total selling  (or  buying)  price by  the quantity  (=coefficient). 
Mark-up  :  this is the percentage which  must  be added  to the unit 
buying price to obtain the unit selling price. 
Carplex algebraic expansims  arrl  interdependent variables in the analysis 
We  can therefore ask  questions along  the following  lines: 
a) 
b) 
Are differences in selling price greater: 
- for home-produced  goods: 
- or for  imported products? 
is there a  price relationship between all the  items produced by  a 
large manufacturer,  or between  the  items produced  by  all the 
manufacturers of a  given nationality? 
For  example,  are differences in overall price more  or less the same 
for  the various  items produced  by  a  given manufacturer,  or on  the 
contrary,  highly variable? 
Are  mark-ups rrore or less the same  for all  (or  nearly all)  the goods 
produced by  a  given firm,  or do  they vary greatly according to the 
item and/or  the sales point? 
52 c) 
Do  some  manufacturers  (and  perhaps some  sales points)  consistently 
charge different prices according to the size or  form  of the packing? 
Are  the unit prices of "own-label"  items comparatively higher or  lower 
than those bearing the manufacturer's label  (sold everywhere else)  at 
sales points where: 
- there is nor  competition with similar products bearing the manufact-
urer's brand; 
there is such  competition since similar products bearing the man-
ufacturer's brand are also available at the "sales points"  in 
question? 
These  three points will be  further considered  in order  to throw  light on  a  number 
of basic questions: 
1.3.3. 
a) 
b) 
c) 
What  role do  imports and  importers play in price movements,  from  the 
standpoint of analysing  the process of inflation?  To  what extent can 
imports become  a  deflationary factor? 
What  is the overall strategy applied by  the largest manufacturers to 
fix the price of their various products,  according  to geographical 
area,  type of retailer  (buying  these products)  and  certain charact-
eristics of the goods  in question? 
What  use do  thf~ largest retailers make  of their bargaining power  in 
relation to ~.nufacturers?  To what  extent does competition between 
retailers really exist,  and  what  benefits does the consumer  gain from 
the effects of retailers'  bargaining power? 
Dynamic  and international approaches 
It is even more  important that all these relationships,  and  other possible 
relationships,  may  be  used: 
a)  as the first step in working out a  "dynamic  framework",  since Table l 
gives data not only for  the survey in question,  but also for  any 
chosen,  previous survey  (six months,  one year,  five years etc.,) 
according to the aims  and  r~1irements of the research.  The  static 
comparative method,  which  analyses differences in price and  mark-ups 
between  two  different points in time,  allows significant conclusions 
to be drawn  on  the evolution of commercial structures and  of 
industrial and  commercial strategies. 
53 strategies": 
b)  internationally,  to compare: 
- prices and profits in the various EEC  Member  States; 
- changes  in these given structures over a  period. 
It should  then ultimately be possible to identify two  "long-term industrial 
I) 
II) 
The  pricing p::>licies of the largest manufacturer  .in  the international 
field and  changes as regards products,  countries,  retailers and 
profitability; 
the pricing policy of the largest retailers,  their profitability and 
their  tendency to retain commercial power  by  the use of own  labels 
in order  to offset the power  of supply. 
In this way  the quantitative data obtained from  a  long  series of surveys on  prices 
and  mark-ups would  provide the basis for  a  full factual analysis of the interaction, 
at international level,  of interdependent strategies practised by  manufacturers and  retailers, 
the aim of this analysis being  to identify developing  trends in the structure of competition. 
1.3.4.  Breakdavn  of Table 1 
There is clearly no  single economic  approach capable of interpreting all the 
data in Table 1,  and  in particular the salient features of the many  facts it contains,  be-
cause it is very wide  in scope and  includes all the  raw  data collected as well as some  proc-
essed data. 
Table  1  must,  therefore,  be  processed as follows: 
a) 
b) 
its contents must  be  logically sub-divided so that meaningful partial 
synthesis of the specific points to be  brought  ~1t can be  achieved; 
this is done  here by  means  of Tables 2  to 10;  see the following 
paragraphs. 
by  an  "overall dynamic  synthesis"  which  enables and  compares  in one 
or more  tables all the data which  seems  particularly significant in 
the long  term. 
This second  operation clearly depends  on  the results of the research project,  as 
presented in concrete form  in three or  four  years  time.  Only  then will it be possible to 
attempt a  new  overall dynamic  synthesis of this kind. 
54 1.3.5.  Table 2 
Table 2  contains the results of a  series of computer  calculations using the 
basic figures;  it gives the difference between  the maximum  and  minimum  price of each product 
(right of table)  and  shows  the corresponding sales points and  the name  of their owners,  as 
well as the type of business  ( distinguishing at the same  time between  the broad group,  based 
solely on  size,  and  the detailed category based on  size,  location and  purpose) . 
The  products  (that is the specific items according  to brand  and  size of packing) 
are classified according  to difference between maximum  and  minimum  prices  (  £Rp  in  %:  at 
the bottom of Column  3 of Table 2).  We  shall call this percentage difference  .. the relative 
percentage difference  ... 
This  index cannot be  calculated unless: 
- a  comparison is made  of all the prices recorded for  an  identical item  (same 
product,  same  brand,  same  size)  in all the shops covered,  thereby ensuring 
that the number  of observations  (n*)  coincides with the number  of shops  in 
which  that identical  item can be  found  and  its price recorded; 
the  two  extreme prices  (maximum  and  minimum)within  the number  n*  of prices 
covered  in the survey are isolated. 
The  next step is to visit the shop  in question and  check  the accuracy of these 
two  extreme prices so as to avoid factual errors wherever  possible.  These  checks are all 
the more  important when  it turns out that the average price differs greatly from  either the 
maximum  price or  the minimum  price.  When  this happens  (very wide  price spread)  it might 
be sensible to coosider  not only the highest prices - maximum  price or 
11first maximum  ..  - but 
also the next three prices down,  i.e.  second  highest,  third  highest and  fourth highest. 
Where  necessary these other maximum  prices - and  the sales points where  they are 
found  -will be entered in the last two  columns  17  and  18  in Table  2.  It will be  useful to 
be  able to compare  the average price with the median price. 
Table  2  also shows: 
i) 
ii) 
the type of brand  (manufacturer's brand,  distributor's own  label etc.) 
and  the origin  (home-produced,  imported etc.,)  since it is useful to 
know  if the widest price differences  (between  the sales points in the 
sample)  are to be  found  on  imported or home-produced  goods; 
the pricing methods  (normal price structure  or special offer),  since 
we  must  know  this in order  to assess the price differences. 
55 1.3.6.  Table 3 
Table  3 gives a  breakdown  on  the comparative  statics approach, it can be  used  to 
compare price variations over  a  given period.  The  products  (items)  are ranked  according to 
the difference in price variations  (£As),  i.e.  according to the difference between  the per-
centage  increase  ( or  reduction)from one  shop to another.  The  sales point which  has shown 
the highest price increase is also shown,  as are the prices on  dates t  and  t  +  i.  The  same 
details are given for  the sales point which  shows  the smallest price increase  (or  reduction) 
over  the period in question.  Thus  the figures do  not refer  to the maximum  or minimum  prices 
but to the prices of those articles which  have  increased the most  (or  the least)  in a 
specific shop  in relation to the  increases recorded for  that same  article over  the period in 
question in the other shops  in the sample.  Columns  8  and  9  (pricing methods)  are of part-
icular  interest since it is essential to know  whether  the  item was  on  special offer on  a 
given date  (t or  t  + i)  in order  to appreciate fully a  given price increase  (or  reduction) 
for  a  given product  (item) • 
Other  information on  each product covered by  the survey and  on  its manufacturer 
may  be  useful for  research  into the causes and  factors  influencing the price increases or 
reductions. 
1.3.7.  Table 4 
In Table 4  the products  (items)  are ranked  according to the maximum  rate of 
price increase recorded  in a  particular shop. 
It follows  that if a  product frequently appears at the top of the table because 
its price has  increased heavily in several shops it would  be  reasonable to conclude that the 
price increases depend  primarily on  the manufacturer  (and/or wholesaler or dealer),  rather 
than on  the retailer.  Table 4 will,. therefore,  be extremely useful for  the study proposed in 
Chapter I  (section 1.2.) 
1.3.8.  Table 5 
Most  of the notes on  Table 2  apply equally well to Table 5.  It will be interest-
ing to compare  the average mark-up with the median  mark-up.  It must  be  remembered  that the 
information obtained on mark-ups generally corresponds broadly to the official mark-up rates, 
i.e.  they are often understated.  In fact,  major  retailers often obtain more  favourable  terms 
from  their manufacturers,  especially in connection with bulk buying  and  delivery dates. 
Given  that special terms of business are often treated as business secrets it is impossible 
to know  what mark-ups  are actually applied.  In certain cases and  for certain retailers they 
can be considerably higher  than the official mark-ups  entered in Table 5.  We  will attempt to 
deal with this problem in Chapter  II  (Section 1.2.7.). 
Despite these limitations,  Table  5 gives an  interesting picture since the fig-
56 ures are shown  from  the angle of comparative statics,  meaning  that the mark-ups  recorded 
during an  earlier survey are shown  in brackets.  Since the approved discount scales 
generally refer to the manufacturer's official terms and  prices,  any  change  in official 
mark-ups  may  be  reflected in 9ctual mark-ups,  with the resulting benefit for certain major 
retailers. 
1.3.9.  Table  6 
In Table  6  the products  (items)  are ranked  in decreasing order according  to the 
percentage represented by  the highest mark-up;  the  items at the top of the table produce 
the highest profit for  the retailers involved  (the salient features of  the products are also 
shown). 
1. 3.10. 
- the names  of these retailers; 
- the selling prices  (total and  unit)  recorded during  a  previous survey as 
well as the most  recent in order to show  whether  or not the  increased mark-up 
is linked to a  recent increase in prices. 
Table  7 
Table  7 gives a detailed list of all the products  (items)  classified by  "product 
group"  (Criterion No.  2),  e.g.  "CON",  "ENF",  "SOO",  "EPI",  in order to show: 
(i)  The  price difference between sales points for each product group, 
as well as the two  sales points charging  the maximum  arrl  the minimum 
price respectively for each specific item; 
(ii)  The  value of certain standard indices such  as: 
-standard deviation,  or SD  (sigma), 
-the variation coefficient in%  (V), 
-the relative difference in%  (£  Rp). 
It will be  noted than within each product group  ("CON",  "ENF
11
,  etc.)  each specific 
item is ranked  according to the relative difference  (  £Rp),  so that the  reeder can irranediately 
see which  product group displayes the largest differences. 
For  each product group  the overall price  (average,  maxil1ll.llTl,  minimum)  is establi-
shed  an  the basis of the arithmetical averages calculated for all the articles in each product 
group,  as stated in Note  2  to Table 7. 
By  comparing  the most  recent  results with those cbtained fran  a'1  earlier survey 
(figures in brc.:.ckcts)  the realer will be  able to anf.>wer  the follONing  questions: 
- Do  the differences in prices charges by  two  sales points always  apply 
57 1.3.11  Table 8 
to the same  items,  or do they vary fran me  survey to another? 
- Are  certain sales points always  the most  expensive  (or the lem:.t 
expensive),  or do the price-lecrlers vary fran one  survey to another? 
Table 8  owes  its originality to the fact that: 
- identical or similar products marketed under different brand names 
or in different packages are listed and  compared  with  one  another on 
the basis of thPir unit price on  the date t  + i  (t + i  );  -- pu 
- the indices measuring  the price spread and  price trends  (namely;  V, 
£ Rp,£  As)  are based  not  on  the selling price of each specific item 
but on  the unit price of each product.  There will,  therefore,  be 
only  one  index  (V,  £Rp,£  As)  for  the whole  range  of items falling 
under  the same  product/brand heading. 
The  table will also help to interpret Tables 4,  10/A  and  11/A.  It will also be 
especially useful for  the analysis in Chapter II.  It will also be  useful to compare  the 
average price with  the median price. 
1.3.12  Table 9 
At  this stage,  the  research programme  includes only  one  table designed to make 
comparisons between  one  Community  country and  another. 
Its primary purpose it to enable the  researcher to select products  (items)  which 
can usefully be compared  fran one  cc:untry to another.  Table  8  - one  table for each of the 
relevant countries - provides the basic material. 
It shc:uld,  however,  be  noted  that: 
- only columns  1,2,3,4,6,15 and  17  in Table 8  are used  in Table 9, 
which  means  that any  reference to material obtained from  a  previous 
survey  (t)  is omitted; 
- all the prices are converted into Belgian francs  and  also expressed 
in Eurcpean units of  accc:unt (rather than in the lccal currency) ; 
- the price variations between  t  and  t  +  i  are not  taken into account. 
For  each product and  each country there may  be  two sets of prices in Belgian 
francs and  EUA,  corresponding  respectively to the  two  alternative methods  of converting to 
the lccal currency: 
58 1.3.13 
a) 
b) 
the  rate based  m  purchasing pa.1er parities arrl/or exchange markets 
for the Belgian franc  (Bfr) ; 
the  rate based  on  the exchange market,  for European units of account 
(EUA). 
Tables 10/A and  10/B  and  11/A and  11/B 
These  tables have  been explained in paragraphs 1.1.  27  (Scrutiny of trerrls  and 
Concept  of Canbined Table  ••••••• )  and  1.1.  28  ("Identical Data
11 
•••••  as a  sign of concerted 
practices) • 
1.3.14  The  two central issues in the study of prices 
All  the tables listed abCNe  prooide,  in one  way  or another,  the  raJN  material 
which  needs to be  sifted,  refined and  clarified before the two  central issues in the study of 
prices can be properly dealt with.  These  two  issues are: 
I. 
i) 
ii) 
country-t~country differences in buying prices/producer prices. 
{the static approach) ; 
country-t~ca.mtry canparison of price trends  (the dynamic  approach) . 
(Static Approach) 
There are very serious complications involved  in ascertaining and  studying  the 
buying prices actually paid by  major  retailers - i.e.  the prices which  should  technically 
correspmd  (in integrated trade)  to the producer prices actually charged  and  actually 
received by  the producers themselves. 
These prices  must,  ha.1ever,  be kna.1n  and  studied  if we  are to analyse: 
a) 
b) 
the strategies and  practices engaged  in by  the producers and  by  major 
retailers; 
the level and  components  of the major  retailers'  mark-ups.  In other 
words,  a  straightforward survey of  retail selling prices that is not 
closely linked to a  survey of actual buying  prices would  not lead  the 
way  to this type of 
11cperational analysis
11 ,which  seeks to establish 
the existence of  legal and  economic  bases for  applying Articles 85 
and  86  of  the Treaty,  and  which  alone can justify the setting-up uf 
such  a  large-scale prcgrarrme.  The  use of the 
11thermameter
11 
- the 
retail prices paid by  the final consumer  - is admittedly an  essential 
first stage in the search for a  diagnosis and,  later,  for  a  solution 
to the situation,  but it is not enoush. 
59 Before going  any  further,  we  should  just mention a  few  special conditions and 
advantages.  They  cannot be  readily quantified,  but,  nevertheless a  country-by-country 
comparison of these buying prices and  producer prices should help to detect,  and  above all 
to prove  the existence  (or otherwise),  the  importance  and  the  impact  of: 
discriminatO£Y prices, where  it is found  that the price of a 
specific product varies considerably between  one Community  country 
and  another  {possibility of applying Article 86  where  prices differ 
because of action taken by  a  dominant  firm; ) 
- unfair prices,  where,  in one  or more  countries,  the existence of an 
obviously excessive price is ascertained after all the components 
making  up  the cost price have  been meticulously  investigated 
(possibility of applying Article 86  where  the excessive price can be 
charged because a  firm occupies a  dominant position) ; 
- concerted prices,  fixed  at an  artificially high level by  means  of 
agreements or concerted practices between  undertakings  (possibility 
of  applying Article 85  where  the dynamic  analysis demonstrates the 
existence of this type of action in concert. ) 
We  also propose to include another table in this Chapter  (Table  9) ,  which will 
highlight the differences in retail prices from  one  Canrnunity  country to another en  a 
specific date. 
The  table uses two conversicn rates so that prices can be canpared an  an  inter-
naticnal scale from  two different angles: 
- the rate based an  purchasing power parities,  used for ccnverting 
local currency into Belgian francs  (or any  other currency); 
- the rate based on  exchange market quotations for ccnverting local 
corrency into European units of account  (or any  national currency). 
If both ccnversian methods  give unequivocal and  ccnverging  results we  will have 
an objective and  quantitative basis for attacking competitive anomalies,  where  the Commission 
might consider own-initiative to be called for under Articles 85  and  86. 
II.  (Dynamic  Approach) 
Table 9 has two distinct limitations: 
a)  it deals cnly with retail prices,  i.e. it lcx:l<s  no  further than the 
11therm-
ometer11; 
60 b)  It is static,  in that it does not tackle the problem of comparative 
trends. 
Table 9  is,  however,  a  stepping-stone towards more  interesting developments  since 
it helps to: 
- select a list of "critical prcrlucts"  whose  prCXJress  along  the econo-
mic  pipeline from  production to final consumer  must  be  traced so 
that the  role played by  each cost component  can be  established; 
complete the dynamic  analysis which will make  it easier to monitor 
and  distinguish the strategies and  practices adopted  by  undertakings. 
This dynamic  approach  should enable us to prcrluce  supplementary evidence of: 
- the existence of price co-ordination  (possibility of applying 
Article 85;) 
- the existence of unfair prices,  whose  illegality will be established 
by  means  of a  detailed study of the relationship between,  on  the one 
hand,  price variations  (at the retail, wholesale and  manufacturing 
stages)  between countries,  tcwns  and  shops  and,  on  the other, 
variations in the carpooents that make  up  prices, mark-ups  and  costs 
(possibility of applying Article 86) . 
Chapter II will set out the guidelines of the  research by  which,  it is hoped, 
the extreme complexity of price studies can be directly resolved with a  view  to achieving 
the "operational objectives"  to which  we  referred in the Introduction  (The  Research Program-
me  - Its Aims  and  Stages"). 
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'0  0 
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·r-1  ·.-I  c  •  ~  ~  ·.-I  ·r-1  (1) 
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l-1  l-1  l-1  $-.-~.S  Cl  ctl·r-1  P-1  0...  0  +J  ......... 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  ll  12  = 
16-20 
Prices 
Price 
t  t  + 
p. 
J 
p. 
J 
13  14 
13,  14,  17,  18  p. 
J 
Total Selling Price for  the  item considered in the given Sales Point. 
TABLE  3 
to be  established for each 
country. 
INDUSTRY 
COONTRY 
CURRENCY 
and  Variations(between t  and  t  t  i) 
Var.  Var.  Price  Max.  Min. 
+J  +J 
i  c  [!:+i  Sj  t  t  +  i  c  "'"+i  Sj  •  ·r-1  •  ·r-1 
t:  a  in %  t:&  in % 
0  0  u  U)  u  U) 
(1)  (var. 
(1)  (var.  •  .....-1  p.  p.  •  .....-1 
0  ctl  max)'  J  J  0  ctl  min)  z  U)  zen 
15  16  17  18  11  20 ClASSIFICATION  OF  PRICE  CHANGES  IN  DEX.:::REASING  ORDER, 
SAMPLING  ALL  ITEMS  AND  SALES  POINTS. 
t  +  i  Sj  vPj  vPu 
Price change  Total price  Unit price 
(in%) 
t  t  +  i  t  t  + 
TABLE  4 
Prcrluct,  size,  Sales point 
brand  No.  arrl  name 
of  cwner. 
i 
N.B:  The  above  table will  shew  a  total number  of  n*y*  price changes;  for each article/ 
sales point  combination the entry in the table should  indicate the price change 
(+)in%  between timet and  timet+ i  (where  i  =  1,  2,  3,  .•..  ).  Those  items 
which  have  experienced the largest price increases  (in each sales point)  will  appear 
at the upper end  of Table 4,  while those  items which  have  experienced  no price change 
or  indeed have  experienced  a price  reduction,  will appear at the  lcwer end  of 
Table 4. 
JC  65 SURVEY  OF  PRICES  AND  MARK-UPS 
Products  ranked  according  to relative difference between mark-ups  (£  qj) 
No.  of survey ..............  . 
Date  .•..........••. 
(Figures in parentheses are for  a  previous survey No •••••. ) 
N  Type  of  o\O  ~~'E -
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J===b=: =-\\\\  ==\\\\ 
I 
l===J:= I ~~ 
~= ==~\ 
~\~  ~~  l  l  ~~\\  1\\~,\ 
2  ... 
1.  Difference in  % = gj = maximum  mark-up - minimum  mark  up. 
2.  Highest selling price for  first maximum. 
3.  In order of magnitude;  2nd,  3rd,  4th highest. 
Pricing 
'E  Method 
cu 
~  co  ·.-I 
Li--1  +  0  c 
·.-I  +J  +J 
~ 
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TABLE  5 
CUJN'I'RY  : •••••••••• 
'lrnN  ••••••••••• 
CURRENCY: .•.••••••• 
Manufacturer/  (Where 
Distr  ib. (OL)  applicable) 
c 
~ 
M  ·.-I 
&~  (/) 
~ 
~  OJ  (1),...-i 
+J  (])  u  (])  0  cu 
~ 
·.-I  ....-i:>  z  z  ~  r«g  .S 
15  16  17  18 
e:~r~· 
F=====r=:  ==== 
4th 
The  average price is not,  of course,  the mean  between  the maximum  and  the minimum,  but the average of all the prices reo:>rded_ at all 
the sales points in the sample for  a  given article. CLASSIFICATION  OF  MARK-UPS  IN  DOCREASING  ORDER, 
SAMPLING  AIL I'lfl£ AND  ALL  SALES  POINI'S. 
t  +  i  qj  Total  price  Unit price 
Mark-ups  vPj  vPu 
(in %) 
t  t  +  i  t  t  + 
TABLE  6 
Prcrluct,  size,  Sales point 
brand 
No.  arrl  name 
of  a.·mer. 
i 
N.B.  The  abOIJe  table will have  a  total number  of  n*y*  mark-ups,  derived by multiplying 
the number  of different items by  the number  of sales points which actually market 
those items.  Those  items that  shOIJ  the highest mark-ups in a  given sales point at 
timet+ i  (where  i  = 1,  2,  3, •.•.•  )  will appear at the upper end  of the tables, 
while those  i terns  sh<J~Jing  a  very 10/J  mark-up,  or irrleed a  negative mark-up,  in a 
given sales point will appear at the 10/Jer end  of Table  6. 
67 SURVEY  OF  PRICES  AND  MARK-UPS 
Measures of price differences by  product group 
No. of survey  : ••••••••••••• 
Date  •••••••••••••• 
(figures in parenthesis are for previous survey No •••••••••••.••. ) 
I  Identity Code  8  ~ 0  n*  Maximum  Price 
~em  (1)  ~.§ 
1-.1 
C)  c..<:I+J  Price  Sales Point  '"@c .  .-~  Size/  No.  1-.1  +J  Brand  OJO!  g  .....-iOOJ  weight product  g.....-i  ·r-1  ·r-1  ..c  Wide  '8 
CO+J+J  1-.1  co  +JO!  Q)+J 
1-.1  ~  ·r-1  4-1  ~.8 
No.  Group 
p...  1-.1  0 
coo. 
total  \\\~  ~\\\\\  \\\\\\  (2)  (2)  \\\\\\  \\\\~ 
ENF. 
total  \\\\'0  ~\\\\\\  l\\\\\\ 
(2)  (2)  \\\\\\  ~~\\~ 
(1)  r_*  = Nunber  of observations 
Minimum  Price 
Price Sales Point 
Wide 
No.  Group 
(2)  ~\\\\\\  \\\\~ 
(2)  \\\\\\\  ~\\\\\ 
TABLE  7 
to be established for 
each country. 
INDUSTRY 
COONTRY 
CURRENCY 
' -
0 . 
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Q)·r-1  ocrn 
(2}  1he Arithmetic mean  of different items constituting the Group,this mean  being calculated on  the Maximum  Prices  (or  the minimum) 
registered for  each  item in the different Sales Point.  In other  terms,  the basic hypothesis is that one man  buys  each  item 
separately in the "Sales Point"  where it costs more  (or  less). 
(3)  Vithin each Product Group  the items are ranked according  to the relative difference  ( £ Rp) SURVEY  OF  PRICES  AND  MARK-UPS 
Regrouping  of products/brands  ("own-labels"  included)  according to the 
unit price and  evolution of the unit price  (1) 
No.  of survey: .•••••••• 
Date  : t  +  i 
Identity  Unit Price  Code  n* 
~a  Average Price  Maximum  Price  I  Minimum  Price  (3) 
§ §  :2 
for  each group  for  each group  for  each group 
•j  ~- .j..J  :2  Diff.  It 
Diff.  Diff.  O..I-.IN  {) 
"M  - :J  'E  t  t  +  i  in %  t  +  i  in %  t  t  +  i  in %  t>  ~  '8  co 
Ul  Q)  1-.1  1-.1 
Q).j..J  ~  m 
Cl  "M 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
(1)  All data are indicated for  each  item of the "Product/Brand"  considered. 
v 
(4) 
t  t  +  i 
14  15 
TABLE  8 
to be established for each 
country. 
INDUSTRY: ••••••••••• 
CCXJNTRY"  : • • • • • • • • • • • 
CURRENCY: ••••••••••• 
Price Variations 
(Rp  between  t  and  t+i  - --
(in  %)  (in  %) 
t  t  +  i  MAX.  MIN.  (As 
in % 
16  17  18  19  20 
(2)  Items  referring to each "Product/Brand"  are ranked  in decreasing order of the Unit Price,within each  "Product/Brand"  class, 
taking into account  t..l1e  "Average Price for  each Group"  (Column  6), at time t  + i. 
(3)  n*  = Number  of observations for  each  item at time  t  +  i  (in parentheses,at the right side in the same  column,number of observa-
tions at timet). 
(4)  V =  coefficient of variation. 
All prices are expressed in national currency. SURVEY  OF  PRICES  AND  MARK-UPS 
List of products comparable  at international level an  the basis of unit price. 
No. of survey ..........  . 
Date  ...•..•.•.. 
(Figures in parentheses are for previous survey No ••.••  ) 
Description  Identity Ccrle  Pricing  Total price  (in lcx:::al 
Country  of items surv  rnethcrls  currency) 
eyed in each  n* 
~ountry(prod. Product  Brand  Average  Max. 
~ize, brand)  (2} 
D 
F 
I 
NL 
B 
UK 
IRL 
OK 
Min. 
TABLE  9 
CCXJNTRY 
'KWN 
CURRENCY 
Exchange  rate  : •••••.••  Bfr.  {1) 
EUA  {1) 
Unl.t  pr1.ce  1.n  Btr  ,anct;or 
EUA  and/or other 
v 
Average  Max.  Min.  (3)  price (2.)  price  price 
{5)  76)  ______ ------------------
J~l  ______ ------------------ {6) 
J~l  ______ ------------------ (6) 
_{~l  ______ ------------------
(6) 
J~l  ______ ------------------
(6) 
{5)  ('f;)  ______ ------------------
J~l  ______ ------------------
{6) 
J~l  ______ ----------------- {6) 
1.  The  following  exchange  rates were  used to calculate prices in Bfrs and  EUA  respectively: 
rn  ........  arld •••••••  ;  FF. • • • • • •  ar1d  ••••••• ;  Lit  • • • • • • •  arld  • • • • • • •  etc. , 
£Rp 
(4) 
2.  As  elsewhere in these tables,  the average price is calculated on  the basis of all prices 
sample,  rather than on  maximum  and  minimum  prices. 
recorded at all sales points in the 
3. 
4. 
V = variation coefficient 
£ Rp = relative difference  {in  %)  = maximum  price - minimum  price 
minimum  price 
5.  PricE  based on  purchasing power  position. 
6.  EUA  price  based on  free market  rates. 
X  100 SURVEYS  OF  PRICES  AND  MARK-UPS  ON  FOODS'IUFFS  AND  BEVERAGES 
CURRENCY  CONVERSION  TABLES 
In European Units of Account  (EUA) 
In Belgian Francs  (Bfrs)* 
Equivalent in national currency of 1  EUA  (1) 
ANNEX  TO  TABLE  9 
In Bfrs., (1)  r  (2) 
1976  1977  6  1976  1977 
r;d:>i  '";tic 
·r-1  c  c 
(J) 
c:  ~  c:  c:  l-1 
.w  0  Q)  .w  0  Q)  Q) 
c:  ·r-1  l-1  c:  ·..-!  l-1  :>  Q) 
B 
.w  l-1  January  July  January  July  B 
.w  l-1  c:.w  January  July  January  July  C1l  :J  cU  :J  8~  u  zu  u  zu 
-
D  [M  3.03223  2.82434  2.68045  2.62517  D  1Uv1  (1)  15.092  15.422  15.352  15.543  (2)  ___  --16:-982-- ---17:-256 ___ ~--17:-564-- --17:-722--
lFF  1!2. ___  8.7792  8.1918  7.384~  __  2:.~~~~-- F  IF  5.21284  5.31728  5.57233  5.57637  F  ---------- -----------------------
l?\  R  1C}C}l  R l21Q  8.3003  8  .. 1029 
(1)  0.055947  0.047430  0.041771  0.040232 
I  LIT  817.999  918.364  985.151  1014.236  I  1  LIT  (2)  ___  5:-569575-- -5-:-565345 ___ -5-:-56I24r-- o-:-558985--
NL  FL.  3.11146  2.99359  2.80409  2.80437  NL  1  FL.  1!2. ___  14.708  14.550  ~~~~~~~~~--
1.4.550 
--15:-884-- ---Is-:-8I8 ___  --r:s-:-794--
(2) 
B  FB  45.7650  43.5582  41.1509  40.8048  B  lFB  (1)  1  1  1  1  (2)  ___  ____ I _____  _  ____ I ______ 1-----r----- ----r-----
UK  £  0.574278  0.614228  0.654430  0.666835  UK  1  £  (1)  79.69  70 .. 915  62.880  61.191  72)  ___  --I5I-:-62-- ---99-:-655 ___ 1---93-:-916-- --95-:-j45--
(1)  79.69  70.915  62.880  61.1.91 
IRL  £IRL  0.574278  0.614228  0.654430  0.666835  £  IRL  l£IRL (2)  ___  --153-:-95-- ---99-:-835 ___ ---95-:-879-- --94:310--
DK  DKR  7.17504  6.76205  6.60115  6.85440  DKR  1  DKR  1!2. ___  __§.:.~1~~-- ---~-=-~~~~--- ---~.:~~~~--
:>.~_).jj_  ----------
(2)  5.8509  5.7034  5.6018  5.4-172 
l.  Conversion rates based on  free market  exchange  rates.  See Eurostat  (monthly general statistics bulletin) 
1-1978,  pp.l67-168,  Brussels,  Luxembourg.% 
2. 
* 
Conversion rates based an purchasing power parities calculated by  the SOEC  (General Statistics, Statistical Methods 
end  Liaison Activities Directorate). 
~he figures may  also be expressed in other national currencies,  calculated on  the basis of the EUA  conversion rates 
(free  rr~rket exchange)  indicated in the left-hand section. CCM3INED  TABLES  FOR  ZONES  PROPOSED  BY  REM)  LINDA 
A.  CIJ\SSIFICATION  OF  PRODUCTS 
Prcrluct  Number  of cases occurring in each  zone 
&  ~ker  I.  (  t+  i  Sj)  II.  (t +  i  qj)  ·r-1 
1-l 
()  .  0..  Variation of prices  Measurement  of Mark-ups  U)  ~  8  Q)  Q) 
'O.W  1-l 
·r-1  C-'  (Table  3a)  (Table  Sa) 
~  '@4-4  .w  s::  r-IO  ()  s:: 
VellJgreen 
~ 
·r-1  ::l  'E 
·r-1  co  c  '8  en  .wo  co  ·r-1  .w  red  prange  red  :>range  yellow green  Q)·r-1  1-l  1-l  1-l  ~  co  Cl.W  P.!  Ill  0  z 
III.  (*C  )  4 
TABLE  10/A 
to be completed for  one 
or more  countries and/or 
regions. 
Total 
Concentration of product 
at national level  I  II  III 
(Table  1) 
red  lrange yellow  green  red  )range yellow green 
Products are classified according to the number  of cases coming  within the  red  zone of price variations  (t +  i  Sj)and subsidiarily 
in the orange zone. 
The  list does not include products for which  no case of "price variations"  comes  within the red or orange  zone. COHBINED  TABLES  FOR  ZONES  PROPOSED  BY  REMO  LINDA 
B.  CLASSIFICATION  OF  SALES  POINTS 
I 
Sales point  Number  of cases 
Type  of  I.  (  t  +  i  Sj) 
Rank  No.  and  Business  Name  of  Price variations  name  owner. 
~road  Detail  (Table 3a) 
~roup  ed 
Cat.  red  brange yellQ\o{ 
coming  within each  zone. 
II.  (  t  +  i  qj) 
Measurement of mark-ups 
(Table  Sa) 
green  red  orange yellow  sreen 
TABLE  10/B 
to be completed for one 
or more  countries and/or 
regions. 
Total 
I  and  II 
red  orange yellow green 
Sales points are classified according to the number  of cases coming  within the red zone of price variations  {t +  i  Sj) 
and  subsidiarily in the orange zone. 
The  list does not  include sales points for which  no  case  of price variations comes  within the red or the orange  zone. COMBINED  TABLES  OF  IDENTICAL  DATA  PROPOSED  BY  REM)  LINDA 
A.  CLASSIFICATION  OF  PRODUCTS 
Product  Identical Data 
Rank  Detailed 
t'~nufacturer  Price Variations 
description  Ul  oo'@  For  reference  0...  -
Q) 
of  B 
o\O  Ul  Q)  :> 
No.  Nat.  IU  .....-!.....-! 
item  ~  u  IU  0  t  +  i  Sj  l9  .....-!  Ul  :> 
.....-!  ~  s:: 
IU  1\  0  ~-r-l 
.j...J  u  ·n  0 
u  s::  ·r-l  Cf.l  lo-1  Ul 
::1  'E 
·r-l  .j...J  Q)  U].j...J 
rg  Q'\  s::  ..0  ~-S  Max.  Min.  IU  ·r-l  (])  ·r-l  3  lo-1  lo-1  lo-1  '0  +  z&  0-!  p:)  0  H  .j...J  z 
.....-! 
IU 
u 
·r-l 
.j...J 
Ave.  s:: 
(]) 
'0 
H 
TABLE  11/A 
to be completed for  one or 
more  countries and/or 
regions. 
Mark-Ups 
Ul  oo'@  For  reference  -
Q) 
dP  Ul  (])  :> 
IU  .....-!.....-! 
u  IU  0  t  +  i  qj  .....-!  Ul  :> 
~  s:: 
1\  0  ~·r-l 
·r-~  0 
Cf.l  lo-1  Ul 
(])  U].j...J 
~ 
(])  s::  Max.  Min.  ·r-l  m·r-l  t  z&  :z; 
Ave. 
The  l1st 1ncludes only products for  wh1ch  an  1dent1cal var1at1on of reta1l sell1ng pr1ce has been recorded at at-least two sales 
points in the relevant period. 
) 
Identical refers to all rates exceeding  by  less than  4%  the identical reference value  (t +  i  Sj > 1  or  t  +  i  qj > 1>. 
Products are classified by  decreasing order of identical rate of variation t  +  i  Sj> 1.  For  reference,  however,  the rates 
t  +  i  Sj  MAX  (maximum  variation),  t  +  i  Sj  MIN  (minimum  variation)  and  t  +  i  Sj  AV  (average variation) are also given. CCMBINED  TABLES  OF  IDENTICAL  DATA  PROPOSED  BY  REM)  LINDA 
B.  CLASSIFICATION  OF  SAlES  POINTS 
Sales Point  Identical Data 
Rank 
No.  and  'I}lpe  of  Name  of  Price Variations 
Business  CMner  £  .  .!t  '@  name  For  reference  ,...,  o  a:.:.  cdA  t3  '@  :>t 
r-i 
~ 
+J  u ·r.  lH  U)  0 
r-i  u  ·r-1  U)  1-l  0  OJ  :>  t  +  i  Sj 
~8 
"@  g'  :1  +J  - ~~ 
U)  Cti  .~ 
'8  c  dP 
+J+J  Q)  ·r-1  ........  OJ  U) 
~ 
c 
1-l  1-l  OJ  ra  1-l  '0+  ~~~ 
·r-1 
o:ll?  QU  P-t  H+J  z  u  ::.8 
. 
Q) 
~ 
TABLE  11/B 
to be completed for one 
or more  countries and/or 
regions. 
Mark-ups 
For  I:S  .~ '@ 
,...,  o&:>  reference 
edt\  4-l  r-i 
0  ~  ~ g  +J  u ·r. 
u  ·r-1  U)  1-l  r-iC  t  +  i  qj 
:1  +J  - OJ  Ul  Ul  t'O·r-1 
'8  c  dP  ~$  ~:.B  . 
Q)  ·r-1  ........  ~  c 
1-l  ~t  ='  ra  ·r-1 
AI  z  u  z  Q)  c  ::.8  ::.8 
The  list includes only products for which  an identical variation has been recorded.  All rates exceeding the identical reference 
value  (t + i  Sj> 1  or  t  + i  qj> l)by less than  4%  are considered to be  identical. 
Q) 
~ 
Sales points are classified in decreasing order of the number  of products for which  each sales point has applied a  rate of variation 
(increase or decrease)  identical with the rate applied by at least one other sales point,  as regards price variations,  and  subsid-
iary as regards measurement of the mark-up. 
All Froducts for which  sales points apply either an identical price variation policy or an identical mark-up pblicy are included 
in this table. CHAPTER  HJO 
THE  SECOND  STAGE 
POWER  INTERPLAY  BETWEEN  RETAILERS  AND  PRODUCERS 2.1.  THE  SETS  Of  "ATOMS  OF  INFORMATION" 
2.1.1.  Descriptior  of  the  program~e 
The  second  stage  of  the  research  program~e represents  the  bulk  of  the  ~ork tc  be  done  during 
the  next  few  years. 
It  aiw.s  to outline  and  stress  a  variety of  aspects  of  the  : 
"Power  Interplay between  Retailers  and  Producers". 
Generally  speaking,  the  "producer" is  either  an  importer/exporter  cf  agricultural cr  basic 
commodities  or  a  manufacturer/processor,  but  it  is  well  to  remember  that  the  ~ower interplay 
may  also  involve  primary  or  secondary  wholesalers  and  agents.  Our  methodology  - as  regards 
the  present  Chapter  Two  - plans  a  clear distinction between  the  manufacturers/processors  ard 
the  importers/wholesalers.  1 
Our  approach  will  therefore  extend  to the  intriguing question  of  the  analysis  of  the  structure 
and  evolution of  the  complete  economic  channels  through  which  the basic goods  pass  - with  or 
without  being  submitted to manufacturing  or precessing  - from  the  producing  countries  to the 
final  western  consumers.  The  fifth  anc  sixth  tables  are,  in  partic~Lar, prepared  for  the 
purpose  of  such  ar.  analysis.  See  sections  2.5.,  2.7.  and  2.8. 
ALL  the  raw  data  collected at  the  pilot stage,  and  especially at  the  first  stage,  will 
continue to  be  used  to give  a  picture  of the evolution of  competition  as  concerns  relation-
sr. ips  : 
-between retailers and  consumers  ; 
-between  retailers  and  producers. 
In  this  respect,  the  reader  is  referred to the  following  concise  schemes  and  tables  referring 
to  Chapter  Two  : 
First  Reference  Table,  concerning  structure  (retail prices, mark-ups  and  buying  prices)  ; 
-Second  Reference Table,  concerning  evolution  (retail prices,  mark-ups  and  buying  prices)  ; 
- Third  Reference  Table,  concerning  "Power  InterpLay",  "Shop  Efficiency"  ana  ''Loss  Leaders"  ; 
Fourth  Reference  Table,  concerning  excessive  prices,  breakdown  of  the  final.  price and 
nat~onal and  Local  concentratior. 
A distinction will  be  made  between  "integrated" distributive  firms,  buying  direct 
from  the  producer,  and  "inaependent" distributors,  buying  from  v.holesalers.  Thus 
there  will  be  two  types  of  buying  price, generally  higher  in  the  Latter  case  than 
in  the  former. 
79 Commentaries  on  the questions and  tables will be  found  in the following sections of 
Chapter 2: 
-the sets of atoms  of  informat~on  (2.1.) 
- the brands and  sizes available  (2.2.) 
- the selective historical series  (2.3.) 
- analysis of shop efficiency  (2.4.) 
- evolution of actual price structures for selected products  (2.5.) 
-negative mark-ups  - loss-leading  (2.6.) 
-retail buying prices and  power  interplay  (2.7.) 
- completion of the monographic  approach by  product:  excessive prices and their 
causes.  And particularly the breakdown  of prices (2.8.) 
completion of the  firm-~firm monographic  approach: 
crucial points of the research  (2.10.) 
national and  local concentration 
(2.9.) 
International comparisons will play a  leading role here.  If these comparisons are to 
have  real economic  significance and  operational value,  they must  satisfy certain basic 
conditions: 
- comparisons must  not be  confined to retail selling prices in the various countries 
but must  also extend to the various producer prices and possibly also dealer or 
wholesaler prices,  thus highlighting the comparative effect of taxation in the 
various countries; 
- the comparisons  must  be  based not  only on  an average  price for  each country but also 
on  the highest price (possibly even the highest two,  three or four prices)t  the  lowest 
price,  and  of course the average price  (and possibly also the median  price)  observed 
in each local sample  surveyed in each country; 
comparisons must  not  be  confined solely to prices but  must  also consider retail 
mark-ups  and,  where  the independent  trade is involved,  wholesale  or trade mark-ups, 
thus again highlighting the effect of taxation in each country,  so as to give 
comparisons  of pre-tax mark-ups. 
But  it must  be  emphasised with particular force that the need is for price comparisons 
relating not  only to identical products but also to comparable  products.  There are 
two  aims  here: 
- to ascertain the range  of choice available to consumers  in each country and  each 
town  or city studied; 
- to obtain pointers to the possible existence of market-sharing agreements  or to the 
existence of particular barriers to trade between states, depriving consumers  in this 
or that country or town  of access to this or that brand  or type  of product  of a  given 
manufacturer. 
This  chapter of the research programme  proposes a  set of  140 questions designed to bring 
out every facet  of the phenomena  we  are studying. 
80 XIV 
(14) 
XV 
(1-5) 
XVI 
(16) 
XVII 
( 17) 
XVIII 
(18) 
FIRST  REFERENCE  TABLE  CONCERNING  STRUCTURE  ( Retai  1  Prices,  f.~ark-ups and  Buying  Prices) 
Corresponding questions 
RETAIL  PRICE 
Product:  degree  of dispersion 
of unit prices for the product. 
"Own  Label"  products: 
Unit prices  of "O.L."  products 
in relation to branded products. 
Imported products: 
Unit prices of imported products 
in comparison with home-produced 
goods. 
Shop  identity: 
Highest  (or lowest)  unit price, 
all items  considered. 
Shop  identity: 
Most  expensive  shop in relation 
to the shop's minimum  unit price 
available. 
XXXIX 
( 39) 
XL 
(40) 
XLI 
(41) 
XLII 
(42) 
XLIII 
(43) 
RETAIL  :r."illRK-UP 
Product:  degree  of dispersion of 
mark-ups  for  the  product. 
"Own  Label"  products: 
Retailers'  mark-ups  in relation 
to branded products. 
Imported products: 
Retail mark-ups  in comparison 
with home-produced  goods. 
Shop  identity: 
Absolute highest  (or lowest) 
mark-up,  all items  considered. 
Shop  identity: 
Shop  recording the  highest 
mark-up. 
LXV 
(65) 
LXVI 
(66) 
LXVII 
( 67) 
LXVIII 
(68) 
LXIX 
(69) 
BUYTI~G PRICE 
Product:  degree  of dispersion of 
buying prices for the product. 
"Own  Label"  products: 
Buying prices paid by  retailers 
for "O.L."  products in relation 
to branded  products. 
I~ported products: 
Buying prices paid b,y  retailers 
,for imported products  in com-
parison -vd th home-produced  goods. 
Shop  identity: 
Highest  (or lowest)  unit  buying 
price paid by  retailers, all 
items  considered. 
Shop  identity: 
Shop  recording the  highest  u.nit 
buying price paid in relation to 
the minimum  unit  b~ng price of 
the shop. 
Questions  I  to XII are  examined in Section 2.2. -"The brands and sizes available". XIX 
(19) 
XX 
(20) 
XXI 
(21) 
XXII 
(22) 
XXIII 
(23) 
FIRST  REFERENCE  TABLE  CONCERNING  STRUCTURE  (Retail Prices,  Mark-ups  and  Buying Prices) 
Corresponding questions 
RETAIL  PRICE 
Shop  identity: 
Highest  (or lowest)  unit price 
and  choice available to consumers 
Shops  policy: 
Uniform  or differentiated unit 
prices  on  different brands  of the 
same  manufacturer's product. 
Shops'  policy: 
Degree  of dispersion of prices 
between different shops,  for 
identical items. 
Shop  identity: 
Dearest  (or cheapest)  shops 
selling identical items. 
Shops'  policy: 
Brands  for which we  have  the 
highest degree  of dispersion of 
prices.  Countries  (or regions) 
having the highest  (or lowest) 
prices for identical items. 
XLIV 
(44) 
XLV 
(45) 
XLVI 
(46) 
XLVII 
(47) 
XLVIII 
(48) 
RETAIL  MARK-UP 
Shop  identity: 
Highest  (or lowest)  mark-up and 
choice available to consumers. 
Shops  policy: 
Uniform  or differentiated mark-
ups  on different brands  of the 
same  manufacturer's product. 
Shops'  policy: 
Degree  of dispersion of mark-ups 
between different  shops,  for 
identical items. 
Shop  identity: 
Shops  applying highest  (or 
lowest  mark-ups  for identical 
items. 
Shops'  policy: 
Brands for which  we  have  the 
highest degree  of dispersion of 
mark-ups.  Countries  (or regions) 
having the  highest  (or  lowest) 
mark-up for identical items. 
LXX 
(70) 
LXXI 
(71) 
LXXII 
(72) 
LXXIII 
{.-,-:). \ 
\  I '""} 
LXXIV 
(7 4) 
BUYDiG  PRICE 
Shop  identity: 
Highest  (or  lowest)  b~ring price 
and  choice available to consumers. 
Producers'  policy: 
Retailers'  unit buying prices 
paid for different brands  of the 
same  manufacturer's  product. 
Producers-retailers  interplay: 
Degree  of dispersion of buying 
prices between different  shops 
for  identical items. 
Producers-retailers  interplay: 
Shops  paying the hiehest  (or 
lowest)  buying prices for 
identical items. 
Producers'  policy: 
Brands  for which we  have  the 
highest degree  of dispersion of 
buying prices paid by retailers. 
Countries  (or regions)  having  the 
highest  (or  lowest)  bu~ring price 
for  identical items. FIRST  iBF~:@ICE TABLE  CONCERNING  STRUCTURE  (Retail Prices, Mark-ups  and  Buying Prices) 
Corresponding questions 
no  RETAIL  PRICE  No  RETAIL  MARK-UP  No  BUYING  PRICE 
XXIV  Nulti-shop operators'  policy:  XLIX  r,1ul ti-shop operators'  policy: 
YJ..V  Uniform  or differentiated prices  L  Uniform  or differentiated mark-
(24/25)  for identical items  betwe~  (49/50)  ups  between different shops -
different  shops  of the chain - different questions  and  hypothese~ 
di:ferent questions and  - existence of  endogenous  com-
hypotheses.  petition. 
~ 
LI  Multi-shop operators'  policy:  <E  LIII  Hypotheses as to the  causes  of 
(51/53)  uniform retail prices charged 
by different shops  of the  same 
chain. XXVI 
(26) 
XXVII 
( ')ry )  \-' 
XXVIII 
(28) 
Y..XIX 
(29) 
SECCND  REFERENCE  TA:SLE  CONCERNTI~G EVOLUTION  (Retail Prices, Mark-ups  and  Buying  Prices) 
RETAIL  PRICE 
Products: 
Variation of degree  of dispersion 
of  ~~it selling prices. 
Product  identity: 
Variation of the dearest  or 
cheapest  Brand/Size. 
"Own  Label"  products: 
Price  increases for "0.1." 
products  in relation to manu-
facturers'  branded products. 
Imported products: 
Price increases for  imported 
products in comparison with 
home-produced goods. 
LTV 
(54) 
LV 
(55) 
Lv"T 
(56) 
LVII 
(57) 
Corresponding questions 
RETAIL  :MARK-UP 
Products: 
Variation of degree  of dispersion 
of mark-ups. 
Product  identity: 
Variation of the  Brand/Size 
having the highest  (or  lowest) 
mark-up. 
"01-m  Label"  products: 
Increase  or decrease  in mank-ups 
in relation to manufacturers' 
branded products. 
Imported products: 
Increases or decreases in 
mark-ups  in comparison with home 
produced  goods. 
LXXV 
(7 5) 
LXXVI 
(76) 
LXXVII 
(77) 
LXXVIIJ 
(78) 
BUYING  PRICE 
Products: 
Variation of degree  of dispersion 
of  u.ni  t  buying prices. 
Product  identity: 
Variation of  the  Brand/Size 
having  the highest  (or lowest) 
buying price. 
"Own  Label"  products: 
Increase in buying prices for 
"O.L."  products in relation to 
manufacturers'  branded products. 
Imported products: 
Increases in unit buying prices 
for  imported products in 
comparison with home-produced 
goods. XXX 
(30) 
XXXI 
XXXII 
( 31/32  ~ 
XXXIII 
(33) 
XXXIV 
(34) 
SECOND  REFERENCE  TABLE  CONCERNTIJG  EVOLUTIOIJ  (Retail Prices, Mark-ups  and  Buying  Prices) 
Corresponding questions 
RETAIL  PRICE 
Shop  identity: 
Variation of the dearest  or 
cheapest  shop. 
Shop  policy: 
Relationship between price 
increases and several factors 
qualifying the  shop policy  (range 
of products,  imported goods,  etc.~ 
Shop  policy: 
Changes  in manufacturers'  brands. 
Shop  policy: 
Elimination of "own  label" 
products  or manufacturers'  brandec 
p~oducts and price variations  on 
substitute products. 
LVIII 
(58) 
RETAIL  I.IARK-UP 
Shop  identity: 
Variation of the  shop applying 
the highest  (or  lowest)  mark-up. 
LXXIX 
(79) 
BUYING  FJIC_;_. 
Shop  id.cntity: 
Variation of the  shop paying the 
highest  (or  lowest)  lL~it  buying 
prices. 
LIX  Shop  policy:  LY~  Shop  policy: 
LX  Relationship between increases and  LXXXI  Relation~hip between increases  in 
(59/60)  ~-~creases in mark-ups  and  the  (80/81)  buying prices and -the factors 
LXI 
(61) 
factv~s indicated in question 31.  indicated in question 31. 
Shop  policy: 
Elimination of "own  label" 
products  or manufacturers'  branded 
products and  variations in 
mark-ups  for substitute products. 
LYJ..XII 
( 82) 
3hop  policy: 
Elimination of  "own  label" 
products  or manufacturers' 
branded products and variations 
in buying prices  of substitute 
products. No 
XXXV 
(35) 
XXXVI 
(36) 
XXXVII 
(37) 
·XXXVIII 
( 38) 
SECOND  REFERENCE  TABLE  CONCERNING  EVOLUTION  (Retail Prices, Mark-ups  and  Buying  Prices) 
Corresponding  questions 
RETAIL  PRICE  No  RETAIL  lt.ARK-UP  No  BUYTITG  PRICE 
Shop  policy:  LXII  3hop policy:  LXXXIIJ  Manufacturers'  policy: 
Changes  in size and/or packaging  (62)  Changes  in size and/or packaging  (83)  Changes  in size and/or packaging 
and  increase in unit prices.  and variations in mark-ups.  and increase in buying prices 
paid by retailers. 
Producers'  and retailers' 
policies: 
Explanation given by producers  a.ncJ 
retailers on  changes  of brand/ 
size/packaging. 
r~~ul ti-shop operator Group:  LXIII  Multi-shop  operator Group: 
Uniform  or differentiated price  (63)  Uniform  or differentiated 
increases for identical items  sold  variations  of  the mark-up applied 
by different shops  of the chain.  b,y  the different shops  of the 
chain. 
~egional and international  LXIV  Regional  and international  LXXXIV  Regional  and  international 
comparisons  of price variations  (64)  comparisons  of variations  in  (84)  comparisons  of variations in 
in relation to several factors  mark-ups  in relation to several  buying prices paid by retailers 
(questions 26  to 37  and  11  to 13).  factors  (questions 26  to 37  and  in relation to several factors 
11  to 13).  (questions 26  to 37  and  11  to  13~ POW~ INTERPLAY 
SHOP  l!.:E11;'ICI:s:t-;cy 
"LOSS  LEtillSRS" 
I..ist  of relevant  questions 
LXXXV 
(8)) 
L.XXXVI 
(86) 
LXXXVII 
(  87) 
LXXXVIII 
(88) 
LXXXIX 
(89) 
XC 
(?0) 
XCI 
( 91) 
XCII 
(92) 
X~"'III 
( 93) 
XCIV 
(94) 
:?Oin:::R  INT~I1PLAY (Section  2. 7.):  QQ  85-94 
Comparative  evolution  o£'  prices  (buying,  producer's, u.rdt retail  prices) 
cm1sidering  the  nw.xiwtun,  minirnm:1  and  average - identification of firms 
benefi  ti:ng  or suffering froE1  the  evolution. 
nanking  of cmmtries  (and/  or regions)  according to the  increases in 
different types  of price. 
Ranking  of countries  (and/or regions)  according  to the  increases in 
differences  bct~rJeen the different  t,ypes  of price - :Sxplanatory causes. 
Identification of fir;ns  and  countries  (and/or regions)  benefiting or 
suffering  fro:-11  the  evolution - Quantitative  breakdo1-1n  of  indi  vidu.·1l 
profits ana  losses. 
Comparison  bet~wen products - Ranking  accordine  to  the  increases  in 
different  types  of price. 
Comparison bctueen products - Ranking  according to the criteria 
indicated in question 87. 
Compnriso:r!  bet~r:een products - Ranking,  by  country,  according to absolute 
sizes  of different  types  of mark-up - retail,  trader,  importer,  exporter -
considerine tho  naximwn,  minimmn  and  average. 
Quantity discounts  and  rebates. 
Discounts  and  rebates  linked to exclusive rights. 
Discounts  and  rebates  under different forms -Difficulties of concrete 
evaluation. 
87 THIRD  REFE.R~~CE TABLE  CONCERNTIW:  - POHER  INT:&;'"RPLAY 
SHOP  EJ.i'FICIEHCY 
"LOSS  LEP  .. DERS" 
List  of relevant questions 
XCV 
( 95) 
XCVI 
(96) 
XCVII 
(97) 
XCVIII 
(98) 
XCIX 
(99) 
c 
(100) 
CI 
(101) 
CII 
( 102) 
CIII 
(103) 
SHOP  EFFICIENCY  (Section  2 .4.):  QQ  95-103 
Identification of "the best  (or the  v-Jorst)  shops",  as  concerns 
separately selling prices,  mark-ups  and  buying prices. 
General definition of efficiency - Identification of shops. 
Degree  of brand monopolisation and  shop  efficiency. 
Relationship bett1een  time  in stock and retail buying price. 
Relationship bett.veen  time  in stock and  retail mark-up. 
Countries  (and/or regions)  having the most  (or  least)  efficient 
shops. 
Evolution of "shops"  averages  ( w1i  t  s~lling and  beying prices) 
- Breakdotm  by  countries (and/  or regions). 
Identification of shops  whose  efficiency increases or deteriorates. 
Changes  in ranking of shops  according to the  overall efficiency  score. THIRD  REFERENCE  TABLE  CONCERNING:  - POWER  INTERPLAY 
SHOP  EFFICIENCY 
"LOSS  LEADERS" 
List  of relevant questions 
CIV 
(104) 
cv 
(105) 
CVI 
( 106) 
CVII 
( 107) 
CVIII 
(108) 
CTX 
( 10J) 
ex 
( 110) 
CXI 
( 111) 
CXII 
(112) 
CXIII 
(113) 
CXIV 
( 114) 
cxv 
( 115) 
"LOSS  LEA.DERS"  (Section 2.6.):  QQ  104-115 
Identification of shops  opting for  a  loss leading policy,  at a  given 
moment. 
Evolution of mark-ups  and  changes  in loss  leaders. 
Long  term analysis  and  identification of retailers more  attached to 
the  loss  leading policy. 
Explanatory  causes - Hypothesis  of  predatory pricing. 
Identification of products  and  brands  chosen as  loss  leaders. 
Effects  of loss  leading  on  time  in stock. 
Effects  of loss  leading  on  retcdlers'  buying  pi•ices. 
Effects  of  loss  leadine  on  retail selline prioes. 
Loss  leaders  and  ovm  label products. 
Loss  leaders  and ir.aportecl  products. 
Internc;,tionill  comparisons,  as  regard8  products  chosen  us  loss  leaders 
as  1-vell  as the different effects  seen  under  QQ.  109-113. 
Attitudes  of  r;~anufacturers towards  loss leaders - Different questions. 
89 FOURTH  REFERENCE  TABLE:  EXCESSIVE  PRICES 
BREAKDOWN  OF  THE  FINAL  PRICE 
NATIONAL  AND  LOCAL  COMPm'ITION 
List  of relevant questions 
CXVI 
(116) 
CXVII 
( 117) 
CXVIII 
(118) 
CXIX 
(119) 
cxx 
(120) 
CXXI 
(121) 
CXXII 
(122) 
CXXIII 
( 123) 
EXCESSIVE  PRICES  (Section 2.8.):  QQ  116-118 
EXcessive  prices - list of products and  fir~s concerned - use  of maxima 
(prices,  mark-ups,  differences,  increases) - share of sole distributors. 
Ranking  of suspect products and  firms  b,y  degree of probability of 
excessive pricing - role of exclusive agreements. 
Ranking  of suspect products and  firms according to the speed at which 
prices downstream react to changes  in producers prices. 
BREAKDOWN  OF  THE  FINAL  PRICE  (Section 2.8.):  QQ  119-123 
Table  of comparative statics - comparative  evolution of prices, 
mark-ups  and  components  of margins  and  costs (reference to question 85 
-shares accounted for by  taxes). 
Explanations  of trends  observed in answering question  119. 
Link between profits made  by  certain firms  and  the existence of 
dominant  positiOns and/or restrictive agreements  and  practices. 
Detailed breakdown  of the mark-up  (reference to question 91)  -
share accounted for by  taxation. 
Detailed breakdown  of producers prices into their various components. 
90 FOURTH  REFERENCE  TABLE:  EXCESSIVE  PRICES 
BREAKDOWN  OF  THE  FINAL  PRICE 
NATIONAL  AND  LOCAL  COMPm'ITION 
List of relevant questions 
CXXIV 
(124) 
cxxv 
(125) 
CXXVI 
(126) 
CXXVII 
( 127) 
CXXVIII 
(128} 
CXXIX 
(129) 
cxxx 
(130) 
CXXXI 
(131) 
CXXXII 
( 132) 
CXXXIII 
( 133) 
CXXXIV 
( 134) 
cxxxv 
( 135) 
CXXXVI 
( 136) 
NATIONAL  AND  LOCAL  CONCENTRATION  (Section 2.9.):  QQ  124-136 
Possible correlation between dominance  of producers on  a  product market 
and  level of retail selling prices. 
Price increases and intensity of dominance. 
Dominance  of producers and  trends of prices at the various levels. 
Survey of dominant  positions on  national product markets held b,y  the 
100  largest agri-food firms  in the western world. 
Possible correlation between the dominance  of a  producer and  the comparative 
profitability of the dominant  firm. 
Possible correlation between price levels on  a  given product market  and 
the profitability of the producer firm.  Role  and  effects of  exclusive 
agreements. 
Price increases and  profitability. 
Trends  of prices and variations (uniform,  identical)  and  profitability of 
the firms  concerned. 
Evolution of  the shares of the ten principal retail buyers  in the 
aggregate sales of the ten principal manufacturers of food  and  beverages. 
The  most  profitable competitors. 
Evolution of the shares of the ten principal manufacturing suppliers 
in the aggregate sales of the ten principal retail distribution groups. 
Alternative suppliers. 
Possible relation between the development  of producers prices and  the 
absolute and relative shares bought  b.y  wholesalers and retail distributors. 
Special terms  and  advantages  granted by  producers in relation to the 
quantities bought  b,y  certain wholesalers and retail distributors. 
List and market  shares of the ten principal retail distribution groups 
on  the national market  and  in a  number  of selected large conurbations -
indicators of local concentration. 
91 FOURTH  REFERENCE  TABLE:  EXCESSIVE  PRICES 
BREAKDOWN  OF  THE  FINAL  PRICE 
NATIONAL  AND  LOCAL  COMPETITION 
List of relevant questions 
CXXXVII 
( 137) 
CXXXVIII 
(138) 
CXXXIX 
(139) 
CXL 
( 140) 
NATIONAL  AND  LOCAL  CONCENTRATION  (Section 2  •. 9.):  QQ  137-140 
Development  aver the last ten years of the market  shares of the ten 
principal groups nationally and  in selected conurbations -
indicators of local concentration. 
Comparison  between the evelution of concentration in distribution 
nationally and  locally. 
Individual sheet for each selected shop,  comparing its pricing 
policy with the policy of other shops  in the  local sample  (table XII). 
Comparative  analysis and  final conclusions on  the basis of the overall 
results of the surveys: 
-relation between  the market  power  of retail distributors locally 
and  the relative levels of prices and mark-ups; 
- increase in concentration in local distribution and  increase in 
prices and mark-ups; 
- existence of excessive or unfair prices b.y  reason of the dominance 
enjoyed by producers; 
- detection of a  number  of practical cases  (dominant  positions, 
anti-competitive agreements,  exclusive agreements); 
- value - necessity even - of broadening the surveys. 
92 2.1.2.  The  problem  of selectinG essential data (products,  retailers,  producers) 
The  selection aims  to extract a  more  restricted und  more  meaningful  sample  from  the 
bulk of data available  on: 
a)  products, 
b)  retailers  (operator groups), 
c)  producars 
and  submit it to thorough anal,ysis. 
This  manifold analysis will be  situated in a  dynamic  framework,  in order to bring out 
the relationships if aey  beti·.reen  the levels,  disparity (or dispersion)  and  evolution 
of retail prices and: 
- one  one  side:  the  level, disparity and  evolution of buying prices and 
retail mark-ups, 
- on  the other side:  the pricing policies and  profitability of  the 
retailers and  producers  concerned. 
2.1.3.  Comparisons  based  on  unit prices 
Accordingly,  the  comparisons will be  based  on  the unit prices of different  items, 
since the objectives set  out  above  imply the need  to  com~ire a  great number  of brands 
and  sizes - also includ.ine a  great  nUI;Jber  of "ovm  labels" - sold in a  great number 
of  shops  and  countries. 
A specific analysis - in this dynamic  framework - \vill  concern each relevant  ~reduct 
taken from  the given sample  on  the basis of a  set of six tables:  "Selective Historical 
Series",  based  on  the ]Ei! prices and data. 
2.1.4.  A set of six tables concerning only  the selected products 
Six tables concerning only the  chosen relevant  products  (a)  will therefore  be  the 
starting point for concrete  ~d  wider analyses - also taking into account all available 
financial,  economic  and  legal  information - on  the bargaining power  and actual behaviour 
of the selected: 
- retailers (b) 
producers  (c) • 
Further historical series tables are  planned in order to bring  out  the  evolution of 
turnovers and  market  shares and  of all meaningful data for the  n~in retailers as well 
as the main  producers  (Tables VII,  VIII,  IX,  X,  XI  and  XII). 
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EY.TL.AN~'i.  TORY  NOTES  REFERRDTG  TO  TH3  FIRST  TABLE 
Shops  of the  sample  are  runl::ed  according to the  deg.ree  of "Brand/Size r.Ionopolization" 
at  timE;  t, i.e. at the date  of  the first enquiry.  Thus  the first  shop  from  the left 
is the  one  offering  the  sr~w  .  .1lest m.u11ber  of brands  and/or  sizes to the  consumer,  and 
the  last  shop  (on  the rir;ht)  - 'lrhose  ranking corresponds  to the total number  of shops 
in the  sample  - t·Till  be  the  shop  offering cons'Wners  the broadest  choice  of brands 
and/or  sizes.  At  the  bottom  of the table it is possible  to  see the range  of choice 
available for the  given product  in each  shop  in each  country. 
- Horizontal broken lines separate d_ata  referrine to  tltvO  colU1tries  taken into account. 
- Data given  only  by  -vmy  of exa1.:ple  are  indicated in pe1rentheses. 
The  code  number  for  each  shop  makes  it possible to know  the  actUc..1-l  narne  of the  shop 
(c:md  of the  operator group  or  chain)  according to the lists referring to  each 
cotmtry  (in our  example,  two  different lists for Great  Britain (GB)  and France  (F) 
will  be  examined). 
The  own  label corresponds to the given shop  selling the relevant  product.  Thus, 
as regards  Great  Britain,  v-1e  l·rill  have  different  O'Wl'l  labels for  instant coffee for 
each retailer,  such as Sainsbur;y,  Key  Markets,  Safeway,  Cater  Bros.,  Haitrose, 
Tesco  and  so  on.  As  regards France,  in our  example,  we  have  the "Coop"  otm  label. 
1.-Jhen  a  given brand and/or size is not available in one  colU1try  but  only in the 
other one,  "n.a."  (not  available)  lvill  be  indicated  on  the corresponding horizontal 
line for this cotu1try. 
In  our  exanple,  it h~s been assumed  that the  s~~ple is of  30  shops  both in Great 
Britain and  in France. 
-As concerns  the dates  of  surveys  indicated in the table,  1977/1  indicates the  survey 
carried  out  in the first half of the year  (January/Febr~~ry),  1977/2  the  survey 
carried out  in the  second half  (July/August). 
Imported products are designated by  an asterisk. 
The  s;y-mbol  "+"  indicates the highest priced product/shop (or the highest mark-up) 
and  the  symbol  "-" the  lm·rest  one. 
The  last  colurr~ (on  th~_right) gives  the name  of the actual  producer  or manufacturer, 
which is not the  srune  as the  supplier when  the latter is a  wholesaler  or dealer 
(exporter,  importer). 
The  bottom  of the  table gives,  for each shop: 
stock turnover period  (time  in stock)  - Tj, 
average unit selling price  ~  P  );  the  second  and  third tables give  the mark-up  (q) 
and  unit  buying price  (  P  ),v u  au 
the  score  of each shop,  from  which  an efficiency ranking can be  derived  (see at 
2.2.6.  and 2.4.3.). 
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SEL~TIVE HIS'IORICAL  SERIES 
- concerning some  relevant products  taken from  the  sample - TABLE  IV 
SYNTHESIS  :  RETAILERS  UNIT 
SELLING  PRICES 
Country:  •••  Currency:  ... 
ER  =  %;  v  =  %  MAXIMUM  MINIMUM  AVERAGE 
,Jlu  u  ( 1)  ( 1)  (2) 
- UNIT  SELLING  PRICE  .  .  .  .  ..  ... 
corresponding to: 
1)  Shop  :  name  (and Code  No)  ...  (  )  .  .  .  (  )  ...  ( 
2)  Brand/Size  :  name 
3)  Actual  Producer or Manufacturer  :  name 
4)  Other brands  :  I) ••• II) ••• III)  ••• 
5)  No  of brands x  sizes in the shop  ..  X  ••  =  ••  ..  X  ••  =  ••  .  .  X  ••  =  •• 
- RETAIL  PRICE  INDEX  AND  SHOP  (Code  No)  INDEX  SHOP  INDEX  SHOP  INDEX  SHOP 
base  :  1977/1  =  100  ••  (  )  ••  (  )  .  .  (  ) 
1977/2  =  100  ..  (  )  .  .  (  )  .  .  (  ) 
1977/3 =  100  ••  (  )  .  .  (  )  .  .  (  ) 
) 
(1)  They are the highest  (or lowest)  unit selling prices  (yPu)  in absolute terms,  considering all items for a  given product 
(question 17),  corresponding therefore to the dearest  ~or cheapes~ shop in the sample. 
(2)  The  average price has been calculated on  all items  (brands,  sizes,  •• ).  The  shop outlined in the table is the 
one  in the sample  which is closest to the average price. 
- "O.L." designates the  own  label products sold by a  given retailer. 
- Imported products are indicated by an asterisk. SELECTIVE  HIS'roRICAL  SERI:ES 
- concerning some  relevant products taken from  the sample  - TABLE  V 
PRODUCT:  ••••  SYNTHESIS  RETAILERS  MARK-UPS 
Enquiry 
Country:  •••  Currency:  • •• 
No  Date 
€R  - %;  v  - %  MAXIMUM  MINIMUM  AVERAGE  q  q  (1)  (1)  {2) 
- MARK-UP  (RETAILER)  ...  .  .  .  • •• 
corresponding to: 
1)  Shop  :  name  (and Code  No)  ...  (  )  .  ..  (  )  .  ..  (  ) 
2)  Brand/Size  :  name 
3)  Actual  Producer  or Manufacturer  :  name 
4)  Other brands  :  I) ••• II)  ••• III)  ••• 
5)  No  of brands x  sizes in the shop  ••  X  ••  = ••  ••  X  •• = ••  ••  X  •• = •• 
6)  Tj-(Ranking in Tj)-(Ranking in overall 
shop efficiency)  ..  -( .. )-( ..  )  ..  -( .. )-( .. )  ..  -( .. )-( .. ) 
7)  Unit  Bu_ying  Price - (Date of purchase)  (  ) (  )  (  )  (  )  (  )  (  ) 
8)  Producer's  or Manufacturer's Unit  Price  (  )  (  )  (  ) 
9)  Unit  Retail Price  (  )  (  )  (  ) 
(1)  They  are the highest  (or lowest)  mar~up (q)  all items considered (question 42),  corresponding therefore to the  shop 
in the  sample applying them. 
(2)  The  average mark-up has been calculated on  all items  (brands,  sizes,  ••• ).  The  shop mentioned in the table is 
the  one  in the sample  which is close to the average mark-up. 
- "O.L."  designates the  own  label products sold by a  given retailer. 
- Imported products are indicated by  an asterisk. - Q 
Q 
SELECTIVE  HISTORICAL  SERIES 
- concerning some  relevant products taken from  the  sample - TABLE  VI 
SYNTHESIS  RETAILERS  UNIT 
BUYING  PRICES  PRODUCT: 
Enquiry 
No  Date 
Country:  ••• 
v  = 
- UNIT  BUYING  PRICE  - (Date  of purchase) 
corresponding to: 
1)  Shop  :  name  (and  code  No) 
2)  Brand/Size  :  name 
3)  Actual Producer or Manufacturer  :  name 
4)  Other Brands  :  I)  ••• II)  ••• III)  ••• 
5)  No  of brands x  sizes in the  shop 
6)  T  j  - (Ranking  in T  j) - (Ranking in ove:r-
all shop  efficienc~ 
1) Retailers Mark-up 
8)  Producer's  or Manufacturer's Unit  Price 
9)  Unit Retail Price 
- BUYING  PRICE  INDEX  (compared with retail 
price index) 
base  :  1977/1  =  100 
1977/2  = 100 
1977/3 =  100 
Currency: 
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(1)  They  are the highest  (or lowest)  unit buying prices  (aPu)  in absolute terms,  all items  considered  (question 6B), 
corresponding therefore to the shop in the  sample  which buys at the highest  (or  lowest)  price. 
(2)  The  average buying price has  been calculated on all items  (brands,  sizes,  ••• ).  The  shop mentioned in the table is 
the one  in the  sample  which is close to the average price. 
- "O.L." designates  the  own  label products sold by a  given retailer. 
- Imported products are indicated by  an asterisk. 2.1.5.  Comparisons  between retailers'  b$ying prices and retail selling prices 
The  structure and behaviour of each firm - retailers as well as producers,  manufacturers 
and/or traders included in the "restricted" sample - will be  analysed,  focusing also on 
any  possible long-run effect an  the level, disparity and trend of: 
- blzy'ing  prices (paid by retailers) 
- retail prices  (paid  by  consumers) 
2.1.6. General features of the programme 
A lonB-term analysis  on  this basis will give a  living picture of the actual working  of 
competition in a  field of the greatest interest both to the consumer  and  to the authorities. 
In conclusion the second  stage is essentially 
- selective since it implies the choice of a  more  limited number  of products,  retailers 
{groups}  and  s~ppliers; 
- dynamic  since it considers all the chosen data in their long-run connection; 
- comprehensive  since it considers all kinds  of data and  information,  both quantitative 
and qualitative,  which  might  be  helpful for attaining its objectives. 
2 .1.  7.  The  two  fields of the research:  Market  - consumer  and  producer stage 
There  is no  doubt that in recent years power  relations have  been changing between the 
manufacturers  of goods  (suppliers)  and  the major retailers (purchasers),  and  this has 
brought into existence new  trends and features in the working  of the competition 
mechanism. 
Because  of the complex  interdependence of the phenomena  under study,  the analysis will 
have  to work  from  several starting points and  angles,  in order to: 
- follow each stage of the channel  throl18h which a  given product or brand moves  from 
producer to final consumer, 
- see how  retail prices are compared,  correlated and  evolving. 
Let  us  distinguish two  main  starting points: 
I) Retail stage exclusively:  relationship between retailers and  consumers; 
II) Intermediate stage:  relationship between  producers and retailers. 
As  regards the "retail stage exclusi  velt', it is helpful to distinguish two  sub-groups 
of data: 
Ia)  those acting directly on  consumers  and  easily and  automatically emerging  from  the 
prices and mark-ups  surveys carried out by the Commission  - retail prices; 
Ib)  those acting on  the retail prices,  but not known  by the final  consumer  since they 
imply a  specific survey and analysis - retail mark-ups. 
As  regards the "intermediate stages", two  sub-groups  of data will be  distinguished: 
IIa) quantitative data,  to be  summarized  in the "historical series tables",  such as: 
evolution of retailers'  buying prices compared  with the evolution of retail selling 
prices,  turnover and market  shares  (from the suppliers'  viewpoint  and  from  the 
customers'  viewpoint)  and  so  on; 
IIb) qualitative data,  expressed by legal and  financial arrangements,  tying clauses in 
the contracts,  discount terms  and  so  on. 
101 2.1.8. References to the tables of Chapter One 
Sub-group Ia) refers to data- i.e. brands and prices - and  indices having certain 
characteristics in common: 
- the.y  are collected in the framework  of the research programme  on  prices and mark-ups, 
on  the basis of the principle:  "go to the shop,  see and  compare", 
- they can therefore be  said to be  the "atoms  of information" that ought  to be  available 
to each consumer  or housewife, 
- however,  one  complete  econometric elaboration of those "atoms  of information"  provides 
the material for a  large,  comprehensive  picture of certain significant features of 
the major retailers'  business strategies. 
The  set of eleven tables described in Chapter One  of this report gives several instances 
of how  much  of what  information and  what  conclusions  can be  obtained from  a  volume  of 
elementary data  ("atoms  of information")  which,  as single items,  should be  there for 
each housewife to see. 
2.1.9. "Atoms  of information" - structural and  evolutionary viewpoint 
The  "atoms  of information"  constitute the ground  for elaborations,  viewed  from  two  basic 
angles: 
- from  the structural (or statio) angle, at a  given moment, 
- from  the evolutionary angle,  over a  given reference period. 
Let us consider,  firstly,  the structural angle. 
2.1.10.  Basic data:  brands and relative prices 
The  "atoms"  taken into account in the structural (or static) framework  and hypothesis 
are the following: 
I) the brands  (and sizes/weights)  of each product on  sale at each shop,  outlining more 
particularly the origin (country of production,  name  and nationality of the manu-
facturer or of the distributor) and,  generally speaking,  all the essential 
characteristics (shelf life,  importance to the consumer,  etc.) of each item 
considered; 
II) the relative prices of each brand  (and size/weight) which  differ,  sometimes 
considerably,  according to the shop  investigated and  the time of the survey. 
From  the evolutionary angle,  the analysis will consider the changes  in position taking 
place between  the same  thousands  (or millions)  of "atoms"  considered in the structural 
(or static) approach,  over one  or more  reference periods. 
All these analyses  imply,  as we  have  seen,  the prior selection of "relevant products" 
if the research is not to sink in the sea of millions of "atoms of information". 
Initially the following products have  been considered b,y  the Commission  and  the researchers 
working  with it: 
1)  instant coffee and,  where  appropriate,  ground coffee or beans; 
2)  sugar; 
3)  pure chocolate,  in powder  and solid form,  and/or cocoa; 
4)  homogenized  bab,y  foods:  (a) desserts (fruit),  (b)  mixed  vegetables with meat, 
fish,  chicken; 
102 5)  margarine and/or other edible oils (groundnut  oil, corn oil, etc.); 
6)  tinned peas  (natural); 
7)  tinned and  packet  soups  (vegetable- minestrone,  vermicelli- chicken,  tomato,  pea, 
mushroom); 
8)  beer (bottled and in cans); 
9)  mineral water; 
10)  cola beverages. 
Account  has also been  taken of the high degree of concentration on  the various national 
markets for most  of these products  (see Table VIII at 2.9.2.). 
Each  national research institute is asked to add to this list two  further products of 
specific interest for national market  structure. 
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2.2.1.  Choice  of the  consumer,  "own  label"  products,  imported goods 
In each shop  there is generally a  number  of brands  (sizes and  weights)  for each product 
at a  given moment  ("structural" or static approach). 
In the research programme  the structure of the range of products offered to the  consumers 
will be  analysed for each shop according to: 
I) the number  of brands actually available for each product; 
II) the share  of  own  labels,  in relation to manufacturer's  branded products, 
III) the share of imported products. 
2.2.2.  References  to tables 1, 2, 4,  8,  10  and  11  of Chapter One 
The  number  of brands actually available for each product  implies a  series of analyses 
from  three basic angles: 
a)  product;  b)  spatial or geographic;  c)  evolutionary• 
Let  us refer back to Tables  1,  2, 4,  8,  10  and  11  of the first stage  (Chapter One)  which 
give a  full picture  of all products and  items  taken into account in all the  sample  shops. 
Table8, for instance,  shows  all basic data collected, referring to different brands  (and 
sizes/weights) available for each product, all items being ranked in decreasing order of 
unit price at the time  of the most  recent  survey (i.e. t+i).  However,  as a  starting point 
for further analysis it is necessary to ascertain at each shop in the  sample  whether  any 
brand or item (of each given product)  has been neglected,  and whether there has  been any 
error in recording price differences,  especially for the  extreme  (i.e. dearest and 
cheapest)  items. 
It is obvious  that Table  8,  taken with Tables  1,  2  and 4,  is of crucial importance to 
the attainment  of the objectives of our research,  for these tables reveal that: 
the number  of items is very high  (almost a  thousand)  in each  survey country; 
it is neither possible nor fruitful to take the analysis further for all the  items 
in the  sample  of products;  ---
-there is meaningful quantitative information in tables 1,  2,  4,  a,  10  and  11  enabling 
us to determine what  are the most  "relevant" products which actually deserve more 
refined investigation. 
2.2.3.  Criteria for selecting the products to be  analysed at the  second  stage 
The  products to be  submitted to more  sophisticated analysis must  be  selected according 
to criteria permitting: 
a)  comparison of the products  (and relative data:  prices,  mark-ups,  and  so on)  over a 
given period of time and  among  the different  countr~es and regions; 
b)  analysis  of the negotiating power  as between retailers and manufacturers.  Accordingly, 
preference will be  given to products  -.~hich are: 
- available in all the countries and  shops  taken into account  for the analysis; 
- manufactured by  companies  operating world-wide; 
- relatively homogenous  as regards quality,  in order that comparisons  based upon  the 
"unit prices"  are not misleading:  it is not very fruitful to compare  the unit price 
for tinned caviar with the unit price for tinned sardines; 
104 - sold under several brands and sizes,  including possibly a  large number  of 
own  labels. 
2.2.4.  References to the first stage 
As  we  have  seen, it is in fact the analysis of the results from  the first stage of the 
research (see particularly the above  mentioned tables 1,  2, 4,  8,  10  and  11  in Chapter 
One)  which will allow us  to pass on to the second stage of the research based primarily 
on  the "Selective Historical Series". 
Because  of the continuity of the development  of the analysis,  we  may  sometimes  appear 
somewhat  repetitious in presenting,  elaborating and  commenting  on  data,  but  this,  however 
tedious,  is unavoidable if we  wish to investigate all facets  of complex phenomena really 
thoroughly. 
2.2.5.  Choice  of brands and  sizes - QQ•  1-13 
The  first Table  of the "Selective Historical Series"  stresses the  geographical or spatial 
dispersion of prices for the  same  product according to brand and  size,  but  especially 
according to the sales point. 
In fact,  the first Table outlines many relevant aspects of the pricing system and 
distribution structure. 
First of all answers are given to the following detailed and specific questions,  concerning 
the range  of choice open to final consumers: 
I)  How  many  brands and  sizes of one  product are available in one  given shop  of 
(1)  the sample? 
II) Is there,  or is there not,  a  reasonable choice of brands and  sizes for the 
(2)  consumer? 
III) Is the range of choice broadly the same  for all shops in the  local sample,  or are 
(3)  there strong differences among  the shops  in the  sample? 
IV) 
(4) 
The  same  question,  but referring to an inter-regional comparison,  that is:  is 
there broadly the  same  range  of choice - concerning given brands and sizes - in 
all the regions surveyed  (for example:  1)  Greater London,  2)  Greater Manchester, 
3)  Greater Glasgow)  or does this range  of choice vary considerably from  one  region 
to another in the  same  country? 
V)  The  same  question,  but referring to an international comparison.  Does  the range 
(5)  of choice differ - concerning given brands and sizes - among  the different countries 
considered? 
VI)  Are  the~  brands and  sizes,  produced by the~  manufacturers,  available in _ill 
(6)  countries,  regions  or shops,  or do  the names  and sizes of those brands  (as well as 
the names  of their manufacturers)  vary according to country,  region or shop? 
VII)  What  is the share  of own  labels and/or imported products analysed in different 
(7)  countries  (or regions)? 
VIII) Are  the more  popular sizes sold under own  labels or under manufacturers'  brands? 
(8) 
IX)  Are  actual manufacturers of  own  label products the same  as  of manufacturers' 
(9)  branded products or are they different? 
X)  Are  imported products more  widespread among  the  own  label products or among  the 
(10)  manufacturers'  branded products? 
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(11)  manufacturers and sizes sold in each given shop  or is there a  tendency towards 
continual change? 
XII)  Is there a  tendency towards  an increase in the  share of  own  label items in the 
(12)  sample  of shops,  or is there a  tendency towards an increase in manufacturers' 
branded products?  The  same  question for imported products in relation to 
home-produced  goods? 
XIII) 
(13) 
In a  mare  general way,  is there a  general or common  tendency towards a  widening 
of the range of brands and sizes available to the final consumer  (and therefore 
towards an increase of competition among  brands sold in each shop)  or is there, 
on  the contrary,  a  tendency towards a  reduction in the number  of brands and 
sizes available in each  shop? 
We  must  point  out the "double meaning"  of the word  "~"  ("what  is the share", 
questions 7 and  12): 
-number of items  (brands and  sizes), 
-percentage of the retailers'  total sales of the given items  (own  labels and  imported 
goods). 
2.2.6. Unit Retail Selling Prices:  contents of the first table 
The  first table of the "Selective Historical Series" is designed to illustrate: 
spatial and  geographical  comparisons, 
evolutionary comparisons. 
In the same  scheme  it is planned to indicate together,  for comparison purposes,  two 
countries {or two  regions  of the  same  country)  and also the code number  of each shop, 
the name  and  owner  of the shop  being identified from  the separate lists of Sales Points 
for each country. 
These  shops are ranked according to the same  criterion - in decreasing order of the 
degree of brand monopolization,  the first shop  (on the left) being the one  where  the 
consumer  has the narrowest range  of choice  of brands and  sizes and  the  last shop  (on 
the far right)  being the  one  where  the range  of choice is the widest. 
All the brands,  sizes and  manufacturers,  even if they are available only in~  of the 
countries (or regions)  compared,  are specified on  the right of the table,  as well as the 
whole  range  of  own  label products available in each  of the countries  (or regions). 
The  names  of the shops  (and  of their owners  or groups)  are specified in the lists attached 
to the first table. 
Moreover,  conclusions about  the distribution structure in several member  countries can be 
drawn  from  comparison of more  "couples"  of tables  (each one  for two  countries or regions). 
The  bottom of the first table indicates,  for each shop 
- the stock turnover rate or time in stock (Tj); 
the average unit selling price; 
the "SCORID'  for each  shop,  used to calculate the efficiency rankings  (as we  will 
see at 2.4.:  "Analysis of shop efficiency"). 
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For the study of structural evolution,  the first table has to be  established for each 
survey  (and generally these enquiries will be  six-monthly}.  Thus,  one  series of these 
tables,  covering a  sufficient number  of six-monthly surveys,  will outline the  evolution 
of eaoh distribution structure as well as the existence of  common  and/or divergent 
features in the comparative evolution as between member  states or between different 
regions studied. 
Therefore,  several first tables regarding different countries  (and regions}  as well as 
different surveys  (carried out at different times  over a  sufficiently long period)  will 
be  the subject of cross comparisons  and  of further summary  tables. 
In order to underline salient and  more  m~ingful data from  the first table, it is 
planned to establish a  "Summary  Table"  (fourth table)  concerning more  particularly the 
evolution of the "Unit Retail Selling Price".  Similar "Summary  Tables" will have  as 
their subject the evolution of "Retailers Mark-U~' (fifth table}  and  the evolution of 
"Unit Retail :au_yi.ng  Price"  (sixth table}. 
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2.3.1.  Basic presentation of the First, Second  and  Third Tables 
The  layout  of the first table is the  same  as that of the second  and  third tables, 
though the data to be  entered in them  is different even if they are closely related, 
since all three tables take into account: 
- the  same  product and  the  same  bran<:ls,  sizes,  manufacturers  and  own  labels; 
the  same  surveys  (No.  and date); 
the same  countries (or regions),  generally two  for each table; 
-the same  sample  of sales points  (or shops),  each one  with the  same  name  and  code 
number  in each of the three tables. 
But,  what  is more  important is that the  shops  (or "sales points")  are ranked in exactly 
the same  order in the three tables,  the first shop  (or the second,  third,  etc.) being 
exactly the  same  (same  ranking,  same  name)  in all three. 
In this way,  since: 
- the first table outlines the "Unit Selling Price"  (to final consumers), 
the  second table:  the "Retailer's Mark-up", 
the third table:  the "Unit Retail  Bu.ying  Price", 
it is possible to investigate thoroughly  the structures considered,  in order to point 
out the salient aspects of the quantitative relationship between the buying price and 
the selling price. 
From  cross comparisons  based  on  the set of these three tables it is possible to draw 
valuable conclusions that will help to improve  our  knowledge  of the behaviour  of major 
retailers.  Let us  examine  separately the quantities outlined in each table: 
-unit selling prices (first table); 
-retail mark-ups  (second table); 
-unit buying prices (third table). 
All these tables also consider,  at the bottom,  the shops'  average "stock turnover rate" 
(Tj)  for the  given product  (or time in stock),  suggesting fruitful comparisons  and 
remarks,  in relation to averages  concerning unit selling and buying prices and  mark-ups. 
2.3.2.  The  unit retail selling prices - QQ.  14-20 
The  first table aims  to answer  the following questions,  concerning unit  prices in 
particular: 
XIV)  What  is the degree  of dispersion of unit prices between the different brands and 
(14)  sizes- including  own  label products- for the same  product? 
XV)  Generally speaking,  how  are the  own  label products priced in relation to 
(15)  manufacturers'  branded products: 
a)  are they cheaper? 
b)  are they more  expensive? 
c)  are they sometimes  cheaper and  sometimes  more  expensive? 
Does  the difference in price correspond to a  real difference in quality? 
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(16)  goods. 
XVII)  In which  shop  of the sample will we  find the highest  (or lowest)  unit price?  For 
(17)  which  brand and  size?  Do  those prices refer to own  label products and/or to 
imported products? 
XVIII)  Referring to the lowest unit price charged in each  shop~egardless of brand and/or 
(18)  size),  which is the most  expensive  shop in the sample? 
XIX)  Is the  shop with the highest  (or lowest)  unit price the one  where  the choice  of 
(19)  brands and  sizes is widest  (or narrowest)?  Or  is there no  significant relationship 
between the number  of brands and  sizes and  the price level' 
XX)  When  the shops  of the sample  sell one  product made  by  the~  manufacturer but 
(20) under different trade marks  - including own  label ones - which  brand,  and  in which 
shop,  costs more  (or less)  and  why? 
2.3.3.  The  selling prices of "identical items" - QQ.  21-25 
One  aspect  of great interest is the  comparison and  analysis  of unit prices of "identical 
~"  (same  brand and size), that can be  found  in more  than one  shop. 
Thus  we  will put questions  such as: 
XXI)  What  is the degree  of dispeFsion of prices between the different shops  selling 
(21)  a  given "identical item"  (same  brand and  size)? 
XXII)  Which  are the dearest  (or cheapest)  shops for each "identical item",  exactly defined 
(22)  as above  (same  brand and  size)? 
Are  these  shops  the  same  as the dearest  shops  as regards the unit price of the 
product when  no distinction is made  as to either brand or size (as  we  have .done 
in question 18)? 
XXIII)  Which  are the brands and  the actual producers or manufacturers for which the 
{23)  highest degree of dispersion of prices is observed as between: 
a)  the  shops constituting the local sample? 
b)  the different countries or regions  surveyed? 
c)  which  countries (or regions)  have  the highest  or  lowest  prices for the same 
"identical items"  (ie. same  brand,  same  size,  same  actual manufacturer)? 
XXIV~ It is possible to consider the following alternatives: 
(24  a)  does the retailer group have  some  of its shops  specializing in the more 
expensive brands  (prestige brands)  while  other shops sell only more  common, 
cheaper brands? 
b)  do all the shops  of the group sell more  or less the  same  brands and  sizes, 
without  any specialization as to quality? 
For the latter hypothesis,  the following question will arise. 
XXV)  What  is the pricing policy of the  operator group?  It m~  be  that: 
(25) a)  in all shops  of the group the prices of "identical items"  are the  same; 
b)  in some  shops,  prices are higher for some  "identical items"  and  lower for others; 
c)  some  shops are always  more  expensive and others are always  cheaper. 
The  problem is ver.y  complex.  It m~  be helpful to refer to the fundamental 
questions regrouped under 49,  50  and  51· 
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~  comparing two  or more  fourth tables (extracted from  the respective first tables}, 
relating to different points in the reference periOd {!, !±!t ~~  eto.), it is 
possible to draw 1onclusions on the evolution of the structure considered.  Questions 
will be  put about  : 
XXVI)  Does  the degree of dispersion of unit prices, between the different brands 
(26)  and sizes - including own  label products - increase or decrease between t, 
l±!t ~'  t+3,  etc.?  (See also question 14).  -
XXVII)  Is it always the same  brand/size that is the most  expensive or the  cheapest'l 
(27) 
XXVIII)  Does  the  (average)  unit price increase more  for  own  label items  or for 
(28)  manufacturers'  branded products?  Or  can no  clear trend be  observed? 
(See also question 15). 
XXIX)  Does  the  (average}  unit price increase more  for imported products or for 
(29)  home-produced  goods? 
XXX)  Is it always  the  same  shops that sell the more  expensive  items or the less 
(30)  expensive  ones  (in terms  of unit price)?  (See also questions  17  and  18). 
XXXI)  Are  the shops  with the highest  (or lowest)  increases in the  (average)  unit 
(31)  prices those where: 
a)  the choice  of brands and sizes (including own  labels) is wider or narrower? 
Or  is there no significant relationship?  {See  also question 19). 
b)  the choice of brands and sizes (including "own  labels")  has become  wider 
or narrower during the reference period'?  Or is there no significant 
relationship? 
o)  the share of own  labels has increased {or decreased)  in relation to 
manufacturers'  brand products'? 
d)  the share of imported products has increased (or decreased)  in relation to 
home-produced  goods? 
e)  an important  change  of the brands,  manufacturers,  sizes and packages  took 
place during the reference period?  (See also question 11). 
XXXII)  Is there a  significant relationship between the increase in unit prices and  an 
{32)  important change  in the brands and sizes sold b,y  a  given shop'? 
XXXIII)  Is the change  affecting a  given manufacturer's brand sold in a  given shop due  to: 
(33)  a)  removal  of the brand from  the manufacturer's catalogue and  production line; 
b)  a  change  of supplier b,y  the retailer, though in favour  of another 
manufacturer's brand; 
c)  replacement  of the manufacturer's  brand  by an  own  label,  the product still 
being made  b,y  the  old manufacturer; 
d)  replacement  of the manufacturer's brand by  an  own  label,  the new  product being: 
d 1)  made  by a  new  manufacturer, 
d2)  imported,  whereas  before it was  home-produced, 
d3)  home-produced,  whereas  before it was  imported. 
1.  In point 4  we  will refer to the normal  hypothesis  of an "increase in prices",  but the 
same  questions  and  remarks  are usually valid when,  as  an exception,  there is a  decrease 
in prices and not  an  increase. 
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(34)  Do  they concern home-produced  or imported goods?  Which  are the substitute 
products if any,  and  how  much  more  (or less) do  they cost than the  items 
dropped?  Is there a  tendency towards  a  sharp increase (or decrease)  in unit 
prices for substitute products in comparison with the  own  labels or manufacturers' 
brands that have  been dropped? 
XXXV)  Has  the change  in the size and/or packaging of a  given product - whatsoever  the 
(35)  brand  concerned:  manufacturer's brand or  own  label - caused an increase in the 
unit price that is: 
a)  greater than the average  increase in the unit price of the product? 
b)  smaller than the average  increase in the unit price of the product? 
XXXVI)  Which  reasons have  been advanced  by manufacturers and/or retailers for 
(36}  explaining the changes  eventually recorded in the above  mentioned questions? 
XXXVII)  When  one  operator group  owns  several shops,  is the  increase in the unit prices 
(37)  for identical items  of the given product absolutely the same  for all shops  of 
the group,  or do  these increases in unit prices differ according to the  item 
and  shop? 
XXXVIII)  Ar~ 1he  answers to all questions  of this point- from  26  to 37,  as well as  to 
(38)  questions from  11  to 13: 
a)  much  the  same  for all countries and/or regions  surveyed,  or at least for most 
of them? 
b)  divergent from  one  country and/or region to another? 
2·3·5·  The  retail mark-up - Contents  of the Second Table - QQ.39-45 
The  second table has as its subject the retail mark-up  by shops  and  brands/sizes. 
Before  examining this table it is worth  considering the first two  reference tables  (one 
on structure, the other on  evolution)  summarizing,  in a  comparative way,  the contents 
of the questions related to each of the three tables as regards unit retail prices, 
retail mark-ups  and  buying  prices. 
Answers  will be  given to the following questions: 
XXXIX)  What  is the degree of dispersion of mark-up  between  the different brands and 
(39)  sizes- including own  label products- for the same'product1 
XL)  What  is the size of the mark-up  applied to own  label products,  in comparison 
(40)  with manufacturers'  branded  products: 
a)  are they lower? 
b)  are they higher? 
c)  are they sometimes  lower  and  sometimes  higher? 
XLI)  The  same  question,  as regards the mark-ups  on  imported products in comparison 
(41)  with home-produced  goods. 
XLII)  In which  shop  of the  sample  will we  find the absolute highest  (o.r  lowest)  mark-up? 
(42)  For which  brand  and  size?  What  is the size of those mark-ups?  Are  they applied to 
own  label products,  and/or imported products1 
Ill XLIII)  Referring to the  lowest unit price which  is available in each shop  (whatever 
(43)  the corresponding brand and/or size): 
a)  which is the shop applying the highest  (or  lowest)  mark-up? 
b)  does this shop  coincide  or not with the most  expensive  (or cheapest) 
shop  considered in questions  17  and  18? 
c)  does this shop  coincide with  one  of the  shops  indicated in question 42? 
XLIV)  Are  the  shops  recording the  ~ighest (or lowest)  mark-ups  (questions 42  and 43) 
(44)  the  ones  where  the  choice  of brands and  sizes is wider  (or narrower)?  Or  is 
there no significant relationship between the number  of brands and sizes and 
the level of mark-ups? 
XLV)  When  the  shops  of the  sample -sell one  product made  by  the ~  manufacturer, 
(45)  but under different trade marks  - including  own  labels - which  brand,  and  in 
which  shop,  has the highest  (or lowest)  mark-up? 
2.3.6.  The  mark-ups  applied to identical items - QQ.  46-48 
Let  us now  consider each item separately,  defined jointly by brand and  size,  in order 
to come  to some  conclusion as to the  comparison between  identical items  where  they are 
sold in more  than one  shop. 
XLVI)  What  is the degree of dispersion of mark-ups  between the different shops 
(46)  selling a  given  identical item,  (aame  brand and size)? 
XLVII)  Which  are the  shops  recording the highest  (or lowest)  mark-ups  for each 
(47)  identical item,  defined exactly as  above  (ie.  same  ~and and  size)? 
Do  the names  of those  shops  coincide  or not with the  shops mentioned at 
questions 43,  17,  18  and 22?  In which  cases and  to what  extent? 
XLVIII)  Which  are the brands  and  the actual producers  or manufacturers for which 
(48)  we  observe the highest degree  of dispersion of "mark-up": 
a)  between the  shops  constituting the  local sample  analysed? 
b)  between the different countries or regions  surveyed? 
c)  which  countries (or regions)  record the highest  (or lowest)  mark-ups  for 
the  same  identical items  (ie.  same  brand,  same  size,  same  manufacturer)? 
2·3·7•  The  retailer groups  operating several shops- Q.  49 
A major problem may  arise with the following question: 
XLIX)  Referring to the hypothesis at question 25  - the major retailer groups  operating 
(49)  several "sales points" - what  is the pricing policy of the group?  Since it is 
reasonable to assume  that one  given group  b~s all identical items  sold in its 
shops at the  same  price, it seems  evident that the present question coincides 
substantially with question 25.  In fact, if the  b~ing price is the  same  and if 
an identical mark-up is applied by all shops,  there will also be  an identical 
"retail price".  So  hypotheses  25  (a),  (b)  and  (c) refer equally to final unit 
retail prices as well as to retail mark-ups.  But  transport facilities and  the 
cost  of capital and  land vary according to both location and  size of different 
shops - even if they are controlled by  the  same  operator group - and  so accurate 
analyses are needed about: 
a)  the buying price paid b.y  the retailer to obtain delivery of the  goods  at a 
given warehouse  or storage point, 
b)  the full,  actual cost borne by the retailer in order to have  goods  ready 
for sale in each of the different shops  of the  group. 
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on  the full,  actual cost of the  good  b  • 
Thus  the answer to question 49  entails making  an accurate analysis of the 
different mark-ups  applied  Roc  different  shops  in the  same  group,  to determine 
to what  extent the differences in final unit retail prices are  linked to 
differences in the full,  actual costs,  varying according to shop. 
2.3.8.  The  competitive price for each shop and  endogenous  competition - Q.  50 
A common  answer  to questions 49  and 25  should highlight the working  of  competition 
in the different areas  surveyed. 
From  the purely economic  vieWPoint,  it seems  evident that: 
- each shop  (owned  by  the  same  retailer (operator group),  as it is on  our hypothesis) 
has to contend with a  different competitive situation depending  on  its location and 
on  the number,  importance and  pricing policies of competing shops,  that is those 
existing in the relevant area; 
- accordingly,  each shop will have  to adapt its prices to  the prices of its actual 
competitors in this relevant area and  the prices ought  to vary between  shops 
controlled by the  same  operator group as a  normal  effect of  competition; 
it is obvious that in this case,  the mark-up- for each shop- should be  fixed  in 
such a  way  as to obtain the "competitive price"  characterizing each shop.  One  of 
the most  efficient retailers in the  UK  has  four different price levels and  four 
different pricing policies,  depending  on  the location of individual shops. 
The  preceding remarks  aim to demonstrate that competitive as yell as efficient behaviour 
by the retailers automatically implies  endogenous  competition  between shops  controlled 
by the same  operator  group. 
We  therefore put  the question: 
L)  Assuming  several  shops to be  owned  by the  same  operator: 
(50)  a)  is there endogenous  competition between those  shops  in one  or more  relevant areas 
analysed,  so that a  high degree  of dispersion of prices between them  is observed? 
b)  what  is the comparative degree  of dispersion for prices and  mark-ups  between the 
different shops? 
c)  for which  operator groups  and  in which regions and  countries is endogenous 
competition stronger,  in relation to the answer  given to question 48  (b)? 
d)  are prices lower  in areas where  several shops are controlled by  several 
retailers competing against  one  another?  How  many  competing  shops are there? 
How  many  competing retailers? 
2.3.9.  Shops  of the  same  groups applY  uniform prices - Q.  51 
Let us now  consider the hypothesis  of uniform prices  b.Y  putting the following 
question: 
1.  See 
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of LI)  If prices are the  same  for all shops  controlled b,y  the  same  retailer,  one  of the 
(51)  following hypotheses will occur: 
a)  either the retail price of a  given item (ie. product determined  b,y  the brand, 
size and  package)  is fixed  b,y  the manufacturer himself for all shops  selling 
this product in one  or more  regions  or countries; 
b)  or there is an agreement  between the operator groups  owning  the  shops  existing 
in a  given relevant area to refrain from  price competition for this product; 
c)  or the operator group is fixing a  uniform mark-up  based exclusively on  a  common 
buying price,  calculated artificially for all shops  of the group  on  the basis 
of the  suppliers'  invoices. 
If the hypotheses  51  (a)  and  (b)  do  occur we  can conclude that: 
- there is no  competition on  the product,  owing  to the restrictive behaviour  of the 
manufacturer  (hypothesis a); 
- there is no  competition on  the product,  owing  to the restrictive behaviour of the 
retailers  (hypothesis b). 
This latter hypothesis would  justify a  thorough and  comprehensive  investigation into 
the behaviour of given retailers in order to see if similar agreements also concern 
other products,  seriously affecting competition in the relevant area. 
2.3.10.  Explanatory hypothesis of uniform prices- QQ.  52-53 
Let  us finally examine  hypothesis  51  (c),  that is, prices are derived from  the 
application of a  general mark-up  on  a  uniform buying price,  both being  common  to 
all shops  of the operator group.  In this case we  have  the dilemma: 
LII) Either the competitive pressures  on  the retail side in the relevant area are 
(52)  relatively weak  (no  competing  shop nearb,y,  or only a  higher priced shop)  and 
so it is possible to disregard competition,  and particularly prices in other 
shops,  in the relevant area,  without the profitability of the  shops  under 
study being affected; 
LIII)  Or  those competitive pressures are fairly strong (several low  priced shops 
(53)  nearb,y)  in which  case a  rigid,  uniform pricing policy is bound  to be  inefficient 
since it neglects the actual specific environment  of each shop. 
But  the "profitability" and "efficiency"  issue is taken into consideration by  joint 
analysis  of the set of data (average stock turnover rate for each shop as well as  the 
shop's average unit retail price, retail mark-up  and unit buying price) at the bottom 
of the first,  second and  third tables. 
At  any rate it is worth noting that such an analysis has to distinguish between the effi-
ciency of the single shop and  the efficiency of the aggregate  operator group,  the latter being 
obtained by  aggregation of the "efficiency score"  of all the individual shops in the 
restricted sample  (of shops as well as of products),  always  assuming this sample  to be 
representative. 
2.3.11.  The  evolution of "mark-ups"  - QQ.  54-64 
If the analysis is to be  complete answers must  also be  given to questions  concerning the 
evolution of mark-~ ("q")  (questions 54-64),  which  are similar to questions  concerning 
the evolution of unit retail prices  (questions 26-38).  There  is no  need to reformulate 
those questions. 
Later,  in section 2.7.  we  will analyse in detail the problems  concerning the unit  b~ying 
~  ("aPu"),  distinguishing between structure (questions 65-74)  and  evolution 
{questions 75-84),  with additional questions  concerning more  particularly the "power 
interplay"  (questions 85-94).  In this respect, it is helpful to recall the reference 
tables mentioned in point  5: 
114 - first reference table concerning 
prices), 
structure (retail prices,  mark-ups  and  bu;ying 
- second reference table concerning 
prices), 
evolution (retail prices,  mark-ups  and  bu;ying 
- third reference table concerning "power  interpla,y"  (85-94);  shop  efficiency (95-103) 
and  the loss leading policy (104-115). 
- fourth reference table concerning excessive prices,  breakdown  of the  final price and 
national and  local  competition (116-140). 
These  tables summarize  all questions from  14  to 140.  It is useful to recall that 
questions  1 to 13  concern the more  general problem  of the  choice actually available 
to the consumers. 
2.3.12.  The  problem of defining and calculating the retailers'  b~ying prices - QQ.  65-94 
The  analysis of the relationship between selling (or retail) prices,  mark-ups  and buying 
prices is1an essential step in the study of the power  interplay between retailers and 
producers  •  Even  if, in the initial stage of the research,  it may  be  very difficult to 
answer most  of the  140  questions,  the target of the research as defined above  has to 
be kept in mind.  In this way,  the  140  questions can be  regarded as  guidelines for a 
multiple-stage long-term research project. 
It might  be  helpful to formulate a  number  of additional remarks  on  the treatment  of 
bu;ying  prices. 
The  collection of bu;ying  prices is  particular~ fruitful for analysis  of: 
I) the  comparative viewpoints of retailers and  producers, 
II) the mark-up  policy of the major retailers. 
As  concerns  the first point, it will be necessary to check the buying prices declared 
by retailers with the manufacturers'  prices.  If these prices are divergent,  an 
appropriate survey will be needed  in order to seek possible explanations: 
a)  manufacturers are not selling direct~ to major retailers but to commercial 
distributors or wholesalers;  in this case it is helpful to analyse the margins  of 
those traders; 
b)  buying prices declared by retailers are not  exact or manufacturers'  prices are not 
exact,  owing  to errors or to other causes to be discovered; 
c) retailers consider a  peculiar definition of "buying price",  which does not  correspond 
with the "manufacturers'  price"2. 
1. It is for this reason that it seems  helpful: 
- to regroup all the questions  concerning the retailers' buying price  (QQ.  65-84) 
with the closely connected questions concerning the basic aspects and tendencies 
of power  interplay (QQ.  8~94), 
- to examine  these questions later at 2.  7.: "Retail Buying  Prices and Power  InterplaY''. 
2.  The  effect of taxes  on  the relevant product will have  to be  considered. 
115 In principle,  the "buying price" represents the cost of the good  plus  other costs for 
delivery to the warehouse  or to the retailer's shop (c.i.f.).  It is therefore possible 
that transportation and  insurance costs account for the difference between the 
manufacturers'  price (f.o.b.) and the retailers' net buying price.  The  way  different 
sorts of  discounts and  facilities granted to big retailers are registered and disclosed 
by the retailers and  by the manufacturers is a  problem that will be  considered later at 
2.7.24.  and 25. 
2.3.13.  The  "formal"  and the "actual" .mark-up 
The  date of pur.chase  of the  goods  may  also be relevant in these times  of inflation. 
Knowledge  of the buying price is vital if we  are to check the size of retail mark-ups 
declared by the retailers themselves,  b,y  comparing retail selling prices with their 
actual  buying prices. 
The  problem is very important: 
- Are  all retailers considering the  same  conception of the mark-up,  or is each using 
a  different definition? 
- Is it possible to distinguish between a  formal  and an actual mark-up? 
The  simplest  approach would  be to take from  the third table the buying price,  to add  the 
mark-up  from  the  second table and  thence to obtain the selling price,  which  ought to be 
the same  as in the first table. 
It is an essential task for  each research :institute to check,  in this way,  the  consistency 
of data linked by these three tables.  But  it is easy to forecast that the selling price 
calculated from  the  second and third tables will rarely correspond to the price in the 
first table.  In this case,  appropriate analyses will then have  to be  undertaken in order 
to provide  explanations,  such as: 
a)  the mark-up has  been calculated on  a  buying price which  is different from  the 
buying price currently applied at the time  of the retail price survey; 
b)  the retail price has  changed  since the mark-up  was  calculated. 
In these hypotheses it is easy to see that we  have  a  formal  mark-up  (that is, a  given 
"q"  applied to the buying price)  and an actual mark-up  (that is, the actual percentage 
indicating the difference between the actual selling price and  the actual buying price). 
2.3.14.  Relationship between bu,ying  price,  time in stock and "actual" mark-up 
In practice the retailer will find it quite  easy to know  the  formal mark-up,  since he 
himself fixes  the percentage to be applied.  But  in inflationary times it may  be 
difficult to know  the actual mark-up,  since the prerequisite would  be  knowledge  of the 
actual date  of purchase and  of the actual buying prices for any  item sold by  the  shop. 
\fuen  a  product is bought at several times at different prices, it is necessary to take 
into account  the time  in stock in order to calculate an average  buying price and  an 
average mark-up. 
The  institutes must  therefore take care to try to collect relatively comparable and 
homogenous  data as regards buying prices and  mark-ups,  outlining all existing discrepancies 
and differences between the  second and  third tables on  the  one  hand  and  the first table 
on  the  other.  It is also obvious that specific analysis  of the time  in stock,  linked to 
the  problem  of the "shop efficiency"t is justified by the objectives of the research 
programme. 
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2.4.1.  Time  in stock 
At  the bottom of each  of the three tables just examined,  there is one  highly relevant 
point: 
- the stock turnover rate,  or time in stock (Tj),  which  is outlined for each shop  of 
the sample. 
It is noteworthy that this Tj  (j indicating the code  number  of the  shop)  is only an 
average calculated on  different brands and  sizes of the given product sold by  the-shop. 
It is suggested that the stock turnover rate should be  expressed b,y  the number  of  d~ys 
during which the product is kept  in the shop  or in its warehouses,  that is the number  of 
days  between the delivery date from  the supplier and  the selling date to the final 
consumer  (for example,  for canned vegetables - 140 days;  for eggs- 8 days).  For this 
reason it is better to speak of time  in stock.  It is evident that,  ceteris paribus, 
the fuore  efficient shops are those where  the time  in stock is shortest. 
In this way  it is possible to analyse the relationships between time in stock and: 
- the unit selling price; 
- the mark-up; 
- the unit buying price. 
2.4.2.  The  concept  of shop  efficiency 
In this framework,  it is possible to elaborate a  general approach to shop  efficiency 
from  two  angles: 
- the benefit to the shop; 
-the benefit to the consumer  (social angle). 
From  the first angle: 
-a shorter time in stock (Tj);  and  a 
- lower buying price, 
mean  that the  shop is more  efficient than others with a  longer time  in stock and/or 
a  higher buying price. 
From  the second angle: 
-a lower unit selling price;  and  a 
- lower mark-up, 
indicate that the benefit arising from  the shop's efficiency is passed  on  to the consumer. 
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It·is possible to rank the shops  b.y  efficiency in order of scores. 
To  begin with,  all shops will be ranked- each one  having a  given rank number- b.y 
increasing order of the time in stock,  unit selling price,  mark-up,  unit b~ing price. 
The  more  efficient shop will therefore rank as number  1  on  each of those parameters. 
In the first table,  the "best shop"  will have  a  score equal to. 2,  that is:  ranking 1 
for the time in stock and  ranking  1 'for the unit selling price, that is the cheapest 
price of all the shops  in the  sample.  The  least efficient shop might  possibly have  a 
score  equal to 60,  that is:  given a  sample  of 30  shops,  it would  rank 30th b.Y  time  in 
stock and  30th b.Y  unit selling price (it would  therefore be the most  expensive  shop in 
the  sample. 
In the  second table,  the score ranking will be  founded  on  the time in stock and  on  the 
size of the mark-up  (the "best shop"  being the  one  applying the lowest mark-up),  while 
in the third table,  the score ranking will be  founded  on  the time  in stock,  as usual, 
and  on  the unit buying price (the "best  shop"  being the  one  paying the  lowest  buying 
price). 
2·4·4· Aspects  of shop efficiency - QQ.  95=100 
Answers  to the following questions might  be  helpfu11: 
XCV)  Do  the efficiency rankings  of the three tables coincide,  that is:  the best 
(95)  (or the worst)  shops are always  the  same  in each of these tables? 
XCVI)  If it is possible,  given the necessary data, to calculate an overall score -
(96)  by  adding the shops'  rankings  in the three tables - which  would  be  the most  (or 
least) efficient shops,  according to the definitions given above? 
XCVII)  Since all shops are ranked according to the number  of brands and sizes available 
(97)  to the consumer  (degree  of brand monopolization)  it is easy to see if the most 
"product monopolistic"  shops,  at the left side of the table,  are also the most 
(or leamt)  efficient shops in the sample. 
XCVIII)  Does  it happen  that shops recording the lowest  buying prices have  to bear a 
(98)  longer time in stock since they usually buy  more  than they need in order to reap 
substantial discounts? 
XCIX)  When  comparing the  second tables referring to different products,  is there evidence 
(99)  of a  relationship between the time in stock and  the size of the mark-up?  Does 
this relationship exist in none,  in some,  in most  or in all shops  of the  sample? 
In one,  in several or in all countries surveyed? 
C)  Which  are the countries  (and/or regions)  which  have  the most  (or least) 
(100)  efficient shops? 
1. It will be  observed that we  have  not yet  examined  QQ.  65-94 concerning  jointly 
the unit retail buying prices and  power  interpl~, but  given the strategic 
importance and  considerable complexity of both,  it is helpful to postpone this 
analysis until Section 2.  7., after having cleared the ground  by  examining shop 
efficiency (QQ.  95-103)  and  the loss leading policy (Section 2.6.;  QQ.  104-115). 
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Under  the evolutionary viewpoint it will be helpful to answer  the  following  questions: 
CI)  As  regards the evolution of "shops'  averages"  - time  in stock as well as unit 
(101)  selling and  b~ing prices- do  they tend to increase,  and if so to what  extent 
and  in which  countries (and/  or regions)  in particular'? 
CII)  Which  shops  are tending to become  "better"  (that is, cutting their time  in stock, 
(102)  mark-ups  and  possibly even the buying and  selling prices)  and  which  shops  are on 
a  deteriorating trend'? 
CIII) Do  the overall efficiency scores resulting from  the three tables,  and  the three 
(103)  individual efficiency scores change  considerably in time  or not'?  Which  shops  are 
the best  (or worst)  in the long run'? 
119 2.5.  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONCRETE  PRICE  STRUCTURES  FOR  SELECTED  PRODUCTS 
2.5.1. References to the basic contents  of the first,  second  and  third tables 
The  first,  second  and  third tables give a  breakdown  of the structure and  its evolution, 
by  analysing each shop,  product,  brand  and  supplier  (producer,  manufacturer)  in the 
"restricted"  sample. 
It is helpful to recall the  fundamental  goals  of the research programme: 
To  analyse both the structure and  the  evolution of: 
the power  interplay between retailers and  producers and their patterns  of behaviour, 
the working  of competition in the distribution channels  through which  given products 
and  brands  move  from  producer to final  consumer, 
the effects of the  competition mechanism  on  final retail prices and  on  the  consumers' 
freedom  and  behaviour. 
2.5.2.  The  analysis  of concrete price structures as  a  top priority 
The  analysis of answers  given,  even to only  some  of  the  140  questions,  enables us  to 
draw meaningful  conclusions.  These  questions concern more  particularly the  concrete 
structure and  evolution of the prices of selected products. 
The  analysis of the concrete structure and  evolution of prices is,  in our view,  a~ 
priority for  any further analysis  of relations between retailers and  producers  in 
general terms. 
It may  be  objected that this supposedly detailed analysis extends  only to a~ 
restricted sample  of selected products1  so that there  can be  no  question of drawing 
general conclusions  on  the patterns of behaviour of retailers and  producers. 
However,  it will be  noted that the three "observation posts" - unit retail selling prices, 
retail mark-ups,  unit retail buying prices - play a  threefold function: 
a) first,  they enable the reliability of data collected to be  checked as to homogeneity 
and consistency; 
b)  second,  they provide an illustration of the working  of competition between retailers; 
c)  third,  they provide  a  means  of measuring  the  evolution of the balance of power  and 
dominance  as  between retailers and  producers. 
Why  and how?  Let us see. 
2.5.3.  Rigorous definitions are a  sine qua non  of several  comparisons 
As  regards  (a),  this statement  seems  to us to be  self-evident,  considering the need for a 
comparative analysis  of the behaviour of shops  and retailers with different price policies 
and structures and  the highly specific situations of individual regions  and countries.  The 
great number  of questions  aim  to check that data are  ~~assified according to comparable 
definitions and  approaches,  and  thus to avoid all ambiguity. 
1.  See 2.1.10. 
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. .. 2·5•4•  The  THREE  KEYS 
As  regards  (b)  and  (c),  we  need  three keys  for analysing the answers to the various 
questions,  or at least to some  of them: 
- key  one:  the analysis  of evolution, 
- key  two:  international  (and if possible interregional)  comparisons  of this 
evolution, 
- key three:  comparison between products. 
The  Summary  Tables  (the fourth,  fifth and sixth)  are a  good  example  of the way  in which 
we  may  approach  some  general conclusions,  having recourse to key ~  and to key 1!£• 
Later analysis will highlight the role of key ~· 
The  fourth table,  concerning the unit selling price,  will give  several pointers to 
the working of competition between retailers,  b,y  setting out the answers  to the basic 
questions: 
- 26:  variation of degree  of dispersion of unit selling prices, 
27:  change  in the dearest  or cheapest brand/size, 
30:  change  in the dearest  or cheapest  shop. 
When  those answers  show  that: 
- the degree  of dispersion of prices remains high or increases in the time;  and 
- the dearest  and  cheapest brand/size changes  continuously, 
- the dearest and  cheapest  shop  changes  continuously; 
there is evidence  of keen  competition: 
- between brands/sizes 
- between shops. 
If moreover,  it is found  that: 
- differences between maximum  and  minim~ price increases are widening and  even,  on 
the minimum  side,  there is a  price decrease; 
the names  of shops  with the highest  or  lowest  increases in the prices are  changing; 
this corroborates the evidence in favour  of effective competition. 
We  are assuming that: 
competition tends to develop dynamically,  and  is visible through the continuous 
changing of relevant data and  factors·l, 
1.  See:  R.  LINDA,  Concurrence  oligopolistique et planification concurrentielle 
internationals,  in "Economie  Appliqu~e", Archiws  de 1'  ISEA,  1972,  No.  2-3, 
pages  340-341,  367-369. 
121 - differing prices or differing price increases are a~  of competition, albeit of a 
.probably "imperfect"  form,  but at least fairly workable,  whereas  uniform prices and 
uniform increases tend to point to restrictions of competition.  And  on  the whole  we 
prefer imperfections  of competition,  since it still works,  rather than restrictions 
of it1. 
Here  it is worth emphasising the utility of the index of dispersion,  which  offers a 
summary  quantitative picture of the effects on  prices  jointly exerted by imperfections 
and  b,y  restrictions of competition. 
The  indexER~  (Relative Difference)  expresses the  perc.entage difference between the 
highest unit  u  price recorded in any  shop  (most  expensive  shop)  and  the  lowest unit 
price recorded  elsewhere  (che&pest  shop)2.  If ER~  exceeds~ it m~  be  concluded 
that the conditions  of  competition are very  u  different for the  two  extreme 
priced shops  of the  sample.  But  it- is noteworthy that the  existence  of different 
conditions  of  competition surrounding at least two  shops  in the sample- owing  essentially 
either to their location or specialization or both- constitutes per~  a  sign of 
competition.  This  sign of competition will  be  even more  meaningful  and reliable if we 
have  a  coefficient  of variation (  V )  exceeding 20%.  Such  a  high coefficient  of variation 
will demonstrate and  confirm thatp u  the difference in conditions of competition concern 
not j"ust  two  shops  in the  sample but the whole  sample,  since each shop has  a  different, 
specific unit price of its own. 
2.5.6.  The  number  of brands and  sizes as a  sign of competition 
Another relevant factor is the number  of brands  and  sizes available in the  shop 
(question 13): 
- with the highest selling price, 
- with the  lowest  selling price. 
If this number  is increasing both in the most  expensive  shop  and  in the  cheapest  one  and, 
under the  evolutionary viewpoint,  even  the names  of  those  shops  are  changing  from~ to 
.1!:1,  .:tt,g_,  t+  3,  we  have  a  further sign of competition: 
between brands, 
between shops. 
It seems  reasonable  therefore to argue that  shops  are widening  the  range  of brands 
available to consumers  in order to become  more  attractive to them. 
Analysis  of the evolution of retail prices by  means  of a  set of fourth tables can also 
offer pointers to the  evolution of power  relations between retailers and  producers, 
though these pointers may  be  felt to be  somewhat  ambiguous.  The  need for reference  to 
the fifth and  sixth tables is evident.  See  our commentaries  on  the sixth table. 
1.  R.  LINDA,  Methodology,~·~., 1976,  point 65. 
2.  The  formula is ER~  =  Maximum  Price - Minimum  Price  x  100  u  Minimum  Price 
See:  Commission  of the European  Communities,  Sixth Report  on  Competition Policy, 
Luxembourg,  April  1977,  points  312-315· 
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Conversely,  it is possible to.identify certain~  of restriction of  competition: 
- It is alw~s the same  shop  and  the same  brand which  are the dearest  or  cheapest.  This 
means  that there is same  source  of resistance to competition between brands  (quality, 
prestige, etc.) and  between  shops  (location,  specialization,  etc.); 
- The  percentage price increases are uniform for all brands and  for all shops.  This 
means  that an agreement definitely exists between suppliers  (producers,  manufacturers) 
and/or retailers; 
- The  number  of brands and sizes available in each shop is continuously decreasing,  each 
shop tending  to specialize in only one  or  two  brands.  If this sign is accompanied  by 
other negative signs,  competition would  seem  to be  sharply restricted. 
2.5.8.  The  synthesis concerning the retail mark-ups  (Fifth table) 
While  the fourth table represents but  a  first step in the analysis,  and  is easy enough 
to fill up  since it is sufficient to obtain information simply by  visiting the  shops  of 
the sample,  the fifth table as a  rule requires the direct cooperation of shops  themselves 
or of public authorities. 
Let us recall the basic questions: 
54:  variation of degree  of dispersion of retail mark-ups, 
55:  change  in the brand/size having  the highest  (or lowest)  mark-up, 
59:  change  in the  shop  applying the highest  (or lowest)  mark-up. 
In principle,  the degree  of dispersion of mark-ups  between different shops - at a  given 
moment- may  be a~  of competition,  since: 
- each shop  has a  different cost structure,  as a  result  of the  scale  of quantities 
purchased,  location,  size,  stock turnover rate (Tj); 
each shop  has  to encounter different kinds  of competing  shops,  in relation to its 
location,  the available means  of communication,  etc. 
Hence  the application of a  uniform mark-up  by all shops  in the  sample  is the  sign of 
collusive behaviour or  of public measures  to fix the maximum  mark-up.  But,  the public 
authorities generally fix a  maximum  mark-up  to be  observed  by  all shops  only when 
competition is not  exerting sufficient pressure  on  retailers to out their mark-ups. 
2·5·9·  Sharp decrease of the retail mark-ups  as a  sign of  competition 
Under  the evolutionary viewpoint,  it is possible to have  the  following  hypotheses in the 
process from  time ,! to .!±lt ,!g, etc.: 
l{ypothesis 
- The  degree  of dispersion of  rr~rk-up 
among  shops  is increasing 
- The  average mark-up is sharply 
decreasing,  as are both the 
maximum  and the minimum  mark-up 
The  brand/size having  the highest 
(or the  lowest)  mark-up  is changing 
The  shop having the highest  (or 
lowest mark-up  is changing 
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Remark 
Probable  sign of competition 
-Definite sign of keen competition: 
Three  hypotheses:-ra},  (b),  (o) 
- Sign  of competition 
~-
- Sign of  competition It is evident that a  sharp decrease  of the mark-up is a  definite sign of competition. 
But  the question is:  between  whom? 
In this respect it is possible to formulate  three hypotheses: 
a)  existence of competitive pressures  from  other shops; 
b)  increase in bargaining power  of the retailers'  suppliers  (producers,  manufacturers); 
c)  combination of factors  (a)  and  (b). 
From  this it follows  that: 
- we  are  confronted with real "multiple competition",  many  factors  and  facets being 
strictly interdependent, 
we  need to take into account separately the price structure and  evolution of  each 
product,  for  each shop in the  sample,  in order to extract  individual causes  o~ 
complex  of results. 
This  is a  point that must  be  heavily emphasised.  As  we  are  to analyse "multiple 
competition",  it is not possible to consider cumulative relationships and  cumulative 
data,  covering and  concealing contradictory and  amalgamated  factors,  tendencies and 
effects. 
To  analyse phenomena  linked to "multiple competition"  we  will have  to keep in mind  at 
the  same  time: 
- not  only key  one  recording the sharp decrease in the evolution of mark-ups  (or the 
opposite hypothesis  of a  sharp increase),  but also: 
- key  two:  international comparisons,  and 
key three:  comparisons  between products; 
- not  only the mark-up  evolution,  but also: 
the  evolution of unit retail prices,  and 
the  evolution of unit buying prices. 
2.5.10.  Sharp increase in retail mark-ups 
Let  us  now  consider the hypothesis  of a  sharp increase in the mark-up applied by  one  or 
more  shops in the  sample,  from  time  t  to~~  ~~  and  so on,  resulting from  a  chronological 
set of fifth tables.  -
This  shar~ increase may  concern: 
a)  the maximum  mark-up 
b)  the minimum  mark-up 
c'·)  the average mark-up. 
The  fifth table enables us  to focus  further investigation on  shops  (and especially operator 
groups)  recording: 
- higher mark-ups at any given moment, 
- higher increase in the mark-up  during the period considered. 
124 2.5.11.  Structural viewpoint  (at a  given moment) 
It seems  prima facie that a  high  (or the highest)  mark-up  is a  sign of market  power,  but 
the questions are:  On  which  side?  And  against  whom? 
To  the detriment of final consumers,  since there is no  effective competition from  other 
shops; 
To  the detriment  of suppliers,  since the retailer - who  has  considerable negotiating 
(or purchasing)  power- can buy at a  very  low price without  having to pass his saving 
on  the buying price on  to the consumer. 
These  phenomena  are closely linked,  as  we  have  seen in paragraph 9·  But  one  must  not 
neglect the following  hypothesis: 
- a  given retailer is obliged to apply a  higher mark-up  because his cost structure is 
heavier than at  other shops  due  to inefficiency (excessive personnel costs,  excessive 
time  in stock); 
consequently,  as  the high mark-up is reflected on  the retail selling price,  the  turnover 
of the shop is reduced under the pressure  of competition from  other  shops,  resulting 
in lower prices. 
An  appropriate detailed analysis  seems  therefore necessary concerning the  shops  (and 
operator groups)  recording the highest mark-up,  and  the  chronological set of fifth tables 
will in this case act as a  warning light.  See  in particular Table XII  (Q.  139,  point 
2.9.11.). 
2.5.12.  Evolutionary viewpoint - Explanatory hypotheses  about  an increase in mark-ups 
Mark-ups  may  also increase as a  result of several tied,  combined  and  even  contradictory 
factors: 
I)  inflationary tendencies (first and foremost); 
II) discontinuation of special offer and/or loss leader policies pursued in previous 
periods;  see section 2.6.,  "The  negative mark-up:  loss  leading"; 
III) slacker competitive pressures from  other shops,  owing  either to the elimination of 
some  shops  (or operator groups)  or to the adoption of a  collusive (or non-agressive) 
price policy followed  b,y  all shops  in the region,  no  further  commentary  being 
necessary; 
IV)  increase of negotiating (or purchasing)  power  enjoyed  b,y  retailers vis-a-vis the 
suppliers:  see section 2.7.:  "Retailers'  buying prices and  power  int~rplay"; 
v)  heavier cost structure at the shop  (and/or or  the  operator group)  owing  to an 
increase in personnel costs and/or  overheads and  so  on,  no  further  commentary  being 
necessary. 
We  must  now  draw attention in particular to point I:  "Effects of  sharp increases  in 
the retailers bU.ying  prices". 
2.5.13.  Purchases by big retailers as an inflationary factor 
In an inflationary period,  a  sharp increase in the mark-up  may  be  the result of a  series 
of facts,  which  can be  illustrated as follows:  A big retailer forecasts a  probable  sharp 
increase in the (retailers'  b~ing) price of a  given product and therefore buys  an 
enormous  quantity just before  the price  increase takes place. 
125 We  must  now  look at what  may  happen: 
a) It may  be  that the weight  of this purchase anticipates and amplifies the  impact  of 
the forecasted price increase of the product,  this big purchase therefore  playing an 
inflationary role.  And  so,  for example,  the current retail buying price will rise by 
20%  instead of  10%. 
b)  The  big retailer must  afterwards  choose  between three price levels and  hence  three 
price policies. 
2.5.14. First pattern of price policy 
He  fixes a  relatively low  retail selling price  (for example:  +  2%)  in order to meet 
competition from  other shops  and possibly increase his market  share. 
In this hypothesis  we  will have,  as regards the above  mentioned retailer: 
- a  relatively low  "actual" mark-up; 
- a  shorter time  in stock; 
- a  unit retail selling price increasing b,y  less than the  corresponding increase in the 
buying price (paid by  the other retailers ~r  the forecasted  increase has  taken 
place)  and  probably also lower  than the increase in the selling price of  other 
competing shops. 
2.5.15.  Second  pattern of price policy 
He  fixes a  retail selling price proportionate to the increase  in the retail buying price 
(in our example:  2o%).  He  will do  this if he  does  not want  to provoke a  price reaction 
from  other competing  shops,  because if he  increases the retail selling price b,y  less than 
the increase in the buying price,  competitors might  align their prices,  so that there 
was  no  change  in the retailers'  market  shares. 
This price policy is based  on  the principle of "peaceful coexistence"  ("quieta non movere") 
that represents the normal  and  most  widespread pattern of behaviour in modern  oligopolistic 
structures. 
In this hypothesis  we  will have,  as  regards  the  above  mentioned retailer: 
- a  relatively important  increase in the "actual"  mark-up,  since this retailer has 
benefited from  a  lower  buying price  (his purchase taking place  on  a  date  just before 
the forecasted  increase in buying prices); 
a  longer time in stock for the product  concerned,  since this retailer is not willing 
to try to attack the market  shares and positions of his  competitors and  so,  having 
bought  an  enormous  quantity of the product,  he  has to stock the  goods  longer before 
the whole  quantity is sold.  Moreover,  even if all other things remain unchanged,  a 
price  increase naturally entails an increase in the time  in stock in proportion to the 
demand  elasticity of the product,  since final  consumers  will tend  to reduce their 
consumption  of products whose  prices are going up. 
2.5.16.  Third pattern of price policy 
He  raises his retail selling price b,y  an  increase (for example:  50%)  far greater than 
the increase in the retailers'  buying price (in our  example:  20%). 
126 He  can do  this if he  is not hampered  by  the competitive pricing policies of  other shops 
(and  operator groups),  since: 
either this big retailer dominates  the market,  (nypothesis:  existence of dominance), 
or,  even without  the existence of this dominance,  the relationship between different 
retailers is so friendly and  well cultivated that all of them  will follow  our given 
retailer passively and  promptly in making  this very sharp increase in the retail selling 
price (hypothesis:  existence  of price leadership). 
In this hypothesis we  will have,  as regards the above  mentioned retailer: 
- a  very sharp increase in the actual mark-up, 
- a  probable  sharp increase also in the  time  in stock,  in proportion to the demand 
elasticity of the product. 
In the present hypothesis,  we  can conclude  that the existence of collusive conduct  in the 
field of retail distribution renders  competition virtually ~on-existent. 
Moreover,  the  benefit of the  operation would  be  much  greater for our retailer in the  event 
of relatively rigid or unelastic consumer  demand  (sugar,  coffee,  tea cocoa),  since total 
sales would  not be  affected by the retail price increase. 
2.5.17.  The  possible influence  on  inflation 
1  In our analysis  we  refer to the actual mark-up  ,  since that alone will  enable us  to 
illustrate: 
- the actual behaviour  of retailers,  who  have  the power  to make  use  of inflationary 
tendencies in order to reap considerable profits, 
- the  impact  of this retailers' pattern of behaviour on  the  propagation of the  inflationary 
process. 
In this respect it seems  evident: 
a)  that big retailers can  pl~ a  decisive role in curbing (first pattern:  point 2.5.14.) 
or alternatively stimulating (third pattern:  point 2.5.16.)  the  inflationary process; 
b)  that big retailers have  the power  to stimulate the inflationary process  only where: 
- the market  structure is very highly concentrated,  with strong power  of dominance; 
- there is no  real competition between  these retailers; 
1.  The  problem  of the discrepancy between the "formal"  and  the "actual" mark-up  has  already 
been evoked  in Section 2.3.:  "The  selective historical series",  points  13  and  14. 
Let  us recall that in order to take  into account  the "formal"  mark-up,  it is 
sufficient: 
- to consider the unit retail bgying price,  not at the moment  of  the purchase  of the 
product  concerned,  but at the moment  of the  survey, 
- to compare  it with the unit retail selling price at the same  moment. 
In contrast,  to calculate the "actual" mark-up,  it is necessary to take into account 
the actual unit buying price,  at the moment  in which  the purchase  was  made  and  then to 
calculate the percentage mark-up resulting from  the difference between  the  unit retail 
selling price, at the moment  of the survey,  and  the actual unit  buying price. 
This  very essential point will be  examined  in more  detail in section 2.7. "Retailers' 
BQying  Prices and  Power  Interpla~'· 
127 c)  that the public authorities must  therefore keep a  very close  eye  on  the situation so 
that retailers cannot use  (and abuse)  their dominance  against the general interest. 
In this respect,  we  must  point out that the  chronological set of fifth tables (Retail 
mark-ups)  highlights several important  aspects  of\the  above  phenomena.  And  if we  also 
analyse the  chronological set of sixth tables  (Unit retail buying prices), it will be 
possible to draw up decisive conclusions  as regards the products and the retailers 
surveyed. 
2.5.18.  KEY  ONE  and KEY  TWO- Role  played by fourth,  fifth and  sixth tables in the 
development  of the analysis 
The  fourth,  fifth and  sixth tables are designed to set  out all fundamental data for 
analysing phenomena  described at points 2.5.10 to 17,  provided that we  have  recourse to 
the two  keys: 
- key  one:  the analysis  of evolution; 
- key two:  the international comparison of this evolution. 
With  these tables we  can: 
I) ascertain the  shops  (and the  operator  groups)  following  a  given pattern of behaviour, 
owing  especially to the distinction and  contrasts between Maximum  and Minimum: 
- unit retail selling prices; 
- retail mark-ups; 
-unit retail buying prices; 
II) detect the  existence of excessively sharp increases  in unit retail selling prices 
and/or in mark-ups  and/or in unit  buying prices,  by  measuring  their actual size 
via comparisons between Maximum  and Minimum; 
III)  compare  the  evolution in different countries  (and/or regions),  and  more  particularly 
measure  the differences in the increases - or decreases - in retail selling prices, 
mark-ups  and  retail buying prices there; 
IV)  compare  the  levels and  the variations of the  time  in stock in the different countries 
(and regions),  this being .a  meaningful  indicator of shop efficiency. 
If the trend  of the more  important data  (prices and  mark-ups)  diverges in the different 
countries  (and regionsh this will help to establish and  quantify the  impact  on final 
prices,  and  more  particularly on  the inflationary process,  exerted by the different 
structures of trade and  competition in these different countries  (and regions). 
It will also be  possible to establish and  quantify the  effects both of dominance  and 
of collusive practices relating to specific products in specific countries  (and regions). 
2.5.19.  Crucial products- Establishment  of additional monthly tables 
The  use  made  of key one  and  key  two  may  be  further refined if circumstances  so require. 
For  example,  if a  given  product is found  to be  subject to sharp and/or frequent  variations 
possibly increases - in current international prices  (such as coffee,  cocoa)  a  further 
development  of the analysis,  based  on  the  above tables,  will be  necessary. 
We  have  seen that all surveys and all tables are intended to be  established every six 
months;  but  this frequency is inadequate for the  collection of meaningful data for analysis 
of the working  of market  mechanisms  for certain products.  Therefore,  if the research 
institutes notice that there are or  have  just been important  changes  in the price structure 
of a  given product,  they should forthwith: 
128 identify between  one  and  four  of the most  important retailers operating in the country 
(or region)  surveyed; 
establish additional fourth, .fifth and  sixth tables in a  new,  revised version not  only 
every six months  but  every two  months  or even every month. 
2.5.20.  Contents  of the new  revised version of the additional tables  fifth A, 
sixth A 
The  new  revised version of the additional tables (fourth A,  fifth A,  sixth A)  will be 
established monthly - or every two  months  - for the  one  or two  given products whose 
price structures are undergoing  important  changes.  They  will indicate: 
- in the place of the three columns:  I  MAXIMUM  MINIMUM  AVERAGE I 
- one  or more  columns  one  for each retailer chosen for more  thorough analysis as regards 
the given product(s);  taking the example  of distribution in the United Kingdom,  we  have: 
ALLIED  SUPPLIERS  F:mE  FARE 
TESCO  SAINSBURY  (CAVENHAM  GROUP)  (Associated British 
Food:  ABF  Group) 
It will then be  possible to monitor the  behaviour  of these retailers and  the  impact  on 
the structure of prices very closely. 
It is obvious  that the additional tables - established every  one  or two  months  - will 
omit  all non-essential or non-consistent data (for example:  the  indexes  of dispersion: 
~R P  and  V  ). 
au  au 
2.5.21.  The  speed at which retail prices react to charges  in producers'  prices 
l'le  must  again stress the fundamental  purpose  of the new  revised versions  of the add.i tional 
tables,  fourth A,  fifth A and  most  especially sixth A.  If the  latter is established 
monthly it will highlight more  particularly the  speed at which  specific retail prices 
in the different countries,  regions and  shops  surveyed - react to the changes  in the 
_R.roducers'  prices.  Knowledge  of this speed  of reaction is  of basic  importance for 
competition policy. 
Let  us  take  two  examples: 
a)  If the  producers'  price of coffee (or seed oils,  or margarine)  increases  on 
1 December  1976  b,y  20%: 
- on  which  date will this increase  occur in the different  countrie~ regions  and 
shops  surveyed? 
- by  hov-r  much  ( 5%,  10%,  20%,  50%,  100%)  v-Iill  the different  shops  in the  sample  actually 
increase the :retail  price  of the different ma,kes  and  types  of  coffee? 
b)  If the producers'  price of coffee  (and/or seed oils,  or margarine)  decreases  on 
1 July 1977  by  10%: 
on  which date will this decrease  occur in the different countries,  regions  and 
shops  surveyed? 
by  how  much  will the different shops  reduce  the retail price  of  the different makes 
and  types  of coffee? 
- are there countries,  regions  and.  shops  i-Jhere  there is no  reduction at all in the 
retail price?  vlhy  and  ho\'1? 
The  value  of  establishing the sixth A table  monthl~ is self-evident. 
129 2.6. 1"'EGATIVE  T.1ARK-UF:  "LOSS  LEADING" 
2.6.1.  Negative mark-ups- QQ.  104  and  105 
The  fifth table will reveal  the  existence of any  loss  leaders,  that is  items  sold at 
a  retail price below  the  buying  price.  The  warning signal is given by  a  negative mark-up. 
A warning signal  concerning the  loss  leading policy may  result from  several tables of the 
first stage research  (Chapter One)  under  the column  Pricing,  where  one  can distinguish 
whether  we  have: 
- a  special offer,  that is a  temporary reduced price offered to  consumers  for 
advertising purposes; 
- standard pricing; 
- an  undefined pricing pattern. 
Obviously not all special  offers constitute loss leading;  on  the  contr,ary,  it m~ be  that 
some  products are always  offered below their unit  buying price,  without there being a 
special offer. 
The  following  hypotheses  and  questions  must  be  answered1: 
CIV)  At  a  given moment: 
: 104)  - only  one  or a  few  shops  select a  given product  as  a  loss  leader.  In this case 
the mjjl:lmum  mark-up will  be  negative; 
- several  (or all)  shops  select  the  same  product  as a  loss  leader.  In this case, 
not  only  the minimum  mark-up,  but also the average  and  maximum  mark-ups  will be 
negative  or close to zero. 
CV)  The  evolution of mark-ups  from  time  t  to t+1,  t+2,  and  so  on  shows: 
: 105)  the product  is no  longer used as  a  loss leader; 
- it is always  the  same  shops  that  select the  given product as  a  loss leader; 
the  product  is selected as a  loss  leader first by  one  shop  and  then by another. 
2.6.2.  Identification of retailers - Purposes  of the  loss  leading policy - QQ.  106  and  107 
If, in the analysis of evolution,  one  product  seems  to be  preferred by  one  or more  shops 
as  a  loss leader,  it is essential to develop further investigation in order to ascertain: 
CVI)  Which  retailers more  frequently  have  recourse to this practice. 
(106) 
CVII)  For what  reasons  do  they do  so:  to eliminate one  specific competitor (a small 
(107)  business or a  big one)  or simply to promote  the  expansion of the  shop and  increase 
turnover. 
In the hypothesis  of predatory pricing further analysis  and  action might  be  helpful  since 
a  negative mark-up - for  the  purpose  of eliminating competitors - is a  sign of degeneration 
of competitive behaviour,  which  is not  socially beneficial. 
1. It will be  observed that we  have  not yet  examined  QQ.  65-94 concerning  jointly the unit 
retail buying prices and  power  interplay,  but  given the strategic importance and 
considerable  complexity of both,  it is helpful to postpone this analysis until Section 
2.7., after having cleared the  ground  by  examining shop efficiency  (QQ.  95-103)  and 
the  loss leading policy  (Section 2.6.;  QQ.  104-115)• 
130 2.6.3.  Set  of effects linked to the  loss leading practice - QQ.  108-111 
Four points  in particular must  also be  outlined as  concerns  the  loss leading practice. 
CVIII)  Is it always  the  same  brand belonging to the  same  manufacturer which  is selected 
(108)  as a  loss  leader,  or does it change  from  one  moment  to another? 
CIX)  What  are the after-effects of loss  leading for  the retailers,  as  concerns  more 
(109)  particularly: 
- a  decrease in time  in stock (Tj)  for the brand and  shop  involved in the  loss 
leading; 
- an  increase in time  in stock (Tj)  for brands  and  shops  not  having recourse to 
this practice. 
CX)  h~at are  the after-effects of loss  leading for the manufacturer,  as concerns mare 
(110)  particularly an anomalous  increase or decrease in retail buying prices: 
- for brands used as loss  leaders; 
- for other brands. 
CXI)  vlliat  are the after-effects of loss leading for the final  consumer,  as concerns more 
(111)  particularly an anomalous  increase or decrease in unit retail selling prices,  that 
is does  an anomalous  increase  or decrease  in unit selling prices concern shops  and 
brands  having previously indulged in loss leading or other shops  and  brands? 
2.6.4.  Own  label products and  imported  goods  - QQ.  112  and  113 
Two  particular questions must  also be  outlined: 
CXII)  Is loss leading practised more  particularly with own  label products  (O.L.)  or with 
(112)  manufacturers'  branded products?  Is this tendency  confirmed by  surveys  carried out 
over a  relatively long period? 
CXIII)  Is loss leading practised more  particularly with imported goods  or with home-produced 
(113)  goods?  Is this tendency confirmed by  surveys  carried out  over a  relatively long 
period? 
2.6.5.  KEY  TWO:  International comparisons - QQ.  114  and  115 
The  analysis of loss leading has  to be  taken a  stage further by  means  of international 
comparisons  (key two). 
CXIV)  In general,  are the  same  products and brands selected as loss  leaders in different 
(114)  countries?  Are  the effects for retailers, manufacturers and  final  consumers 
(questions  109,  110,  111,  112,  113)  broadly the  same  in different countries and 
regions? 
CXV)  Do  the manufacturers all take the  same  attitude to loss leading?  Hostility or 
(115)  cooperation with retailers practising it?  Is there any  chan~e in their attitude? 
Does  it vary accarding·to the product, retailer and  country tor region)? 
2.6.6. Analysis  of the pricing policy of a  selected retailer (shop "A"  as regards a 
given product 
The  problem  of the possible discrepancy between the "formal"  and  the "actualt' mark-up  was 
considered in connection with the evolution of concrete price structures for chosen 
products. 
131 EXAMPLE  OF  TABLE  FOR  ANALYSING  THE  PRICmG  POLICY  OF  A  GIVEN  RETAILER  FOR  A GIVEN  PRODUCT 
BUYING  PRICES  SELLING  PRICES  TDlE  IN  STOCK 
(days) 
Date  Date  of  Current  Date  Current  Selling price  Mark-up  Average  of  for given  of  purchase  buying  of  selling  of 
quotation  for shop "A"  price  survey  price  of shop "A"  shop "A"  all shops  shop "A" 
1/ 9/1976  1/ 9/1976  100  15/ 9/1976  110  120  +2o%  30  180 
1/10/1976  - 100  15/10/1976  150  120  +2o%  30  180 
1/11/1976  - 120  15/11/1976  160  120  +2o%  30  18o 
1/12/1976  - 140  15/12/1976  200  120  +2o%  30  180 
1/ 1/1977  - 150  15/ 1/1977  250  120  +2o%  30  18o 
1/ 2/1977  - 160  15/ 2/1977  300  130  +3o%  30  180 
1/ 3/1977  1/ 3/1977  200  15/ 3/1977  300  150  - 25%  30  60 
1/ 4/1977  - 220  15/ 4/1977  300  150  - 25%  30  60 
1/ 5/1977  1/ 5/1977  240  15/ 5/1977  300  216  - 10%  30  60 
1/ 6/1977  - 200  15/ 6/1977  300  216  - 1o%  30  60 
1/ 7/1977  - 180  15/ 7/1977  280  216  - 1o%  30  60 In our inflationary times,  the concept  of loss leaders might  be  extended and  revised.  Let 
us  suppose the following hypothesis:  compare  the current average  of the  b~ing and  selling 
prices of all shops  in the sample  with the individual selling price of one  given shop "A", 
at different moments.  · 
It will be  possible to isolate and  analyse the pricing policy of shop "A"  and possibly 
to identify a  particular type  of loss leading policy. 
2.6.7.  Positive mark-up and  loss leading in inflationary times 
The  example  in the table shows  all the difficulties of the analysis.  The  example  is 
meaningful in itself.  Shop  "A"  (operator group)  bought  (on 1 September  1976)  a  very 
large quantity of one  given product  (correspo~ing more  or less to increased retail 
sales over a  six month  period)  and  so he  does  not care at all about  the very sharp 
increases in current prices,  but  he  tries to operate a  predatory policy directed against 
rival shops.  In this way,  even if the mark-up  is positive in December  1976  and January 
1977  (+  2o%)  as well as in February 1977  (+  30%)  this product is in fact  being used as a 
loss leader,  since shop "A"  sells it at a  price very much  lower than not  only the current 
retail selling price,  but also the current retail byYing  price. 
This pricing policy might  be  considered to be  some~hat similar to the first pattern of 
pricing policy,  considered in section 2.5.,  point  14,  ("The  evolution of concrete price 
structures for selected products"), if one  important difference did not have  to be 
underlined.  In the present case,  we  have  undoubtedly a  ver  extreme  attern of behaviour, 
the selling price of the  shop "A"  being well  below  the current retail bu.ying  prices  even 
if the selling price is higher than the "actual" buying price), the loss leading policy 
~ight be  a  weapon  used to eliminate competitors. 
Therefore,  even a  positive mark-up  may  conceal,  in inflationary times,  a  highly agressive 
loss leading policy. 
2.6.8.  Extension of the analysis of the individual retailer's pricing policies 
It would  be  helpful to establish the above  table not  only for the products and  for the 
shops  or retailers (operator groups)  operating loss leading policies but also for other 
products and  shops,  in order to  ascerta~n, for each relevant product and  shop,  the actual 
evolution of each big "retailer's"  ind~.vidual behaviour and policy in the  competitive 
framework  surrounding him.  But,  in order to do  so,  many  theoretical and  practical problems 
have  to be  solved.  In section 2.7.,  we  will analyse more  thoroughly the problem  of the 
actual  buying price,  in order to higllight the actual working of market and  competition 
mechanisms  between retailers  (b~ers) and  producers  or manufacturers  (suppliers). 
2.6.9. Special  offer 
One  aspect  of the retailer's attempts to promote  sales by  underpricing some  products is 
the Special Offer. 
In principle special offers are available for a  certain length of time  only  (two  or three 
weeks)  and  sometimes  the unit selling prices of the  items  chosen may  be  below the unit 
buying price. 
But  even when  the mark-up is positive,  the special offer constitutes an anomalous  reduction 
in gross  income  from  the product,  the  counterpart being found  in an increase in gross 
income  from  other products  sold by  the  shop.  Therefore it is helpful,  in analysing the 
evolution of mark-ups  relative to a  given product,  to outline the basic features  of the 
special offer policies followed  b.Y  one  or more  retailers. 
The  raw material for doing this is to be  found  in the different tables planned in the first 
stage  of the research (Chapter One). 
133' 2.  7.  RETAIL  BUYING  PRICES  AND  POWER  INTERPLAY 
2.7.1.  Summary  of retail bgying prices  (Sixth Table) 
The  sixth table (retail b~ing prices) deserves particular attention since it summarizes 
all the essential data so far assembled. 
An  analysis of the evolution of retail bgying prices taken as far as possible,  constitutes 
an essential element  for assessing the  power  interplay between ·retailers and  producers 
(or manufacturers).  Accordingly,  it will be  necessary to examine  the sixth table in 
connection with the third table,  the latter showing  the  br~akdown of retail b~ing prices 
by  shops and brands and sizes,  in order to illustrate all ~  and  indices as to the 
rules that govern competition between retailers and  producers. 
2.7.2.  The  degree  of dispersion of retail bgying prices- Q.  65 
Before  examining the sixth and third tables together, it is fruitful to glance at the 
first two  of the three reference tables  (one  concerning structure,  the other concerning 
evolution)  summarizing,  in a  comparative  way,  the contents of the questions relating to 
each of the three "observation posts": 
-unit retail selling prices, 
- retail mark-ups, 
- unit retail buying prices. 
Answers  will be  given to the  following questions: 
LXV)  What  is the degree  of dispersion of the retail buying price between the different 
(65)  brands  and  sizes - including own  label products - for the same  product? 
We  have  two  possible extreme hypotheses:  a)  The  degree  of dispersion is verY  high; 
b)  The  degree  of dispersion is very low. 
Moreover,  it must  be  ensured that prices are comparable,  being those either of the 
integrated trade or of independent retailers.  Some  analysis of terms  of delivery may 
be  necessary. 
2.7.3. aypothesis a):  The  degree  of dispersion is very high 
HYpothesis a):  The  power  interplaY between retailers and  producers  does not  work  as 
between  two  closely united armies  struggling vigorously against each other.  On  the 
contrary,  each army  is divided within b.y  competitive behaviour and  tendencies since there 
are: 
- on  the  one  side,  several retailers competing  against  each other to buy at the  lowest 
price, 
- on  the other side,  several producers  (or manufacturers)  also competing against  each 
other to sell to the  competing retailers at the highest price. 
The  effect of this situation is that since each retailer (or buyer)  is surrounded by 
specific conditions of competition - owing,  above all, to his  size and  the total quantity 
he  is able to purchase - ~  will also be  able to negotiate a  different bgying price. 
Hence  the degree  of dispersion will be  very high,  since: 
- the retailer with the greatest bargaining power  will get  the  lowest  b~ing price, 
- the retailer with the weakest  bargaining power  will have  to bear the highest  buying price. 
134 Such a  situation of keen competition on  both sides of the market  will be  expressed 
quantitatively: 
by  a  relative difference  (cR  ) of more  than  10%, 
apu 
by a  coefficient of variation (  V )  of more  than 5%.  au 
If these indices become  too high,  the relative difference  exceeding  20%  or  3o%  and 
coefficient  of variation exceeding  10%  or  15-20%,  it might  be  argued that: 
- the conditions  of competition are too unequal,  seriously hindering both retailers (those 
having the  weakest  bargaining power)  and  manufacturers  (those being obliged to supply 
some  retailers at too  low  a  price); 
this inequality in the  conditions  of competition might  ultimately result in the 
elimination of  some  competitors  (both retailers and  manufacturers),  thus provoking 
a  sharp increase in the degree  of concentration,  in both retail distribution and 
manufacturing; 
such a  sharp increase  in the degree  of concentration might  seriously hinder  competition 
(and market)  mechanisms; 
therefore,  excessive  competition might  in itself result in a  very dangerous  process  of 
monopolization; 
this monopolization process attributes too much  power  to retailers,  allowing them  to 
speculate  on  purchases  and  to abuse  their power  in the retail trade. 
However,  before proceeding with the analyses described above,  it is helpful  to ascertain 
to what  extent the "quality"  of the different brands  of the  same  product  is homogenous  and 
comparable. 
In some  very special cases,  the high degree  of dispersion of buying prices may  reflect 
no  more  than an  important  difference in the quality of the brands  considered1. 
2.7.4.  tivpothesis  b):  The  degree  of dispersion is very  low 
Bypothesis b):  If the degree  of dispersion of buying prices is relatively low,  three 
explanations are possible.  There  exists: 
(1)  a  high degree  of market  transparency  and  strong competition; 
(2)  collusive agreements,  or at least concerted practices; 
(3)  concealed discounts and  special buying terms. 
As  regards  point  (1),  no  comment  is necessary since this is the situation of  perfect 
competition with which  all readers will  be  familiar. 
As  regards point  (2),  it may  occur that: 
- either retailers have  entered into collusive agreements  in order to obtain lower  prices 
to the detriment  of suppliers  (manufacturers  or producers); 
or suppliers  (manufacturers  or producers)  have  entered into collusive agreements  in 
order to obtain higher prices to the detriment  of buyers  (or retailers); 
or both hypotheses are  confirmed,  the  structure being,  in this  case,  close to the 
"bilateral monopoly"  model. 
1.  International price discrimination by  a  manufacturer against retailers in different 
countries might  be  a  case for action under the  EEC  Treaty rules  on  competition. 
135 As  regards point  (3),  it is evident that it will not be  possible to ascertain the actual 
buying price achieved by  some  big retailers,  who  are known  to enjoy considerable bargaining 
power.  It is beyond  doubt  therefore that they could benefit from  special buying terms. 
This point will be  examined  late~ on  in this section (points 24-25)• 
2.7•5•  The  degree  of dispersion and  the working  of competition 
The  prima facie  conclusion is that: 
when  the degree of dispersion is low,  we  have  ambiguous  and contradictory signs., 
indicating both monopolistic  (or collusive)  and  competitive behaviour; 
when  the degree  of dispersion is high,  we  have  a  positive sign of  the  existence  of 
competition. 
Even  in the latter hypothesis,  we  must  search for  other signs  and  indices in order  to 
highlight the power  interplay between retailers and  producers,  because: 
if competition is really keen and  the  conditions  of  competition (surrounding the 
different operators)  are  very unequal, 
- it is evident that  some  retailers (those having the greater bargaining power)  can 
benefit from  this inequality whilst  others  suffer' badly. 
It follows  that retail selling prices will ultimately be  set  in one  of the  two  following 
ways,  there being no  apparent alternative: 
either the retailers who  buy  at the  lowest  prices will follow  a  policy of peaceful 
coexistence  in relation to selling prices,  thus reaping much  more  substantial profits 
than other,  less favoured retailers; 
or they viill seek to eliminate their competitors  by  passing on  to  the retail selling 
price the saving  on  the buying price. 
In the latter hypothesis  the degree  of dispersion of mark-ups  would  be  very  si111ilar  to the 
degree  of dispersion of unit  buying prices,  since  each retailer will tend: 
to apply  the  same  mark-up; 
to charge  therefore a  different unit selling price,  depending  on  the unit  buying price. 
2.7.6.  Relationship between retail selling price and  b~ying price 
If we  place  our analysis in the  logical frameVJork  of classical "perfect competition"  the 
conclusion is inevitably pessimistic,  since any  substantial saving  on  the unit bl)Ying 
price - for  a  given retailer- vlill  be  of no  benefit  to the  consumer. 
Hhy  is this so? 
Because,  either this saving (on the bgying price)  constitutes extra profit for the  given 
big retailer or it constitutes a  weaEon  by  means  of which  he  can eliminate his competitors, 
monopolize  the market  and  hence  abuse  the monopolistic power  thus given to  him  at the 
expense  of the  consumers.  The  explanation is plain and  clear:  the  classical conception 
of "perfect competition"  is based  on  the  principle  th.&.;  it is not  possible to ha.ve  an 
equilibrium situation with several different  rices for  the  same  roduot;  according  ~o the 
classical theory,  we  can have  only  on~ pri~  equilibrium price  in any given market  • 
1.  See:  R.  LINDA,  Concurrence  oligopolistique et planification concurrentielle 
internationale,  in "Economie  Appliquee",  Libraire Droz,  Gen~ve,  1972,  nn.  2-3, 
pages  327-328,  334-342;  and Methodology  •••• ,  op.  cit., point 65. 
136 But  the classical theory is erroneous  and not  borne  out  by  reality.  The  price  surveys 
carried out  in the different member  countries  of the  Community  have  demonstrated that, 
in the  same  town  or region,  it is possible to observe  several different retail selling 
prices for an  identical product  or item,  and  the degree  of dispersion of retail selling 
prices is in fact  indeed  very  high. 
This  point is of vital importance. 
2.  7.  7.  The  bases  of "rr,ul tiple  cornpeti tion"  and  the existence  of multiple  equilibrium 
prices 
If we  accept  the  erroneous principle  (inherited from  the classical theory)  that there 
can  be  only  one  equilibriwn price  in any  one  market,  we  will reach an important  conclusion 
for economic  policy: 
- since any difference  in the unit  buying price  cannot  ultimately benefit the final 
consumer, 
that public authorities must  fix this single equilibrium price at the  lowest  possible 
level in order to benefit the consumer  and  to curb inflation. 
But  the principle  of a  classical perfect  economy  is  erroneous as  we  have  seen,  since it 
is possible to  observe  several very different retail selling prices for the  same  product 
at the  same  moment  in the  same  market.  Therefore: 
it is neither possible nor fruitful  to fix  .::t  single official price  (to be  charged by 
all shops)  because: 
this single price  will  correspond either to the highest  price  (most  expensive  shop)  or 
to the  lov1est  price  (cheapest  shop)  or  to the middle  of the  range; 
- consequently,  either the single,  official price will provide  a  rent  (or extra profit) 
for the more  efficient shops,  this extra profit being both socially undesirable and 
inflationary,  or this single,  official price will drive  the "marginal"  shops  (ie.  the 
least efficient} off the market. 
On  the  contrary,  we  must  realize that the real-life situation is based  on  the  phenomenon 
of multiple competition,  which  implies  the existence of a  situation of equilibrium,  even if: 
- unit retail selling prices differ from  one  shop to another,  even in the  same  town  or 
region; 
- the mark-ups  applied  by  different retailers are also different; 
- unit retail buying prices also differ. 
The  state of equilibrium is a  result,  therefore,  of dynamic  forces  working  from  a 
combination  of differentt  divergent  and  opposing data and  situations surrounding firms,  this 
inequality (or diversity;  being the catalyst to the  competition process.  The  crucial 
problem is not  eliminating this inequality (or diversity),  because this would  simply mean 
eliminating competition as well,  but rather of finding  out  the ceiling of inequality  (or 
of diversity),  above  which  the competition mechanism  would  be  hindered by  the  emergence 
of domit1ance. 
In a  sense,  our analyses  aim  to determine  and  to describe  the "living space"  between the 
ceiling and  the floor of inequality (or diversity),  within which  competition can develop 
its endogenous  process. 
137 2.7.8.  Pricing of  own  label  items -The problem  of the quality of the  products  Q.  66 
Further questions  must  be  put as regards  own  labels and  imported products. 
LXVI)  Generally speaking,  how  do  the  prices at  which retailers buy  own  label products 
(66)  compare  \ldth the prices  of manufacturers'  branded  products: 
a)  are  they cheaper? 
b)  are  they  more  expensive? 
c)  are they sometimes  cheaper and  sometimes  more  expensive? 
Does  the difference in price correspond to a  real difference in quality? 
The  answers  to this question may  give  some  indication of  the actual market  poHer  of  the 
retailers, if they are  compared  with answers  given to questions  15,  concerning the unit 
retail selling prices,  and 40,  concerning retail mark-ups. 
Thus  we  can distinguish four  (or  even  six)  hypotheses: 
RETAIL  SELLING  PRICE  BUYING  PRICE  MARK-UP 
+  + 
Own  + 
label  +  products 
+  +  + 
Before  examining  the above  hypotheses,  it is essential to analyse the real quality of  the 
items  considered,  in order to see if the  own  label products are: 
(a)  of better quality; 
(b)  of poorer quality; 
(c)  of the  same  quality. 
For instance,  the quality of block chocolate  may  vary considerably according to the 
percentage content  of cocoa butter,  sugar,  etc. 
This point is also very meaningful  for  our analysis .of  the behaviour  of retailers as 
regards  own  label products.  Are  they sold either on  the basis solely of "price 
competition",  these products being therefore either of poorer quality or  of much  the  same 
quality  (as the  branded products),  or on  the basis of a  "non-price competition"  pattern, 
the retailer's policy aiming to create a  particular quality image  for his  own  labels. 
In this case it will be  necessary to analyse also the retailers' advertising policy as 
regards their own  labels. 
2.7•9•  Different  ~ypotheses concerning the pricing of  own  label items. 
The  first hypothesis indicates that a  certain degree  of market  power  is enjoyed by  the 
retailers, since they pay  less for the  own  label products  (than for the  manufacturers' 
branded products),  while  they are able to sell them  at a  higher price. 
The  second hypothesis  opens  up  two  opposite and  indeed contradictory explanations: 
- either the retailer is launching an advertising campaign in order  to replace the 
manufacturers'  branded products by his  own  label products and,  if this campaign is 
successful,  we  have  a  sign of the retailer's strong bargaining power; 
138 or the retailer cannot  obtain from  the manufacturers  the quantities  of manufacturers' 
branded products which  he  needs  and  so  he  is obliged to use  other,  more  expensive  sources 
of supply;  in this case,  we  conclude  that the retailer is negotiating with the 
manufacturers  from  a  position of vveakness. 
~fuich of these two  explanations  occurs  in the specific case? 
The  third hypothesis deserves particular attention since - especially in the  case  of a 
high mark-up  for  Ohm  label products- it indicates the  existence  of considerable bareaining 
pov1cr  in the hands  of the retailers vis-a-vis the manufacturers who  actually make  the 
retailers'  own  label products.  These  manufacturers are  hardly competing  with manufacturers' 
branded products,  and  the retailer takes  the  opportunity to· reduce the proportion of 
manufacturers'  branded products  sold  by  him. 
The  fourth hypothesis calls for no  particular comment. 
All the  above  hypotheses must  be  checked against  the  answers  given to other related 
questions: 
- vfuat  is the  share of  own  labels?  (Q.  7); 
-Are the more  popular sizes sold as  own  label items?  (Q.  8); 
Is there a  tendency  towards  an  increase in the  share  of  own  label  items  in the 
sample  of shops?  (Q.  12). 
Similar methods  of analysis will  be  used  for the  answer  to question: 
LXVII)  Generally  speaking,  hov~ do  the prices paid  by retailers for  imported  products 
(G7)  compare  with those for  home-produced  goods; 
a)  are  they cheaper? 
b)  are  they more  expensive? 
c)  are  they  sometimes  cheaper and  sometimes  more  expensive? 
Does  the difference in the buying price  correspond to a  real difference in quality? 
2,7.1\ Identification of retailers 
QQ.  u  and  9 and 7  2  and 7  3 
Further questions  to be  examined  are: 
or the  weakest  ower  -
LXVIII)  vlhich  shop in the  sample  pays  the highest  (or  lo~Vest) unit  buying price?  For 
(68)  which  brand  and  size?  Do  these prices refer to  own  label products and/or to 
imported  products? 
LXIX)  Referring  to the minimQm  unit  buying price that  one  shop is paying  (whatever may 
(69)  be  the  brand and/or size),  which is the  shop that is obliged to bear the highest 
unit  busing price? 
The  answer  to question 68  will identify both the retailers with the  weakest  (or strongest) 
negotiating power  and  the manufacturers  or producers with the strongest  (or weakest) 
negotiating p01r1er. 
The  answer to question 69  will confirm the identity of the retailer with the weakest 
bargaining power. 
139 All this  information is of botsic  utility in a  long-tern1  analysis,  as  we  shall see later. 
But  the answers  to questions 68  and  69  must  be  linked up  to the answers  to questions: 
LXXII)  t{hat  is the degree  of dispersion of buying prices between different shops for 
(72)  identical items? 
LXXIII)  Hhich  shop  pays  the highest  (or lowest)  buying prices for  identical  items? 
(7 3) 
Hence, if it is assumed  that: 
- the degree  of dispersion is very high as regards  both the  b~ring price  (product  unit 
price)  under question 65  and  the  buying price  (identical item)  under question 72; 
and that 
it is always  the  same  shop  (or retailer)  that pays  the  highest  (or the  lowest)  buying 
price as regards questions 68  and  69  as  well as  question 73, 
it is possible to ascertain the identity of the retailers that actually have  the strongest 
and weakest  bargaining power  respectively. 
2.7.12.  Large  scale purchases and  choice for  consumers- Q.  70 
Answers  to questions 70  and 71  may  help to reveal the retailers'  purchasing policy. 
LXX)  Is the  shop  paying the highest  (or lowest)  unit  buying price the  one  where  the 
(70)  choice  of brands and  sizes is widest  (or narrowest)?  Or  is there no  significant 
relationship between the number  of brands and sizes and  the level of buying prices? 
The  answer to this question will indicate the  extent to which  some  retailers prefer to b~ 
very considerable quantities  of  only one  brand of a  given product,  in1order to get 
substantial discounts  (in return for exclusivity and/or for quantity)  •  The  generalization 
of this policy results in a  shop  offering only  one  brand for  each existing product,  no 
choice therefore being available to the consumer. 
Is this a  sign that strong bargaining  power  is enjoyed by  the retailer?  Or  is it, on 
the contrary,  a  sign of weak  bargaining power? 
In this respect,  it will be necessary: 
- to  compare  the evolution of sales, mark-ups  and  gross  income  of retailers working  under 
the single brand policy; 
- to ascertain whether there is a  free decision by  the retailer to base his policy upon 
only one  brand  or whether,  on  the contrary,  there are  important  producers  ~r manufacturers 
who  simply refuse to supply him; 
to ascertain whether this policy,  based on  one  single brand,  is the effect of inter-
locking shareholdings  or directorates between the retailer in question and  the producer 
or manufacturer from  whom  alone he  buys. 
2.  7 .13.  Several brands made  by the  same  manufacturer - Q.  71 
It is of the greatest interest to know  the pricing policy of a  given manufacturer in 
relation to different products manufactured  b,y  his firm but presented under different 
brand names.  We  will therefore put the following  question: 
1.  The  analysis of time in stock as set out in Section 2.4.  (Analysis  of  shop  efficiency) 
provides the means  of describing and  explaining the various  features  of the major 
retailers'  policies. 
140 LXXI)  l'lhen  shops  in the  sample sell one  product made  by  the  same  manufacturer but  under 
(71)  different trade marks- including own  labels- which  b~,  and  in which  shop,  costs 
more  (or less)  and  why? 
Previous analysis will highlight whether the difference in trade mark  and price  corre~pond 
to a  difference in quality. 
Further analysis will establish: 
- whether the difference in brand name  and price conceals a  difference in negotiating 
power  enjoyed by  different retailers  b~ing the different brands  from  the  same  producer 
or manufacturer; 
- whether the brands  having the highest  buying price are artificially pushed up by 
intensive advertising campaigns  by the producers  (or manufacturers)  and/or by  the 
retailers concerned;  · 
- whether the brands having the highest bgying price have  a  proportionate highest selling 
price to final  consumers  and,  on  the contrary,  whether the brands having the  lowest 
b~ying price are used for the  purpose  of special offer campaigns  by retailers,  with or 
without  the  consent  of the  producers  (or manufacturers). 
2·7·14•  KEY  THREE:  The  comparisons  between products in relation to international 
comparisons - Q.  74 
The  following  set  of questions  implies,  among  other things,  the use  of key three already 
proposed at point 2.5.4.  (comparisons  between products): 
LXXIV)  ~fuich are the brands  and  the actual producers  or manufacturers for which  we 
(74)  observe  the highest degree of dispersion of buying prices: 
(a)  betvveen  the  shops  constituting the  local  sample  surveyed? 
(b)  between the different countries  or regions  surveyed? 
(c)  which  countries  (or regions)  record the highest  (or  lowest)  buying prices 
for the  same  identjcal items  (ie.  same  brand,  size and  manufacturer)? 
In our belief,  the answers  given to the  set of questions at 74,  connected with the 
answers  given to the set  of questions at 48  (retail mark-ups),  will  enable us  to outline 
the real substance  of ne  otiatin  ower  on  both sides  of the  market:  the  supply side 
(producers  or  and  the demand  side (retailers). 
Above  all, it will  be  possible to ascertain the  brands  and  producers for which  the 
phenomenon  of pOHer  interplay appears  to be  the most  marked  and  especially the most 
variegated,  mving  to the  high degree  of dispersion of buying prices. 
Furthermore,  through the  international comparisons,  it will  be  possible to ascertain: 
- in which  countries  (or regions)  the negotiating power  balances  out  in favour  either 
of producers  or manufacturers  (higher buying prices)  or  of retailers  (lower  b~ing 
prices,  possibly but not necessarily accompanied  by  higher retail mark-ups); 
- in -t-lhich  countries  (or regions)  and  to  v.rhat  extent  the  lower  buying  prices are  passed 
on  to the final  consumers  in the  form  of a ~  retail-seiTing price. 
In this respect it will  be  necessar,y  to compare: 
- all the answers  - referring to a  given product  or  brand - to the set of questions at 23 
(retail price)  with  the  answers  given to the sets of questions at  48  (mark-ups)  and  74 
(buying pr:i.ces); 
-all those  answers  with the  answers  to questions  65,  66,  67,  68  and  69  to see if the 
strongest  (or the  weakest)  bargaining power  enjoyed  by  individual retailers  alwa~concerns 
the  same  brand  and  size  (an  identical  iterf,)  or  sometimes  one  brand  <tnd  one  product  and 
other times  other bro..nds  and  other products. 
141 2.7.15.  The  summarizing role of the Sixth Table:  "arrival" and  "depa.rture" 
Analysis  of the  evolution of buying prices and  of all the questions  connected wit.  it 
enables us: 
to use  together the three keys  defined at Section 2.5.  (key  one:  the analysis  of 
evolution;  key  two:  the international - and  the inter-regional - comparison of this 
evolution;  key  three:  the  comparison between products); 
to approach the  core  of the power  interplay between retailers and  producers. 
But  it is obvious  that if we  are to make  progress in the  evolutionary  or dynamic  approach, 
we  are faced with the problem  that the data to be  taken into account will  expand  in 
volume  with the number  of  surveys  to be  compared  and  analysed.  Hence  the further 
development  of  our analysis requires  the advance  summary  of the main results if we  are 
to have  a  really intelligible and meaningful  picture. 
This  can be  done  by  means  of the  sixth table,  which  plays a  dual  summarizing role 
("arrival" and "departure"),  as do  the fourth and  fifth tables,  that is: 
(a)  the "arrival" role,  made  possible by  its concise structure,  is based  on  three 
"warning lights": 
the maximum; 
the minimum; 
the average. 
The  table  summarizes  salient features described analytically (by  shops  and  brands/sizes) 
in the first three tables and  obtained from  data such as:  unit  buying prices, retail 
mark-ups,  unit retail prices,  shops,  actual producers and  time  in stock; 
(b)  the "departure" role,  introducing new  data for further  comparative analysis. 
As  concerns  the  latter role, it is noteworthy  that the sixth table  gives  essential 
additional  information (left  out  of the first to third tables because  of lack of  space) 
such as: 
date  of purchase; 
unit producer  or manufacturer price; 
trend  of  indexes  of  b~ring prices,  producer prices and retail prices. 
All  these data are selected according to the  above  breakdown accordine  to the  three 
"warning lights"  (maximum,  minimum  and  avei·age). 
Lastly,  we  must  emphasize  that,  as regards  both the  summary  roles  (of the sixth table)  and 
the data set out  in the first to sixth tables,  these  t~bles always  indicate whether  a  given 
~  refers: 
to an  own  label product  (designated  by  "0.1."),  manufacturers'  branded products 
therefore being detern;ined  by  exclusion; 
to an  imported  product,  which  is indicated by  an asterisk,  home-produced  eoods  therefore 
being determined  by  exclusion. 
It is clear then,  that  the sixth table enables  essential  conclusive data to be  extracted 
from  an  enormous  bulk of atoms  of  informa.tion. 
142 2.7.16.  The  evolutionary vievmoint:  various aspects- QQ.  75=78 
To  the question "How  are  we  to analyse the sixth table?"  the  answer  is:  "by using 
the tr.II'ee  keys  already proposed." 
As  regards  the  evolutionary viewpoint  (key  one),  we  will have  to answer  the  following 
questions,  by  comparing  tv.J"O  or more  sixth tables  (extracted from  the first,  second and 
third tables),  relative to different moments  of the reference period (J, itlt ~' etc.): 
LXXV)  Does  the degree  of  dispers~on of unit  b~ying prices among  the different brands 
(75)  and sizes- including own  label products- increase  or decrease fromj to 1±1' 
.:tt,g,  etc.? 
LXXVI)  Is it always  the  same  brand/size that  has the highest  or lowest  'W'lit  buying 
(76)  price? 
LXXVII)  Does  the  (average)  unit bu.Ying  price  increase more  for  own  label items  or for 
(77)  manufacturers'  branded products?  Or  is no  clear trend apparent? 
LXXVIII)  Does  the  (average)  unit bgying price  increase more  for  imported  products  or for 
(78)  home-produced  goods? 
2.7.17.  Interpretation of an  increase  in the degree  of dispersion of the unit  buying 
price 
As  a  rule,  an  increase  in the degree  of dispersion of the unit buying price as  between 
retailers in the  sample  will mean  that: 
terms  of  suppl~' are  becoming  more  ur1equal  among  the retailers purchasine the product; 
therefore,  some  retailers are probably acquiring stronger bargaining power  at the  expense: 
a)  apparently,  of the  producers  (or manufacturers)  or dealers  selling the  product, 
b)  possibly of the  other retailers who  have  to face  a  sharp increase  in their unit 
prices as manufacturers  (or yroducers)  pass  on  to them  the  loss  they themselves 
have  suffered as  a  result  of better terms  granted  to the stronger retailers, 
c)  consequently,  of  the final  con8runers,  if the average retail selling price  increases 
very  considerabl;y as a  result of the  increase in the unit  buying  price  suffered by 
the  other retailers. 
It is necessary to check  what  may  be  a  very  important  economic  conclusion,  namely  that 
an  increase in the degree  of dispers:i on  of the retaj  1  buying price may  be  a  contri  butor;t 
factor  in the  inflationary process. 
Comparison  of the  evolution  of  mark-ups  betv1een  the retailers receiving rnuch  better terms 
of  suppl~'  and  those  1-vho  suffer in consequer1ce  shm·J: 
- that the increase  in negotiating potver  is  a.  real phenomenon  for  some  retailers; 
- t·Jhether  this increase  in the negotia.ting power  will benefit  or damage  the final 
consumer. 
These  conclusions v!ill  be  coDfirwed  and  possibly enlarged  by  the  ans1-1er  given to 
question 46. 
On  tl1e  other  ha:nd,  a  decrease  in the degree  of dispersion of unit  buying price rrteans  that 
terr; s  of supply are  becorninc;  more  equal  among  the retailers,  but  this conclusion  opens  the 
wa;J  to  contradictorJ-r  expl'lnat:ions  about  thr~  evolution  of  the retaj lers'  bargaining p01.-1er, 
dependine  on  the  ans-v1ers  to other  comwcted  questionn  in our  system. 
Answers  to questions 77  tmd  7r3  may  be  helpful,  but  they also hav'3  to be  interpreted in 
thE:  eeneral  frawe1r1ork  of  our  syst.en,  or questions. 
143 2.7.18.  The  set of questions concerning the Eetail bgying price  (QQ.  79-84)  and 
power  interplay 
The  set  of  connected answers to the four questions  considered above  therefore brings  out 
only some  aspects  of the basic trend of the negotiating power  as between retailers and 
producers  or manufacturers. 
The  set of answers  have  therefore to be  linked to other,  more  detailed questions,  in 
order to establish the  exact identity of given retailers in terms  of  stronger  (or weaker) 
bargaining power  vis-a-vis producers  or manufacturers. 
More  particularly,  further analysis will take  into account  the answers  to all the 
questions below: 
I)  Quentions about  the  evolution of the  buying price - QQ.  75-84. 
II)  Questions  about  the evolution of the retail nark-ups - QQ.  54-62. 
III) Questions - Q.  85  - about  the  comparative  evolution of 
- unit buying prices 
-unit producers prices 
- unit retail selling prices. 
IV)  Questions about  the  international  (or inter-region;;;,l)  comparc;,.,ti ve  evolution  of  the 
data at III,  using key  two  - QQ.  8G-S8. 
V)  Questions  about  the product-to-product  comparative  evolution of  the  data at III, 
using ke;{  three - QQ.  89-91. 
VI)  Questions  about  the deterwin:.1.:Lion  of c:.:,ctual  buyine  prices,  discounts  and  rebates -
QQ.  92-94· 
As  regards  the wording  of the questions  concernine the  evolution  of  the  ~~it buying price 
(QQ.  79-84),  it will be  ver·:/  silllilar to those  cor1cernine  the  evolution of retail selling 
prices:  see Section 2. 3.:  "The  selective historical series",  point  ,; ,  (  Q~.  30-38). 
2.7.19.  An  approach  to  the  power  interplay- Q.  85 
It is now  possible to refine  the  analysis  of poHer  interplay by  focusing  on  the str\lcture 
and  evolution of retail bu,ying  prices  in compurison  with  other prices and data available. 
As  we  have  already  underlined,  the three keys  constitute a  fundamental  tool for attaining 
our research  p~poses. 
As  concerns  especially point III (key  one:  analysis  of  evolution)  \ve  will put the 
following question: 
LXXXV)  vlhat  is the  comparative  evolution of unit retail buying prices,  unit  producers 
(85)  prices and  unit retail selling prices?  Is it possible to work  out  price  indexes 
(see  bottom  of sixth table)  taking into acco1.mt  separately the  averaec  increases 
and  the maximum  and  minimum  increases?  ln1a t  explanations  can be  given as  to the 
cause  of a  divergent  evolution?  Increase  in transport costs,  tn taxes,  and  so  on? 
144 2.7 .20.  International  con~parisons concerninc the  evolution of retail buying  prices and 
other prices - QQ.  SG-8/J 
As  concerns  lfiore  p~lr"ticularly point  IV  (key  th•o),  1r1e  1vill  put the  follovling  set  of 
questions: 
LXXXVI)  HoH  are  the different countries  (or reeions)  ranked according to the  following 
(86)  criteria: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
incre2.,se  in the unit  bu;ying  }rices  (maximum,  minimum  and  average  prices 
indicated in the  sixth table ? 
as  (a),  referring to the  unit  producers  prices if it is not  the  same  as 
unit retail bu;ying  price? 
as  (a),  referring to the retail selling price? 
Two  further questions will have  to be  discussed: 
LXXXVII)  Hmv  are  the different countries  (or reeions)  ranked according to  the  following 
(87)  criteria: 
LXXXVIII~ 
(88 
(a)  averace  incre<:~sc  (or decrease)  in the difference between the unit retail 
selling price and  the unit retail buying price?1 
(b)  average  increase  (or decrease)  in the difference between the unit retail 
buying  price  ~1d the  producers  (or manufacturers)  price?1 
(c)  (d)  (e)  (f):  as  (a)  and  (b),  but referring to the  maximum  and  minimum 
increases  in price differences,  specifying the names  of  the relevant 
retailers in each country?1 
(g)  evolution of the rates  of taxes affecting the various stages of distribution? 
In which  countries  (or regions)  do  we  find  the 
manufacturers)  or traders: 
retailers,  producers  (or 
(a)  who  benefit from  the  evolution in question 87? 
(b)  who  suffer from  it? 
See  also questions  118  and  121  (Section 2.8.). 
2.7.21.  Rankin  ional differences 
and  the 
As  regards the fifth and  last point  (key three:  comparisons between products),  we  shall 
put  three basic questions: 
LXXXIX)  How  are the different products ranked  according  to each of the following criteria: 
(89)  (a)  increase  in m1it retail b  in~  rices,  indicating separately the average, 
maximum  and  minimum  prices  as  in the sixth table)? 
(b)  as  (a),  referring to unit producers prices? 
(c)  as  (a),  referring to unit retail selling prices? 
iJhat  is the breakdown  of the  shares accounted for  by  transport  and  insurance costs 
and  taxes  in: 
- unit retail buying prices  (average,  maximwn,  minimum) 
- unit producers prices  (average,  maximum,  minimum) 
-unit retail selling prices  (average,  maximum,  minimum). 
See  also questions  119 ~~· 
1.  See  also 2.5.21.  - The  speed at which retail prices react to changes  in producers' 
prices. 
145 XC)  :ao\'J  are  the different  ~roducts ranked according  to each of the different criteria 
(90)  indicated in question  7? 
XCI) 
(91) 
Hovf 
the 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
are the different products ranked  b;r  country  in decreasing order for  each of 
following data,  as  obtained from  the most  recent  survey: 
absolute size of average retail mark-up,  that is:  the difference uetween  the 
retail selling price and  the unit retail buying price,  specifying the  amount 
accounted for  by  taxes; 
absolute size  of the maximum  ret&il mark-up,  specifyine the  name  of the 
relevant retailer for each country,  and also the  amount  accounted for  by  taxes; 
absolute size of the minimum  retail mark-up,  specifying the  name  of the relevant 
retailer for  each country,  and  also the  amount  accounted for by taxes; 
absolute size of the average  wholesale  (or  import/export)  mark-up,  that is: 
the difference between the unit retail buying price and  the unit  producers  (or 
manufacturers)  price,  before deduction of  any  transport  and  insurance  costs borne 
by  the trader  (amount  to be  specified); 
(e)  absolute size  of the  maximum  wholesale  (or trade)  mark-up,  before deduction  of 
any  transport and  insurance  costs borne  by  the  trader  (amount  to  be  specified). 
The  name  of the relevant wholesaler  (or trader)  for  each country will also be 
indicated; 
(f) absolute  size of the minimwn  vlholesale  (or trade)  mark-up,  before deduction of 
any transport  and  insurance costs borne  by  the trader  (amount  to be  specified). 
The  name  of the relevant  wholesaler  (or trader)  for each country will also be 
indicated. 
See also question 123. 
Here  it is worth remembering  that the sixth table illustrates the differences: 
between the retail bgying price and  the actual producers'  (or manufacturers')  price, 
as regards both structure and  evolutio~ in the different countries; 
between the retail selling price and  the actual producers'  (or  manuf~cturers') price, 
as regards both structure and  evolution,  in the different countries. 
From  the ansv1ers  to questions 87-91  we  can discover: 
whether there is discrimination in producers'  (or rranufacturers')  prices according to the 
country  (and/or region)  where  a  given product  is bought; 
in which  countries  (and/or regions)  the distributive  system  is most  and  least 
expensive to the final  consumer,  assuming a  uniform producers'  (or manufacturers')  price.1 
tihat  we  now  need is a  quantitative  breakdown  of all these factors,  that is:. 
an attempt at estimated figures  for  each cost and/or profit element  (transport and 
insurance costs,  storage costs,  various  forms  of taxes,  exceptional profits and  s9 an); 
identification of the producers,  traders or retailers concerned  (whether  they are 
benefiting or being damaged),  special attention being also paid to the differences in 
taxation depending  on  product  and  country. 
1.  See  also 2.5.21. -The speed at which retail prices react to charges in producers 
prices 
146 2.7.22.  The  problem  of calculating the ectual retail  b~ying price 
It is apparent  from  the  above  questions  that there is a  need  for a  very  thorough analysis 
of: 
I)  the distributive system,  ir1  relation to the production (and/or n;o.nufe.cturing)  systen., 
considered  in teru.s  of: 
- international  trade; 
each selected product  submitted to the  very  thorough analysis; 
II)  the concept  (definition and  measure)  of: 
the unit retail  b~ing price;  and 
- the unit  producers price;  or 
the unit manufacturers price. 
The  crucial problem,  as  we  have  seen,  is calculating the actual retail buying price1of a 
given item,  this calculation presupposing knowledge  of the actual date  of purchase. 
On  this ba.sis it will be  possible to calculate: 
- the actual mark-up. 
How  are we  to determine the actual date  of purchase,  in order to know  the actual retail 
buying price? 
And  then:  how  are we  to determine  the different  forms  and  sizes  of discounts,  rebates 
and  so  on? 
2.1.23.  Practical ways  and means  of determining actual retail b3ring prices 
Briefly speaking,  we  can indicate four  suitable ways: 
(a) direct questions to retailers;  (b)  indirect or mediate questions to retailers; 
(c) direct questions to all suppliers concerned  (producers  and/or  traders);  (d)  estimations 
based  on  analysis  of chronological and  international sets of tables and data. 
(a)  The  retailer has  to be  asked,  on  the  occasion of each  six-monthly survey,  about: 
- the date  of purchase and  the retail buying price - at the actual date  of purchase -
of a  given  item  (product),  which  exists in the  shop at the  time  of the  survey; 
-the retail buying price for the  corresponding  item  (product),  currently payable 
at the  time  of  the survey. 
The  first point is necessary for calculation of the actual mark-up,  to be  recorded in the 
present  survey,  while  the second  point will  be  utilised for analysing and  determining 
actual retail buying prices and  mark-ups  in future  surveys  (see letter (d)). 
(b)  Another question to be  put to the retailer on  the  occasion of  each survey concerns  the 
average  time  in stock,  which  will enable  the research institute: 
- to ascertain the actual date  of purchase  of the  items  (products)  concerned; 
- to check these calculations  (and  estimations)  with  other information directly 
supplied by  the retailers concerned,  as regards  the actual date of purchase, 
retail buying price and  retail mark-up  (see letter (a)). 
1.  This knowledge  is essential for calculating more  particularly the speed at which  the 
retail selling price reacts to changes  in the retail  ~ying price.  See  also 2.5.21. 
147 (c)  By  contactint:  the retailers'  main  suppliers,  such as  producers,  manufacturers, 
v1holesalers,  i:n:r:-orters  and/  or exporters,  it Hill be  possible to double-check the 
inforu~ation given by  the  retc:...ilers  as  regards actual d<.ltes  of purchn.se  and  actual 
ri'Jtail  bu~/ing prices  (resulting from  letters  (a)  and  (b)). 
(0.)  It is  pos~ible to estiwate and  to double-check the  actual dates  of purchase  and  the 
actual  buying prices by  ;;mc-tlysing  data collected in previous  surveys  (see  the  second 
question i:n  letter (a),  as v.;ell  as  questions  (b)  and  (c)).  As  concerns  more 
particularl~,r the  actuc..tl  buying prices,  where  they are  fixed  internationally, it is 
possil1le  also to derive useful  information from  surve;ys  carried out  in other countries. 
The  conclusion is  obvious: 
determinine  and  estimating the actual dates  (or  times)  of  the  purchase,  the actual 
retail ht:wing  prices and  the actual mark-up  is a  very difficult task,  but  not  an 
impo~sible one.  And  in any case  importance  of such knowledge  justifies all the efforts 
made  in fulfilline the  task; 
-key one  (the analysis  of evolution)  requ1r~ng systematic  and  continuous  development  of 
the research over  time - in a  long-term context and  programme  - as well  as  key  t1r10  (the 
international  comparison)  requirine international cooperation bet1r1een  the European 
Commission  and  the n::<tional  research institutes, ooth play a  decisive role in high-
lighting the pattern of behaviour  of the major retailers as well  as the working  of 
market  and  price structures. 
2.  7 .24.  Dir;count  and  rebate  scheme  - QQ.  92-94 
There  exist different  forms  of discount  and rebate  schemes.  The  research institutes will 
answer  the  following questions: 
XCII)  In the detern;ination of the unit  buying  price  has it been  possible  to find  out 
(92)  whether  some  retailers  (specifying their name)  receive the  following rebates  or 
discounts,  and  if so what  is the probable percentage  of purchases affected: 
(a)  a  rebate  linked to the aggregate quru1tity  bought  by  the retailers at a  given 
time  or in a  given period.  How  is this period determined and how  does  the 
rebate  scheme  operate? 
(b)  a  rebate linked to the rate  of  increase of quantities purchased  b,y  the 
retailers in relation to a  previous year  (or other fixed  period)? 
XCIII)  As  92,  as regards rebate  linked to exclusivity  (in respect  of purchases  or of 
(93)  sales or  of both). 
XCIV)  Are  some  retailers  benefiting  from  special terms  that it is difficult to express 
(94)  as  sums  of money  because  they  concern: 
(a)  the  terms  and  conditions  of transport,  delivery and  storage  of the  goods 
purchased  (eg.  for  supplementary  services demanded  by  buyers); 
(b)  other special terms agreed between the retailer (buyer)  and  the seller 
(producer,  manufacturer  or wholesaler)? 
2.7.25.  Standard.  contracts between suppliers and  buyers 
He  must  emphasise  that it is the actual  buying price,  ie. the full price minus  all discounts 
and  rebates allowed  to the retailer,  that must  be  taken into account.  The  calculation and 
estimation of those discounts - granted under different  forms  and  in different ways  -
constitutes a  very delicate operation.  In this respect,  it may  be  helpful  to consider the 
standard contracts that  sorr1e  big retailers (buyers)  and  manufacturers  or  wholesalers 
(suppliers)  currently apply in their business relationship.  It is noteworthy however  that 
exceptions are often allowed  from  the  standard contracts and  terms  in dealings with very 
big retailers  (buyers).  The  report  of the research institute will specify in detail how 
the different  forms  of discount  have  been worked  out,  calculated and/or  estimated,  so as to 
give a  very precise view  of the reliability of the  b~ying price taken into account,  and to 
what  extent it is really the actual beying price. 
148 The  actual  b~ying prices have  to be  compared,  both from  the  evolutionary and  the 
international viewpoints,  and for this reason they mu:st  be  defined very strictly. 
The  research on price structures nO\'If  I'eaches  the final  stage,  as  though the circle were 
completed,  since it is now  possible to integrate: 
- the results of analysis  of retail buying prices and  power  interplay  (QQ.  65-93) 
with further and deeper analysis: 
of  shop efficiency  (QQ.  95-103); 
of loss  leading  (QQ.  104-115). 
Indeed it is now  possible to give the names  of retailers in each  of the different 
countries ano.  re,  ions  who  are  buying  the  selected products  fron1  producers and/  or 
manufacturers and  or traders, 
at  the  lowest  price,  those retailers therefore having the greatest bargaining power, 
at the highest price,  those retailers therefore having the weakest  ba.rga.ining power. 
If those retailers'  names  are  broadly the  same  for all products,  we  must  no1v  see what 
kind  of relationship exists beh1een strength of retailer b3-rgaining power  (against the 
suppliers)  and: 
(a)  shop efficiency  (Section 2.4.); 
(b)  loss leading  (Section 2.6.); 
(c)  the  level  and  the trend of concentration in actual regional  (or local) retail 
distributiorJ  and  in national retail distribution in each given country in general. 
2. 7.27.  Shop  efficiency at the  fin:-tl  st~_ge  of analysis - Reference  to  QQ.  95-103 
The  next.  stuee  in the ane.lysis will  sroH  how  far the strongest retailerc:  (in terms  of 
bargainine po11er)  make  use  of tbeir p )l·:er: 
I)  either: 
b;y  reducine their retail sell:i.ng prices  and  mark-ups,  therefore  benefiting the 
final  consumer; 
by reducing  the  time  in stock of the different products,  owing  to an  increase in 
their cales helped  by  loNer prices; 
II)  or: 
- by doine  so  i:n  some  of their  shops  operated but not  in others. 
In the latter case  an  att.eF.pt  1vill  be  made  to ascertain the  actu.-1-l  long-term goals  of the 
policy  pursued  by  the retail operator  eroup: 
by virtue  of this stronger  bargaining 
order  to drive certain troublesome 
markets? 
On  the  other hand,  further  a.nalysis - usine certain e;:;sential  data already seen  (as regards 
rotail selling prices,  mark-ups  ancl  time  in stock)  - '1-vill  shoH  the deeree  of probability of 
the  vTeakest  retailers  (in  terr~.G  of  barged ning pouer)  being driven off the market  sooner  or 
later. 
Internatiort[l1  compc>,risons  of the  evolution {key three)  will help to forecast  the  expected 
trends  in  each  coU11try  aYJ.cl/ or regi  OE  analysed. 
149 2.7.28.  Loss  leading at the final  stage  of analysis- Reference to QQ.  104-115 
The  research institutes, after estimating the actual date  of purchase  and  the actual retail 
buying price,  will  be  able to move  on  to a  detailed analysis of  the  loss leading policy. 
It is in almost all respects a  highly ambiguous  "two souls."  policy  (Zwei  Seelen wohnen  ach! 
in meiner Brust- Goethe),  since it is difficult to define  and anyway it may  reflect: 
I)  either the existence of strength and  efficiency, 
II)  or the existence of weakness  and inefficiency. 
I) In the first case  loss leading may  be  an active - even aggressive - policy of  a 
strong retailer for curbing his competitors  and  even  eliminating them.  His  considerable 
bargaining power  (vis-a-vis the suppliers)  enables him  to follow a  very effective and 
dangerous  policy without  enduring substantial losses  (points 2.6.6.  to 8.).  And  so, 
without  bearing either risks  or losses,  this retailer can eliminate competitors  in 
some  regions  or towns  and thus restrict the'bompetitive arena". 
But,  on  the  other hand,  docs this policy benefit  the  final  consumer  by  helping to 
comb~t inflation?  After all, this retailer,  in our  inflationary times,  is in practice 
working against those  who  speculate  on  anticipated price rises! 
A loss  leading policy,  in other words,  acts as  a  barrier to artificial price  increases: 
- both at the producers'  level,  as regards the  trend.  of international trade; 
- and at the regional  (or local)  level,  as regards  consumer  prices. 
A meaningful  indication of v1hether  the  good  or bad "soul"  is animating  the  loss  leading 
policy l-vill  be  whether  the policy is fairly vTidespread  amone  all the  shops  of the 
retailer operator group or applied solely  in selected shops  in crucial reeions  or 
to\mS  (point 2.7.27.II). 
II)  In the  second  case,  the  loss  leadine policy  expresses the  existence  of weakness  and 
of inefficiency because  the  rteak retailer,  who  is obliged to buy at an excessively high 
price from  his suppliers,  is also obliged to sell some  products  belor: his buying price. 
In this case,  there are two  possible explanations: 
a)  The  "vJeak"  retailer is weak  l)ecause  he  is small. 
Since he  is small,  he  can  buy  only  small quanti  ties and  thus  has  a  weak  bare.:dning 
pov1er  (vis-a-vis suppliers). 
Since  he is small,  he  is also inefficient because  he  is not  able  to reap economies 
of  sc~le in distribution,  his personnel is utilized below  capacity,  therefore his 
selline prices are  too hieh and  he  has also to endure  a  longer  time  in stock. 
In this case,  a  loss  leading policy is the  last resort and  the retailer may  well 
be  heading for bankruptcy. 
b)  The  "weak"  retailer is a  big operator  group. 
Since he is too big,  his management  is not  able to run the business efficiently or 
else his management  is simply of poor quality,  so that there is no  relationship 
betv1een  corporate size and profitability.  The  real difficulty in ana  lysine the 
effjciency of a  big group is shown  by  the fact that,  since this  group is  operating 
ntany  u:ndertald.ngs  in differentlines of business and  in different regions,  it cat! 
use.,12rofits  that  way  arise from  the abuse  of dominance  (or monopoly)  power  in some 
markets  to offset losses  incurred in other rn.arket::;. 
In a  big eroup also the  quc.di ty of management  n.ay  be  highly varia1)le  (raneine from 
the excellent to the  very poor manager)  and.  the  best managers  may  1--:ish  to preserve 
the distinction betwsen themselves  and  the "poorer"  managers  by  keeping  the latter 
in jobs as  long as  the  overall financial position of  the  conglomerate  group is out 
of the red. 
150 Anyway,  the analysis of the "buying price"  in this section should  seek to establish 
whether the big retailer is actually using his strong bargaining power  to obtain 
'the best  terms  from  his suppliers,  as  is most  probable. 
In any  case,  the practice of loss  leading has  to be  analysed very thoroughly in 
order to ascertain whether: 
it aims  to conceal the  inefficiency of some  shops  and  branches  of the retailer 
operator group,  offset by  excess  profits in other shops  or branches and/or for 
other products;  or 
it is possible because  of large volume  of overall sales in the  shops  practising it, 
these shops  being  in a  position to finance  their own  loss leading. 
The  comparison  of time  in stock in relation to different products and  shops  might 
be  helpful here. 
151 2.C.  COMPLETION  OF  THE  MONOGRAPHIC  APPROACH  BY  PRODUCT:  EXCESSIVE  PRICES  AND  THEIR 
CAUS11'S  - AND  PARTICULARLY  THE  BREAKDO'VJN  OF  PRICES 
2.8.1.  A monographic  approach  by  product 
The  foregoing considerations have  highlighted the  complexity of the factors that determine 
the final price,  that is to say the series of final  prices which  the  consumer  may  be 
charged for the  same  product  (and/or brand)  by  different  shops  in different countries. 
The  above  analyses  have  given practical forn1  to the  idea of a  mono  ra hie a  roach to the 
product,  since,  working  from  a  large number  of items  of  information  prices and  mark-ups 
relating to a  large number  of products,  the ultimate aim  should be  to narrow our attention 
down  to a  number  of selected products,  each studied separately by  a  kind  of monograph  and 
subjected to the most  detailed analysis possible with the information available. 
The  point now  is to complete  this monographic  approach  by  product along  two  lines: 
(a)  detecting and  an~lysing excessive prices1; 
(b)  analysing  the  causes  of excessive prices,  with particular reference to: 
the existence  of a  distribution circuit involving  too many  stages; 
the existence  of excessive mark-ups; 
the  existence  of particularly heavy  taxes. 
But  this analysis  of the causes  of excessive prices is bound  to involve  completion of 
the monographic  approach by  firm  if excessive prices are  caused by: 
the  existence  of dominance,  caused in its turn by: 
the existence  of an excessive degree  of concentration,  nationally or  locally. 
2.8.2.  The  chain  of excessive prices 
Section 2.7.  highlighted certain phenomena  of price formation,  the analysis  being based 
on  the relations between  firms  and  the  two  ends  of the distribution chain: 
producers; 
retailers. 
The  study of excessive prices means  that  the  an~lysis must  be  extended  to! 
the  other links  in the distribution chain bett·,leen  producer and  retailer2; 
factors  conditioning the producers  prices. 
1.  The  detection and analysis  of excessivE>  prices are essential to  the  Cormnis sion' s 
activities in relation to Community  competition poL.cy.  The  judE,"'Tlent  given by  the 
Court  of Justice  on  14  February  1978  in Case  27/76,  Chiquita  (United  Brands  Company 
v.  Commission)  confirrr.s  the need  for  systern~ttic,  detailed analysis  of excessive 
pricing. 
2.  As  regards  the retail trade,  it will  be  reme:nbered  that  a  distinction is made  between 
integrated distribution - firms  bu;y-ing  direct from  the producers - and  independent 
distribution - buying through wholesalers. 
152 One  mieht  imagine  the  existence  of a  chain  of excessive prices  since these can be 
chareed: 
at the rets.il level  (final consumer  price); 
- at the producer  level; 
at any  intervenine level. 
Any  excessive  price at any  stage in the distribution cha:in  obviously affects do\mstream 
levels  of distribution,  the full cumulative  effect being manifested,  of  course,  at the 
consu~er stage.  An  example  of the  formation  and  development  of prices is given  in 
Table VII. 
2.8.3.  The  detection of  excessive prices 
One  practical  consequence  flow8  from  the foregoing: 
In the detection of excessive prices,  the  b:Lsic,  primary point  of observation is the 
cons~~er price.  The  retail selling price is a  transparent  datmn  easily accessible to all. 
This final price is the point  of departure for  any specific operational enquiry.  We 
therefore hcwe  every reason for regardine it as  a  kind  of thermometer. 
An  excessive  price  can be  detected in the  follovdng ways: 
I)  IN  STATIC  TEmrs,  by  studying the relevent  structure at a  given  point in time: 
a)  Comparison  of retail selling prices; 
- bct'tleen different  shops  in the  same  region or  town; 
bet1-:een  different co'Wltries  or regions. 
b)  B:reakdoHn  of the retail selling price into its various  components. 
II) IN  Dl'l!AtUC  TERMS,  by  studying the evolution of this structure with reference to the 
tl-:o  above  aspects  (comparison in prices and  breakdot.,rn  of the final price).  The  two 
keys  with which  we  are  now  familiar will  be  used: 
- key  one:  analysis  of the  evolution of the different prices  (selling price,  buying 
price,  producers'  price)  for the  same  sample  of  shops  in the  same  country; 
- key  t1-vo:  analysis  of  the  comparative  international evolution,  between shops  in 
different countries. 
But  with particular reference to breakdown  of the retail selling price  (aspect  (b)), 
key three - comparison betvJeen  products - may  be  of precious assistance. 
In questions 85  to  91 1 
rle  described the  instruments  that  can be  used  to highlight the 
countries,  products and  shops  of which it can be  said that prices are probably  excessive. 
Since  an excessive prioe is the most  flagrant  example  of an anomaly  of competition,  the 
point now  is to seek out  the  cause  of the excessive prices,  and  the result of our  sea~ch 
may  be: 
- proof that the prices are really excessive; 
description of the  causes behind these  excessive prices; 
-in certain cases,  an  operational  conclusion as to~  of attenuating or even 
eliminatine these  excessive prices. 
153 TABLE  VII 
FORIV:ATIOU  AND  EVOLUTION"  OF  PRICES  FOR  CERTADJ  SELECTED  PRO:JUCTS 
PRODUCT:  Nescc1..fe  Instant  Coffee  (10  bags:  18  gremmes)- made  b;y  Ne~:rt.le  (S1·litzBrland) 
PRICE  (in national currency) 
PRICE  VARIATIOUS  (~)  (·X·) 
number  and  PRODUCER'S  PRICE  ( **·)  WTOLESALE  PRIG:.:  =  R~TAIL 
date  of  BUYING  PRICl~ (**) 
survey  r-~aximrun  Minimum  Average  Maximum  ~ani  mum  Average 
(***) 
Price  Name  Price  Name  Price  Price  Name  Price  Name  Price 
and  or  and  or  ,;n~  and  or  an~  or  an~  %  :!:  Uo  c1  +  No  d1  +  No 
rf!  Ro  if. 
;~  IV  I·  - /  - l'  -
I) Januar·y  77 
II) July 77 
VARIATION  AND  ~ ~ 
~/~  ~  ~  DIFFERENCE  ~:...===-;;{.  ~  ======·  ======  F======  ======  ------ ======= 
III) ... 
VARIATION  AND 
DIFFERWCE 
IV)  ... 
VARIATION  AND 
D  IFFERENCl~ 
v) ... 
VARIATION  AND 
DIFFERENCE 
~  The  figures  in this example  relate to Italy and  prices are  in Lit. 
*  A distinction must  be  made  between price variations  (the percentage increase or 
decrease  over the original price)  and  differences  in mark-ups  (calculated between 
the new  rate of mark-up  and  the  old rate  of mark-up).  This  example  seeks  to 
highlight  the distinction betvJeen  the  hJO  concepts. 
**  ~lliere  integrated trade is concerned,  producers price = retail buying price. 
***  The  average price is always  calculated from  all available prices.  It does  not 
therefore constitute the midway  point between the  maximum  and  the  minimum. 
154 T.ABL::!;  VII 
PCP~'.ffl~  TIC'~!  MTD  ~!OLUTION O"li'  PRICES  FOR  CF8TAHT  SEIBCTZD  PRODUCTS 
r:8CmUCT:  ~~0SCc.:.fe  Instc:J.Y.It  f!offee  ( 10  b8.gs:  18  grrunmes)  - made  b,y  Nestle  (S111[l -:.zerlan~.) 
PRICE  (in no.t.iorw.l  currency) 
Number  PRIC:S  VJ',.RIATIONS  (~)  (*) 
and  R:::TAIL  FRTCJ~ 
date 
of  Y.  a  x  i  m a 
r~~inimum  ~verage 
I  II  III  IV  (***)  survey 
Fl'ice  Narrte  Price  Nawe  Price  Name  Price  Uame  Price  Name  Price 
an~  or  an~  or  an~  or  an~  or  an$  or  an~ 
r1  No  c1  No 
n1  No  n1  No  1- No  c1  ;o- jU- /"- /''- /" -
I) Jan.  77  700  490  572 
II) Jul.  77  850  540  635 
VARIATION  L~  ~ ~ 
~ ~  AND  +21 ,4% 
~  ~  ~ 
+10.2? ~ 
+11,0% 
DIFFFBEN'CE  ~- I~  ....  ====- •===  == ---=== =-- - ====-- ---- ====  ---=-=~  ======  ======= 
III) ... 
V.AR.  AND 
DIFF. 
IV)  ... 
VAR.  AliD 
DIFF. 
v)  ... 
VAR.  AND 
toiFF. 
N.B.  The  fi~es in this example  relate to Italy and  prices are  in Lit. 
*  A distinction must  be  made  betvreen price variations  (the percentage  increase or 
decrease  over the original price)  and  differences  in mark-ups  (calculated between 
the new  rate of mark-up  and  the  old rate of mark-up).  This  example  seeks to 
highlieht the distinction between  the  two  concepts. 
**  vfuere  integrated trade is concerned,  producers price = retail buying price. 
***  The  average  price is always  calculated from  all available prices.  It does  not 
therefore constitute the midway  point  between  the  maximum  and  the minimum. 
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FORrwiATION  AND  EVOLUTION  OF  PRICES  FOR  CERTAIN  SELECTED  PRODUCTS 
PRODUCT:  Nescafe Instant Coffee  (10  bags:  18  grammes)  -made by Nestle  (Switzerland) 
RETAIL  MARK-UPS  AND  DIFFERENCES  (*)  (%) 
Number  Maxima  Minima  ~verage 
and 
date  I  II  III  IV  Rate  Name  Rate 
of  and  or  and  Rate  Name  Rate  Name  Rate  Name  Rate  Name  survey  And  or  and  or  and  or  and  or  Diff.  No  Diff. 
Diff.  No  Diff.  No  Diff.  No  Diff.  No 
I) Jan.  77  44·9  34.6  30.4  24.2  1·4  18.4 
II) Jul. 77  53·4  35·4  26.4  22.7  -2·5  14·7 
VAR.  AND 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
DIFF.  +8.5  ~-
+0.8  -4.0 
~ 
-1·5  -3·9  -3·7 
"'~== ---=-=  ======  ======  F:====== b'::f::: __  ~  ====== V="=-=:!f= ~====== 
III)  ••• 
VAR.  AND 
DIFF. 
IV)  .. , 
VAR.  AND 
DIFF. 
V)  ••• 
VAR.  AND 
DIFF. 
~  The  figures in this example  relate to Italy· and prices are  in Lit. 
*  A distinction must  be  made  between price variations (the percentage increase or 
decrease over  the  original price)  and differences in mark-ups  (calculated between 
the new  rate of mark-up  and the  old rate of mark-up).  This  example  seeks to 
highlight the distinction between the  tv10  concepts. 
**  Where  integrated trade is concerned,  producers price = retail buying price. 
***  The  average price is always  calculated from  all available prices.  It does not 
therefore constitute the midway  point between the maximum  and  the minimum. 
156 2.8.4.  The  concept  of  the  excessive price - Proposal for an operational definition -
QQ.  116  and  117 
The  follovdne working  hypotheses  are proposed: 
(a)  An  excessive price could be  regarded as being the exact  opposite  of the price of a 
loss leader,  considered at section 2.6.; 
(b)  thus,  just as reference could be  made  to the lowest  prices and  mark-ups  brought  out 
by  the fourth,  fifth and  sixth taples in or4er to establish·a guide list of products 
and  shops  that might  be  surveyed for the existence of loss-leading,  likewise reference 
could be  made  to the highest figures in those tables t·o  establish a  guide list of 
products and  shops  that it might  be  worth  examining for excessive pricing; 
(c)  at a  later stage in the  survey,  possibly taking account  of the various qualitative 
factors,  the two  guide  lists (loss leaders and  excessive prices)  could be  restricted 
to products and  shops  where  the values of the degree  of dispersion of prices and 
mar~ups are highest  (and particularly the co-efficients eRP  and eAs)• 
On  this basis an attempt must  then be  made  to answer  the  following questions: 
CXVI) 
(116) 
Referring to questions 85  to 88  (in section 2.7.19.  and 2.1.20.), is it possible, 
in each country surveyed and in all the countries  surveyed and  compared,  to 
establish a  guide list of suspect  products and  firms  as regards the question of 
excessive pricing?  Do  the suspect firms  include sole distributors?  It goes 
without  saying that initially it will be  the quantitative criterion of maximum 
prices,  mark-ups  and·differences and  increases in them  that will be  used for 
establishing this list. 
CXVII)  Can  the list of products and  firms  suspected of excessive pricing be  broken into 
(117)  three categories: 
(a) certainty or great probability of excessive pricineJ 
(b)  probab11ity or reasonable presumption; 
(c) abstract possibility still to be  checked and  proved. 
2.8.5.  Excessive prices and  the speed at which retail prices react to change  in 
producers'  prices - Q.  118 
CXVIII)  Can  the suspect products and  firms  be  ranked according to the following criteria: 
(118) 
(a)  speed at which  a  downstream  price (retail buying  or selling price) reacts 
to an increase in the producers pricef 
(b)  speed at which  a  downstream  price reacts to a  fall in the producers price? 
What  role is played b,y  exclusive agreements?  And  by  the type  of trading? 
Products and  firms  can then be  ranked,  b,y  reference to two  extreme  cases: 
-anticipation (highest speed):  downstream  prices rise or fall before the 
producer's price rises or falls; 
-impermeability (zero):  downstream  prices do  not  change  when  producers~ prices 
do. 
It goes  without  saying that the  s~ed at which final prices react to change  in 
producers'  prices constitutes a  significant pointer to the practical functioning 
of competition - or alternately of restrictive practices. 
157 2.8.6.  Selection and analysis of suspect products - Table  VII 
The  search for the causes  of excessive prices entails, among  other things,  analysis  of 
price formation  and  trends.  This is the first stage  of the operational phase  of the 
survey,  aiming to analyse the real scope  of competitive anomalies. 
Here  it will be  ~vorth establishing a  comparative  sununary  table  by  means  of which  the 
formation and  evolution of the prices  of certain products  oan be  brought  out  (Table  VII). 
It should be  noted that the table distinguishes between the wholesaler (or trade)  price 
and the producers'  price,  thoueh these  t~vo prices \vill of course  coincide uhere  integrated 
trade is involved.  As  regards  the  currency in which  prices are expressed,  this Hill be 
the  natior~l currency of the  country where  the relevant products are  ret~iled.  Conversion 
of producers'  prices where  products are imported t·lill  have  to be  l:used  on  the nearest 
exchanee rate to that actuo1ly paid by  the  importer  (dealer or major retailer). 
The  importance  of Table VII  lies in the fact that it cor:1bines  a  d~rnami.c approtwh  (or 
the  comparative statics approach)  over what  may  turn out  to be  quite a  long period with 
a  vertical section of price structure from  production to  the retail staee. 
By  stu1ying this table  He  can immediately detect certain competitive anorrulies. 
Indication of  the  percentages to be  added to the proiucer's price in order to obtain 
the retail selling price and  the wholesale price respectively enubles  comparisons  to 
be  drawn  betv1een  the  various tendencies affecting "crucial" products. 
In practical terms  a  distinction has  to be  made  beti<'Teen: 
- uhe  selection of prod.ucts  whose  prices are to be  broken dmm; 
- the  object of this breakdmm. 
On  the first point, it is  obvious  that  the  operation is so complex and  costly that very 
strict limits have  to be  accepted.  He  shall confine  ourselves to selecting t1vo  or three 
products  where  the  operation would  at first sight  seem  to be realistic and  fruitful. 
The  list of criteria to be applied in selecting products for analysis in itself highlights 
the orientations and  objectives  of  our research,  as  can be  seen from  the followine: 
(a)  Size  of the  mark-up 
The  answers  to question 91  will highlight those products for which  excessive mark-ups 
are  observed at l-lhatever  level of distribution (wholesale  or retail). 
(b)  Upward  trend  of mark-ups 
This will be  observed from  the anst-vers  to question 87. 
(c)  Existence  of dominant  positions  on  national and/or local markets 
This  is a  decisive point,  for as a  rule it is precisely the existence  of dominance  that 
enables producers,  retailers or other intermediaries to set excessive prices.  The 
criterion was  already emphasized at point 2.2.3., and  we  shall return to it. 
2.8.7. Analysis  of the  comparative  evolution of various  cost and  price components- The 
search for explanations ~ ~Q.  119-121 
The  followine  points will have  to be  considered for suspect  products: 
CXIX)  Referring to the answers  to questions 85  to 87,  is it possible to establish a  table 
(119)  of comparative statics, highlighting the  following factors: 
producers'  prices in the main  countries  of origin,  expressed in national currency 
at the various  times t, t+1,  t+2,  etc; 
158 series of variations  in producers'  prices  (average,  maximum  and  minimum)  at any 
given moment,  expressed as percentages  of the price at time t; 
percentage  of  the producers'  price accounted for at a  given  time t+i  (i=O,  1,  2,  ••  ) 
by  transport,  insurance and  storage costs,  distinguishing the average,  maximum  and 
minimum,  from  each  producer  country to each town  or region covered by  the retail 
selling price surveys; 
other specific cost  components  (taxes,  duties,  etc); 
the mark-up  taken by  the wholesaler or importer,  as  a  percentage  of the producers' 
price,  and  the evolution of the mlrk-up over  the reference period,  specifying the 
proportion accounted for  by  taxes  ; 
buying price paid by  each retailer at each time t, distinguishing the  average, 
maximum  and  minim~m, the price being expressed in several different monetary units 
(price in the producing country,  price in the buyer's country,  price in European 
units  of account); 
series of variations in buying prices  (according to  countr~ of origin)  for  each 
retailer at each  time .!±.!t  as  a  percentage  of the price at time  t; 
retail mark-up  as  a  percentage  of: 
(a)  the producer's price;  and 
(b)  the buying price, 
specifying the  average,  maximum  and  minimum  and  the proportion accounted for  by 
taxes; 
retail selling price for  each retailer,  converted into the  currency of the 
producer's  country and  into the European unit  of account; 
series of variations in retail selling prices  (according to country of origin)  for 
each retailer at each  time .i±!r  as  a  percentage  of the price at  time .i• 
CXX)  Hhat  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  the  answers  to question  119?  Can  a  divergent 
(120)  evolution of the  various  prices,  costs and  cost  comp011e11ts  for certain products  be 
observed  according to produoine and/or buying cow1try?  Nhat  causes are  suegested 
for the divergent  evolution? 
CXXT)  Is it possible to estimate the net  gains  (or losbes)  to certain retailers,  producers 
(121)  (or manu£acturers)  or dealers as  a  result  of changes  in the  above  prices and  costs? 
Are  the net  g'dins,  if :.:u1y t  linked  to dominance  or  even  monopoly,  to restrictive 
agree1r.ents  or  to restrictive practices?  Do  exclusive agreements  have  the  effect of 
raising 1)rices  and  rr.c:.trk-up::;? 
2.8.8.  The  breakdown  of mJ.rk-ups  - Q.  122 
The  a  ..  n:::;~·wr;::;  to the  foregoing  questions  should  make  it possible to break doNn  the various 
variable cost  component8  that  con~titute the mark-up.  But  the  problem  of fixed  costs  carmot 
be  overlooked. 
CXXII)  Can  the  mark-up for certain products  or  categories of products  be  broken down  for 
(122)  certair1 fil"l:ts  (a:nsv:er  to  qu·~:ction 91),  with a  distinction bein6  made,  araong  other 
thing::;,  bet;.,·een  wages  and  salaries,  interest  OlJ.  capital,  rent,  insurance and  costs 
affecting processine plant  in general,  storace and  rr~rketine?  CQn  this be  done 
again for  cert-stin  retailers  <:tnd  for  certS:.in  wholesalers and]or  importers?  The 
l.Jroportion  <:t.ccounted  for by  taxes  should  be  specified particularly. 
1.  It is obvious  that where  the integrated trade is involved- particularly where  the 
retailer imports direct - this  item vdll not apply. 
159 The  answer to question 122  raises highly complex  problems.  Very  often estimates will 
have  to be  made,  taking account  of the cost  structure of  the various types  of firm 
(retailers, dealers,  importers).  In some  cases it will not  be  possible to break down 
mark-ups for a  given product  but  only for a  category of products  and  possibly only for 
the whole  business  of the relevant  firm. 
2.8.9.  Breakdown  of the producer's price  Q.  123 
The  analyses  may  reveal that the causes  of the excessive price lie at  the first. link of 
the chain,  that is to say with the producer.  In this  case an attempt must  be  made  to 
answer the  following question: 
CXXIII)  Can  the producer's price be  broken down  for a  given product  or  category of products 
(123)  whose  producer's price at first sight seems  excessive  or has risen considerably 
during the reference period?  The  point here is to take the producer's price for 
each of the various firms  studied and  break it down  into its components: 
taxes; 
energy used in processing or manufacturing the products; 
-raw materials purchased  (before processing); 
wages  and  salaries; 
interests  on  capital; 
rent  and  insurance; 
storage and transport. 
The  Institute will also estimate R & D expenditure,  and  especially expenditure  on 
advertising either for a  specific product  or for a  group  of products. 
It is clear that serious problems  will arise in such an operation as regards: 
high-technoloey products requiring highly capital-intensive production plant; 
firms  with a  high degree  of diversification or of vertical integration; 
all these factors  thus constitute a  serious barrier to the  breakdown  of fixed costs, 
tholl€h this would  be  the  only way  of highlighting the  cost structure  of a  given period. 
Even  so it must  be  borne in mind: 
I)  coe:ts  could be  broken dm·m  per group of related products; 
II) the use  of alternative bases for estimation might  throw up  certain conclusions  as to 
the  comparative  evolutim1 of  company  and  group structures over  a  given period; 
III) the cost breakdown  \vill  have  the  greatest  chance  of  success for fairly slmple 
proo.ucts  manufactured by  single product  firms. 
In this connection,  it is worth noting what  the  Court  of Ju.s tice of the  -r~ope3.n Communi ties 
said in its Chiquita  judgment  of  14  February 1978  in Case  27/76  (United  Brands  Company  v 
Commission),  grounds  of  judgment  254  <:tnd  255: 
"h'hile appreciating the  considerable  and.  at times  very great difficulties in N"orking  out 
production coRts  which  may  sometimes  include a  discretiorery apportionment  of  irJclireot 
costs and  general  expondi ture and  v.rhich  rne,y  vary significantly aocor<ling  to the  size  of 
the w1dertaking,  its object,  the  complex  nature  of its set  up,  its territorial area  of 
operations,  wh0ther it mw1Ufaotures  one  or  several products,  the  number  of its sul)si.dL.1rics 
and their relationship Ni th  eet.ch  other,  the production costs  of the  lY  .  .:mana  do  not  seem  to 
present uny  insu.pcra'ble  problems. 
In tbis case it emerges  from  a  study bj'  the United Nations  Confer·:mce  011  trade  cmd. 
development  of  10  February 1975  that  the pattern of the production,  packngine,  tr::t.r:r.>por-
tation,  marketing and distribution of hs.na.nas  could.  have  made  it possible to compute  the 
approximate  production cost  of this fruit  and  .J.ccordins;l~r to  c&-lculo.te  vrl1ethcr  j_ts  s'3llinc 
price to ripener/distributo::;a  vre_s  excessiv'3." 
160 2.9.  COMPLETION  OF  THE  FIRM-BY-FIRM  MONOGRAPHIC  APPROACH:  NATIONAL  AND  LOCAL  CONCENTRATION 
2.9.1. Dominance  as an explanation of excessive prices - Table VIII 
Dominance  may  appear: 
on  the producer's market; 
on  the distributor's (or retailer's) market. 
In the first case it is "product dominance"  - that is to say dominance  exerted by  the 
manufacturer  of the product - that has repercussions  on  the purchasing retailer and, 
as a  consequence,  on  the final consumer. 
In the  second  case it is dominance  b.y  the large retailer which  has  repercussions  both 
upstream  on  the producer and downstream  on  the consumer. 
Studies by  the Commission  have  already revealed the existence  of a  great m~  producer's 
markets  which  exercise a  considerable power  of dominance  in several  EEC  Member  States. 
Table  VIII givys  a  series of examples  of national markets  of which  the leading firm holds 
more  than 25%.  Most  of the products to be  covered by  the detailed survey envisaged at 
this stage of the  investigation can be  found  in the list in Table  VIII for at least one 
Member  State. 
The  following are the products  involved: 
instant coffee and  possibly coffee grounds  or beans; 
sugar; 
- pure chocolate,  in powder  and  solid form,  and/or cocoa; 
-margarine and/or other edible oils  (groundnut  oil, corn oil, etc.); 
tinned peas  (natural); 
tinned and  packet  soups  (vegetable -minestrone, vermicelli - chicken,  tomato,  pea, 
mushroom); 
- homogenized  bab.y  foods:  (a) desserts (fruit),  (b)  mixed  vegetables with meat,  fish, 
chicken; 
-beer (bottled and  in cans); 
- mineral water; 
- cola beverages. 
1.  This table is taken from  the Seventh Annual  Report  on  Competition Policy,  point 287 
(Table 12),  published b,y  the Commission  in April  1978. 
The  definition of dominance  used for the table is independent  of the interpretation 
of the Treaty rules on  competition. 
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ing  (in %) 
1  86 
2  >85 
2  >85 
2  85 
2  85 
2  85 
7  84 
8  82 
9  >Bo 
9  8o 
9  8o 
9  80 
9  80 
9  80 
9  8o 
16  75 
16  75 
16  75 
16  75 
20  74 
21  73 
22  72 
23  71 
24  >70 
24  70 
24  70 
24  70 
24  70 
24  70 
24  70 
24  70 
24  70 
LIST  OF  PRODUCT  MARKETS  IN  WHICH  THE  LEADING  FIRM 
HOLDS  MORE  THAN  2  5%  OF  THE  TOTAL  NATIONAL  MARKET 
(based on  a  limited sample  of products and  countries 
covered by sectoral surveys) 
Market  Sector  Coun- Year  try 
Sugar  ALI  DK  1975 
Cola beverages  ALI  B  1976 
Spirits  ALI  DK  1976 
Beer  ALI  DK  1975 
Needlework threads  TEX  F  1973 
Chewing  gwn  ALI  F  1972 
Electric coffee-makers  ELE  F  1975 
Unworked  filter paper  PAP  B  1975 
Refrigerators and  freezers  ELE  F  1974 
Dishwashers  ELE  F  1974 
Hairdryers  ELE  F  1975 
Sewing  threads,  haberdashery  TEX  F  1973 
Automobile  ignition systems  TRA  D  1974 
Floor detergent  powders  CHI  I  1976 
White  rum  ALI  GB  1974 
Jute yarn and fabrics  TEX  F  1972 
Unsweetened  condensed milk  ALI  F  1972 
Baby  foods  ALI  DK  1975 
Sparking plugs  (as originally  fitted~  TRA  I  1974 
Coffee grinders  ELE  F  1975 
Frozen foods  ALI  I  1973 
Cine film (8,  Super 8,  etc.)  CHI  GB  1973 
Still films  CHI  GB  1973 
Non-barbiturate sedatives  PHA  GB  1973 
Chocolate powder  ALI  F  1972 
Cereals  (flakes)  ALI  F  1972 
Milk powder  ALI  GB  1973 
Dog  and  cat food  ALI  F  1972 
Instant coffee  ALI  F  1972 
Sweetened  condensed milk  ALI  F  . 1972 
Tranquillizers  PHA  NL  1973 
Sulphite paper  PAP  B  1974 
162 
TABLE  VIII 
Leading brand 
and/or firm 
De  danske  suk:ker-
fabrikker 
Coca  Cola 
United  Breweries  1 
Dollfus Mieg 
General  Foods 
Moulinex 
Intermills 
Thomson  - Brandt 
Thomson  - Brandt 
Moulinex 
Dollfus Mieg 
Bosch 
Spie-S  pan  (Procter 
&  Gamble) 
Bacardi - Bass 
Charrington 
Agache-Willot 
Gloria (Carnation) 
Nestle 
Marelli 
Moulinex 
Sages2 
Kodak 
Kodak 
Roche 
Poulain 
Kellogg 
Cadbury  Schweppes 
Mars  (Unisabi) 
Nestle 
Lait Mont-Blanc3 
Denayer Rank- c1 
ing  (in %) 
33  69 
34  67 
34  67 
36  66 
37  65 
37  65 
37  65 
37  65 
37  65 
42  63 
43  61 
44  >60 
44  .> 60 
44  60 
44  60 
44  60 
44  60 
44  60 
44  60 
44  60 
44  60 
44  60 
44  60 
44  60 
57  58 
57  58 
59  57 
59  57 
59  57 
59  57 
63  56 
LIST  OF  PRODUCT  MARKETS  IN  WHICH  THE  LEADING  FIRM 
HOLDS  MORE  THAN  25%  OF  THE  'roTAL  NATIONAL  MARKET 
TABLE  VIII 
(based on  a  limited sample  of products and countries 
covered by  sectoral surveys) 
Market  Sector  Coun- Year  Leading brand 
try  and/or firm 
Detergent for dishwashers  CHI  ..  I  1976  Finish (Soilax)4 
Margarine  ALI  GB  1973  Van  der2Bergh & 
Jurgens 
Detergent powders  CHI  GB  1975  Unilever 
Tinned  spaghetti,  etc.  ALI  GB  1973  H.J.  Heinz 
Kraft paper or similar  PAP  I  1972  Import 
Newsprint  PAP  B  1975  Import 
Vermouth  ALI  GB  1974  Martini 
Corrugated board  PAP  B  1974  Import 
Sparking plugs  (replacement market)  TRA  GB  1975  Champion 
Batteries (as originally fitted)  TRA  I  1972  Marelli 
Frozen foods  ALI  GB  1973  Unilever 
Stationery  PAP  GB  1972  Dickinson Robinson 
Group 
Other  hypertensive drugs  FHA  GB  1973  MSD 
Bulbs  and  lamps  for motor  vehicles  TRA  D  1974  Osra.m 
Margarines  and  edible oils and  fats  ALI  D  1974  Unilever 
Puffed cereals  ALI  F  1972  Kellogg 
Whisky  ALI  GB  1974  Distillers 
Tinned  soups  ALI  GB  1973  H.J.  Heinz 
Dietetic products and  bab,y  foods  ALI  F  1972  Fali5 
Dehydrated  potato powder  ALI  F  1972  Nestle 
Margarine  ALI  F  1972  Astra-Calve 
Tinned  meat  ALI  I  1973  Simmenthal 
Sparking plugs  TRA  D  1974  Bosch 
Malted  beverages  ALI  F  1972  Scpad - Nestle 
Edible oils  ALI  F  1972  Groupe  Lesieur 
Processed cheese  ALI  F  1972  Bel 
Prepared potatoes  ALI  D  1974  Pranni-Werk 
Car  tyres  TRA  F  1975  Michelin. 
Analgesics  FHA  DK  1972  The  Danish 
Pharmacies 
Powered  scythes  MAC  I  1974  :oos 
Board  from  recycled paper  PAP  B  1975  Import 
163 Rank- c1 
ing  (in %; 
63  56 
65  55 
65  55 
65  55 
65  55 
65  55 
65  55 
65  55 
65  55 
65  55 
74  54 
75  53 
76  >52 
76  >52 
76  52 
79  51 
80  :;::.  50 
8o  >50 
80  :::>50 
80  >50 
8o  :>'50 
80  >50 
80  50 
8o  50 
8o  50 
80  50 
80  50 
80  50 
80  50 
80  50 
8o  50 
80  50 
TABLE  VIII 
LIST  OF  PRODUCT  MARKETS  m WHICH  THE  LEADnlG  FIRM 
HOLDS  MORE  THAN  25'/o  OF  THE  TOTAL  JATIONAL  MARKET 
(based  on  a  limited sample  of products and  countries 
covered by sectoral surveys) 
Market  Sector Coun- Year  try 
General-purpose computers  MAC  I  1973 
Soups  ALI  D  1974 
Milk powder  ALI  F  1972 
Instant chocolate drinks  ALI  F  1972 
Tinned  soups  ALI  F  1972 
Mustards  and  condiments  ALI  F  1972 
Mopeds  and  scooters 50  co  TRA  I  1972 
Tinned  baked  beans  ALI  GB  1973 
Lining materials  TEX  F  1972 
Newsprint  PAP  F  1974 
Sugar  ALI  GB  1973 
Tranquillizers  PHA  DM  1972 
General-purpose computers  MAC  GB  1973 
General-purpose computers  MAC  D  1973 
Batteries (as originally fitted)  TRA  GB  1975 
Electric cookers  ELE  DK  1973 
Cola  beverages  ALI  NL  1974 
Slimming  preparations  PHA  GB  1973 
Refrigerators  ELE  I  1973 
Anti-angina drugs  PHA  GB  1973 
"Plain skin"  hormones  PHA  GB  1973 
Tranquillizers  PHA  GB  1973 
Tinned  salmon  ALI  GB  1973 
Flax yarn  TEX  F  1972 
Dietetic preparations  ALI  I  1973 
Precooked meals  ALI  F  1972 
Chocolate biscuits  ALI  GB  1973 
Crisps  ALI  F  1972 
Ice cream  ALI  D  1974 
Printing paper and  stationer.y  PAP  B  1975 
Electric vacuum  cleaners  ELE  F  1975 
Rice  ALI  F  1972 
164 
Leading brand 
and/or firm 
IIM 
Maggi3 
France-Lait 
Nestle 
Liebig 
Generale Alimentaire 
(Cavenham- GB) 
Piaggio 
Heinz 
Dollfus, Mieg&  Cie 
Import 
Tate &  Lyle 
Dum ex 
Im 
IIM 
Lucas 
Ernst Voss 
Coca  Cola 
Zanussi 
ICI 
Glaxo 
Roche 
John  West2 
Agache-Willot 
6  Plasmon 
Buitoni-Perugina 
United  Biscuits 
Flodor 
Langnese-Iglo2 
Import 
Moulinex 
Cofariz Rank- c1 
ing  (in %; 
96  49 
96  49 
98  48 
99  47 
99  41 
99  41 
102  46 
102  46 
102  46 
105  45 
105  45 
105  45 
105  45 
105  45 
105  45 
105  45 
105  45 
113  44 
113  44 
113  44 
116  43 
116  43 
116  43 
119  42 
119  42 
121  40 
121  40 
121  40 
121  40 
121  40 
121  40 
121  >40 
LIST  OF  PRODUCT  MARKETS  IN  WHICH  THE  LEADING  FIRM 
HOLDS  MORE  THAN  25%  OF  THE  TOTAL  NATIONAL  MARKET 
(based on  a  limited sample  of products  and  countries 
covered by  sectoral surveys) 
Market  Sector  Coun- Year  try 
Condensed  and  evaporated  ~ilks,  ALI  GB  1973 
sterilized creams 
Vacuum  cleaners  ELE  GB  1975 
General-purpose  computers  MAC  B  1973 
Dry-cleaning machines  ELE  DK  1973 
Biscuits  ALI  F  1972 
Synthetic detergents  CHI  GB  1975 
Ice cream  ALI  DK  1975 
Corned  beef  ALI  GB  1973 
General-purpose  computers  MAC  F  1973 
Dehydrated  soups  ALI  F  1972 
Mineral water  ALI  F  1972 
Special soups  ALI  GB  1973 
Cocoa  (butter and  powder)  ALI  !JL  1973 
Motor  vehicle lighting systems  TRA  D  1974 
Frozen foods  ALI  F  1972 
Beer  ALI  F  1972 
Sedatives and  ~pnotics  PHA  NL  1973 
Colour  television sets  ELE  I  1973 
Cardio-vascular drugs 6:-on  reserpinic)  FHA  F  1972 
Tinned fish  ALI  GB  1974 
Ice cream  ALI  GB  1973 
Pasta  ALI  F  1972 
Mayonnaise  ALI  F  1972 
Colour television sets  ELE  DK  1973 
School  and  students'  exercise books  PAP  B  1975 
Kraft paper for large-capacity sacks  PAP  F  1975 
Washing  machines  ELE  GB  1975 
Condensed  milk  ALI  GB  1973 
Tinned  tuna  ALI  GB  1973 
Sauces  ALI  F  1972 
Washing  macnines  ELE  I  1973 
Medium-sized  and  large EDP  systems  MAC  I  1974 
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Leading  brand 
and/or firm 
Carnation Foods 
Hoover 
I H-i 
Fisker og Nielsen 
Aliment  Essential 
Unilever 
Frisko2 
Fray Bentos 
rm 
Maggi  (Nestle) 
Groupe  Perrier 
Baxters 
De  Zaan  (Grace  ey.) 
Westfalische 
Metallindustrie 
Find  us 
BSN 
Hoffmann-La  Roche 
Germany  (FR) 
Unilever 
J. Lyons  &  Co. 
Panzani-Milliat4 
Mayolande 
Philips  Pope 
Papeterie de  Belgique 
Import 
Hoover 
Carnation Foods 
John  West2 
Generale Alimentaire 
(Cavenha,m  - GB) 
Zanussi Rank- c 
1 
ing  (in %) 
121  >40 
121  >40 
121  >40 
121  >40 
121  >40 
121  >40 
121  >40 
121  ::> 40 
121  >40 
121  >40 
121  40 
121  40 
121  >40 
121  40 
121  40 
121  40 
121  >40 
121  40 
121  40 
121  >40 
121  >40 
121  40 
150  39 
151  38 
151  38 
151  38 
151  38 
151  38 
156  37 
156  37 
158  36 
158  36 
LIST  OF  PRODUCT  MARKETS  IN  WHICH  THE  LEADING  FIRM 
HOLDS  MORE  THAN  25%  OF  THE  TOTAL  NATIONAL  MARKET 
(based on  a  limited  sample  of products and  countries 
covered b,y  sectoral surveys) 
Coun- Market  Sector  Year  try 
Vodka  ALI  GB  1974 
Electric cookers  ELE  I  1973 
Bottled beer  ALI  NL  1974 
Computer  terminals  MAC  I  1974 
Beer  ALI  NL  1974 
Other vitamins  PHA  GB  1973 
Professional calculating machines  MAC  I  1974 
Scientific micro-calculators  MAC  I  1974 
Ladies'  stockings  TEX  GB  1974 
Cold-cure preparations  PHA  GB  1973 
General-purpose  computers  MAC  NL  1973 
Tomato  ketchup  ALI  F  1972 
Bronchial dilators  PHA  GB  1973 
Tufted carpets  TEX  F  1972 
Industrial sewing  threads  TEX  F  1973 
Dehydrated and powdered  soups  ALI  GB  1973 
Cough  medicines  PHA  GB  1973 
Cognac  ALI  GB  1974 
Psychotropics  PHA  NL  1973 
Bab.y  foods  (vegetables,  meat,  fruit)  ALI  D  1975 
Woven  yarn  TEX  GB  1968 
Car batteries  TRA  D  1974 
Cereals  (flakes)  ALI  GB  1973 
Sewing  thread  TEX  GB  1972 
Yoghurt  ALI  GB  1973 
Knitting machines  MAC  I  1973 
Television sets (all types)  ELE  F  1974 
Agricultural tractors  MAC  I  1974 
Anti-diabetic preparations  PHA  NL  1973 
Sound  recording equipment  ELE  DK  1973 
Washing  machines  ELE  F  1975 
Vitamins  PHA  DK  1972 
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Leading  brand 
and/or firm 
Grand  Metropolitan 
Ltd. 
Zanussi 
Heineken 
Im 
Heineken 
Ciba 
Courtaulds 
B.  Wellcome 
IBJI 
Generale Alimentaire 
( Cavenham  GB) 
Agache-Willot 
Dollfus Mieg &  Cie 
Unilever 
Parke Davis 
Martell 
Hoffmann-La  Roche 
Hipp 
Carrington 
Bosch 
Kellogg 
Coats-Paton 
Express Diary Co. 
Germany  (FR) 
Fiat 
Hoechst 
Philips 
The  Danish 
Pharmacies Rank- c1 
ing  (in%) 
158  36 
158  36 
158  36 
163  35 
163  35 
163  35 
163  35 
163  35 
163  35 
163  35 
163  35 
163  35 
163  35 
163  35 
163  35 
175  34 
175  34 
175  34 
175  34 
179  33 
179  33 
179  33 
179  33 
179  33 
179  33 
179  33 
179  33 
179  33 
188  32 
188  32 
188  32 
188  32 
LIST  OF  PRODUCT  MARKETS  IN  WHICH  THE  LEADING  FIRM 
HOLDS  MORE  THAN  25%  OF  THE  'IDTAL  NATIONAL  MARKEr 
(based on  a  limited sample  of products and  countries 
covered by sectoral surveys) 
Market  Sector  Coun- Year  try 
Hyper-cholesterolaemic drugs  PHA  F  1972 
Fruit and vegetable condiments  ALI  F  1972 
Colour television sets  ELE  F  1974 
Cardboard  PAP  I  1972 
Batteries (replacement market)  TRA  GB  1975 
Crackers and  sandwich biscuits  ALI  GB  1973 
Sparking plugs  (replacement market)  TRA  I  1973 
Diuretic drugs  PHA  NL  1973 
Cotton velvet  TEX  F  1972 
Fishing nets  TEX  F  1972 
Canadian tents  TEX  F  1972 
Bed  linen  TEX  F  1973 
Antibiotics  PHA  NL  1973 
Envelopes  PAP  B  1975 
Sanitary and  household  paper  PAP  F  1975 
T,yres  (as originally fitted)  TRA  I  1974 
Gynaecological drugs  PHA  NL  1973 
Baby  foods  ALI  GB  1973 
Black and  white television sets  ELE  GB  1975 
Electric cookers  ELE  GB  1975 
Snack  foods  ALI  F  1972 
Oral diabetic drugs  PHA  DK  1972 
Ice cream  ALI  F  1972 
Psychotropic drugs  PHA  F  1972 
Sugar  ALI  I  1973 
Spinning machines  MAC  I  1973 
Mineral  water  ALI  DK  1976 
Pepper  and  spices  ALI  F  1972 
Tinned  meat  ALI  DK  1974 
Weaving  machines  MAC  I  1973 
Newsprint  PAP  I  1972 
Cardboard  PAP  F  1975 
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Leading  brand 
ard/or firm 
Generale Alimenta;re 
( Cavenham  - GB) 
Verona 
Chloride 
ABM  (Ass.  Biscuits 
Man.  Ltd.) 
Marelli 
Hoechst 
Agache-Willot 
Agache-Willot 
Agache-Willot 
Dollfus Mieg &  Ci~ 
Beecham 
Enveleo  (Intermills) 
Beghin-Say 
Michelin 
Organon 
H.J.  Heinz 
Thorn 
Thorn 
Generale Alimentaire 
(Cavenham- GB) 
Hoechst 
Ortiz 
Eridania 
Germany  (FR) 
Generale Alimentaire 
( Cavenham  - GB) 
Ja.ka 
Suisse 
Timavo/Arbatax 
Import Rallk- c1 
ing  (in%) 
192  31 
192  31 
192  31 
192  31 
192  31 
192  31 
198  >30 
198  ~30 
198  -:::or30 
198  :;.-30 
198  -::--30 
198  :::--30 
198  -:::o-30 
198  ::--30 
198  30 
198  >30 
198  30 
198  >30 
198  >30 
198  >30 
198  >30 
198  >30 
198  >30 
198  30 
198  30 
198  >30 
198  >30 
198  30 
198  30 
198  30 
198  >30 
198  >30 
198  30 
LIST  OF  PRODUCT  MARKETS  IN  WHICH  THE  LEADING  FIRM 
HOLDS  MORE  THAN  25%  OF  THE  TOTAL  NATIONAL  MARKET 
(based  on  a limited sample  of products and  countries 
covered qy  sectoral surveys) 
Market  Sector Coun- Year  try 
Refrigerators and freezers  ELE  GB  1975 
Liquid detergents  CHI  I  1976 
Combine  harvesters  MAC  I  1974 
Knitting wool  TEX  F  1974 
Worsted  goods  TEX  F  1974 
Sulfonamides  PHA  DK  1972 
·Cardboard  PAP  GB  1972 
Anti-tuberculosis preparations  PHA  GB  1973 
Oral diabetic drugs  PHA  GB  1973 
Systemic antibiotics  PHA  GB  1973 
Parkinson anticonvulsants  PHA  GB  1973 
Systemic anti-inflammatory drugs  PHA  GB  1973 
Dishwashers  ELE  D  1972 
Draught  beer  ALI  NL  1974 
Cocoa  powder  ALI  F  1972 
Non-board  packaging materials  PAP  GB  1972 
Contraceptives  PHA  DK  1972 
Broad-spectrum antibiotics  PHA  GB  1973 
Haematinic  drugs  PHA  GB  1973 
Diuretic drugs  PHA  GB  1973 
Contraceptives  PH/I.  GB  1973 
Anti-nauseants  PHA  GB  1973 
Record  plB3ers  ELE  DK  1973 
Lemonades  ALI  NL  1974 
Batteries (replacement  market)  TRA  I  1972 
General analgesics  PHA  F  1972 
Non-narcotic analgesics  PHA  GB  1973 
Laxatives  PHA  GB  1973 
Radios  ELE  DK  1973 
Peripheral vasodilators  PHA  F  1972 
Plain antacids  PHA  GB  1973 
Knitwear  TEX  GB  1968 
Antibiotics  (pencillin and  PHA  F  1972 
derivatives) 
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Leading  brand 
and/or firm 
Thorn 
Sole Piatti 
La  verda 
Lainiere de  Roubaix 
Peignage Amedee 
Hoffmann-La  Roche 
Unilever 
Pfizer 
Geigy 
MSD 
Miele 
Heineken 
Nestle 
DRG 
Schering 
Beecham 
Hoechst 
Bang  &  Olufsen 
Heineken 
FAR 
Bang  &  Olufsen 
Boehringer 
Courtaulds Rank- c1 
ing  (in%) 
198  30 
226  29 
227  28 
227  28 
227  28 
227  28 
227  28 
227  28 
227  28 
234  27 
234  27 
234  27 
234  27 
234  27 
234  27 
240  26 
240  26 
240  26 
240  26 
244  25 
244  25 
LIST  OF  PRODUCT  MARKETS  IN  WHICH  THE  LEADING  FI~i 
HOLDS  MORE  THAN  25%  OF  THE  TOTAL  NATIONAL  MARKET 
(based  on  a  limited sample  of products and  countries 
covered by sectoral surveys) 
Market  Sector  Coun- Year  try 
Jonge Genever  (Holland's gin)  ALI  NL  1974 
Motorcycles  TRA  D  1974 
Detergents for washing machines  CHI  I  1976 
Mushrooms  ALI  F  1972 
Sugar  ALI  F  1972 
Frozen foods  ALI  DK  1974 
Lager beer  ALI  GB  1974 
Margarine  ALI  DK  1974 
Psychopharmacological drugs  PHA  DK  1972 
Tinned meats for hot meals  ALI  GB  1973 
Black and  white television sets  ELE  DK  1973 
Non-alcoholic beverages  ALI  F  1974 
Fishing industry  ALI  D  1974 
Tyres  (as originally fitted)  TRA  GB  1975 
Rotary cultivators  MAC  I  1974 
Tyres  (replacement  market)  TRA  GB  1976 
Colour television sets  ELE  GB  1975 
Anti-rhumatismatic drops  PHA  F  1972 
Fruits in syrup  ALI  F  1972 
Car  tyres  (replacement market)  TRA  I  1974 
Ice cream  ALI  I  1973 
TABLE  VIII 
Leading brand 
and/or firm 
Bols 
If.iH 
Dash  (Procter & 
Gamble) 
Eur~conserves 
Beghin-Say 
FDB 
Bass  Charrington 
Unilever 
Dum ex 
Fray Bentos 
Bang &  Olufsen 
Perrier 
Nordsee2 
Dunlop - Pirelli 
MRJ.I  - Sicilia 
Dunlop- Pirelli 
Thorn 
Roussillon 
Alimentaire 
Michelin 
Algel-Findus2 
1.  Tuborg-Carlsberg 
2.  Controlling group:  Unilever 
3.  Controlling group:  Nestle 
4•  Economics  Laboratory Inc., Delaware  (USA) 
5·  Controlling group:  BSN  - Gervais - Danone 
6.  Controlling group:  Heinz  - USA 
Key  to abbreviations 
a)  Sector or industry 
ALI  = Food  and  beverages 
CHI  •  Chemicals 
ELE  = Electrical appliances  (radio and  TV  sets,  record players,  tape decks,  etc; 
household electrical appliances) 
MAC  = Non-electrical machinery  (agricultural,  office, textile, building,  hoisting and 
handling machines) 
PAP = Paper  manufacturing and processing 
PHA  = Pharmaceuticals 
TEX  =  Textiles 
TRA  •  Vehicles,  aircraft, etc. 
169 Key  to abbreviations  (cont.) 
b)  Country 
B 
D  = 
DK 
F 
GB  = 
I  = 
NL  = 
Belgium 
Germany  (Federal Republic) 
Denmark 
France 
United Kingdom 
Italy 
Netherlands 
In the  case  of certain markets dominated  b.Y  imports it has  only been possible to 
state "Import"  or the country of origin instead of  the  leading firm. 
2.9.2.  Correlation between dominance  and  price levels and  increases - QQ.  124-126 
The  data in Table VIII constitute a  basis for a  dynamic  table along the following  lines, 
for each of the above-mentioned  products in each Member  State,  the example  being taken 
from  the French model: 
Coun- Market  shares  of the four  main  brands  and/or firms 
No.  Product market  try  Year 
I  II  III  IV 
1  Instant coffee  F  1970 
1972  7o%  Nestle  ........  .  .......  .  ....... 
1974 
1976 
2  Sugar  F  1970 
1972  28% 
Beghin-Sey  ........  ........  .  ....... 
1974 
1976 
3  Powdered  chocolate  F  1970 
1972  7o%  Poulain  ........  •••••••  • ••••••• 
1974 
1976 
4  Cocoa  powders  F  1970 
1972  3o%  Nestle  ........  ........  .  ....... 
1974 
1976 
5  Margarine  1970  6o% 
1972  Astra-Calve  ........  .  .......  .  ....... 
1974  (Unilever) 
1976 
and so  on,  for each "critical" product  and for each Member  State in question. 
170 The  questions arising are  of great practical interest. 
CXXIV)  Is there a  correlation between the dominance  enjoyed b,y  producers  on  national 
( 124)  markets for a  given product - measured  by the market  shares of the dominant  firms 
show.n  in Table VIII - and  the prices of the products in question?  Is it possible, 
by comparing price divergences between different countries,  to conclude that prices 
are higher in precisely those  countries in which  the relevant  firms have  greater 
market  power?  Can  one  be  certain that these price divergences are not caused by 
differing tax rates? 
CXXV)  Is the increase in the price of a  product greater in countries and/or regions  where 
(125)  dominance- ie. the market  share of the  leading brands and/or firms- is greater 
than in countries and/or regions where  oligopolistic concentration is less great 
and  competition is keener? 
CXXVI)  Is there a  correlation between-the degree  of dominance  enjoyed by producers  on  a 
(126)  national market for a  given product  and  the  existence: 
of uniform or identical producer prices; 
of uniform or identical retail prices at the sample  sales points; 
of uniform or identical variations in prices at the  sample  sales points? 
Can  such uniformity be  explained by  the  existence of agreements  or  concer~ed 
practices among  producers,  between producers and distributor-retailers or among 
distributor-retailers? 
2.9.3. Dominance  and profitability of the leading producer firms - Tables  IX  and X - Q.  127 
An  increase in market  power  ought  in theory to be  accompanied  b.y  monopoly rents,  ie. it ought 
to lead to an increase in the profitability of the firm itself.  But  the structural 
complexity of the modern  firm is such that an automatic correlation between market  power 
and profitability cannot  alw~s be  established.  Indeed,  the contrary may  prove to be  the 
case. 
As  the Court  of Justice pointed out in its judgment  of  14  February 1978  (United Brands 
Company- "Chiquita"  bananas),  the existence of "excessive prices", resulting from  the 
existence of a  dominant  market  position,  need not necessarily be  accompanied  by the 
realization of large profits. 
The  Court  cormnented  in particular: 
"An  undertaking's  economic  strength is not measured  by  its profitability; a  reduced 
profit margin or even  losses for a  time are not  incompatible with a  dominant  position, 
just as large profits may  be  compatible with a  situation where  there is effective 
competition"  (Ground  of Judgment  126). 
It is appropriate to note at this point that the two  sources  of a  firm's profitability 
are  (a)  the efficiency of management  and  labour in the broad sense  (a socially positive 
phenomenon)  and  (b)  exploitation of a  dominant  market  position (a socially negative 
phenomenon). 
Only  by  analysing a  firm's structure and  the markets in which it operates is it possible 
to compute  the share attributable to each factor (efficiency and  dominance). 
Because  of this view taken by the Court,  we  too must  analyse profitability - from  several 
angles  and with many different tools,  approaches  and  methods - in order to find  out if the 
products manufactured by dominant  firms are sold at "excessive"  or "unfair" prices on 
certain markets. 
171 Here it will be  necessary to use the various methods  which are commonly  employed  for 
measuring  the profitability of firms.  In particular,  we  shall use the method  which  consists 
in bringing out the comparative profitability of the different firms  operating in a  given 
sector,  a  method  which  has already been used in our "lilethodology''. 
Under  this method  the firms  in the  sample are graded b,y  juxtaposing their ranking in each 
of the four profitability ratios in order to obtain a  "profitability score"  for each firm 
(a "final ranking") • 
These  ratios may  be  defined briefly as follows: 
r1 
net ;12rofit 
X  100  sales 
net ;12rofit  100  r2  =  X  own  capital 
cash flow  100  r3  =  sales 
X 
cash flow  100  r4  own  capital 
X 
With  regard to the definition of the above  variables, it will be  necessary to indicate 
for each individual case: 
- whether the definitions set out in the Methodology  have  been used  (eg.  net pre-tax 
profit plus  cash flow= gross  income);  or,  on  the contrary, 
- whether  only data complying  with other definitions were  available. 
Table  IX  covers the top 100  firms  in the agri-foodstuffs sector.  For 64  of these firms 
it was  possibl~ to use  the method  of ranking according to comparative profitability, as 
outlined above  •  Table X brings  out the relationship between profitability and "dis-
equilibrium of size" for each of the 64  firms  which it has  been possible to subject to 
the complete analysis. 
In this connection,  the following fundamental  question must  be  asked: 
CXXVII)  What  are the dominant  brands  and  the dominant  positions on  each national product 
(127)  market  owned  by  each of the  100  firms  in the world agri-foodstuffs industry covered 
b,y  Table  IX?  The  worldwide  character of the structure,  and  consequently of our 
investigation,  is merely confirmed by  this Table  IX. 
2.9.4. Ap;12roaches  to and  correlation of l2rofitabiltty - QQ.  128-131 
A series of questions,  connected with the analysis  of profitability,  must  be  posed: 
CXXVIII)  Is there any  significant relationship between the degree  of dominance  exerted on 
(128)  certain product markets  and  the level of comparative profitability enjoyed b,y  the 
dominant  firm?  Is it possible to discover any  increase in that profitability (of 
a  given firm)  subsequent to an increase in its power  and  its market  share  on 
certain product markets? 
1.  See  R.  Linda,  Methodolo  of concentration anal sis a  lied to the 
and markets,  Commission  of the European  Communities,  September  197 
pages  49  to 67. 
2.  The  ratios in Table  IX  are based  on  net profit and  cash flow after tax,  which,  with a 
few  exceptions,  correspond approximately to the average  of the value  of the same  ratios 
which  would  be  calculated - as  provided for  b,y  the  Commission's  research programme  -
from  net profit and  cash flow before tax. 
172 THE  'roP  100  GROUPS  IN  THE  ilORLD  FOOD  Ilf.DUSTRY * 
(in 197 4) 
A)  The  64  world  eroups  graded according to comparative profitability 
Size  Profit- Ratios  Variable value 
ranking  ::tbility  _.£1  04  0  ...  0~ 
score  R1  - 01  R2  =  07  R  -~  R  -~  01  04  3  - 01  4  - 07 
Among  Among 
rthe  64  the  100  Rank- Score  Rank- Rat~  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Sales  1Tet 
I of)  ing  (  ~~)  ing  (%)  ing  (%)  profit  firms  firms 
l.ng  l.ng  \ /C 
10  12  1  23  5  1·11  4  19.18  7  10.10  7  24·94 2522150  195972 
34  49  2  26  8  7-13  3  20.40  9  8.85  6  25.31  1009818  72031 
33  46  3  28  6  7-52  6  18.70  8  9·99  8  24.86  1035053  77795 
29  41  4  44  3  8.24  9  15.88  4  10.71  28  20.64 1088557  89677 
36  53  5  47  15  5·59  5  18.80  17  7-22  10  24-31  967700  54052 
46  65  6  51  11  6.01  13  15.54  10  8.68  17  22.42  814524  48982 
48  68  7  61  14  5.66  12  15.57  14  7.88  21  21.66  753131  42661 
12  16  8  64  23  4.20  11  15.70  21  6.51  9  24.32  2080759  87414 
8  10  9  76  25  3.86  8  16.65  31  5·46  12  23.55 2570273  99153 
64  100  10  77  1  14.82  27  12.69  1  17.88  48  15.32  455269  67469 
14  18  11  81  26  3.76  13  15·54  28  5·57  14  23.06  2000103  75137 
15  19  12  82  22  4.22  10  15.85  27  5·70  23  21.39  1886828  79661 
TABLE  IX 
(US  ~ '000) 
05  07  Firm 
Cash  Ovm 
flow  capital 
254828  1021572  Coca  Cola 
89345  353030  Kellogg 
103410  416034  Beecham 
116559  564849  National 
Distillers 
69906  287503  Heublien Inc. 
70674  315260  Jos Schlitz 
Brewing Co. 
59332  273968  Castle &  Cook 
135420  556926  Pepsico 
140229  595565  CPC  International 
81414  531482  Hiram  Walker-
Gooderham 
111486  483438  General Mills 
107512  502632  Carnation 
*  Sources:  AGRODATA  - Institut Agronomique  Mediterraneen de Montpellier  (I.A.M.),  Commission,  Seventh Report  on 
Competition Policy,  Part III, Point 296,  Brussels-Luxembourg,  April  1978 
Coun-
try 
USA 
USA 
GB 
USA 
USA 
USA 
USA 
USA 
USA 
CAN 
USA 
USA THE  TOP  100  GROUPS  IN  THE  'iTORLD  FOOD  HDtBTRY 
(in 197 4) 
A)  The  64  world  eroups  graded  according to comparative  profitability 
Size  Profit- Ratios  Variable value 
ranking  ability  04  04  0'""  o~ 
score  R1  R  -~  R  -~  01  04  =err  R2  = 07  3 - 01  4  - 07 
Arr.ong  Among 
~he 64  the  100  Rank- Score  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Sales 
lTet 
lcff)  ing  (  ~~)  ing  (4'  ing  (%)  profit  firms  firms  lng  1ng  \ 7c  I"  I 
23  30  13  88  13  5.81  25  13.65  13  8.08  37  18.98  1468199  85365 
59  93  13  88  12  5-90  26  13.01  12  8.38  38  18.48  484264  28575 
25  34  15  95  17  4·53  32  11.90  15  7-72  31  20.28  1413091  64019 
35  51  15  95  34  3.06  7  17.15  41  4.20  13  23.50  972438  29791 
45  64  15  95  4  8.12  41  10.14  3  12.35  47  15-43  840068  68175 
18  24  18  97  29  3·39  19  14.38  33  5·37  16  22.78 1647939  55932 
24  31  19  99  19  4·47  19  14.38  25  6.04  36  19-41  1438251  64320 
53  79  20  104  21  4·38  29  12.45  20  6.92  34  19.65  641492  28128 
32  45  21  105  27  3-75  21  14.31  30  5·48  27  20.91  1042608  39136 
60  94  21  105  7  7.18  42  10.03  5  10.03  51  14-40  484032  34740 
5  5  23  106  31  3.30  16  15.24  35  4.62  24  21.33  3541216  116991 
7  9  23  106  24  4.00  24  13.68  26  5·84  32  19-99 2986692  119480 
41  59  25  109  2  9.21  48  9-41  2  12.44  57  12.72  885678  81575 
TABLE  IX 
(us t  '000) 
05  07  Coun- Firm  try 
Cash  01-m 
flow  capital 
118678  625367  Camp  be  11  Soup  USA 
40573  219575  Scottish New- GB 
castle Brew. 
109061  537762  Anheuser-Busch  USA 
40811  173668  Oscar Mayer  & Co.  USA 
103714  672200  Allied Breweries  GB 
88569  388866  Standard Brands  USA 
86855  447434  Heinz  USA 
44390  22587 4  Arthur Guinness  GB 
57173  273437  Del Monte  USA 
49862  346199  Whitbread  GB 
163762  767737  Beatrice Foods  USA 
174544  873204  General Foods  USA 
110212  866703  Seagram  CAN THE  'roP  100  GROUPS  IN  THE  'irlORLD  F'OOD  DIDUSTRY 
(in 197 4) 
A)  The  64  world  eroups  graded according to comparative profitability 
Size  Profit- Ratios  Variable  value 
ranking  n.bility  _.£1  04  0'""  o~ 
1  04  score  R1  - 01  R2  =  07  R  -~  R  - .!:2  01  3  - 01  4  - 07 
Among  Arr.ong  Rank- Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  I 1Yet  fthe  64  the  100  Score  Ia!)  ing  (  ~~)  ing  (%)  ing  (%)  Sales  +-' t 
firms  firms  1ng  1ng  \ 7c  • pro  ... 1 
6  8  26  113  36  2.95  17  15.05  40  4.26  20  21.75 3073210  90691 
31  43  27  114  35  3.00  15  15.49  42  4.17  22  21.53  1046820  31411 
9  11  28  120  47  1.91  22  13.93  46  3·58  5  26.14 2525521  48227 
19  25  29  121  18  4·52  35  10.92  22  6.50  46  15.69  1599831  72327 
21  28  30  123  56  1.08  2  21.31  61  1.40  4  27.65  1537198  16538 
2  2  31  125  20  4-46  46  9·84  16  1·32  43  16.14 5603155  250093 
39  57  32  128  61  0.54  1  21.55  63  0.82  3  32.62  896904  4861 
20  26  33  129  46  1.95  23  13-91  49  3.33  11  23·74 1551876  30261 
28  39  34  132  32  3-25  33  11.78  32  5.38  35  19·52  1227 345  39878 
44  63  35  135  9  6.99  57  6.78  6  10.28  63  9·99  851634  59487 
1  1  36  137  40  2.65  31  12.18  37  4·47  29  20.50 n3666661  362807 
57  89  36  137  30  3·33  50  8.45  18  7.15  39  18.16  514737  17132 
-
TbBLE  IX 
(us  '/>  '000) 
05  07  Coun- Firm  try 
Cash  01-m 
flow  capital 
131063  602576  Ralston Purina  USA 
43667  202822  Am star  USA 
Corporation 
90504  346290  Associated  GB 
British Foods 
103935  662483  Norton Simon  USA 
21464  77617  Iowa  Beef  USA 
Processors 
410222  2541560  Nestle Alimentana  CH 
7359  22558  American  Beef  USA 
Packers 
51664  217625  Tate and  Lyle  GB 
66048  338441  Quaker  Oats  USA 
87574  876837  Bass  Charrington  GB 
610991  2979817  Unilever  GB/NI 
36818  202771  Pernod  Ricard  F THE  'I()p  100  GROUPS  IN  THE  VTORLD  F'OOD  INDUSTRY 
(in 197 4) 
A)  The  64  world  eroups  graded  according to comparative profitability 
Size  Profit- Ratios  Variable value 
ranking  ability  _.Qi  04  .2.2.  _.Q2.  score  R1  - 01  R2  = 07  R3  = 01  R4  - 07  01  04 
Among  Among 
~he 64  the  100  Rank- Score  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Sales  lTet 
ldf)  ing  (  ~~)  ing  (%)  ing  (%)  profit  firms  firms  l.ng  l.ng  \ 7c 
40  58  38  139  10  6.54  54  7·53  11  8.41  64  9-67  888570  58128 
47  66  38  139  28  3.70  37  10.66  29  5·51  45  15.86  781965  28959 
51  71  40  141  39  2.66  30  12.19  39  4·30  33  19·72  708000  18800 
37  54  41  145  48  1.84  18  14.73  54  2.65  54  2.65  943163  17369 
52  73  42  146  63  0.33  63  3.00  19  7.06  1  64.67  688176  2252 
55  84  42  146  42  2.33  38  10.55  36  4·48  30  20.31  592090  13790 
16  22  44  147  33  3-07  40  10.52  34  5.26  40  18.01  1679855  51632 
54  80  45  152  16  4·54  52  7.86  23  6.39  61  11.06  627348  28495 
3  3  46  161  52  1.47  28  12.68  55  2-45  26  21.04 4615715  68066 
13  17  47  162  59  0.66  64  2-43  24  6.26  15  22.91  2035037  13524 
62  98  48  168  54  1.20  58  6.16  38  4-35  18  22.35  465901  5589 
4  4  49  170  44  2.12  34  11.13  51  3.22  41  16.91  4471427  94627 
TABLE  IX 
(US_¢  '000) 
05  07  Firm  Coun-
try 
Cash  Ovm 
flm-v  capital 
74700  772166  Distillers  GB 
43106  271720  Reckitt &  Colman  GB 
30418  154238  Molson  Industries  CAN 
25036  117932  Geo  A.  Hormel  USA 
and  Co. 
48596  75140  Beghin  Say  F 
26550  130736  Rowntree  GB  Mackintosh 
88443  491022  CSR  - Colonial  AUS 
S1J8ar  Ref. 
40118  362683  Liggett &  Myers  USA 
112952  536934  Swift  (Esmark)  USA 
127292  555568  Gervais Danone  F 
20275  90702  Perrier  F 
143777  850011  Kraft  co  USA - -..J 
-..J 
THE  'TOP  100  GROUPS  IN  THE  lrlORLD  F'OOD  Il'illUSTRY 
(in 197 4) 
A)  The  64  world  eroups  graded according to comparative profitability 
Size  Profit- Ratios  Variable  V9..lue 
ranking  ability 
- 04  04  0'""  0'""  score  R1  R2  R  -~  R  -~  01  04  - 01  = 07  3  - 01  4  - 07 
Among  Among  Rank- Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  J;et 
1;he  64  the  100  ing  Score  lc11)  ing  (  ~1c)  ing  (%)  ing  (%)  Sales  profit 
firms  firms 
~ng  I_JC 
56  86  50  180  57  0.79  45  9-85  59  1.78  19  22.04  581777  4624 
63  99  51  182  37  2.91  47  9·49  43  4-07  55  13.27  464710  13520 
61  96  52  183  64  0.26  55  7-24  62  1.22  2  34·59  472820  1207 
11  15  53  186  45  1.96  49  9-25  48  3-38  44  16.01  2230106  43607 
42  61  54  189  42  2.33  51  8.33  44  4.00  52  14.31  883238  20577 
22  29  55  193  55  1.12  36  10.77  60  1.75  42  16.90  1479492  16530 
49  69  56  196  51  1.59  39  10.54  56  2-25  50  14-93  751926  11960 
43  62  57  197  38  2.82  44  9.86  53  3.08  62  10.78  878999  24771 
38  56  58  201  41  2-35  53  7-62  47  3·54  60  11-48  904847  21232 
17  23  59  211  50  1.61  56  7-03  52  3-13  53  13.69  1652112  26587 
27  38  60  212  49  1.66  60  5-41  45  3.88  58  12.64 1299088  21574 
TJ..BLE  IX 
(US %  'JOO)  leo~~  05  07  Firm  I  try 
Cash  Qr,"r.  I 
::'lo'tv  capital 
1: 
10345  46928  Burns  Foods 
18902  142447  Libby McNeill  A 
and  Libby 
I 
5768  16677  Ward  Foods  USA 
75484  471547  United  Brands (AMK)  USA 
35352  246989  PET  USA 
25941  153525  Canada  Packers  CAN 
16945  113519  International  USA 
:Multifoods 
27081  251242  Anderson  USA 
Clayton Co. 
31993  278633  Brooke  Bond  GB 
51763  377994  Rank  Hovis  GB 
McDougall 
50442  39897 4  Cadbury  Schtveppes  GB THE  TOP  100  GROUPS  IN  THE  irlORLD  FOOD  INTIUSTRY 
(in 197 4) 
A)  The  64  world  eroups  graded according to comparative profitability 
Size  Profit- Ratios  Variable value 
ranking  ability 
.2.1  04  0  ...  22  score  R1  =  01  R2  = 07  R  -~  R4  = 07  01  04  3 - 01 
Among  Among 
the 64  the  100  Rank- Score  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Rank- Rate  Sales 
1Tet 
ing  I of)  ing  (%)  ing  (%)  ing  (%)  profit  firms  firms 
~ng  \_lC 
26  37  61  216  53  1.46  59  6.02  50  3·25  54  13·34  1366004  20005 
50  70  61  216  61  0.54  43  9-89  63  0.82  49  14·94  727051  3960 
30  42  63  232  58  0.73  61  4·49  57  2.13  56  13.19  1057828  7675 
58  91  64  239  60  0.60  62  3·94  58  1.85  59  12.15  507986  3042 
~ -·  .. - .._...,. i 
T.hBLE  IX 
(us  ~ '000) 
05  07  Cou.n- Firm  try 
Cash  0-vm 
~low  capital 
44328  332339  J.  Lyons  GB 
5985  40049  Missouri  Beef  USA 
Packers 
22548  170901  Spillers  GB 
9382  77235  Di  Giorgio  Corp.  USA B)  The  other  36  world  groups  graded according to size 
(owing to lack of  complete data it was  not possible to include these  36  groups  in the 
grading based  on  comparative profitability) 
Size ranking  Ratios  Variable value  (in US  ¢  'COOs) 
01  04  05  07 
Among  Among  R1  R2  R3  R4 
Sales  Net  Cash  Own 
the  36  the  100  Profit  flow  Capital 
firms  firms 
1  6  1.68  10.14  - - 3  458  336  57  995  - 571  822 
2  7  2-57  10.35  - - 3  264  502  83  845  - 810  431 
3  13  0.18  4-84  - - 2  489  517  4  599  - 95  028 
4  14  3.01  11.86  - - 2  379  862  71  581  - 603  750 
5  20  2-54  11.81  - - 1 793  049  45  458  - 384  804 
6  21  1.80  16.26  - - 1 749  304  31  572  - 194  157 
7  27  1.90  16.62  - - 1  551  289  29  410  - 176  923 
8  32  - - - - 1 423  630  - - 173  340 
9  33  - - - - 1 416  298  - - 55  817 
10  35  1.13  11.38  - - 1 405  392  15  825  - 139  028 
11  36  - - - - 1  390  000  - - -
12  40  1.67  6.00  - - 1  145  308  19  092  - 318  282 
TABLE  IX 
Firm  Country 
Greyhound  (Armour)  USA 
Borden  USA 
Taiyo Fishery  JAP 
Consolidated Foods  USA 
Nabisco  USA 
Central Soya  USA 
Archer - Daniels Midland  USA 
Oetker Grupp  BRD 
Ass.  Milk Producers  USA 
Union  International  GB 
Cavenham  GB 
Unigate  GB - =  Q 
B)  The  other  36  world groups  graded according to size 
(owing to lack of complete data it was  not possible to include these  36  groups  in the 
grading based on  comparative profitability) 
Size ranking  Ratios  Variable value  (in US  ¢  1000s) 
01  04  05  07 
Among  Among  R1  R2  R3  R4 
Sales  Net  Cash  Own 
the  36  the  100  Profit  flow  Capital 
firms  firms 
13  44  - - - - 1  046  120  - - -
14  41  - - - - 1 029  160  - - 130  930 
15  48  0.67  8.43  - - 1 012  339  6  828  - 81  012 
16  50  2.82  14.04  - - 1 004  231  28  309  - 201  617 
17  52  0.60  23.02  - - 970  424  5  868  - 25  488 
18  55  3·52  11.12  - - 934  707  32  894  - 295  744 
19  60  2.03  9·48  - - 885  366  17  939  - 189  327 
20  67  2.04  14-78  - - 765  620  15  640  - 105  640 
21  72  -2.00 f-11.29  - - 691  270  13  827  - 122  472 
22  74  1.03  12.11  - - 677  569  6  966  - 57  532 
23  75  5·99  37.18  - - 671  261  40  221  - 108  190 
24  76  0.60  15·57  - - 661  526  3  947  - 25  345 
TABLE  IX 
Firm  Country 
Groupe  Coop.  Garna  F 
Svenska M.  Riskforering  sw 
Snow  Brand  ~Ulk Products  JAP 
Pillsbury  USA 
Groupe  Coop.  MacMahon  F 
Kirin Brewery  JAP 
Ajinomoto  JAP 
United Biscuits  GB 
Cie  Financiere Lesieur  F 
Nisshin Flour  JAP 
Booker McConnell  GB 
Meiji Milk Products  JAP B)  The  other  36  world  groups  graded according to size 
(owing to lack of  complete data it was  not possible to include these  36  groups  in the 
grading based  on  comparative profitability) 
Size ranking  Ratios  Variable value  (in US  ¢  'OOOs) 
01  04  05  07 
Among  Among  R1  R2  R3  R4 
Sales  Net  Cash  Own 
the  36  the  100  Profit  :flow  Capital 
firms  firms 
25  77  1.52  14.09  - - 690  901  10  040  - 71  232 
26  78  0.18  2.70  - - 650  690  1  140  - 42  210 
27  81  0.52  4·97  - - 62·:  620  3  230  - 65  040 
28  82  - - - - 620  828  - - -
29  83  - - - - 607  420  - - -
30  85  2.61  14.51  - - 590  171  15  406  - 106  406 
31  87  0.16  1.09  - - 549  840  890  - 82  020 
32  88  0.36  3·45  - - 523  804  1  898  - 54  941 
33  90  4·30  12.  76.  - - 513  999  22  094  - 173  17 3 
34  92  6.58  12.33  - - 491  460  32  330  - 262  100 
35  95  3.28  28.85  - - 475  820  15  630  - 54  180 
36  97  1.30  15·92  - - 471  497  6  136  - 38  552 
Firm  Country 
Kane  Miller Corp.  USA 
Union Laitiere Normande  F 
Koninklijke  Wessanen  NL 
Sodima- Yoplait  F 
Rumasma  ESP 
Campbell  Taggart  USA 
Mjolkcentralen  STtJ 
Morinaga Milk Industry  JAP 
Hershey Foods  Corp.  USA 
Heineken N.V.  NL 
Ivlars  GB 
Hygrade  Food  USA Year:  197 4 
Profitability 
ranking 
TABLE  X 
\fORLD  (the Hest) 
FOOD  I1mUSTRY  (including beverages) 
Sample:  n*  ==  64 
Firm  S.  o1x.  o
7
x. 
l.Ze  --
1 
X  100  - 0 
l.  X  100  ranking  o1x1  7
x1 
- Top  "01"  firm  (turnover)  US  ~ 13  667  million UNILEVER 
- Top  "07"  firm  (own  capital)  US  ~ 2980  million UNILEVER 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
13 
15 
15 
15 
18 
19 
20 
21 
21 
23 
23 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
Coca-Cola  (USA) 
Kellogg  (USA) 
Beecham  (GB) 
National Distillers  (USA) 
Heublein  (USA) 
Jos.  Schlitz - Brewing  (USA) 
Castle &  Cook  (USA) 
Pepsico  (USA) 
CPC  International  (USA) 
Hiram  Walker  - Gooderham  (CAN) 
General :Mills  (USA) 
Carnation  (USA) 
Campbell  Soup  (USA) 
Scottish& Newcastle  Breweries  (GB) 
Oscar Mayer  (USA) 
Allied  Breweries  (GB) 
Anheuser - Busch  (USA) 
Standard  Brands  (USA) 
Heinz  (USA) 
Arthur Guinness  (GB) 
Del :Monte  (USA) 
lfuitbread  (GB) 
Beatrice Foods  (USA) 
General Foods  (USA) 
Seagram  (CAN) 
Ralston Purina  (USA) 
Amstar  Corporation  (USA) 
Associated British Foods  (GB) 
Norton Simon  (USA) 
Iowa  Beef  Processors  (USA) 
Nestle Alimenta.na  (CH) 
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5 
31 
28 
29 
35 
42 
38 
10 
8 
43 
16 
15 
13 
54 
43 
27 
19 
21 
26 
51 
34 
50 
6 
4 
23 
7 
39 
18 
11 
40 
2 
18.45 
7  ·39 
7  ·57 
7 ·97 
7.08 
5·96 
5·51 
15.23 
18.81 
3·33 
14.63 
13.81 
10.74 
3·34 
7.12 
6.15 
10.34 
12.26 
10.52 
4·69 
7·63 
3·54 
25.91 
21.85 
6.48 
22.49 
7.66 
18.48 
11.71 
11.25 
41.00 
34.28 
11.84 
13.96 
18.95 
9·64 
10.57 
9·19 
10.68 
19.98 
17.83 
16.22 
16.86 
20.98 
7·36 
5.82 
22.55 
18.04 
13.04 
15.01 
7-58 
9·17 
11.61 
25.76 
29.30 
29.08 
20.22 
6.80 
11.62 
22.23 
2.60 
85.29 TABLE  X 
Profitability  Size  o1x.  o7
x. 
Firm  --
1 
X  100  r  x  100  ranking  ranking  01x1  7x1 
32  American  Beef  Packers  (USA)  52  6.56  0.75 
33  Tate and  Lyle  (GB)  33  11.36  7-30 
34  Quaker  Oats  (USA)  30  8.98  11.35 
35  Bass  Charrington  (GB)  24  6.23  29-42 
36  Unilever  (GB/NL)  1  100.00  100.00 
36  Pernod  - Ricard  (F)  54  3-77  6.80 
38  Reckitt & Colman  (GB)  48  5-72  9.11 
38  Distillers  (GB)  24  6.50  25-91 
40  Molson  Industries  (CAN)  52  5.18  5 .n 
41  Geo  A.  Hormel  (USA)  49  6.90  5·97 
42  Beghin  Say  (F)  58  5·04  2.52 
42  Rowntree  Mackintosh  (GB)  )7  4·33  4-38 
44  CSR- Colonial Sugar  Ref.  (AUS)  17  12.29  16.47 
45  Liggett & Myers  (USA)  43  4·59  12 ·17 
46  Swift  (Esmark)  (USA)  8  33.77  18.09 
47  Gervais Danone  (F)  11  14.89  18.64 
48  Perrier (F)  63  3·41  3-04 
49  Kraftco  (USA)  3  32-72  28.52 
50  Burns  Foods  (CAN)  61  4-26  1-57 
51  Libby McNeill  (Libby's)  (USA)  60  3-40  4-78 
52  Ward  Foods  (USA)  64  3-46  0.55 
53  United  Brands  (AMK)  (USA)  13  16.32  15.82 
54  Pet  (USA)  46  6.46  8.28 
55  Canada  Packers  (CAN)  36  10.83  5·15 
56  International Multifoods  (USA)  54  5·50  3.80 
57  Anderson - Clayton  (USA)  46  6.43  8.43 
58  Brooke  Bond  Liebig  (GB)  37  6.62  9·35 
59  Rank  Hovis  McDougall  (GB)  21  12.09  12.68 
60  Cadbury  Schweppes  (GB)  31  9·51  13.38 
61  Missouri Beef  Packers  (USA)  58  5.32  1.34 
61  Lyons  (GB)  58  10.00  11.15 
63  Spillers  41  7 ·74  5·73 
64  Di  Giorgio  (USA)  61  3·72  2·59 
183 Clearly the existence of such a  correlation: 
- would  have  to be  established b,y  several alternative methods  of measuring 
profitability, in order to leave no  doubt  as  to the validity of the results 
obtained; 
- would  be  easier to establish for firms  that were  more  or less single-product 
firms  compared  with the large diversified firms  the multiplicity of whose 
activities and  products  enables them  to offset profits and  losses flowing 
from  these different activities. 
CXXIX)  Is it possible to discover a·correlation between price levels- on  certain 
(129)  national product markets- and the profitability of a  given firm?  What  role 
is played b.y  exclusive-rights agreements? 
CXXX)  Does  an increase in the  pric~ of a  given product  have  any repercussions - and 
(130)  if so,  to what  extent- on  the degree of profitability of a  given firm? 
CXXXI)  Can  it be  established that the  existence either of uniform  or  identical producer 
(131)  prices or of uniform or identical retail prices or of uniform  or identical changes 
in prices is capable  of positively (or even neaatively)  influencing the profita-
bility of the producer firms  concerned? 
2·9·5•  Concentration of demand- questions put to producers:  the  share  of the ten leading 
customers - Table XI  - Q.  132 
There arises the problem  of finding  out  to what  extent  the power  of domination exercised 
by  the manufacturer through his  own  brand is matched  by  the countervailing power  of  the 
distributor-buyer,  who  takes  the form  - in the case  of integrated trade - of the large 
retailer.  The  answer to this problem might  explain why  the large multinational firms, 
holding a  whole  series of powerful positions  on  several markets,  are not necessarily the 
most  profitable concerns,  their profitability being eroded by  the bargaining power  enjoyed 
b.Y  the large retailers who  buy  from  them. 
The  concentration and  power  of distributor-retailers must  be  considered from  the  following 
two  aspects: 
a)  concent·ration and  power  in relation to suppliers,  ie.  manufacturers  who  make  food 
products and  beverages,  together with wholesalers  or dealers; 
b)  concentration and  power  in relation to consumers,  who  buy  the relevant products in the 
shops. 
The  increase in the power  of the large retailers as buyers  over the past ten years is shown 
by  Table XI,  which  reproduces the results of a  survey organized by  the European Association 
of Branded  Goods  Industries  (AIM).  The  results have  been classified in such a  way  as to 
bring out  the countervailing power  with which  each of these six national producers is 
faced  in its own  countr,y.  Thus,  for example,  in 1976  a  German  producer  (described by  the 
code  number  "I") derived  54%  of its national turnover  from  only ten national customers  (as 
opposed  to 40%  in 1967).  The  producer indicated by  the  c~e number  "X"  has  had  the 
advantage  of being faced  by  the least concentrated demand  • 
Table XI  gives  only a  very general  view  of the situation.  Subsequent  investigation will 
have  to produce  a  more  thorough analysis and  answer  the  following  questions: 
1.  Commission,  Seventh Report  on  Competition Policy,  Part III,  Points  303-304,  April  1978. 
184 CXXXII)  Is it possible to obtain the following information from  the ten principal 
(132)  manufacturers  of food  products and  beverages in each country: 
-the movement  in the percentage share,  for each year from  1970  to 1977,  of the 
purchases made  b.y  each of the ten largest national customers  from  each 
manufacturer taking part in the survey,  in relation to the total turnover 
achieved by  each of these manufacturers: 
a)  on  its domestic market; 
b)  on  its total market  (both domestic and  foreign); 
- an analysis of these sales over  each of the ten national customers and  over 
product groups,  following the classification into 22  groups  used in Chapter One 
(1.1:  for example,  tinned meat,  tinned fish,  baby  foods,  etc.); 
- the names  of these ten largest national customers. 
Among  these ten largest national customers  we  shall distinguish between 
independent  wholesalers  (or dealers)  and distributor-retailers in order to 
show  how  their role has  evolved and  how  their market  shares and  trading margins 
have  moved  in relation to integral traders.  We  shall also ask these producers 
to state the name,  nationality and relative power  of their actually and/or 
potentially most  formidable  competitors. 
2.9.6.  Concentration of demand  - questions put to distributor-retailers:  share  of the 
ten leading suppliers - Q.  133 
To  confirm the information received from  different sources,  a  question similar to question 
132  will have  to be  put to the~  principal groups  of distributor-retailers in each country, 
viz: 
CXXXIII)  Can  the following  information be  obtained from  the ten principal groups  of 
(133)  distributor-retailers operating in each country: 
-the movement  in the percentage share,  for each year from  1970  to  1977,  of the 
purchases made  b,y  each of these distributors from  their ten principal national 
suppliers in relation to the total purchases made  by  eachlOf  these distributor-
retailers: 
a)  on  its domestic market, 
b)  on  its total market; 
a  breakdown  of these  purchases  b,y  national supplier and by  product  group 
following the classification into 22  groups  established in Chapter  One  (1.1.); 
the names  of these ten largest national  suppliers; 
the names  of alternative or potential suppliers,  even foreign ones. 
Can  the  same  information be  obtained from  a  few  large wholesalers  or dealers? 
It will be  necessary to record negative as  well as affirmative answers,  and  in particular 
to record the reasons  given  b,y  the  firms  questioned. 
2.9.7.  Relation between the development  of demand-concentration and  the movement  of 
producer prices - QQ.  134-135 
At  this point two  kinds  of formulation and  approach ought  to be  established: 
a)  from  the angle  of the price of the  product; 
b)  from  the angle  of the  firm:  b1)  producer;  b2)  wholesaler  or dealers;  b3)  retailer. 
185 On  the basis  of the answers  to questions  132-133  and  also to questions 85-91,  it would 
be  very useful to consider the following points: 
CXXXIV)  Is there any relation between the movement  in the producer's selling prices for 
(134)  certain specific products and  for certain groups  of products  and  the movement  in 
the proportions of the  products in question purchased from  the manufacturers  by: 
a)  the wholesalers  or dealers, 
b)  the distributor-retailers? 
What  conclusions can be  drawn  from  such an analysis? 
In particular,  do  exclusive-rights contracts have  any  special influence? 
CXXXV)  Is it possible to analyse the contractual advantages  other than price reductions 
(135)  (such as special conditions for delivery and  storage,  credit,  finance,  contribution 
to advertising expenditure,  exclusive rights and  exclusive-rights premiums,  etc.) 
which  producers  may  be  prompted  to grant: 
a)  to wholesalers  or dealers, 
b)  to distributor-retailers, 
b.y  reason of changes  in total purchases? 
Is there any correlation between the  sum  of these advantages  and  an increase in the 
concentration and  power  of the  large purchasers? 
2.9.8.  Individual  information sheets for  each responding firm 
It should be  possible,  on  the basis of the replies to the questions above,  to draw  up  a 
series of individual  information sheets for  each: 
producer; 
wholesaler (or dealer); 
- distributor-retailer, 
covered  b.y  the  limited selected sample. 
With  regard to the distributor-retailers,  however,  further details will be  needed. 
2.9.9. Natural size of the market  and analysis  of local concentration 
One  problem  which will have  to be  considered is the power  of the distributor-retailer 
vis-a-vis the  consumer,  which  will entail examining local concentration. 
The  phenomenon  of concentration must  be  analysed by  considering the "natural size"  of each 
unit,  in this case the  size of each geographical market.  For producers  of industrial food 
products and  beverages the "natural size"  coincides with the size of the country,  whereas 
in the  case  of the distribution of those  same  products the "natural size"  is the size of the 
town  in question,  including its suburbs if any. 
When  determining the natural size we  must  have  regard to operational and practical criteria 
inherent in the functioning of competition,  which entails determining the  geographical area 
in which  supply and demand  come  together,  or,  in more  concrete terms,  the number  and  identity 
of the  ohops  between which  consumers  in a  given town  or  conurbation may  choose  when  making 
their purchases. 
Since the number  and identity of the  shops  (and distributing firms)  involved will vary from 
one  town  to the next there would  be  no  sense in simply measuring the degree of concentration 
at the national level. 
Data gathered in this way  (at national  level)  would  give misleading net results:  various 
local dominant  positions would  balance  each other out  because  the strength of each 
distributing-retailing group varies very greatly from  town  to town  and  from  region to region. 
186 Producer-
seller 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
v 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
IX 
X 
DIDREE  OF  DEPENDENCE  OF  PRODUCER-sELLERS  ON  DEMAND 
FROM  LARGE  DISTRIBUTOR-PURCHASERS  OF  FOOD  PRODUCTS 
(In decreasing order,  1976  position) 
TABLE  XI 
Shares  of the FIVE  leading purchasers  Shares  of the  TEN  leading purchasers 
in the total sales of the producer-seller 
Federal  Federal 
Republic  of  France  Italy  Belgium  Producer- Republic  of  France  Italy 
Germa.n.y  seller  Germany 
1967  1976  1967  1976  1967  1976  1967  1976  1967  1976  1967  1976  1967  1976 
29  54  14  34  7  12  22  47  I  40  72  26  48  10  18 
33  44  16  23  - 12  13  45  II  49  66  26  36  9  16 
20  43  8  22  6  12  15  44  III  25  65  11  35  - 16 
6  36  11  21  6  11  13  44  IV  - 34  18  33  - 15 
- 23  9  20  - 10  17  43  v  9  22  16  32  8  14 
6  15  18  19  7  10  11  43  VI  10  20  22  30  11  13 
5  15  16  18  - 8  10  39  VII  8  20  21  29  8  12 
6  14  1  18  5  7  15  37  VIII  9  20  3  27  - 12 
7  14  12  16  3  7  17  36  IX  12  19  18  25  6  10 
5·4 11.4  8  12  3  6  25  35  X  8  17  11  17  4  10 
Source:  Based  on  a  sample  of 10  producers per country who  took part in a  survey  organized by  the European 
Association of Branded  Goods  Industries  (All~). 
Belgium 
1967  1976 
29  57 
31  56 
21  56 
18  54 
20  53 
25  52 
35  51 
20  50 
15  20 
26  45 Concentration and  power  on  the distributive side (vis-a-vis the final  consumer)  must 
therefore be  measured and  analysed at local level. 
With  this aim  in mind,  we  shall consider a  series of typical  indicators of the concentration 
of distribution,  comparing  the data calculated at national level with those calculated for 
a  few  major  conurbations in each country. 
The  following  indicators in particular are relevant1: 
1)  The  number  of "large shops"  (distinguishing the six size categories - hypermarkets, 
superstores,  large  supermarkets,  supermarkets,  large self-service shops,  small 
self-service shops- mentioned  as criterion No  15  in paragraph 1.1.22): 
either in a  given country or conurbation (absolute figure), 
or per segment  of  10  000  inhabitants  (relative figure). 
2)  Total floor area (in square metres  or square feet)  of "large shops"  exceeding 
4000  sq. ft.  in area  (hypermarkets,  superstores,  large  supermarkets,  supermarkets): 
either in a  given country  or conurbation (absolute figure), 
- or per segment  of  10  000  inhabitants. 
3)  Total floor area (in square metres  or square feet)  of all shops  (distinguishing 
between "large shops"  and "small shops")  used  by  each  of  the  10  principal groups 
of retailers: 
operating in the country in question, 
operating in the  conurbation in question, 
indicating separately: 
- the absolute figure for  the  country  or  conurbation in question, 
- the relative figure  calculated per segment  of  10  000  inhabitants. 
4)  The  movement  over  the past  ten years of the  indicators mentioned under  1),  2)  and 
3)  above. 
2.9.10.  The  concentration of distribution on  the  supplY side- difference between 
national concentration and  local concentration - QQ.  136:138 
The  starting-point for studying concentration in distribution is to be  found in some  of 
the reports already published by the  Commission  (November  1976  to October  1977,  relating 
to the United Kingdom,  France,  the Federal Republic  of Germany,  Denmark  and Italy).  These 
results will be  used along·with the findings  of a  wider  investigation in order to obtain 
answers  to the following questions: 
CXXXVI)  What  are the  10  principal groups  of distributor-retailers of food products and 
(136)  beverages: 
in the country as a  whole, 
in several large  conurbations in the country? 
Is it possible to calculate the share  of total sales of the products concerned 
accounted for by  each of these groups,  both at national  level and  in the  sample 
conurbations? 
What  is the value  of the six concentration indicators set  out  in para.  2·9·9·  both 
in the  country as a  whole  and in the  sample  conurbations? 
1.  We  would draw readers'  attention to the paper presented b,y  Mr  W.N.  Barnes,  of the 
Middlesex Polytechnic,  London,  to the International Symposium  on  "Distribution: 
Structure and Management"  under the title "The  Urgent  Need  for Specific and Realistic 
International Marketing and Distribution Indicators".  The  symposium,  organized  b,y 
the European Institute for Advanced  Studies in Management,  was  held in Brussels  on 
29  and  30  May  1978. 
188 SURVEYS  ON  PRICES  AND  WlARK-UPS 
Table  of actual prices and  price deviations  (in%) 
for  each brand or "own  label"1 
SURVEY  NO:  Month/Year  (Month/Year) 
(Figures in parentheses are for a 
previous  survey,  No  •••  ) 
Sales point No:  ....  Name  of  owner: 
COUNTRY: 
TOlAN: 
CURRENCY: 
Identity code  Manufacturer  Purchase price 
Detailed  Product  *  Name  Average  description  n  Size/  Product  Brand  Origin  and/or  N"ation- This  Average  retail  group  of product  brand  No  No  ality  shop  code No  \  price 
'I 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
0006  006  9.06  .  .  .  .  .  . 
0006  000  8.6 
•  .  . 
•  .  . 
•  .  .  .  .  . 
1.  One  table per sales point. 
This table was  suggested by Development Analysts  Ltd.  (DAL)  - Croydon,  UK. 
TABLE  XII 
.....  .....  ..... 
Sale price 
Ae,tual  peyiation Deviatior 
(in %)  price  from  from  in this  average 
shop  price  .average· 
(+/-)  price 
I+!-%) 
13  14  15 
9·50  + 0.44  + 4-80  .  .  . 
•  .  . 
Total for 
branded  -?I.+/- L+l-
products 
8.5  - 0.1  - 1.2 
•  .  .  .  .  . 
Total for 
branded  ~r+/- r+/-
products 
.  .  . 
•  .  . 
Total for 
'bwn  label' ~r+/- r+/-
products CXXXVII)  What  movement  has there been,  in the past ten years,  in the market  shares both 
(137)  at national level and  in the  sample  conurbations  considered in the previous 
question? 
Do  these ten groups  include any producers  who  have  extended their vertical 
integration downstream  as far as  the  level of retail trading? 
What  is the  trend in the values  of the six concentration indicators mentioned 
above  (2.9.9.)  during the past ten years? 
CXXXVIII)  What  conclusions  can be  drawn  from  a  comparison  b~tween the level and  the trend 
(138)  in the degree  of concentration of distribution (of food  products and  beverages) 
on the national  seal~ and  on  the  local scale? 
Do  local surveys reveal that the  large distributors have  been acquiring shops 
to any  considerable extent? 
2.9.11.  Price levels and  pricing policies of selected shops  and  groups  of distributors-
Table XII - Q.  139 
The  problem  of reconciling the results of analyses at national level with the results of 
detailed surveys  of prices and  mark-ups  at local level  now  arises in acute form.  In what 
way  and  to what  extent does  an increase in local concentration - in a  given tolvn  or 
conurbation - react upon  the  level and  trend of prices and mark-ups?  That point  will  be 
considered in our  last question  (No  140)  in the present research programme.  But  first we 
must  find  out  how,  and  by  what  approach,  an answer  to a  question of such complexity and 
scope  can be  arrived at.  We  must  initially use  the results obtained in the first phase 
(Chapter One)  and  the  second phase  (this chapter)  of the  study to try to find an 
exhaustive answer to the following questions: 
CXXXIX)  Is it possible to draw up for each shop  selected - not  for all the  shops  in the 
(139)  local sample- a  series  of Tables XII  showing  both the selling price and  the 
purchase price of each product at each shop  selected,  in relation to the average 
prices for ~  the  shops  in the  local  sample? 
In this  way  Table XII  would  show  the relative position of each sales point  and 
of each selected group  of distributor-retailers with regard to its pricing 
policy for  each product  (item sold)  in the  context  of the pricing system (selling 
prices as well  as purchase prices)  characterizing the local  sample  of  sales points 
as a  whole.  A few  explanations  on  Table XII are called for.  Table  XII  was 
suggested,  in more  concise  form,  by Development  Analysts Ltd.  (DAL)  of Croydon 
(R.I'l.  Evely and A.J. MacNeary). 
Table XII  rnust  be  drawn  up  for each sales point  in the local  sample  belonging to 
one  of the  groups  of distributor-retailers chosen for more  detailed analysis by 
means  of questions  132  and  133. 
Table XII  gives  other information,  viz: 
the manufacturer and  his nationality; 
the purchase price,  the object  of the  exercise being to compare,  firstly,  the 
individual purchase price at the  shop in question with average  purchase prices 
(despite the difficulty of finding  out  the  individual purchase price)  and, 
secondly,  selling prices with purchase prices  (both average  prices and 
individual prices at each shop). 
In addition,  for the  products bearing a  brand name  or trade mark  and  for the 
products bearing the distributor's  own  label,  the table  shows  aggregate deviations 
from  the average  price (+/-)  and  the  same  deviations  (+/-)  expressed as  percentages. 
In this way  it will be  possible to use all the Tables XII  (one for  each sales 
point  selected)  to rank the different  shops  selected from  the most  expensive  (with 
the highest positive %deviation from  the average selling price)  to the  cheapest 
(with the highest negative %deviation from  the average selling price).  See  also 
paragraphs 2.5.11.  to 2.5.17.  (section 2.5.  of this chapter). 
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and  mark-ups - Q.  140 
It is now  time  to pass directly to the dynamic  phase of the analysis,  proceeding to two 
essential operations: 
I)  comparing  a  series of Tables XII  over a  period that is long enough  to be  significant, 
for each selected shop  or  group  and dealing,  as  we  have  seen,  with all the products 
sold in the  shops  concerned; 
II) integrating the Table XII for each distributor-retailer with a  series of individual 
tables analysing specific  prod~, as follows: 
a)  the tables of the two  examples  of para.  1.1.25 ("pathological"  and "concerted" 
price variations), 
b)  the additional tables  (fourth A,  fifth A,  sixth A)  of para.  2.5.20,  limited to 
the "critical" products used,  in conjunction with the  other paragraphs  of section 
2.5.  (notably para.  2.5.19.), 
c)  the tables in the examples  of paras. 2.6.6.  (analysis  of the pricing policy of a 
selected retailer- shop A- in regard to a  given product)  and 2.6.7.  (positive 
mark-up,  and "loss-leader" strategy in times  of inflation). 
All the results obtained should together  enable us  to answer  our question,  the final  one 
in the research programme: 
CXL)  Do  the  overall results of the  surveys  give us  answers  to the  following points: 
(140)  a)  Is there a  significant positive relationship between the local market  power 
of the large distributor-retailers and  the relative level  of prices and  mark-ups? 
b)  Are  the towns  and/or countries where  the concentration of distribution is greatest 
also those  where  prices and  mark-ups  are the greatest? 
c)  Is an increase in local concentration accompanied  by  an increase in prices and 
mark-ups? 
d)  Should  excessive  or unfair retail prices be  regarded as  originating from  an 
increase in concentration of distribution at local level or from  the  existence 
of restrictive practices? 
e)  Is it possible to ascertain that  excessive or unfair prices are  charged by  the 
producers  of certain brands  or items  who  hold dominant  positions  on  ce~tain local 
and/or national markets? 
f)  Is it possible to detect  any concrete cases where  consumers  in given  towns,  regions 
or countries have  been forced to aooept  the dominance  or  even  the monopoly  of certain 
articles or brands,  or excessive  or unfair prices for  such monopolistic  or dominant 
products{  And  if such cases do  exist are they caused by: 
- the dominance  enjoyed by  either the  producer  or the relevant distributor-retailers 
or by  both together; 
the  terms  of anticompetitive agreements; 
- in particular,  the  existence  or the  introduction of  exclusive dealing  or  supply 
agreements? 
g)  Is it considered that,  in order to obtain more  reliable and  unequivocal results,  a 
higher number  of towns  or regions  should  be  included in each country for detailed 
surveys  on  prices and mark-ups  in the  shops  constituting each  local sample? 
h)  What  results could  be  expected from  extending the  surveys to non-EEC  countries? 
The  replies to the various parts  of this question could provide valuable reference points 
for a  new  direction and  further development  of the research. 
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2.10.1.  Reformulation of the ultimate objectives  of the research 
The  foregoing analysis gives us  a  view  of the crucial points  of the research. 
We  shall now  emphasize  once  again,  and  demonstrate point  b,y  point,  that there is a 
direct logical and functional  link between the ultimate objectives of the research 
and  the philosophy,  aspects and  sequences  of our research programme. 
With this aim  in mind,  it is nec1ssary to reformulate the ultimate  objectives  of the 
research in the following  terms: 
I) to inform the European  Parliament,  public  op~~on, interested circles and  the 
Commission  of developments  in concentration,  competition and  prices,  this being 
a  general  objective within the limits of the area laid down  for  investigation; 
II)  to obtain practical results which will enable "anomalies  of competition"  to be 
tracked down. 
It is this second ultimate objective,  which is nevertheless a  quite specific objective, 
that gives direction and  purpose  to the  philosophy and  the  sequences  of the research. 
Two  types  of  conclusion might  be  reached  in the research: 
either anomalies  of competition do  in fact  exist  on  certain specific markets, 
or it is neither proven nor even  probable that such anomalies exist. 
In the first case,  proof that such anomalies  exist may  be  followed  by  different forms  of 
action depending  whether: 
they fall within the  scope  of Article 85  and  86  of the  Treaty of Rome  so that the 
Commission  is obliged to initiate specific investigations; 
they fall  outside the  scope  of Community  law. 
It is, moreover,  a  good  thing that public opinion - and  of  course  the European  Parliament 
should be  kept  informed  of the existence and  growth of  such anomalies  and  of their impact 
on  economic  life in general and  of their effect on  consumers,  firms  and the  inflationary 
process in particular. 
2.10.2. Definition and pinpointing of anomalies  of competition 
The  crucial point is clearly to define and pinpoint  an "anomaly  of  competition". 
An  anomaly  of  competition may  for practical purposes  be  defined as  follows:  it is a 
variance or deviation in the actual functioning  of the mechanisms  of competition from  a 
given- perhaps ideal - "competitive model".  This in turn entails the empirical  solution 
of two  problems: 
-definition of the "competitive model"; 
-definition of the magnitude  of the variance  or deviation,  so  that  b,y  the mere  fact  of 
exceeding a  certain "ceiling"  or  level the variance or deviation will be  regarded as  a 
per ~  anomaly. 
1.  See the introduction to Chapter One:  "Aims  and  stages  of the research programme". 
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The  "competitive model"  may  be  defined in concrete terms  by reference to: 
I)  market  structures, 
II) prices. 
The  Commission  has  considered all these  levels in its investigations and  several elements 
needed  for the definition of some  of these  competitive models  have  already been obtained. 
The  competitive model  based  on  market  structures 
This model  is characterized by the  following conditions: 
a)  an adequate number  of suitably balanced brands and  producer  groups  (for example,  eight 
producer firms - all present at  any  given moment  - on  a  specific market,  each tvith an 
identical size of  12.5%,  the L index thus being  1/8 = 0.125); 
b)  constant variations in the market  shares  of each producer firm  (in 1970  firm A has 
15%  and  firm  B 3%,  whereas  in 1975  both firms  have  7%).  The  degree  of dJ!¥Unism  of 
each market must  therefore be  considered  • 
Thus  Table VIII,  which  deals with 250  or  so national product markets where  the  leading 
firm holds  over  25%  of the total (of which  about  a  hundred are dominated  by  one  firm 
which  has more  than 50%  of the total)2gives a  series of concrete and  eloquent  examples  of 
deviations  from  the competitive model  •  As  we  note  in our report,  the research programme 
will be developed  in several different directions,  with the aim  of tracking down  and 
quantifying the deviations from  the competitive model.  Such deviations appear: 
- in the movement  or evolution of the national producers'  market,  seen b,y  reference to two 
opposite patterns:  dynamism  (as in the competitive model)  and  rigidity; rigidity is an 
example  of deviation from  the model- see section 2.9.,  especially paras. 2.9.1.  and 
2.9.2.; 
in the movement  or evolution in the national balance of power  between producers  and 
retailers;  growing and  excessive concentration of retailers may  also be  considered an 
example  of deviation (see section 2.9.,  especially paras. 2.9.5.  and 2.9.6.,  Table XI, 
questions  132  and  133); 
in the movement  or evolution of the  local concentration of distributor-retailers; this 
movement,  in that it may  entail a  reduction in the number  of different shops. (among 
which the consumer  may  choose  when  making  purchases),  is another example  of deviation 
from  the  competitive model  (see section 2.9.,  especially paras. 2.9.9.  and 2.9.10., 
questions  136  to 138). 
1.  The  degree  of dynamism  may  be  measured by  the indices d  and F.  See  our Methodology, 
points 51,  52  and  54-61. 
2. Frangois Perroux,  in his well-known works,  has illustrated the aspects and  effects of 
dominance.  See in particular: 
"Esquisse d'une theorie de  l'economie  dominante",  Economie  Appliquee, 
Archives de  l'I.S.E.A.,  No  2-3,  1948. 
"L'effet de domination dans  les relations economiques",  Hommes  et Techniques, 
January  1949· 
"Les  comptes  de  la Nation",  P.U.F.,  PP•  8 ~  ~·· 1949 
"Note  sur la d.ynamique  de  la domination de  la domination",  Economie  Appliquee, 
Archives de  l'I.S.E.A., no  2,  1950. 
"La concurrence et l'effet de  domination",  Ba.nque,  May  1952. 
"L'economie dominante"  in "L'Economie  du x:xe  siecle"  P.U.F.,  Paris, 
e  '  '  3  edition,  1969,  PP•  61-144. 
"Pouvoir et economie",  Etudes  Economiques,  Dunod,  Paris  1974• 
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Both  the research carried  out  this far and  the research to be  undertaken in the present 
programme  is aimed  at establishing a  series  of  competitive models  based  on  prices. 
The  practical utility of this is obvious.  Application of Articles 85  and  86  calls for 
proof,  or at least  sound  evidence,  that the  firms  concerned  have  engaged  in conduct 
forbidden by  the  Treaty.  The  most  striking manifestation of  such behaviour is to be 
found  in prices.  It is by  analysing and  comparing price levels and  changes  that the 
existence  of  competitive  anomalies  can be  tracked down;  this  is the first step on  the 
road to proving that the  conduct  giving rise to such anomalies  may  be  contrary to those 
Articles. 
Therefore  the  competitive model  will  be  defined by  reference to: 
- retail prices; 
purchase prices paid by  retailers; 
producer prices; 
retailers'  and  possibly wholesalers'  mark-ups, 
and three basic indicators will be  used to characterize and  quantify the structure of 
competition: 
a)  from  the static angle 
dispersion  (or disparity)  of retail prices  between sales points  (local dispersion); 
difference  in retail prices between the different  countries  or regions  concerned 
(international differentiation); 
size  of mark-ups:  both their absolute  level and  also their local dispersion (or 
disparity)  and  international differentiation; 
b)  from  the dynamic  angle 
the three indicators considered in their linked movement  or evolution. 
In this connection it is worth recalling the practical usefulness of  our  three 
"magic  keys"  (see section 5 of this chapter): 
first key:  analysis,  over  the different sales points,  of the movement  that has 
taken place; 
second key:  international comparisons  of that movement; 
third key:  multiple  comparisons  between products,  particularly useful with regard 
to mark-ups  and  the various  cost  components. 
Having  said this,  we  shall now  briefly restate the essential stages to be  gone  through 
in tracking down  competitive anomalies  and  in proving their perverse  or illicit nature. 
The  "thermometer"  used  in the investigations is provided,  as  already noted,  by retail 
prices,  that is to say by: 
the  local dispersion (or disparity)  of prices, 
the international differentiation of prices. 
2.10·5·  between the sales  oints 
A certain degree of dispersion of prices and  price variations is a  symptom  of  imperfect, 
though still effective,  competition.  On  the  other hand  if prices and  price variations 
were  identical this would  be  a  s~nptom of competition so perfect  or abstract that it 
amounted  virtually to collusion or the abuse  of a  monopoly. 
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"competitive platform"  which  is characterized by  a  "reasonable"  degr:ee  of dispersion 
of prices.  This  competitive platform corresponds to a  difference  of  between  10f{  and  40/{ 
above  the minimum  price for an identical product  found  in the  local  sample  shops. 
Within  the platform the dispersion of prices is justified by  differences  in operating 
costs between  sample  shops  as a  result of their location,  size,  organizational form,  degree 
of specialization and  diversification,  and  so  on  (seA  Chapter One,  para.  1.1.28.,  point II: 
"Special position of price controls"). 
So  when  the degree  of dispersion - measured  b,y  the  index of relative difference,  tR  -
exceeds  40%  or is  lower  than  10%,  there  can be  said to be  a  deviation from  the  comp~titive 
model. 
A  series of comments  can be  made  on  the  causes  of the deviation from  the relevant 
competitive model  or competitive platform. 
2.10.6. Dispersion of and  discrimination in prices 
Two  extreme hypothetical cases  may  be  distinguished: 
I)  excessively high dispersion of prices, 
II)  excessively low dispersion of prices. 
In the case  of  an  upward  deviation,  ie. a  relative difference in retail prices exceeding 
the minimum  price by  more  than 40%,  there must  be  either very strong bargaining power  on 
the part of some  retailers vie-a-vis the  producers  or suppliers  (they can sell very low 
because  they have  enjoyed exceptional buying terms),  or a  predator.y policy pursued by 
some  large retailers (selling goods  below cost  in order to increase their share  of the 
local  market),~ local dominant  positions exploited by  some  retailers who  impose  much 
higher prices than those charged in another district of the  same  town  or region, ~  other 
reasons  about  which it would  be  very interesting to have  precise knowledge.  The~e are all 
phenomena  which  would  in principle justify more  thorough investigation of causes  • 
For example,  where  very large differences in the prices charged and  in the  terms  granted 
to some  large retailers by  their suppliers are  found,  this might  be  an instance  of  the 
application of "dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them  at a  competitive disadvantage". 
If such practices were  capable  of affecting trade between Member  States,  the Commission 
would  have  to start specific and  comprehensive  investigations  into the products and  firms 
involved. 
The  usefulness  of highlighting the dispersion of prices at  local level (ie.  between sales 
points in the  same  town  or region)  does not  stop here. 
Quantification of the dispersion of selling prices at local level is an essential 
preliminary to international comparisons  of prices  (buying prices ~  selling prices)  for 
the same  product in the different EEC  Member  States. 
It is necessary to clear the ground  of the problem of the  local dispersion of prices 
before  one  can usefully examine  the problem  of price differences - and  price discrimination -
between different countries.  It is therefore necessary: 
to know  the maximum  and  minimum  prices'observed at several shops  (and not merely average 
prices;  these are liable to be  far too deceptive  or fallacious)  before it is possible to 
state that a  certain product is much  more  expensive in one  country than in another; 
1.  See  para. 2.5.5.  and  Table  IV  of this chapter. 
195 to appty several conversion rates - we  have  listed two different rates in Chapter One 
(1.3.)  -before we  can  judge whether the real magnitude  of the differences  in price 
between different countries for the same  product is great  enough to warrant speaking 
of "discriminatory prices"• 
In practice,  of course,  there will be  found  to be  straightforward cases and more 
complicated cases. 
A  straightforward case:  according to all the calculation criteria the  maximum  price 
of a  product as recorded in country A is found  to be at least  5o%  lower than the minimum 
price for an identical product recorded in country B.  Unless it can be  shown  that there 
are very high transport costs or particularly heavy  tax rates in country  B,  there is no 
doubt  that this case  can be  investigated from.the  angle  of discriminatory prices. 
For the more  complicated cases a  whole  series of examples  could be  given: 
the results of the  comparisons  might  vary according to the  conversion rates used; 
the  m~n~mum prices found  in country A might  be  higher  than the minimum  prices in 
country B but  lower  than the maximum  prices in that country; 
the products might  not  be  absolutely identical and there would  therefore be  a  problem 
of comparability. 
In several such cases it would  be  necessary to deepen and widen the analysis  of the 
"critical"  products,  ie: 
either to step up  the frequency with which retail prices were  surveyed in the various 
shops  covered  (recording them  every month  or every other month); 
or to increase the number  of regions  and  to-t·ms  covered in each country  ( eg.  to prepare 
a  sample  of  shops  in Hamburg,  Frankfurt,  etc., rather than limiting the  survey to the 
Greater Munich  conurbation); 
or to combine  several  such operations. 
We  have  therefore proposed that  we  should  confine ourselves to basing our investigations 
on  a  "mobile  or variable  sample"  related either to the products,  or to the countries, 
regions  or tmms,  or to the  firms  (producers as  well as retailers),  for it goes  without 
saying that to intensify some  aspects  of the research would  entail greater specialization 
and  concentration to the detriment  of continuing  the  overall research on  a  routine basis 
over the  whole  field  of  investigation at the  six-monthly intervals originally envisaged -
for  obvious  reasons  of economies  in the  costs  of the research itself.  The  mobile  (or 
variable)  sample  could  even  be  set up,  if necessary,  in a  few  non-EEC  countries. 
2.10.7.  "IJightning surveys"  and  the settine up  of "local waiting-list  samples" 
Establishment  of the mobile  sample  would  make  it possible to supplement  the  periodical 
surveys  (half-;>rearly  or monthly)  Hi th "lightning surveys"  to be  carried out  on  the spot 
without any '-varning.  The  idea would  then be  that,  for all products  or for certain 
critical products: 
- a  "waiting--list"  or temporary list of local or regional  samples  would  be  drawn  up  in each 
country  covered by  the study  (eg.  in France:  Bordeaux,  Nice,  Limoges,  Metz,  Lille, 
Marseilles,  Le  Havre,  Calais,  Strasbourg,  Rheims),  each local sample  consisting of not 
more  than about  ten shops  controlled by  given retail groups  or chains;  ---
simultaneous  lightning  surveys  VJould  take  place in one  or several toims  or regions 
(ee.  Bordeaux,  ~Cetz,  Rheims)  on  an unannounced  date  (eg.  17  May,  5 October,  13  november 
in all the  shops,  in all the  toM.1S  and  in all the  co1n1tries). 
1.  Experience  vli th several  surveys  and  Hi th processing  the results  of  such surveys  might 
eventually lead us  to prefer  one  conversion rate to the  others. 
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secret in order to enhance  the practical usefulness of this kind  of  survey.  It would 
be left to the Commission's Directorate-General for Competition alone to trigger off the 
surveys  of selected,  specified "local waiting-list  samples"  in the different countries, 
giving notice by  telephone or telegram no  more  than a  week  or ten days  in advance. 
Lightning surveys  could even be  carried out  in a  few  non-EEC  countries as well. 
The  lightning surveys would  of course record the prices at which  the  goods  were  offered 
for sale to the public but  they ought also to record additional  information if possible 
on: 
- producer prices; 
-wholesalers' or importers'  prices, if relevant (in the  case  of independent  trade); 
- purchase dates; 
storage period; 
incidence  of taxes and duties. 
All the  information obtained in this way  would  be used to confirm the data obtained through 
the regular periodical surveys  and for international comparisons,  later confirming the 
entire series of data for analysis. 
2.10.8.  Existence  of uniform prices at sales points  in the  same  town  or  region 
We  shall now  examine  the  other hypothetical case  of deviation from  the  competitive model 
or platform,  namely the case where  the differences in retail prices of the  same  product as 
between sales points do  not  exceed  10%. 
In this case it would  seem  much  easier to carry out  international comparisons,  which  are 
more  significant when  the degree  of dispersion at local level is very  small.  Of  course, 
not  only the average prices but also the maximum  and.  minimum  prices found  in each country 
must  be  compared.  If it is found  that all these prices,  in a  given country,  are at least 
4o%  higher than in another  countr;'/  one  is ei1'titied to consider iV"hether  there is discrimi-
natory pricing.  It would  then be  necessary to seek evidence  and  to ascertain the  causes. 
High  taxation on  the  product  in question in a  given  country?  Dominance  of one  brand and/or 
one  firm  on  the market  of a  given countr7?  International agreement  between producers to 
keep the price of a  certain product at  ~  excessively high level in a  given country?  Or 
an excessively costly distribution system in a  country?  Or,  again,  dominance  of the 
distributor-retailers? 
It goes  without  saying that  the  exi~tence of relatively uniform retail prices in a  given 
country always  gives rise to the  suspicion that price-fixing agreements  are in operation 
between producers  or  between distributor-retailers or between producers  and  retailers. 
In section 2.8.  and 2.9.  we  formulated  a  series of questions designed to evoke  practical 
and  direct replies indicating whether  either Article 85  or,  especially, Article 86  of the 
Treaty applies  (Questions  116-140). 
With  regard more  especially to proof of abuse  of a  dominant  position,  we  would  draw attention 
to the following  example: 
existence  of a  dominant  position exceeding,  say,  40%  of the total national market  of 
country A; 1 
1.  This "ceiling"  is related directly to the criteria propounded  by  the  Court  of Justice 
in the United  Brands  case already mentioned  (27,126). 
A market  share  of between  40%  and  45%  is sufficient to constitute power  of domination 
on  the part  of the  firm  concerned - in this  case United  Brands  - because: 
the  percentage "must  be  determined  having regard to the  strength and  number  of the 
competitors"  (Ground of Judgment  110); 
a  firm "does not  have  to have  eliminated all opportunity for competition in order to 
be  in a  dominant  position"  (Ground  of Judgment  113). 
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the retail prices  charged  in country  B for the  same  or  a  reasonab~ comparable  product; 
objective and well-documented  evidence  that this price difference is not due  to higher 
tax in country A nor to the higher mark-ups  commonly  taken by  the trade in country A 
than in country  B. 
If these conditions are all fulfilled and  are verified on  the  basis  of a  comprehensive 
analysis  of the  economic  chain and  of the structure  of prices,  particularly with regard 
to the  level and  evolution of troducer prices,  one  can envisage a  fairly clear,  straight-
forNard  case  under Article 86  abuse  of.a dominant  position). 
2.10.9.  Competitive models  based  on  mark-ups 
These  models  and  the relevant deviations  can only be  determined with  any accuracy actually 
on  the ground.  A series  of questions  (39  to 50  and  54  to 64)  have  been designed  to bring 
out  the main  aspects  of the  problems  connected with  n~rk-ups.  Experience  gained to date 
enables  us  to note the follmving "focal points": 
I) Dispersion and  uniformity, 
II) Maxima  (very high mark-ups)  and  minima  (excessively low  mark-ups). 
An  important  comment  may  be  made  at this point:  the  competitive  platform or model  is,  by 
its very nature,  situated in the middle  of the  interval between the  two  hypothetical 
extremes  (respectively:  I. dispersion and uniformity,  and II. maxima  and  minima),  whereas 
the "pathological" deviations  tend to lie close to one  of the  extremes. 
I)  Thus,  on  the first point,  an excessive dispersion of mark-ups  denotes the existence  of 
ru1  excessively large difference  in the  concrete competitive situations in which  the 
survey  shops  find  themselves. 
On  the  other hand  the  existence  of excessively uniform mark-ups,  or identical mark-ups, 
may  be  a  symptom  of the existence either of an agreement  between retailers,  or of a 
pricing policy  imposed  by  producers,  or of prices fixed officially by  the authorities. 
In this connection it will be  the tables of Chapter One  - and  in particular Tables  5 
and  6  and  Tables  10  and  11  - which will  indicate the reference points for detecting 
anomalies  and  analysing deviations from  the  competitive model. 
II)  The  problems  connected with the~  of mark-ups  involve consideration of a  number  of 
important points. 
a)  In the first place,  there is no  automatic link between the ~  of the mark-up 
and  the  existence  of dominance  or a  monopoly  because  a  high mark-up may  be  caused 
not  only by  the existence  of market  power  but also b.y  the  existence of a  wide 
disparity in the efficiency and profitability of the  survey shops.  Subject to 
this reservation,  we  may  use  the criterion of comparison between products underlying 
the ranking in Table 6  in Chapter One,  in the  sense that the products and  shops 
appearing in the upper quarter of Table  6  probably represent cases of deviation from 
the  competitive platform since their mark-up  is higher than that of the  other products 
and  shops  appearing  lower down. 
b)  However,  comparison  of mark-ups  on  different products  and at different shops calls· 
for two  kinds  of  comment. 
~Jith regard to products,  it must  be  borne in mind  that all things being  equal~ 
mark-up will be  much  higher  on  perishable,  delicate or bulky goods  which cost more 
to keep and store  (eg.  frozen foods)  than on  products whose  keeping and storing only 
pose  problems  of space  (eg.  tinned vegetables,  tinned meat,  tinned fish)  and higher 
still than on  high-value,  non-perishable products with long shelf-life and  easy to 
handle  (eg.  instant coffee,  tea). 
~·Ji th regard to shops,  account  must  also be  taken of the stock turnover rate because 
the  length and  cost  of the stocking period clearly tend to be  correlated with the 
level of mark-up.  The  first,  second and  third tables  of Chapter  Two  all show  lhe 
importance  of the  length of the product  stocking period (Tj);  see section 2.3. 
1.  The  incidence  of different tax rates  on  different products must-also be  taken into account. 
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model: 
one  consists  of an  up~·.rard deviation,  v.rhich  \ve  have  just  considered,  ie.  murk-ups 
that are  excessive  in relation to the normal  average  margin found  on  most  products 
and  in most  shops; 
the  second  type  consists  of dowrmard  deviation in relation to the normal  average 
margin corresponding to the  competitive platform. 
We  shall therefore have  to consider as  well  the mark-ups  on  products  and  in shops  that 
fall in the  lower quarter  of the above-mentioned Table 6.  This  quarter v-rill  include 
all the "loss leaders"  (fully discussed in section 2.4.  and  especially in section 2.6.). 
Nil mark-ups  or negative mark-ups  are  often a  vTorrying  symptom  of an unhealthy or 
pathological state of competition,  t~~t is to say a  state of competition that  leaves 
the door  wide  open  to concentration and  dominance.  It is neither normal  nor desirable 
nor  even possible for firms  to operate at a  loss  over  the  long term.  Such nil or 
negative mark-ups  are therefore a  deviation from  the  competitive platform. 
2.10.10. Distinction between  formal  mark-ups  and actual mark-ups- Determination of  purchase 
date and  purchase  price - Ana.lysis  of cost  structures 
We  have  already pointed out that nil or negative mark-ups  may  be  fictitious  or misleading, 
ie.  they may  be  based  on  an overstated buying price.  In other words  la.rge distributor-
retailers may  obtain from  producers discounts,  reba.tes  or other special terms  that are not 
available to every purchaser and  may  thus  enjoy a  very  low  buying price - one  which  is 
naturally nteant  to be  kept  secret.  Since in the workings  in Chapter  One  the  buying prices 
are  estimated  on  the basis  of official scales there is a  resultant  overestirr~tion of  these 
prices (in the  case  of the distributor-retailers enjoying the  special privileges  just 
described)  and consequently an underestimation  of their mark-ups.  An  attempt at a  reply 
to questions  92  to 94  should enable us  to get  close to reality;  see  section 2.7.  ("Retailers' 
buying prices and  pov1er  interplay"). 
In any  case  an attempted reply to the  questions  on  the actual purchase prices and  purchase 
dates  of a  given product  bought  by  the  large distributor-retailers forms  the first stage 
in establishing the analysis  of costs which is the  only way  that  proof  of the  existence  of 
an "unfair price"  within the meaning  of Article 86  of the Treaty is going  to be  obtainable 
See  also section 2.8.  ("Completion of the monographic  approach by  individual product: 
excessive prices and  the  search for causes- in particular the  breakdoh~ of tho price"). 
Clearly,  unless there is accurate  information on  the price actually charged and  paid one 
can abandon any hope  of ever being able  to prove that this price - or another price ~ 
down  in the chain- is "unfair". 
2.10.11.  Transition to the  conclusive and practical 4ynamic  analysis- Aims  and  object 
~ 
A series of questions  (26  to 38  for selling prices,  and  75  to 84  for buying prices) 
concerning in particular the main  aspects of the movements  of prices. 
A study of price variations,  of divergences  between these variations and  hence  of the 
different mark-ups  must  have  the following aims: 
I) to confirm and reinforce  (or weaken)  the significance of the practical conclusions 
resulting from  the correlations brought  out  by  the static analysis; 
II) to uncover new  competitive anomalies  which  by  their nature  escaped detection under  the 
static analysis method. 
In both cases dynamic  analysis is the culmination and  conclusion,  both scientific and 
practical,  of the research. 
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Comparison  of the movements  taking place in prices and  mark-ups  has  a  multiple significance: 
I) Structural comparison:  movements  in prices and  mark-ups  according to the position 
in the chain,  ie: 
a)  retail prices; 
b)  purchase prices paid  b,y  retailers; 
c)  producer prices; 
d)  retailers'  and,  if relevant, ·wholesalers'  mark-ups  showing the comparative 
incidence  of taxes and duties. 
In this connection the reader should recall the replies given to questions 85  to 91 
and  Tables VI  and  VII  of Chapter  Two. 
II)  Local comparison:  movements  in retail prices according to the identity of the  shop 
in the  local  sample,  thus  showing  the value  of the  index EAs  (absolute difference 
in price variations:  see Tables 2,  3  and  4  of Chapter One). 
III)  International comparison:  movements  in prices and  mark-ups  by  country concerned, 
taking account  of the  incidence  of taxes and  duties. 
IV)  Inter-product  comparison:  movements  in prices and  mark-ups  b.Y  item  concerned,  taking 
account  of the  incidence  of taxes and duties. 
In -this  connection the reader's attention is drawn  to the three "magic  keys"  (see section 
2.5.)  and in particular to: 
- key  one: 
- key two: 
- key three: 
paras.  2·5·5· et seq; 
paras.  2.5.18.  and 2.6.5.; 
paras.  2.7.14.  et seq. 
2.10.12.  The  results expected 
In connection with the dynamic  analysis the  establishment  of competitive models  - and 
determination  of deviations  from  those  models  - obviously ought  to be  carried out  "on 
the  ground",  ie. after the  event.  It is not  possible- at the  present  stage  of  our 
knowledge  and  empirical research - to fix strict and  specific criteria in advance.  It 
is possible,  however,  to lay dorm  a  few  guidelines,  bearing in mind  the startin;;points 
from  rJhich  He  developed  our  dynamic  analysis  (Tables 4,  10  and  11  of Chapter One  • 
Table  4 of Chapter One  classifies,  in decreasing  order,  the price variations which  took 
place in the period  in question,  for  each item and  for  each shop. 
Th~s Table 4 highlights: 
a)  price variations that are  so high that they  may  be  considered pathological,  a 
phenomenon  \vhich  is also brought  out  by  Tables  10  of Chapter One; 
b)  identical price variations Hhich  lead  one  to suspect  the  existence  of  concerted action, 
a  phenomenon  which  is also brought  out  by Tables  11  of Chapter One. 
In either case  one  can envisage that  the detailed analysis based  on  the methodology  of 
Chapter  Two  could be  used,  in order to obtain an answ0 r  to the  question: 
with regard to a),  whether Article 86  (provisions  on  "unfair prices")  applies,  because 
certain price changes  are  exaggerated  m1d  not  justifiable on  economic  grounds  and 
therefore the prices resulting from  these unfair changes  may  also be  considered unfair; 
with regard to b),  whether Article 85  (on price-fixing agreements  and  practices) applies, 
the  other  conditions for the application of the article being fulfilled and  proven. 
In particular, all the  elements  and  analyses  which  can bring out  the magnitude  and  impact 
of market  dominance  must  be  noted:  see section 2.9. 
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might  exist between market  dominance,  price levels and  the  level  of profitability as 
disclosed by  firms'  accounts;  this will  be  done  by  analysing the trend of earnings  (as 
shown  by  their accounts)  of the principal firms  holding dominant  positions  on  product 
markets.  If no  positive correlation is found,  the  causes will have to be  sought;  these 
might  be:  the existence of countervailing power  and a  constant  low-price policy;  social 
initiatives and social expenditure  b,y  the  firm;  promotion of research;  diseconomies  of 
scale and high cost  of domination;  and,  finally,  possible divergence  between the  information 
disclosed by  the accounts  and  the  information obtained through a  subsequent  thorough 
analysis  of the true "economic"  profitability of the firms  concerned. 
Suah  an analysis  could be  supplemented,  in specific cases,  by  a  detailed analysis of the 
various cost  components  and,  especially,  of comparative movements  in them,  and this could 
be  done  for  the various countries and  industries  involved. 
Together,  the criteria set  out  in Chapters One  and  Two  and  the  body  of replies  obtained 
to the  140  questions put  in Chapter  Two  are capable  of achieving the  two  objectives  of 
the research: 
- providing general  information for the European Parliament,  public  opinion,  interested 
parties and  the  Commission,  in order to secure  a  certain degree  of "transparency"  of 
structures and,  in particular,  to ensure that there is systematic and  thorough knowledge 
of market  structures and  changes  in them; 
providing a  collection of specific economic  analyses  which will enable  the  Commission 
to take concrete practical initiatives under Articles  85  and  86  of the  Treaty. 
2.10.3.  Basis  for discussion:  long-term prospects  of the research 
It can be  said with certainty,  at the current  stage  of  our factual  knmvledge,  that it 
will be  several years before the research progrrunme  is  completed and that  complete results 
will come  only in stages,  market  b,y  market,  product  by  product  and  country by  country.  The 
difficulties and  constraints to which  the  investigations will be  subject  cannot  be  over-
estimated.  On  the  other hand,  if we  persevere with the  steady completion and  expansion of 
the research,  it should be  possible to set up  a  semi-automatic and  continuous  apparatus 
for  observing and  analysing structures and prices t·lOrld-tvide.  It is still difficult at 
the present  juncture to describe the whole  range  of concrete actions  open  to the  EEC  in 
the field of competition policy and  in the fight  against  inflation as  a  result  of the 
findings  of the studies.  Besides the  specific results expected in the  short  term,  the 
research programme  provides  a  basis for discussion of future  developments. 
Collection and  comparison  of prices  of identical and/or comparable  products - retail prices, 
mark-ups  and  producer prices - should make  it possible to substantiate the  ex).stence  or 
non-existence  of competitive  ano~lies at world  level.  If,  for  example,  the studies 
described in the research programme  reveal that in one  or more  E~C Member  States retail 
prices and  producer prices are being char5ed that are  excessively high or excessively low 
in relation to prices  in non-Community  countries or in another Member  State,  it would  be 
necessary to analyse  both the  causes and  the resultant  concrete effects  on  production and 
marketing structures in the  EEC  as  a  whole  and,  especially,  to analyse  the harm  which  may 
be  suffered from  this  by  conswners  and/  or producer firrns  in one  or more  lfJernber  States in 
comparison 1vi th consumers  and/  or producer firms  in a  non-Community  country or in another 
EEC  J.V:ember  State.  Among  other things the findings,  even  interim and  partial,  of the 
studies  could provide  the Community  authorities vrith a  series of objective,  systeffiatic 
and  continuous reference points to guide  them  in their attitude to the strategies employed 
by  the  large multinational firms  and/or by  certain producer countries. 
There  is no  doubt  that the  level and  structure of international prices play a  decisive role 
in influencing the trends  which  will  in future  characterize a  new  ivorldwide division of 
productive  economic  activities.  This  means  that it is necessary to collect,  compare  and 
analyse  those  prices. 
The  aims  of the  re>Jearch  programme  thus  go  beyond  the  sphere  of food  products  and  beverages. 
The  same  model  can  be  applied  and  adapted to other markets  and  products. 
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DOMINANCE  STRUCTURE  IN  150 
SELECTED  PRODUCT  ~ARKETS INTRODUCTORY  AND  EXPLANATORY  REMARKS 
--------------------------
1.  As  it  has  already  pointed out  recent  develo~ments  in  research  into  concen-
tration,  competition  and  prices  in  individual  industries  and  markets  reflect 
the economic  principles  affi rmec  by  th€  Court  of  Justice  or.  14  Fecruc:,ry  1978 
in  Case  27/76  (United Brands).  The  following  are  the  seven  main  principles 
that  can  be  deduced  from  the  judgment  since  they  ~ave ccnsiderable  influence 
on  the  orientation and  objedtives  of  the  econo~ic  research  and  analysis 
undertaken  under  the  Co~mission's programme  : 
(1)  the existence of  a  dominant  position  derives  in  general  from  a  combination 
of  several  factors  whic~, taken  separately,  would  not  necessarily  be 
deter~inant  (Ground  of  Judgment  66)  ; 
(2)  one  of  the  factors  whic~ point  to dominance  is  the market  share  of  a 
given  company  compared  with  the  shares  of  its ccmpetitors  (Ground  58). 
This  ~arket  share  m~st exceed  40  % ; 
(3)  a  company  with  a  market  share  in excess  of  40%  does  not  automatically 
control  the  market,  for  its market  share  must  be  assessed  in the  Light 
of  the  strength  an~ number  of  its competitors  (Grounds  108  to 110)  ; 
(4)  the  fact  that  the  n.arket  Leader  has  twice  the  sales  of  its most  strongly 
placed  competitor  and  t~at there  is  no  appreciable decline  in  its sales, 
even  when  new  competitors  enter  the  market,  would  tend  to  confirm  the 
dominant  positio~s  (Grourds  120  to  129)  ; 
(5)  where  a  given  firm  has  a  dominant  position  on  a  specific  prod~ct market, 
Article  86  comes  into play  where  discriminatory or  unfair  pricing  is 
practised,  provided all the  requirements  of  the Article are  met; 
(6)  a  policy of  price differentiation enabling  the  dominant  firm  to 
apply  dissimilar  conditions  to  equivalent  transactions  with  its 
various  trading  partners,  thereby  placing  them  at  a  competitive 
disadvantage,  constitutes  abuse  of  dominance  (Ground  234,  relating  to 
discriminatory prices)  ; 
205 (7)  the existence of  excessive differences  between  the  hig~est  and 
lowest  prices  (Grourd  237)  can  constitute  an  indicium  of  excessive 
disproportion between  costs  actually  uorn  and  prices  actually 
charged  (Ground  252),  so  that  the  Commission  must 
(a)  retrace the  precess  of  retail  price  fcrmation  ; 
(b)  either  in  absolute  ter~s cr  in  comparison  with  ccrrpeting  prod~cts  ; 
(c)  in  order to  evaluate  the  mark-~p. 
Where  the  conclusions  reached  upon  this analysis  indicate that  excessive 
prices  are  being  c~arged out  of  all  reasonable  proportio~ to the  economic 
value  of  the  service or  product  supplied,  it  may  be  concluded  that  a 
dominant  position  is  being  abused  (Grounds  250  to  259,  relating  to 
unfair  pricing). 
2.  Frcm  the principles set  forth  cy  tre  Court  of  Justice it  is helpful  to 
draw  up  conclusions  as  regards  the  research  analysis  development  on  : 
(a)  market  structure  and  the analysis  of  dominance  ; 
(b)  price structures. 
The  Latter  are  considered  in  Chapter  Two  of  the present  volume. 
As  regards  ~arket structure,  the  industries  and  specific product  markets 
which  may  be  under  the  influence  of  a  dominant  firm  must  be  ascertainea 
and  analysed. 
In  the  VIIth  Report  on  the  Competition  Policy,  referring  to  1977,  the 
Commission  has  published  a  table outlining  the  share  and  the  name  of the 
ciominant  firms  in  245  national  markets  for  certain products  (see  Table  VIII 
of  the  Chapter  Two,  n°  2.9.1.,  pages  162 to  169  of  the  present  volume). 
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product  markets  continued  during  1978  and  the structure  of  dominance  power 
has  been  analysed in depth  by  considering  not  only  the  strength  or  share  of 
the  to.E_.Jj!..!!!,  but  the  share  as  well  as  the  rank  of  each  of  the  top_4_fJrms, 
operating  in  each  product  market. 
The  purpose  of  this  Appendix  is, therefore, to  present  these detailed data 
referring to  150  selected  prod~ct markets,  these  products  coinciding  only 
partially with  markets  ccnsidered  in  the  above  menticned  Table  VIII  of 
Chapter  Two. 
The  table  1  of  this  Appendix  has  been  established  in  French,  but 
table  2 gives  the  English  translation  for  each  of  the  150  selected  product 
markets,  designated  by  a  code  number. 
These  markets  are  ranked  in  decreasing  order  of  the  coefficient  2L,  expressing 
in%  the  relation between  the  absolute  figure  fer  the  first  firm  and  the 
absolute  figure  fer  the  second.  The  interpretation of  coefficient  2L  is 
very  eaSy'. 
If  2L  = 100  %,  the  two  largest  firms  have  identical  shares  of  the  industry  or 
market  considered. 
If  2L  = 200  %,  the  first  firm  has  twice  the  second  firm's  share  of  the  relevant 
industry or  market  and  this, according  to  the  eccncmic  principles  affirmed 
by  the  Court  of  Justice  of  European  Communities  on  1L  Fetruary  1978,  Judgment 
in  Case  27/76  (United  Brands)  raises  a  suspicion  of  individual  potential 
dominance. 
If  2L  = 400  %,  the  largest  firm  is  four  tirres  the  second  firm  and  so  on. 
Table  1  is  not  limited  to only  one  indicator  of  dominance  power<i,.e.  :  2L), 
since  for  the  assesment  of  the  position of  a  company  in  rel~tion 
to  the  strength  an~ number  of  its  competitors  Cas  required  by  the  Court  of 
Justice  in  the  atcve qucted  case  27/76),  more  indicators  are  needed. 
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seen)  and,  moreover,  3L  and  4L  - in  combination  with  the  ratios  c1,  c2,  c3, 
c4,  that  is  the  shares,  in%,  of  the first  firm  cc,),  of  the  two  top  firms 
cc2l, of  the three  top  firms  cc3l, of  the top  4  firms  cc4l. 
The  coefficients  2L,  3L  and  4L  give  a  percentage  measurement  of  the  relative 
strength  of  the  four  Largest  firms  so  as  to give  a  quantitative picture  of 
the  degree  of  dominance  enjoyed  by  the  Leading  firm(s). 
5.  These  coefficients  are  interpreted  and  calculated  immediately.  Firstly,  firms 
are  ranked  in  decreasing  order  of their  share  of  the  relevant  industry  or 
market.  The  coefficie~ts are  the~ calculated  rapidly  : 
(1)  only  the  absolute  figures  for  the  tv.'c  top  firms  ( K  = 2)  are  considered. 
Coefficient  2L  gives  the  relation  between  the  absolute  figure  for  the  first 
firm  and  the  absolute  figure  for  the  ~econd ; 
(2)  figures  for  the  first  thr·ee  firms  are  taken  ( K  =  3). 
Coefficient  3L  is  the  arithmetic  rrean  between  two  relations 
(a)  relation  between  the  size  of  the  first  firm  and  the  average  size  of 
the  ~ext  two  firms  ; 
(b)  relation  bet~een the  average  size of  the first  two  firms  and  the  size 
of  the tr.ird; 
(3)  figures  for  the  first  four  firms  are  taken  ( K  =  4). 
Coefficient  4L  is  the  arit~metic rrean  between  three  relations  : 
( a )  r  e L  a t i on  bet  1r1 e en  t hE'  s i z  e  of  t he  f i r s t  f i r m and  t he  ave~  a g  ~- _s  _j z  e  of  t he 
next  three  firms  ; 
( b)  r e La t i on  bet  "'' e en  t hE·  ~rag  ~_s_j_~_:  of  t he  f i r s t  t w  o  f i r m  s  and  t he 
.3_Yerage  size  of  the  second  t\..JO  firms; 
( c )  r e L  a t i on  bet  lri e en  t hE'  aver  ~2  i z e  of  t he  f i r s t  t h r e  e  f i r m  s  and  t he 
s i z e  of  t he  f ou rt h  • 
ALL  these  relations  are  expressed  in  percenta9es,  being  multiplied  by  ~00. 
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211 It  is  helpf~L to point  out  the  economic  meaning  of  indexes  K L,  by 
presenting  the  Graph  1 
"Range  of  power  relations  between  the Top  4  firms.  Sample  of  13  basic 
structure  hypotheses". 
This  graph  aims  to  ccmpare  each  of  13  basic  hypotheses  of  "summit  structures" 
- the  individual  shares. of  each  of  Top  4  firms  (section below  of  the graph) 
- the  corresponding  values  thus  resulting  for  each  of  the  following  indexes 
ZL,  3L  and  LL,  in%,  (upper  section  of  the  graph) • 
•  ZL  1!8 3L  t~4L 
The  grapb  outlines,  thanks  to the  bulk  of  the  13  basic  structure  hypotheses 
taken  into  acco~,.;nt,  the great  "sensitivity''  of  these  indexes  to quantitative 
changes  in "Power  Relations"  between  the  Top  4  firms,  according  to multiple 
but  coherent  rates  of  interlocking variations 
* 
*  * 
I)  Analysing  the  ''value  connections"  between  the  indexes  2L,  3L  and  4L, 
referring  to  any  given  power  structure,  it  is possible to  draw  up  the 
fundamental  quantitative picture  relative to  the  structure  considered. 
II)ln this  way,  it  is  possible to  compare,  through  time  and  in  the  space, 
several_ structures, their  degree  cf  dominance  c,nd  inequality  being 
measured,  notE,y_oi!J..Lor~jnd~ (asisthe  Lsually  done  too simplistically) 
but  by  a~~f-~.ll.r_eel_,_J.Qg_i.£§JJ.y_conne.f.!..§'_d  inde_~~s_(2L,  3L  and  4U 
jointly outlining ~J.~y_a,r.~d comparabl~_s_uantitative aspects  of  the 
structures  compared. 
IIOAccorcingly,  it  is  "reas.onably"  possible to  relcte  the  given  valt.:es  of 
the  subsequent  co~fficients 3L  and  4L  to the  yardistick  constituted  by 
the  basic  coefficient  2L  (which  is  transparent  anc  meaningful  since it 
represents  the  ratio of  the  size of  the  top  firm  to that  of  the  second 
firm),  in  order  to cLtline,  on  this  bas-is,  the  "equivalent"  degrees  of 
inequality  emergirg  from  the  3L  and  4L  coefficie~ts.  Thus,  the  ZL 
value  is  the  ne~ quantitative  Lightening  milestone  for  other  coeffi-
cients  (2L,  3L,  •••  KL). 
* 
*  * 
212 213 6.  The  dominance  po~er is  very  high  on  the  product  markets  considered,  as  results 
from  the  following  figures  drawn  up  from  Table  1  (markets  sample  including 
1 50  cases  of  C2,  115  cases  of  c3  and  78  cases  of  C4)  : 
- c2  ";f  80  %  31  cases 
- c""  ~ 50  %  120  cases 
c. 
- c7 
J  :7  80  %  49  cases 
- c7  'l  50  %  103  cases 
.:; 
- c4  "':7  80  %  32  cases 
- c4  4  50  %  70  cases 
- c4  <  50  %  8  cases 
7.  Having  recCturse  to  a  new  "Model  <!>f  Econometric  X-ray' founded  on  the·  Linda  system 
of  indexes  and  applied  to  the  selected  150  national  product  markets,  it  is 
r: o s s i b L  e  t c  out l i n  e  t he  s t r u  c  t u re  of  Power  R  e La t i or. s  bet  ~~ ee n  t he  Top  4  ( o r  L  ~-s  2__) 
fil:!!!..§_  dominating  these  pr·cduct  narkets.  See  Table  3. 
The  major  size  gap  Lies  between  the third and  fourth  Largest  firms,  for  it  is 
the  4L  coefficient  that  has  the  highest  values  : 
- in  78  % of  cases  it exceeds  the  200  % threshold  (as  against  only  40  % 
of  cases  for  the  2L  coefficient  and  60  % of  cases  for  the  3L  coefficient)  ; 
- in  87%  of  cases  4L  is greater  than  2L  and  in  82  % of  cases  it  is greater 
than  3L. 
One  importa~t automatic  conclusion  from  the  samples  studied is that  the  ncrmal 
form  of  market  dorrinance  on  the  national  markets  forming  the  Community  is  the 
tricpoly,  which  is to  say  that  three  firms  dominate  most  national  product  markets. 
8.  The  reality  is  that  in  mcst  national  product  markets,  the  fourth  firm  is  not 
provided  at  all with  any  market  ~~wer, owing  to its  negligeable market  share, 
while  the third  firm  has  this  market  eower. 
214 In  fact,  a glance to the  sample  of  150  product  markets  (Table  1)  shows  that 
- in  34  cases  the third  firm  has  a  market  share  equal  or  superior to 
15%  of  the  total  rr.arket  size  ; 
-while only  in  2  cases  the  fourth  firm  has  such  a  share  of  the  ~roduct 
market; 
- in  17  cases  the  third  firm  has  even  20%  or  more  of  the total  preduct 
market,  against  zero  case  as  regards  the  fourth  firm; 
- on  the  ether side,  the  fourth  fir~  h~s 10%  or  more  of  the  total  product 
·market  only  in  15  cr-1ses,  while  the  t~.ircl  firn~  has  10%  or  more  in 73  coses. 
It  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that  one  firm  having  less  than  10  % of  the total 
rr.arket  is  indeniably  not  provided  with  market  co~er, while this  market  power 
m  i g  h  t  e x  i s t  i n  p r i n c  i p l e when  rr. a r k  e t  s h  a r e  of  one  g  i v  en  f i r m i s  e  q u  a l  t o  1  5  % 
or  more. 
9.  Within  the tricpolistic arena  there  is  a  clear  superdominant ·duopoly  with 
t~o very  powerful  firms  of  often  comparable  size.  As  we  have  seen,  in  120 
cases,  out  of  the  saw.ple  of  150  product  markets  (i.e.  in  80%  of  cases),  the 
cumulative  share  of  the  top  two  firms  cc
2
)  is  equal  or  superior  to 50%,  while 
in  31  cases  c2  is  equal  or  su~erior to 80  %. 
The  intensity  of  the triopolistic  and  duopolistic  <ior:inc;nce  is  very  h·igh, 
which  creates  a  forn:idable  barrier  tc  e:ntry  ~nto tre same  arena  by  other  firms. 
The  existence  of  this barrier  is  confirmed  by  the  rigidity of  market  shares 
ever· time  on  most  of  the  150  markets  studied. 
10.  On  the  ether  ha~d, monopoly  situatio~s, as  where  2L  is  greater  than  400  %,  would 
seem  to  be  Less  frequent,  though  their  im~act  o~  competitio~ should  neither  be 
overlooked  nor  underestimated.  Only  in  16  % of  cases  does  2L  exceed  400  % 
(where  the  Largest  firm  is  more  than  4  times  Larger  tha~ the  second),  whereas 
3L  exceeds  400  % in  25  % of  cases  and  4L  in  27  %. 
It  is  also  worth  aciding  that  in 9%  of  cases  the  2L  coefficient  exceeds  600  %, 
vJhich  is  to  say  thc:t  r\onopol istic dom-inar.ce  hc:·~·  r'EE)c.hec'  such  ~)  h·ish  Level  t:.s 
virtually tc  eliminate  any  possibility of  competition  by  other  firms  (margarine 
ir  France  and  Great  Britain, biscuits  ir  Ireland,  beer  in  Denmark,  certai~ baby 
foods  in  Great  Britair,  aniseed-based  beverages  in  France,  sparking plugs  and 
frozen  foods  in  Italy,  coffee  substitutes  in  Germary,  and  so  on). 
215 TABLE  1 
MODELE  D'ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUITS 
CODE  DESCRIPTION  INDICATEURS 
MARCHE  MARCHE  DU  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS  L  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  PRODUIT  2L  3L  4L  c1  c2  c3  c4 
001  Margarine  "974  F  2000  - - 60  63  - - ~)  ASTRA-CALVE  (UNILEVER)  2)  EXCEL-SOPRODEL(LESEUR~ 
002  Biscuiterie  1974  IRL  1540  1368  1187  77  82  86  89  ~)  IRISH  BISCUITS  2)  UNITED  BISCUITS 
t3)  ASSOCIATED  BISCUITS  4)  C'.DBURY 
003  Bieres  1974  DK  1383  1386  - 83  89  93  - 1 )  DE  FORENEDE  BRUGGERIER  2)  FAXE  3)  ALBAN! 
004  Succec::!anes  de  1974  D  1143  - - 80  87  - - 1 )  UNIFRANK  (NESTLE)  2)  QUIETA-WERKE 
cafe  (boissons) 
ODS  Aliments  s~rgeles  1973  I  900  1065  785  73  81  88  93  1)  SAGES  (UNILEVER)  2)  SURGELA  (IRI-SME) 
en  general  3)  FRIGODAUNIA  (EFIM)  4)  BRINA 
006  Aliments  pour  en- 1973  GB  870  87  97  1)  GLAXO  2)  RECKITT  COLMAN  3)  WANDER  (SANDOZ) 
fants  (biscottes 
et  ce rea les) 
007  Matieres  adhesi- 1974  NL  852  724  621  68  76  83  90 
ves 
008  Confiserie  (gorr.- 1972  F  850  - - 85  95  - - 1)  GENERAL  FOODS  2)  CHICLETS 
me  a macher) 
009  Aperitifs  anises  1974  F  822  - - 74  83  - - 1 )  PERNOD-RICARD  2)  MARTINI-ST.RAPHAEL 
(boissons) 
010  Bougies  pour  1973  I  750  588  - 75  85  95  - 1)  MARELLI  2)  CHAMP-ION  3)  LODGE 
voitures MODELE  D
1ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUITS 
CODE  DESCRIPTION  INDICATEURS 
MARCHE  MARCHE  DU  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS L  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  PRODUIT  2L  3L  4L  c,  c2  c3  c4 
----' 
011  Lait  concentr€  1972  F  70C  770  - 70  80  86  - 1)  LAIT  MONT-BLANC  (NESTLE)  2)  FRANCE  LAIT 
3)  PREVAL  (PERRIER) 
012  Soupes  (bouillons  1972  F  700  550  1040  70  80  90  92  1)  SOP AD  (NESTLE)  2)  SPN  CCPC)  3)  LIEBIG  (BROOKE~ 
sol ides)  BOND)  4)  ASTRA-CALVE  CUNILEVER) 
013  Margarine  1973/76  GB  670  1216  1217  67  77  82  84  1 )  VANDENBERGH  & JURGENS  CUNILEVER)  2)  KRAFT 
3)  cws  4)  SAINSBURY 
014  F  roma,ges  fondu5  1972  F  644  665  - 58  67  73  - 1  )  BEL  2)  PI SON  3)  ROUSTANG 
015  Biscottes  1972  F  587'  509  631  47  55  62  67  1 )  ALIMENTS  ESSENTIELS  2)  PICARD  3)  CLEMENT 
4)  LU  BRUN  ET  ASSOCIES 
016  Lait  en  r:;oudr€·  1973  GB  583  661  1131  70  82  89  91  1)  CADBURY  SCHWEPPES  2)  CARNATION  FOODS 
3)  SAINSBURY  4)  NESTLE 
017  Sucre  1973  DK  567  - - 85  100  - - DDS  :  DE  DANSKE  SUKKENFABRIKKER 
SUKKERFABRIK.  NYK0BING 
018  Sedatifs  et  hyp- 1973  NL  500  400  349  45  54  63  65  1)  HOFFMANN-LA  ROCHE  2)  UNION  CHIMIQUE  BELGE 
notiques  3)  KALICHEMIE  4)  CIBA 
019  Potages  en  boites  1973  GB  500  525  - 60  72  80  1)  H.J.  HEINZ  2)  CAMPBELL  3)  CROSS  & BLACKWEL 
(canned  s.cups) 
020  Desserts  frais  1972  F  soc  400  55  66  77  1)  GERVAIS-DANONE  2)  SODIMA  3)  CHAMBOURCY 
- -~  - = 
CODE 
MARCHE 
PRODUIT 
021 
022 
023 
024. 
025 
026 
027 
028 
029 
030 
MODELE  D'ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUITS 
- ... 
DESCRIPTION  INDICATEURS 
MARCHE  DU  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS  L  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  2L  3L  4L  c1  c2  c3  c4 
Aliments  surgel~s  1974  D  500  466  51  62  65  1)  LANG~ESE-IGLO  (UNILEVER-NESTLE)  2)  OETKER 
en  generaL  3)  TIKO  (GEG)  4)  TIEFKUHLUNION 
Batteries  pour  1973  I  450  575  - 63  77  84  - 1)  MAR ELL I  2)  F.A.R.  3)  VARTA 
voitL!res. 
C  onse· r\ies  de  1974  GB  443  58  76  1)  UNILEVER  2)  CUCUMBER 
poi ssor. 
OrdiratE'urs  "Ge-·  1972  D  433  350  401  52  64  76  83  1)  IBM  2)  HONEYWELL  3)  UNIDATA  4)  UNIVAC 
neral  Purpose" 
Conser·ves  de  1973  I  400  427  453  60  75  85  93  1)  SIMMENTHAL  2)  ACSAL  3)  TRINITY  4)  STAR 
viande 
IYiatieres  grasses  1974  D  400  598  638  60  75  81  86  1)  UNION  DEUTSCHE  LEBENSMITTELWERKE 
en  ge:nera L  2)  FRITZ  HOMANN  3)  WALTER  RAU  4)  ELITE  MARGARir 
FEINKOST 
E 
Lait  cor!dense  non  1972  F  375  75  95  1 )  GLORIA  2)  FRANCE  LAIT 
suer  E:· 
Frcma~es fra is  1972  F  372  460  36  47  C,""  J(.  1)  GERVAIS  DANONE  2)  SODIMA  3)  CHAMBOUR CY 
Moutardes  1972  F  367  55  70  1)  GEN.ALIMENTAIRES  (GEN.OCCIDENTALE) 
2)  SEGMA  (POULAIN) 
l"':atieres  grc.sses  1973  GR  367  361  301  29  37  42  49  1 )  ELAIS  SA  2)  HUILERIES  DE  LA  GRECE  DU  NORD 
E' n  g  E  r. e  r  Cl L  3)  HUILERIES  DE  GRECE  4)  ELEDURGIKI  S.A. MODELE  D'ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUIT5 
-- ·-·  .,  ..  --- - -·- ·~  . ..  -~  -- . 
CODE  DESCRIPTION  INDICATEURS 
MARCHE  MARCHE  DU  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS  L  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  PRODUIT  2L  3L  4L  c1  c2  c3  c4 
031  Succedanes  de  1974  D  350  85ft- 70  90  94  )  UNIFRANK  (NESTLE)  2)  GUNZBURGER  NAHRUNGSMITTEL 
cafe  soluble  FABRIK  3)  MELITTA  BENTZ 
Cboissons) 
032  Aliments  pour  1972  F  350  70  90  )  GERVAIS-DANONE  (BSN  +  G.D.)  2)  GUIGOZ  (NESTLE) 
enfants  8  base 
laitiere 
033  Poissons  surgeles  1973  GB  350  541  63  81  88  )  BIRD
1S  EYE  (UNILEVER)  2)  FINDUS  (NESTLE) 
~)  ROSS  (IMPERIAL) 
034  ALiments surge Les  1973  GB  339  481  61  79  87  p  UN I LEVER  2)  NESTLE  3)  IMPERIAL 
en  general 
035  Soupes  en  boites  1973  F  333  650  742  60  78  83  87  p  LIEBIG  (BROOKE-BOND-LIEBIG)  2)  BARBIER-DAUPHIN 
(cannes  soups)  ~)  SOPAD  (NESTLE)  4)  SPM/CPC 
036  Bieres  1975  F  333  420  50  65  1'3  ~ )  B.S.N.  BIERES  2)  UNION  DES  BRASSERIES 
5)  ALBRA  (HEINEKEN  NL)  4)  PELFORTH 
037  Aliments  pour  1973  GB  331  452  63  82  91  p  H.J.  HEINZ  2)  GERBER  (CPI)  3)  UNIGATE 
enfants  er.  boites 
et  en  flocons 
038  Huiles  alimen- 1972  F  317  634  57  75  80  ~)  LESIEUR  2)  G. I.E.  INTER HUILES  3)  ASTRA-CALVE 
taires  (UNILEVER) 
039  Antirhe~..:matics  1972  NL  300  304  494  48  64  76  80  ~)  MSD  2)  BOOTS  3)  GEIGY  4)  MIDY 
040  fJ. l i ments  pour  en- 1972  F  300  462  60  81  94  1)  FALl  (BSN  +  GERVAIS-DANONE)  2)  GUIGOZ  (NESTLE) 
fants  en  general  3)  S.P.M.  (CPC)  4)  GERVAIS-DANONE MODELE  D 1ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUITS 
-· 
CODE  DESCRIPTION  INDICATEURS 
MARCHE  MARCHE  DU  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS  L  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  PRODUIT  2L  3L  4L  c1  c2  c3  c4 
-- ---
041  Yoghurt  1973  IRL  300  60  80  1)  EDEN  VALE  (EXPRESS  DAIRIES)  2)  GOLDEN  VALE 
0Lr2  Biscuits  1973  NL  300  330  303  45  60  7C  76  1 )  DE  ZAAN  (GRACE,  USA)  2)  WESSANEN 
3)  BENSDORP/CACAO  4)  GERKENS 
043  The  noir  1974  D  294  267  244  50  67  82  97  1)  TEEKANNE  2)  MESSMER  3)  JACOBS  4)  BONTING 
044  Psychot~rapiques·  1973  NL  285  480  477  40  54  59  64  1 )  HOFFMANN-LA  ROCHE  2)  WEITH  3)  CIBA-GEIGY 
4)  MSD 
045  Produits a base  1974  D  285  312  57  70  90  1)  PFANNI  2)  MAGGI  (NESTLE)  3)  KNORR  (Groupe 
de  pommes de terre  Maizena  :  CPC-USA) 
046  Cuisinieres  tHee- 1973  DK  283  282  294  51  69  83  94  1)  ERNST  VOLL  2)  AEG  &  BBC  3)  HUSQUARNA-KOCKUMS 
triqL.;es  4)  SCAN  ATLAS 
047  Scissons  alcoa- 1972  F  250  405  402  45  63  70  77  1)  BARDINET  2)  CIE  METROPOLE  DES  RHUMS  (MARTINI-
Lisees  Crhum)  ST.RAPHAEL)  3)  DUQUESNE  4)  ST.JAMES  (COINTREAU-
REMY  MARTIN) 
048  Fr~its et  Legumes  1972  F  24C  36  51  1)  GEN.ALIMENTAIRE  (GEN.OCCIDENTALE) 
condimentaires  2)  SEGMA  (POULAIN) 
049  Hormones  1973  NL  237  223  225  19  27  34  39  1)  ORGANON  2)  PHILIPS  DUPHAR  3)  SCHERING 
4)  AYERST 
050  Aliments  surgeles  1972  F  237  295  429  45  64  7'5  80  1 )  FRANCE-GLACE  FINDUS  2)  COFRALIM  3)  ORTIZ 
en  gene ret L  4)  SERVIFRAIS 
~  . -. ·-MODELE  D'ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUITS 
CODE  DESCRIPTION  I  INDICATEURS 
MARCHE  MARCHE  DU  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS  L  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  PRODUIT  2L  3L  4L  c1  c2  c3  c4 
051  Moi sscnneu~.es  - 1972  D  235  220  219  40  57  72  85  1)  GEBRODER  CLAAS  2)  MASSEY  FERGUSON 
batt  et.;s €·s  3)  JOHN  DEERE  LANZ  4)  KLOCKNER-HUMBOLDT-DEUTZ 
052  La it  condense·  1974  D  233  265  35  50  60  1)  ALLGAUER  ALPENMILCH  (NESTLE)  2)  GLOCKS-KLEE 
GmbH  (CARNATION  & Co  USA)  3)  DEUTSCHE  LIBBY 
053  P.  L  i ment s  r:·our  en- 1973  I  227  291  349  so  72  85  93  1 )  PLASMON  (HEINZ)  2)  GERBER  (CPI,  USA) 
f c1nts  E·t  diet~ti- 3)  IPB  BUITONI-PERUGINA  4)  CARLO  ERBA  (MONTEDISOr 
ques 
054  Scissons  r:Cin  Cl  L- 1974  F  225  206  325  27  39  so  54  1)  PERRIER  2)  VITTEL  3)  AVIAN  4)  J.F.A. 
coolisees  en  ge-
n€· r-c1 L 
055  Poudre·s  de  savon  1974  GB  223  - - 67  97 
056  Lait  en  poudre  1972  F  22C  270  55  80  95  1 )  FRANCE  LAIT  2)  GLORIA  3)  LAIT  MONT-BLANC 
(NESTLE) 
057  Bi scuite·rie  1973  GB  ?17  so  73  1)  UNITED  BISCUITS  2)  CADBURY  SCHWEPPES 
058  l\'1e une r i €·  1973  GR  2~6  225  264  17  25  31  35  1)  ST.GEORGES  HILLS  SA  2)  ALLATINI  SA 
3)  MELISSARIS,  NACEO  MILLS  4)  CRETE  FLOUR  MILLS 
SA 
059  Yoghurt  1974  GB  211  225  294  38  56  67  75  1)  EXPRESS  DAIRY  2)  UNIGATE  3)  VANDENBERGH'S 
(UN I LEVER)  4)  MARKS  & SPENCER 
060  Cremes  glacees  1974  D  206  260  26~·  33  49  58  67  1)  LANGNESE-IGLO  (UNILEVER-NESTLE)  2)  SCHOLLER 
3)  SODMILCH  4)  OETKER 
- .  -MODELE  D'ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUITS 
CODE  DESCRIPTION  INDICATEURS 
MARCHE  MARCHE  DU  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS  L  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  PRODUIT  2L  3L  4L  c1  c2  c3  c4 
061  Aliments  J:OUr  en- 1974  DK  zoo  439  60  90  98  NESTLE  I  PLUMROSE  I  IRMA 
f c1nt s  er.  generaL 
062  Cafe  soluble  1974  D  200  175  196  40  60  80  94  1)  NESTLE  2)  DEK  3)  JACOBS  4)  GENERAL  FOODS 
063  Potages  d~shydra- 1973  GB  200  175  40  60  80  1)  UN I LEVER  2)  CORN  PRODUCT  3)  NESTLE  4)  CADBU~~ 
tes 
06L,.  Eloissons  alcoo- 1972  F  194  33  50  1)  DEBRISE  DULAC  (gpe  Vve  Clicot-Ponsardin) 
Lisees  (calvadcs)  2)  BUSNEL  ET  LANCELOT  (PERNOT-RICARD) 
06~·  Poivre  (industrie  1972  F  194  33  so  1 )  GEN.ALIMENTAIRE  2)  DUCROS 
condirnentcire) 
066  Machines  a  Laver  1973  GB  1)  HOOVER  2)  GEC  3)  SERVIS  4)  PHILIPS 
1974  189  262  373  36  55  65  70 
067  T.V.  Col.Aleurs  1973  GB  1)  THORN  2)  PHILIPS  3)  GEC  4)  RANK 
1974  188  200  199  32  49  62  74  1)  THORN  2)  PHILIPS  3)  RANK  4)  GEC 
1975  1)  THORN  2)  PHILIPS  3)  GEC  4)  RANK 
068  Sue re  1977  GB  184  59  91  1)  TATE  &  LYLE  +  MANBRE  &  GARTON  2)  BRITISH 
SUGAR  CORP. 
069  App.  pour  La  re- 1973  GB  1)  THORN  2)  RANK  3)  PHILIPS  4)  BSR 
prod.du  son  autre!  1974  183  185  ~12  22  3l..  44  51  1)  THORN  2)  BSR  3)  PHILIPS  4)  RANK 
que  racios  et  TV  1975  1)  THORN  2)  BSR  3)  RANK  4)  PHILIPS 
070  Refrigerateurs  E.'t  1973)  1)  THORN  2)  LEC  3)  ELECTRO LUX  4)  GENERAL 
con£,€·lateurs  1974)  GB  182  235  301  31  48  58  64  MOTORS  FRIGIDAIRE  (G.M.F.) MODELE  D'ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUITS 
CODE  DESCRIPTION  INDICATEURS 
MARCHE  MARCHE  DU  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS  L  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  PRODUIT  2L  3L  4L  c1  c2  c3  c4 
.  -
071  Ordinate·urs  "c;e- 1973  NL  181  246  253  40  62  74- 85  1 )  IBM  2)  HONEYWELL  3)  DIGITAL  EQUIMENT 
nera L Purpose''  4)  UNIDATA 
072  Eaux  minerales  1976  F  180  181  723  47  73  95  9('  1 )  PERRIER  2)  EVIAN  3)  VITTEL  4)  VOLVIC 
(bois  sons) 
073  Ordi r:ateurs  "Ge- 1973  8  178  279  407  48  75  87  93  1)  IBM  2)  HONEYWELL  3)  UNIDATA  4)  UNIVAC 
neral  Purpcse" 
074  A_nt i di abet i ques  1973  NL  176  28Lc- 327  37  58  67  74  1)  HOECHST  2)  NOVO  3)  ORGANON  4)  WINTHROP 
075  Soft  drinks  1976  DK  176  267  343  30  47  55  60  1 )  DE  FORENEDE  BRUGGERIER  2)  COCA-COLA  3)  FAXE 
<Limondades,  etc.)  4)  ALBAN I 
076  Diuretiques  1973  NL  175  182  254  35  55  71  79  1 )  HOECHST  2)  RIT  3)  CIBA-GEIGY  4)  SEARLE 
077  IV! a chines  Gt  Laver  1973  DK  174  - - 47  75  - - 1 )  FISKER  2)  HOOVER 
078  Sucre  1974  D  172  218  31  49  61  1 )  SDDDEUTSCHE  ZUCKER  2)  PFEIFFER  & LANGE 
3)  ZUCKERFAB.  FRANC KEN  4)  ZUCKERFAB.  VELZEN 
079  Ord1 nate·u rs  "Ge- 1973  I  170  415  432  56  89  97  100  1 )  IBM  2)  HONEYWELL  3)  UNIVAC  4)  UNIDATA 
neral  Purpose" 
080  Aliments  pcur  en- 1973  GB  170  179  34  54  ?0  1)  H.J.  HEINZ  2)  GLAXO  3)  UNIGATE  4)  GERBER 
fants  er.  generaL MODELE  D'ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUITS 
CODE  DESCRIPTION  INDICATEURS 
MARCHE  MARCHE  DU  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS  L  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  PRODUIT  2L  3L  4L  c,  c2  c3  c4 
081  T.V.  Noir/Blanc  1974  GB  168  198  292  32  51  64  70  1)  THORN  2)  PHILIPS  3)  RANK  4)  GENERAL  ELECTRIC 
082  ll.ntibiotiqL.es  1973  NL  166  362  553  35  56  62  65  1 )  BEECHAM  2)  PFIZER  3)  MYCOFARM  4)  HOFFMANN-
II... A ROCHE 
083  Entremets  197·2  F  165  214  33  53  65  1 )  GEN.ALIMENTAIRE  2)  S.P.M.  3)  ANCEL 
084  Cremes  glacees  1974  DK  164  211  46  74  91  FRISKO  (UNILEVER  I  PREMIER  (BEATRICE  FOOD)  I 
EVENTYR 
085  6ieres  1974 
T  162  209  218  29  46  57  66  1 )  PERONI  2)  DREHER  Cgr.  LUCIANI)  3)  Gr.  WOHRER  .I. 
4)  PORETTI  (gr.  BASSETTI) 
086  Pates  alimentaire~  1972  F  161  6~·8  50  81  85  1 )  IBP  CBUITONI-PERUGINA)  2)  PANZANI-MILLIAT 
1=Lats  cuisines  3)  RIVOIRE-CARRE-LUSTUCRU 
087  fl'tayonnaise  Cin- 1972  F  160  191  40  65  82  1)  MAYOLANDE  2)  LESIEUR  3)  GEN.ALIMENTAIRE 
dustrie  condimen-
t a ire) 
088  Conserves  de  1972  F  16C  200  214  15  2~·  30  35 
poisson 
089  Gynecolcgiques  1973  NL  154  150  316  34  56  76  81  1 )  ORGANON  2)  SCHERING  3)  WYETH  4)  NOURY  PHAR-
MA 
090  Chocolaterie,con- 1973  GR  152  143  209  27  45  62  70  1)  ION  SA  2)  LOUMIOIS  SA  3)  PAVLIDIS  SA 
fiserie et  bis- ~)  MELO  SA 
cuiterie 
- -·  -MODELE  D'ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUITS 
- ··~ 
CODE  DESCRIPTION  INDICATEURS 
MARCHE  MARCHE  DU  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS  L  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  PRODUIT  2L  13L  14L  c1  c2  c3  c4 
091  Pneumatiques  de  1975  GB  150  135  186  32  47  66  76  1)  DUNLOP-PIRELLI  2)  GOOD)EAR  3·)  MICHELif\J 
remr:;Lacement  ~-)  FIRESTONE  ~)  UNIPOYAL  6)  AVON 
092  Eclairages  pour  1974  D  150  24E.  - 45  75  88  - 1 )  WESTF.ALISCHE  METALLINDUSTRIE  2)  BOSCH 
vehicules a rr.oteur  3)  SWF 
093  Dermatologiques  1973  NL  150  201  241  18  30  37  42  1 )  SCHERING  2)  CIBA-GEIGY  3)  LABAZ-LEDERLE 
4)  GLAXO 
094  Grues  industrieL- 1973  GB  150  138  - 30  50  70  - 1 )  CLARK  CHAPMAN  2)  HERBERT  MORRIS  3)  DEMAG 
Les 
095  Aspi rateL!rs  de  1974  GB  144  396  - 46  78  85  - 1)  HOOVER  2)  ELECTROLUX  3)  BSR 
poussiere 
096  Ordinateurs  "Ge- 1973  F  144  340  493  46  78  86  91  1)  IBM  2)  HONEYWELL  3)  UNIDATA  4)  DIGITAL 
neral  Purpose"  EQUIPMENT 
097  Lait  cordense  et  1973  GB  144  319  443  49  83  93  99  1)  CARNATION  2)  NESTLE  3)  LIBBY  4)  cws 
cor.centre· 
098  Pates  alimen- 1972  F  143  367  647  43  73  80  83  1 )  PANZANI-MILLIAT  2)  RIVOIRE  ET  CARRE-LUSTUCRU 
taires  3)  BERTRAND  4)  IBP  (BUITONI-PERUGINA) 
099  Cardic-vasculai- 1973  NL  141  139  161  17  29  40  48  1 )  MSD  2)SANDOZ  3)  I CU  4)  ASTRA  CHEMIE  EN 
res  PHARMA 
100  Bas  pour  darres  1973  GB  140  - - 35  60  - - 1)  COURTAULDS  2)  PRETTY  POLLY 
-
.,  ..  '  --MODELE  D'ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUITS 
-- '"'- - .  -··-.  - - -· ~·  ~ 
CODE  DESCRIPTION  INDICATEURS 
MARCHE  MARCHE  DU  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS  L  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  PRODUIT  2L  3L  4L  c1  c2  c3  c4 
--
4;:;;:::~  ' 
101  Batteries  de·  rem  1972  I  136  223  227  3G  52  62'  72.  1 )  FAR  2)  MARELLI  3)  VARTA  4)  FlAMM 
placement 
102  Articles  de  pa- 1974  NL  134  142  137  19  34  58 
piers  et  enve-
loppes 
103  Conserves  vege- 1973  GR  133  167  165  4  7  9  11  1)  KYKNOS  SA  2)  SEKOBE  SA  3)  VEKO  SA  4)  KOPAIS 
tales  SA 
104  Batteri  e·s  pour  1974  D  133  - - 40  70  - - 1 )  BOSCH  2)  VARTA 
voitures 
105  Sauces  (industriE  1972  F  133·  40  70  1 )  GEN.ALIMENTAIRE  (GEN.OCCIDENTALE) 
concimenta.:re)  ~)  SAL INS  DU  MIDI  (GEN.OCCIDENTALE  - CIE  DU  NORD) 
106  Su ere·  1973  I  132  198  33  58  71  h)  ERIDANIA  (MONTI)  2)  ITALIANA  ZUCCHERI 
(MONTESI)  3)  AIE  (MARALDI) 
107  Aliments  pour  e11  1974  D  131  212  257  42  74  89  '!00  1 )  HIPP-WERK  2)  ALLGAUER  ALPENMILCH  (NESTLE) 
f2lnts  e-~r.  general  3)  MAIZENA  (C.P.C.  USA)  4)  GLOCKS  KLEE  (CARNATIOND 
i08  Industrie  du  lait  1973  GR  130  371  392  18  31  35  37  h  )  EVGA  SA  2)  DELTA  SA  3)  RODOPI  SA  4)DODONI 
SA 
109  Farines  1973  GB  129  182  45  80  100  1)  ASSOCIATED  BISCUITS  MANUFACT.  2)  UNITED 
BISCUITS  3)  NABISCO 
110  Margarine  1974  DK  127  129  252  28  50  70  76  lJNILEVER  I  ALFA  I  FDB  I  IRMA MODELE  D'ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUITS 
CODE  DESCRIPTION  I  INDICATEURS 
MARCHE  MARCHE  DU  I  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS  l  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  PRODUIT  2L  3L  4L  c1  c2  c3  c4 
111  Spasmolitiques  1973  NL  125  146  161  20  36  58  1)  BROCADES  2)  HOFFMANN-LA  ROCHE  3)  PHILIPS 
DUPHAR  4)  BOEHRINGER 
11 2  Bi €· res  1974  GB  125  131  140  20  36  50  62  1 )  BASS  CHARRINGTON  2)  ALLIED  BREWERIES 
3)  GRAND  METROPOLITAN  (WATNEY)  4)  WHITBREAD 
113  Potages  deshydra- 1972  F  125  40  72  1)  SOPAD  (NESTLE)  2)  SPM  (CPC)  3)  LIEBIG 
tes  (BROOKE-BOND)  4)  ASTRA-CALVE  (UNILEVER) 
114  Fils a tricc.ter  1974  F  124  - - 31  56  - - 1)  LAINIERE  DE  ROUBAIX  2)  FILS  DE  L.  MULLIEZ 
<de  La~ne) 
115  Conser\i€'S  de  1973  GB  123  27  49  1)  BROOKE  BOND  LIEBIG  2)  SPILLERS  3)  MARKS  & 
"i  ar.de  SPENCER 
116  ~oissonneu~.e·s.- 1972  GB  1 )  NEW  HOLLAND  2)  CLAAS  3)  MASSEY  FERGUSON~ 
batteuses  1974  122  120  197  28  51  73  82  1 )  CLAAS  2)  NEW  HOLLAND  3)MASSEY  FERGUSON 
4)  JOHN  DEERE 
117  Radic:teurs  1973)  1 )  BELLING  2)  GEC  3)  TUBE  INVESTMENTS 
1974)  GB  122  127  186  22  4.0  56  64  4)  UNITED  GAS 
1975) 
118  Ordirate·urs  "Ge- 1973  GB  120  223  262  30  55  65  73  1 )  ICL  2)  IBM  3)  HONEYWELL  4)  NCR 
ral  Purpose" 
119  ProdLits  de  La  1973  NL  119  43  79  1)  MANEBA  2)  WESSANEN  3)  K.S.H.  4)  VAN  DEN 
Meune r i e  VENNE  (WESSANEN) 
120  Detergerts  L  i- ~974  GB  117  - -
..... .., 
C..  I  50  - - 1)  PROCTER  &  GAMBLE  2)  UNILEVER 
qui des MODELE  D
1ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUITS 
CODE  DESCRIPTION  INDICATEURS 
MARCHE  MARCHE  DU  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS  l  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  PRODUIT  2L  3L  4L  c,  c2  c3  c4 
121  Cuisinieres  elec- 1973  GB  1 )  TUBE  INVESTMENTS  2)  GEC  3)  THORN  4)  BELLING 
t ri QL'es  1974  117  145  162  28  52  69  83  1 )  TUBE  INVESTMENTS  2)  THORN  3)  BELLING  4)  GEC 
1975  1)  THORN  2)  TUBE  INVESTMENTS  3)  BELLING  4)  GEC 
122  Yoghurt  1972  F  116  139  192  22  41  55  63  1)  GERVAIS-DANONE  2)  SODIMA-YOPLAIT 
3)  CHAMBOURCY  4)  GAMA  NOVA 
123  Conser·ves  de  1973  GR  115  24  44  1·>  VOKTAS  SA  2)  MIMICOS  BROS.  SA 
viande 
124  Aliments  pcur  en- 1<773  GB  114  166  40  75  95  1)  UNIGATE  2)  GLAXO  3)  J.  WYETH 
fc1nts  a l:;ase  de 
lait 
t-.:1  125  La it  condense  1973  GB  114  40  75  1)  CARNATION  FOODS  2)  NESTLE  3)  UNIGATE  t-.:1 
QQ  4)  CADBURY  SCHWEPPE$ 
126  Boissons  alcoo- 1972  F  114  131  33  62  85  1)  MARIE  BRIZARD  2)  SIMON  FRERES  3)  CDC 
lisees  (gin> 
127'  Papier  poLr  jour- 1972  I  113  146  276  35  66  87  94.  1 )  TIMAVO-ARBATAX  2)  BURGO  3)  S.I.C. 
raux  quotidiens  4)  CART I ERE  RIUNITE  DONZELLIE  MERIDIONAL!  (CRDM) 
128  Tr a  cte~..:rs  c'gri- 1972  GB 
col  e·s  1973  1 )  FORD  2)  MASSEY-FERGUSON  3)  DAVID  BROWN 
1974  112  182  214  27  51  61  71  4)  INTERNATIONAL  HARVESTER 
129  Cart or  ondule  et  1974  NL  112  117  120  21  39  71 
boites  en  ca rtor. 
130  Aliments  surgel~s  1974  Dk  112  128  235  28  53  73  80  BOUVAIS-PLUMROSE  I  DYBFROST  I  IRMA 
en  general MODELE  D'ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUITS 
l 
- -
CODE  DESCRIPTION  INDICATEURS 
-
MARCHE  MARCHE  DU  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS  L  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  PRODUIT  2L  3L  4L  c1  c2  c3  c4 
--
131  cart  or  et  ~apier  1974  NL  111  115  235  29  55  79  86  (  a US agE  S a n i t c' i r  E 
et  me·nage·r) 
132  Pne·untat i qL.es  de  1975  GB  111  109  171  27  52  76  87  1)  DUNLOP-PIRE.LLI  2)  GOODYEAR  3)  FIRESTONE 
!=·remi€·re  mente  4)  MICHELIN  5)  UNIROYAL  6)  AVON 
'133  Papier  pOLf'  jo~r- 1972  I  110  174- 256  32  61  76  84  1 )  TIMAVO-ARBATAX  2)  BURGO  ET  FILIALES 
na U>.  quot i die ns et  3)  MARZA-BOTTO  4)  ASCOLI  ET  VALCERUSO 
presse  p~riodique 
134  C  a  f e en  g  r  21 i r  1974  D  110  156  120  <  22  42  54  66  1)JACOBS  2)  TCHIBO  3)  EDUSCHO  4)  HAG 
1~·=·  Aliments  surgeles  1973  IRL  109  308  46  88  98  1)  BIRO'S  EYE  (UNILEVER)  2)  FINOUS  (NESTlE) 
Et  cor:ge l e  s  3)  FRIONOR 
136  Sucre  1972  F  108  106  27  52  77  1 )  BEGHIN-SAY  2)  GENERALE  SUCRIERE 
3)  SUCRE-UNION 
137  Pneumatiques  de  1974  I  107  139  209  25  48  64  72  1.)  MICHELif\"  2)  PIRELLI  3)  CEAT  4)  FIRESTON~ 
remp Lacemer,t  pcur  5)  CONTINE:NTAL  6)  UNH~OYAL  7) KL EBER-·COLOMBES 
voitures  8)  METZELER 
138  Motocyclcs  1974  0  107  111  153  30  58  84  99  1)  BMW  2)  HERKULES  3)  ZONOAPP  4)  KREIDLER 
139  Conserves  de  1974  DK  107  278  296  32  62  70  78  1)  J AKA  2)  PLUMROSE  3)  OAK  4)  FAABORG 
viar.de 
140  c  re·mes  glacees  1973  GB  105  43  84  1)  J.  LYONS  2)  T.  WALLS  (UN I LEVER) 
,. MODELE  D'ANALYSE  DE  LA  DOMINANCE  SUR  LES  MARCHES  DES  PRODUITS 
CODE  DESCRIPTION  INDICATEURS 
MARCHE  MARCHE  DU  ANNEES  PAYS  COEFFICIENTS  L  RATIOS  ENTREPRISES 
PRODUIT  PRODUIT  2L  3L  4L  c1  c2  c3  c4 
141  Cereales  en  f L  c~- 1972  GB  105  363  42.7  39  78  85  92  1)  KELLOGG  2)  WEETABIX  3)  NABISCO  4)  QUAKER 
cons  OATS 
142  Tracteurs  <:•g r i- 1972  D  105  142  179  21  41  54  63  1)  INTERNATIONAL  HARVESTER  2)  KLOCKNER-HUMBOLDT-
coles  DEUTZ  3)  FENDT  4)  MASSEY  FERGUSON 
143  Conserves  de  1972  F  1  OLt  187  26  51  62  1)  ROUSSILLON-ALIMENTAIRE  2)  CONSERVES  GARD 
fruits  au  sirop  3)  LENZBOURG 
1  L,4  Fils a  cc.udre  1972  GB  103  - - 38  75  - - 1)  COATS-PATON  2)  TOOTAL 
145  CrE.·mes  glacees  1972  F  103  210  231  33  65  77  88  1)  ORTIZ  2)  FRANCE  GLACES  3)  MOTTA  4)  STE 
CREMIERE  NANTAISE 
~46  Conserve·s  ce  c.harr.- 1972  F  103  117  29  55  77  1)  EUROCONSERVES  2)  CHAMP I-FRANCE  3) BLANCHAUD 
pignons 
147  Biscuits  1973  GR  102  - - 17  34  - - 1)  PAPADOPOULOS  E.P.  SA  2)  ALLATINI  SA 
14.8  Poudres  synthe- 1974  GB  100  - - 47  94  1)  PROCTER  AND  GAMBLE  2)  UNILEVER 
tiques 
149  Aliments  st.. rge· les  1976  IRL  100  208  44  84  99  1)  FIND US  (NESTLE)  2)  BIRO'S  EYE  (UNILEVER 
en  ger.era l  3)  IMPERIAL  GREEN  ISLE 
ISO  Pneurr1at i ques  cle  1973  I  100  142  - 34  68  89  - 1)  MICHELIN  2)  PIRELLI  3)  CEAT 
premiere  mente 
pour  voitures 
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CODE  MARCHE 
Range of power relations between the Top 4 firms - Sample of 150 product markets 
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Graph 2 
013  015  016  CODE NUMBER ~ 
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Range of power relations between the Top 4 firms - Sample of 150 product markets  Graph 2 
024  CODE NUMBER 
2L- C2  3L  111111111111  C3  4L  C4 .....J 
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Range of power relations between the Top 4 firms - Sample of 150.product markets  Graph 2 
042  043  044  CODE NUMBER 
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Range of power relations between the Top 4 firms - Sample of 150 product markets  Graph 2 
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050  CODE NUMBER 
2  L - c2  3L  111111111111  c3  4  L  c4 2  Range of power relations between the Top 4 firms - Sample of 150 product markets  Graph 2 
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081 
Range of power relations between the Top 4 firms- Sample of 150 product markets  Graph 2 
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Range of power relations between the Top 4 firms - Sample of 150 product markets  Graph 2 
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Range of power relations between the Top 4 firms - Sample of 150 product markets  Graph 2 
128  CODE NUMBER 
2L-c2  3L  111111111111  c3  4L  c4 Range of power relations between the Top 4 firms- Sample of 150 product markets  Graph 2 
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CODE NUMBER 
2 L - c2  3L  111111111111  c3  4  L  c4 ENGLISH  VERSION 
OF  150  SELECTED  PRODUCT  MARKETS 
Product 
cede 
number 
001 
002 
C03 
004 
005 
006 
007 
008 
009 
'Q10 
011 
012 
013 
014 
015 
016 
017 
018 
Description 
Margarine 
Biscuits 
Beer 
Coffee  substitues 
(beverages) 
Frozen  foods  (in 
generaL) 
Baby  foods  (rusks 
and  cereals) 
Adhesives 
Confectionery 
(chewing  gum) 
Aniseed-based  ape-
ritifs  (beverages) 
Sparkingplugs 
Year 
1974 
1974 
1974 
1974 
1973 
1973 
1974 
1972 
1974 
1973 
ConcentrC~ted milk  1972 
Soups  <stock  cubes)  1972 
~argarine  73/76 
Processed  cheese  1972 
Rusks 
1": i l k  powder 
Sugar 
Sedatives  and  hyp-
not  ~ c  drugs 
1972 
1973 
1973 
1973 
Coun-
try 
F 
IRL 
DK 
D 
I 
GB 
NL 
F 
F 
I 
D 
F 
GB 
F 
F 
GB 
DK 
NL 
019  Canned  soups  1973  GB 
020  Fresh  desserts  1972  F 
241 
Product 
code 
number 
--·-~---------.----
Description  Year  Coun-
try 
·--t----...---------t----~1-
021 
022 
C23 
024 
025 
C26 
027 
028 
029 
030 
031 
032 
033 
034 
035 
C36 
037 
038 
039 
040 
Frozen  foods  (in 
general) 
Car  batteries 
Preserved  fish  pro-
ducts 
General  purpose  com-
puters 
Preserved  meat 
products 
Oils  and  fats  in 
generaL 
Condensed  milk 
Fresh  cheeses 
Mus tare 
Oils  and  fats  in 
general 
1974  D 
1973  I 
1974  GB 
1972  D 
1973  I 
1974  D 
1972  F 
1972  F 
1972  F 
1973  GR 
Instant  coffee  sub- 1974  D 
stitues  (beverages) 
~ilk-based baby  foods  1972  F 
Frozen  fish  1973  GB 
Frozen  foods  in  1973  GB 
general 
Canned  soups 
Eeer 
Canned  and  bottled 
baby  foods 
Edible  oils 
Antirheumatic  cr~gs 
1973  F 
1975  F 
1973  GB 
1972 
1972  NL 
I 
5aby  foods  in  general  1972  F  I 
I 
I 
__ j _  _j --------- -----~-----------· 
Product  Coun-
code  Descri pt i or.  Year  try  code  Description  Year 
number  number 
..;..._...._ 
041  Yoghurt  1973  IRL  061  Baby  foods  in  gene- 1974  DK 
ra l 
042  Biscuits  1973  NL  062  Instant  coffee  1974  D 
043  Black  tea  1974  D  063  Dried  soupes  1973  GB 
044  Psychotherapeutic  1973  NL  064  Alcoholic  beverages  1972  F 
drugs  (ca lvados) 
045  Potato-based  pro- 1974  D  065  Pepper  (condiments)  1972  F 
ducts 
C46  Electric  cookers  1973  DK  066  Washing  machines  1974  GB 
047  Alcoholic  beve- 1972  F  067  Color  T  .. V  ..  sets  1974  GB 
rages  (rum) 
048  Fruit  and  vegetables  1972  F  068  Sugar  1977  GB 
(as  condiments) 
049  Hormones  1973  NL  069  Sound  reprod  .. equipm ..  1974  GB 
(other  than  radio, 
050  Frozen  foods  in  1972  F 
T .. V  ..  sets) 
general  070  Refrigerators  and  1974  GB 
051  Combine  harvesters  1972  I  freezers 
071  General  purpose  1973  NL 
052  Condensed  milk  1974  D  computers 
072  Spa  waters  1976  F 
053  Baby  foods,  dietary  1973  I  (beverages) 
foods  073  General  purpose  1973  8 
054  Non-alcohclic  beve- 1974  F  computers 
rages  in  general  074  Antidiabetic  cirugs  1973  NL 
055  Soap  powder  1972  GB 
075  Soft  drinks  1976  DK 
056  rv: i L  k  powder  1972  F 
<Lemcnac~e etc  .. ) 
076  Diuretic  drugs  1973  NL 
C·57  Biscuits  1973  GB 
077  Washing  machines  1973  DK 
058  MiLLing  industry  1973  GR 
078  Sugar  1974  D 
059  Yoghurt  19?lt  GB 
C79  GeneraL  J:Urpose  1973  I 
060  Ice  cream  1974  D  : computers 
CBO  I  Baby  foods  in  gene- 11973  GB 
1 ra L 
-------------------- __  J! ____  . --------------------
242 -----~ 
Product  Coun- Product  Coun-
code  Description  Year  try  cede  Des c r i p  t i on  Year  try 
number  number 
-~--------- ----
081  Black-and-white  T.V.  1974  GB  101  Car  batteries  (re- 1972 
T 
.I. 
sets  p lacemeflt  n1a rket) 
082  Antibiotics.  1973  NL  102  Stationery  1974  NL 
083  "Ent ren1et s"  1974  F  103  Preserved  vegetable  1973  GR 
products 
084  Ice  cream  1974  DK  104  Car  batteries  1974  D 
085  Beer  1974  I  105  Sauces  (condiments)  1974  F 
086  Pasta  (prepared  1972  F  106  Sugar  1973  I 
meals) 
087  Mayonnaise  (con- 1974  F  107  Baby  foods  in  1974  D 
diments)  generc.l 
088  Preserved fish  1972  f  108  Milk  products  1973  GR 
products 
089  Gynaecological  1973  NL  109  Flour  1973  GB 
drugs 
090  Chocolate,  confec- 1973  GR  110  Margarine  1974  DK 
tior.ery  and  biscuits 
091  Tyres  <replacement  1974  GB  111  Spasmolytics  1973  NL 
rna rket) 
092  Motor  vehicles  1974  D  112  Beer  1974  GB 
<li~hting systems) 
093  Dermatological  drugs  1973  NL  11'3  Dried  soups  1972  F 
094  Industrial  cranes  1973  GB  114  Knitting  garn  1974  F 
(k'OO l) 
095  Va cuurr.  cleaners  1974  GB  115  Preserved  meat  pre- 1973  GB 
ducts 
096  General  ,:urpcse  1973  F  116  Combine  harvesters  1974  GB 
computers 
097  Condensed  and  con- 1973  GB  117  Radiators  1974  GB 
centra, ted  milk 
C98  Pasta  1972  F  118  General  ~urpose  1973  GB 
computers 
099  Cardio-vascular  1973  NL  119  M  i ll  i n  g  i nd us t r y  1973  NL 
drugs 
100  Ladies'  stockings  1973  Ge  120  Liquid  detergents  1974  GB 
---------- .......  ~--
243 ------------- --1-· 
Product  Coun- Product 
code  Des c  r i pt i on  Year  code 
nur.~ber  try  number 
121  Electric  cookers  1974  GB  136  s 
122  Yoghurt  1972  F  137  T 
m 
123  Preserved  meat  1973  GR  138  M 
products 
124  Milk-based  baby  1973  GB  139  p 
foods  p 
125  Condensed  milk  1973  GB  140  I 
126  Alcoholic  beve- 1974  F  141  c 
rages  Cgi n) 
127  Newsprint  pc:,pe r  1972  I  142  A 
128  Agricultural  1974  GB  143  p 
tractors  i 
129  Corrugated  cardboard  1974  NL  144  T 
and  cardboard  boxes  w 
130  Frozen  foods  in  1974  DK  145  I 
gene rc:,l 
131  Cardboard,sanitory  1974  NL  146  p 
and  household  paper 
132  Tyres  <original  GB  147  B 
fit) 
133  Ne~;spri nt  and  pri n- 1972  I  148  s 
tin£  paper 
134  Coffee  in  grains  1974  ['  149  F 
g 
135  frczen  and  deep- 1973  IRL  150  T 
frozen  feeds  -
·------ ---------~-------·-----L--- ------~-----
244 
---~-_,._._.,  .. ---... 
scription 
ugar 
yres 
arket 
otorc 
reser 
roduc 
ce  cr 
erea l 
gricu 
reser 
n  syr 
hreac 
ark 
ce  cr 
reser 
·-
(replacement 
) 
ycles 
ved  meat 
ts 
earn 
s  (Flakes) 
l tura l  tractors 
\'ed  fruits  in 
up 
s  for  needle-
eam 
ved  mushrooms 
"ts  iS CU1 
ynthe 
rczen 
enera 
yres 
cars 
tic J:Owders 
foods  in 
L 
(original  fit 
) 
Year 
1972 
1974 
1974 
1'174 
1973 
1972 
1972 
1972 
1972 
1972 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1976 
1973 
Coun-
try 
F 
I 
D 
DK 
GB 
GB 
D 
F 
GB 
F 
F 
GR 
GB 
IRL 
I TABLE  3  -----
A MODEL  OF  ECONOMETRIC  X - RAY  OF  DOMINANCE  AND  INEQUALITY  STRUCTURE 
3L  --r---------------
4L 
r---·-------- )  --
2L 
--·  -
HYPOTHESIS  NO  %  of  NO  %  of  NO  %  of 
of  totaL  of  total  of  total 
cases  cases  cases  cases  cases  cases 
----1-- ---. 
~  600  %  14  9  12  10  11  14. 
~  400%  24  16  30  25  21  27 
--...--. ~--.-=-------- 1'- - ----:::-="'-·  ----
'?:- 200  %  60  40  70  60  61  78 
-<  200  %  90  60  48  40  17  22 
1---·------.  --·--·  1--- -
100  78  100  Total  number  150  100  118  of  cases 
---~~-- -=-- ;=- -- ·-r:---------:----= ~-- :== 
NO  %  of 
HYPOTHESIS  of  total 
cases  cases 
-- -- ------·--' 
4L  > 2L  68  87 
4L  <  2L  10  13 
·-
Total  number  of  case  s  78  100 
- ------------ -------
4L  ')  3L  64  82 
4L  < 3L  14  18  ·- --
Total  number  of  case  s  78  100 
~-
~  . --- :------':= 
93  80 
25  20 
·------
118  100 
~;-:~-
1  JL  Tota  I.  number  of  cases 
I  ---------------------~-- - -·- -===--==-
The  table 1  <150  product  markets)of  this  Appendix  has  been  carried out 
by  Mrs.  M.A.  HAFER,  MMrs.  M.  LEVEC'  and  G.  HOE6ANCKX,  belonging  to  the 
Staff  of  the  Division 
11Market  Structures"  of  the  Commission,  on  the· 
bases  of  data  s~pplied by  the national  research  Institutes,  who  carried 
out  the  enquiries  on  industrial  concentration. 
245 APPENDIX  TWO 
INTERNATIONAL  COMPARISONS  OF  RETAIL  PRICES 
FOR  SOME  LARGE  CONSUMPTION  PRODUCTS 
TABLES  1)  INSTANT  COFFEE  (NESCAFE) 
2)  TEA 
3)  KELLOGG'S  CORNFLAKES 
4)  SCHWEPPES,  Indian  Tonic  Water 
5)  COLA  BEVERAGES,  small  sizes 
6)  COLA  BEVERAGES,  Large  sizes INTRODUCTORY  AND  EXPLA~ATORY  REMARKS 
-----·--------·------·-·--
This  Appendix  contai~s 18  tables,  three  for  each  product  considered. 
The  first  number  indicates  the  product  (1  :  Instsnt  coffee  ;  2.  Tea  ; 
and  so  on).  The  second  number  of  each  table  refers  to  its  mere  specific 
contents,  according  to  the  following  code  : 
1.  Degree  of  local  prices  dispersion  in  nationa_LS..l::l~!'~·· 
2.  Degree  of  Local  prices  dispersion  in european  units  of  account  (EUA). 
3.  Degree  cf  dispersion  and  international  comparison  of  retail  unit  prices 
(minimum  price  recorded=  100). 
ALL  tables  outline the  top  4  maxima  retail  prices 
the  first  maximum,  i.e.  the  highest  price  registered  for  the  given 
product  in  the  Local  sample  of  shops  considered  for  each  country  ; 
- the  second,  the third and  the  fourth  maximwm,  ~hich  follow  the  first  one 
- the  average  price,  resulting  from  the  arithmetic  mean  of  all  prices 
registerd  for  the  given  product  in  the  Local  sample  of  shops 
the  minimum  price, that  is  the  cheapest  price  registered therefore  in 
the  cheapest  shop  Cwithi~ the  Local  sample  considered)  as  regards  the 
given  product. 
By  this  way  a  concrete  picture  of  the  degree  of  dispersion existing  ir:  each 
local  sample  consideredl  for  each  country,  is outlined.  The  Last  column 
outlines  the  £Rp  (in  %)  :  the  coefficient  of  relative difference  (see 
n.  1.3.5.  of  this volume). 
Table  1  shows  the  actuaL  prices  recorded  by  enquiries  in  nationaL  currer~, 
according  to the  country  considered  (new  pence  in  United  Kingdom,  DM  in 
Germany,  FF  in  France  and  so  on),  while table  2  shows  the  corresponding 
prices  in  european  units  of  account  (E.U.A.  = U.C.E.  = Unites  de  comptes 
europeennes).  The  conversion  rates  being  indicated,  as  regards  years  1976 
and  1977,  in  Annexe  to table 9  of  Chapter  One. 
Both,  Tables  1  and  2  show  also the sizes,  weights  and  packages  considered, 
for  any  given  product,  and  accordingly,  the  retail  unit  prices, 
from  one  country to  anot~er there exist  sometimes  slight  differences  in 
weights  recorded,  in  relation to national  customs  and  practices. 
249 As  regards  Cola  beverages,  two  different  sizes  have  been  considered 
as  two  different  products  : 
- small  sizes  <0,25  l  ;  0,27  L ;  0,35  L)  product  n.  5 
- Large  sizes  (1  Liter)  product  n.  6. 
The  purpose  of  Table  3  is  to stress  international  differences  in  the 
unit  prices  for  the  sa~e identical  product.  For  this  reason,  the  minimum 
price  recorded  for  the  given  product  is  fixed  equal  to  100,  all  other 
prices  being  therefore  related  proportionally  to this  basis.  The  set  of 
Tables  3  (each  for  each  product  considered)  gives  the series  of  un+t  retail 
sellin£  prices  observed  at  the  various  surve.·~·s  in  ~he various  countries 
f~r the  sa~e proC.uct,  the  base  <=  100  %)  being  the  Lowest  ~rice cbserved 
in  the  chec,.,est  country  ~r:  the  date  tv~·e~  that  price  \-.'as  at  its  lp~.esL 
We  thus  have  a  sort  of  minimum  minimorum  equal  to  '00. 
It  is  to  be  underlined that  the  differences  between  international prices 
are  very  considerable,  especially  for  tea,  which  costs  in  other  countries 
(especially  Germany)  even  7 times  more  tha~ in  the  United  Kingdom. 
* 
*  * 
The  tables of  this Appendix  have  been  carried out  according  to  the 
methodology  developped  in  the  present  volume  (Chapter  One)  by  Mr.  Raphael 
BUYSE  and  Mr.  Roger  VAN  HELMONT,  belonging  to  the  staff of  the  Division 
"Market  Structures"  of  the  Commission,  on  the  basis of  data  collected  and 
elaborated  by  the  National  Research  Institutes,  who  carried out  the  prices 
enquiries. 
250 RvH/jg 
DEGREE  CF  LCCAL  PRICES  CISFERSIO~ IN  NATIONAL  CURRENC~ 
CFF,  DM,  New  pence,  Lit.) 
TABLE  1.1.a. 
~ODUCT :  INSTANT  COFFEE  MANUFACTURER  :  NESTLE  PRICE  IN  NATIONAL  CURRENCY  I 
I 
~J~~;;;-~-------~--"'T'~-w-e-=i~g~h-t/~--- Consume~-:-ximum selling prices  I  Minimum  1  Average  I 
I  Ccun  Ecuf- d:sectrai1~~~donJCQnte.OJtS  Selling prices  -~-------;;~;;-pri  ces~;;~-----}ell_i_n._g_U_n_i_t--lf-S-e_l_l  i-n-g..._:;U;.._n_i_t_
1 
try  qui- of  product  Oz.  Gr.  I  - I 
~y  - I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  ---~- prices  (Kg)  prices  (Kg) 
t---+-- I  ~ 
F  1.1.76  Cafe  soluble  I  50  5,00  4,80  4,75  4,65  1CO  96  95  93  3,90  78  4,30  86 
Nescafe lyophil i se.,  CFF)  1•7•76  'Special  phyltre  1 
1.1.77 
1.7.77  I 
6,85 
'  9,55 
6,35 
9,00 
6,15  6,13 
8,25  J  8,23 
137 
191 
127 
180 
123 
165 
122 
164 
5,10 
6,80 
14,45  13,95 
'  I 
1
18,98 I  15,98 
I D  1.1.76  Nescafegoldl  ;zoo 
!coM)  1.7.76  1 
I 
13,78 
15,48 
13,48 
14,90 
72 
95 
92 
69 
E.O 
89 
l  68  I 
77 
67 
74 
84 
I -
1"10,85 
10,85 
GB 
<New 
ence 
1.1.77 
1. 7. 77 
1.1.76 
1.7.76 
1.1.77 
1.7.77 
Nescafe,  Instant 
powder 
I 
18,48  17,98 
:  125,50  22,99 
17,75 
22,95 
16,95 
21,75  127 
88 
114  114  108 
13,49 
15,98 
·4  t113,4  54  47  46,5  42  476  414  410  370  _- 37 
:  67  57,5  57  56  591  507  503  494  51 
'  86  77  75  73  .  758  679  .  661  644  68 
102 
136 
54 
54 
67 
79 
326 
450 
600 
820 
5,82 
8,30 
12,50 
13,90 
' 15,60 
119,41 
40,94 
55 
71,4 
119,1 
116 
166 
62 
69 
78 
97 
361 
485 
630 
1050  ~  1401'  1234  ,1  93 
~~----~~------~--------~-~--~---~----~----~--~--~~--~--~----~----~--~----~~  ____  I DEGREE  OF  LOCAL  PRICES  DISPERSION  IN  NATIONAL  CURRENCY 
CFF,  OM,  New  pence,  Lit.) 
-- ...... -----~--___  ..._  .....  ~--, 
MANUFACTURER  :  NESTLE  PRICE  IN  NATIONAL  CURRENCY  I  PRODUCT  :  INSTANT  COFFEE 
I  ro·•n~·  D~!e  I  .  --r;,eight/ 
~-t ;J  qE~t- I d~e~;~~:otn  _j~~r::~ _  ~ 
l 
Consum~-m-axi~-m-s-e~-L,-.n-g_p_r_i_ce-s--------~--M-i-n-im_u_m--~~A-v-e~r-ag-e--l~ 
~B 11.1. 76  - Nes cafe,  Instant  1
1 
8  :226,8 
pc~der  · 
Ne~  1.7.76  ,, 
per.ce) 1 
1.1.77  1 
.  I 
~1._7.  77-+-----~l  __ l  I 
I  1.1.76  f\escafe  Nestle  I ~ 
(Lit)  1.7.76  C1C  buste)  I  : 
1.1.77  ! 
1.7.77  I  I 
~----"·-----!L~l 
I 
I 
I 
'  I 
elling prices 
I  T  II  Ill  IV 
~-----
c---· 
E.5  78  73 
125  120  110  108 
192  I  1so  148  140 
264  J. 
400  J  395  390  380 
I 
t 
580  510  500  490 
700  650  630  600 
850  750  700  680 
--- .  ··---
-~~--u-
Unit  pricesCKg.)  ~eLl  i ng  Unit  Selling l  Un;; I  -
pri~es  (Kg).  J  I  II  III  IV  prices  (Kg) 
-
375  344  322  73  322  77  339 
551  529  4&5  476  99  436  108  476 
846  661  652  617  132  582  141  622 
1164  193  851  237  1044 
' 
I 
22220  "21940  21660 r  21110  270  15000  359  19940 
32220  28330  27770  27220  390  21660  459  25550 
38880  36110  35000  33330  490  27220  561  31160 
47220  41660  38880  37770  508  28220  I  620  34440 
I 
--~-....--1-·--
I  '  ' 
J RvH/jg  TAHlE  1.2.~  .. 
DEGREE  OF  LOCAL  PRICES  DISPERSION  IN  EUROPEAN  CNITS  OF  ACCOUNT  (EUA) 
r--------------------------
MANUFACTURER  NESTLE  PRICE  IN  E  .. U.A.  l  PRODUCT  :  INSTANT  COFFEE 
J Date 
I 
Coun 
1 
of  Detailed 
descri~tion 
of  product 
-r-~-we~igh-t/.,..._1 ----------·  f  J 
Consumer  maximum  selling prices  Minimum  Average  contents  .  ---+--
Oz ·l  Gr.  _se_I_l_l_i.-.n,_g._p_ 1 
:-i_c_e"Ts_I  1 _I_~_1 _v_- ....  -_·  U~~:i:  :es  ~;;~~~-~-~riper\  ~iensg~~::;  s:r\  lci;
59  ~::;  I 
En-
try  qui-
ry  ·---·------! -~-..... -t---'-----1---~··---+~--t,..;__--- ~-- .. ----------- -~- --r-·--··--.;----r-----.--i 
1.1.76  ~~soluble  !r- :50  :  F 
I  D 
I 
0,95 
1  7  76  Nescafe  lyophilise  ·  ' 
•  •  Special  phyltre  I  1 
1.1.77  '  I 1,31 
I 
1.7.77 
1.1.76  Nescafe  Gold 
1.  7. 76 
1.1.  77 
1.7.77 
I  ~ 
1,  71 
f. 
f 
I 
I 
'  1  200 
1  4,  76 
:  '16, 72 
!  7,03 
:  19,71 
0,92 
1,13 
1,61 
0,91 
1,10 
J  1,47 
0,89 
1,10 
1,47 
19,0 
26,2 
34,2 
18,4 
22,.6 
32,2 
18,2  17,8 
22,0  I  22,0 
29,4  29,4 
0,74 
0,91 
1,21 
14,8 
18,2 
24,2 
0,82 
1,04 
1,49 
16,4 
20,8 
29,8 
4,  60 - L.-4-,-54--~~----4  ,-::-· Z3 TJ:-2·-3-,  0~~--22-,-7·-r-;;  :;-t  -3-,-s  __  7__,__1_7_, 8-+--4  ,-1-2-;-2-0-,-6--; 
5,65  5,48  5,26  33,6  28,2  27,4  26,3  3,84  19,2  4,92  24,6 
6,70  6,62  6,32  35,1  33,5  33,1  31,6  5,03  25,2  5,81  29,1 
' 
I  I 
~--~------+-~--------------~--.----~-----.------·~----~--·---r-- 1  I 
8,75  8,74  8,28  48,5  43,7  ~1,4  I  6,08  30,4 
1
_7_,_3_9-r-3-6_,_9  __ _ 
--~~-~-~~~-~  l 
GB  1.1.76  Nescafe,Instant 
1• 7• 76  powder 
1 .1.  77 
1.7.7"1 
4  1113,4  0,940 
I 
I 
t 
I 
1,090 
1,314 
0,099 
0,820 
0,939 
1,176 
I 
0,810 
G,927 
1,146 
0, 730 
0,912 
1,112 
8,2 
9,6 
11,0 
18,5 
7,2  7,1  6,4  0,640  5,6  0,712  6,3 
8,3 
10,3 
8,2 
10,1 
8,0  0,830  7,3  0,895  7,9 
9,8  1,040  9,1 
11,395  12,3 
I 
1,091  9,6 
1,790  16,0 
~--~------~-----·---------·~----------·--~----~'----~~  ____ ._  __  -·-L.·---··--------'  --r--·-...!..-----:-.-1  -·_j RvH/jg  TABLE  1.2.b. 
DEGREE  OF  LOCAL  PRICES  DISPERSION  IN  EUROPEAN  LNITS  OF  ACCOCNT  CEUA) 
·--------·---~·- -~--------·-·----------·--
INSTANT  COFFEE  MANUFACTURER  NESTLE  PRICE  IN  E  .. U.A .. 
~~!~~~----~~;::~:·~  -::~  ~:-:~  ~~;;~::--·  --·---·----r- Mini mum 
Detailed  ----~-- [ 
descri,:tion  !  Selling prices  Unit  prices(Kg.)  relling  Unit 
Average _] 
Selling  Unit 
prices  (Kg) 
GB  1.1.  76 
1.7.76 
1.1.77 
1. 7. 77 
of  product  Oz. 1 Gr.  - l  t  . 
I  I  I I  I I I  IV  I  I I  I I I  IV  P  r1 c  e  S  ( Kg) 
:2248  - ~:: 1--~,:-r-----r-----4--~--r---~i 
10,0  9,4 
_.._ 
I 
Nescafe,  Instant  8 
pcwder  I 
I 
! 
I 
1,27  5,6 
1,61  7,1 
2,01  8,9 
1,34  5,9 
1,  76  7,8 
2,15  9,4 
l I 
I 
1.1.76 
1. 7. 76 
1.1.77 
1.7.77 
Nescafe  Nestle 
C10  buste) 
I 
f  '  '  I 
I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
I 
'  I 
I 
'  1 
'  I 
I 
1 
t 
I 
'  '  ! 
18  0,482  0,476 
0,555  0,544 
0,660  0,639 
0,739  0,690 
0,465  27,1  26,7  26,4 
0,534  35,1  30,8  30,2 
0,609  39,4  39,4  35,5 
0,670  ".-6,5  46,6  38,3 
·- ·-~---~---
2,89  12,7  3,55  15,7 
I  I  - I  -·  t· 
25,8  T-0,330  18,3  0,439  24,3  I 
29,6  0,424  23,5  0,500  _27, 7 
33,8  0,497  27,6  0,569  31,6 
37,2  0,501  21',8  I  0,611  3.3,9 
I  ,__ ___  1  ____ 
r------DEGREE  OF  DISPERSION  AND  INTERNATIONAL  COMPARISON  OF  RETAIL  UNIT  PRICES 
PRODUCT  :  NESCAFE,  instant  coffee  :  100  gr. 
TABLE:  1.3. 
--------------------------------r-------~----------------------------------------------------------
CON~UMER  uNIT  PRICE  Crrinimum  ~rice = 100  %)  (*)  Date  Detailed  descri~tion  -------------------------------·-----·- p 
cf  of  1=roduct  Cot..ntr}'  Maximum 
En<;uiry  ------------------------ __ J=~-t=~-_II _- --~-~ ~ 
January  1
caf~  soluble,Nescsf~,50gr  F  343  329  326 
1976  Nescaf~ Gold,  200  gr.  D  426  411  406 
:Nescaf~ Instant  pcwder  GB  I  148  129  128 
Average  Minimum  <en  %) 
~~--:,:== 
(**)  _:  _______ --------· ------
295  268  28,1 
I  397  368  318  33,7 
115  113  102  45,7  - 105  100  (X)  16,8  1113,4  gr.  et  226,8 gr.  GB  117  107  100 
-----+~~s~c:f~-~estl~,1~~  b.~~-gr.  _I----~--- 48~---- 479  473  461  436  328 ---4-
48,1 
July  !Idem  r  n.a. 
1 
n.a.  n.a. 
1976  D  .  572  481  466 
l
j  GB  164  1  Lr 1  'I·  139 
GB  '  153  I  146  134 
I  I  597  525  514  t----- -lr--~~---------+--- -t--------+----.---!-----
J anua r·y  I  Idem  F  I  395  I  366  ;  355 
1977  ()  554  539  !  531 
GB  I  186  I  16 7  I  163 
GB  l  208  163  I  160 
t-::~;---~~:---------- --:- ,.  :::--I ::: ---i-::: -
I  1977  I  .  D  774  l  698  !  696 
t  I  GB  I  29 5  '  n. a •  I  n • a •  I  GB  278  1  n.a.  I n.a. 
l  . -----·-·-- I  742  1__6~~---~--
'  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  I 
' 
t  448  I  419  327 
I 
74,9 
137  134  125  31,3 
132  132  121  I  26,1 
504  472  401  I  48,8  --- -
!  354  336  I 
294  34,4  I 
I  508  468  404  37,1 
158  155  I 
147  26,5 
152  153  143  45,3 
544  509  441  42,8  --·-1------
470  475  389  '40,4 
660  589  485  59,5 
n.a. 
I 
251  196  50,4 
n.a.  250 
I 
203  36,7 
594  541  443  67,4 
(*)  Minimum  price = 100.  The  minimum  price  corresponds  to the  lowest  price  found  in  any  shop  in  any  country  among  all 
the  surveys  carried  out  in  the  given  period  for  the  given  product.  As  concerns  NESCAFE,  instant  coffee,  the  Lowest 
price  has  been  registered  in  the  United  Kingdom  in  the  enquiry  of  January  1976.  This  price  represents  the  basis  for 
the  comparisons. 
(**)  E Rp  is  the difference  between  the  maximum  price  (first  maximum)  and  the  minimum  price,  this difference  being  divided 
by  the  minimum  price  and  expressed  in  %. 
The  formula  is therefore:  ~-RP Maximum  price- Minimum  price  x  100• 
minimum  price 
-~ 
I 
I 
•  I 
I 
I 
I 
'  I 
I 
t 
I 
I 
i 
t RvH/jg 
PRODUCT  :  TEA 
lcoun-
Date  I  of  Detailed 
En- descriJ:tion  try  qui- of  product 
ry 
GB  1.1.76  TETLEY  tea  bags 
(New  1.7.76  (36  bags) 
pence  1.1.77 
1.7.77 
I  1.1.76  ATI-PILETTI 
(Lit)  1.7.76  (10  bustine) 
1.1.77 
1.7.77 
D  1.1.76  TEE FIX 
( DM)  1. 7. 76  (25  Beute U 
1.1.77 
1.7.77 
DEGREE  OF  LOCAL  PRICES  DISPERSION  IN  NATIONAL  CURRENCY 
(FF,  DM,  New  pence,  Lit.) 
MANUFACTURER  : 
Weight/  Consumer  maximum  selling prices  contents 
I 
I  Selling prices  Unit  prices  ( 100  gr.) 
Oz.,  Gr. 
I  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III 
'  4  !113,4  17,5  16,5  15,0  15,43  14,55  13,23 
!  17  16,5  16  14,99  14,55  14,11 
I 
' 
I  27  25,5  25  24  23,80  22,48  22,04 
I  42,5  37,48 
I 
I 
I 
1 
117,5  270  255  200  180  1542  1457  1142 
I  220  200  180  170  1257  1142  1028 
I 
' 
250  220  215  200  1428  1257  1228 
I  300  250  244  240  1714  1428  1394  I 
'  1 
'  t43,75  2,68  2,50  2,48  2,45  6,12  5,  71  5,67 
I  2,69  2,50  2,48  2,45  6,15  5,  71  5,67 
I 
t  2,60  2,50  2,48  2,45  5,94  5,  71  5,67 
I  2,99  2,98  2,88  2,  79  6,83  6,81  6,37 
'  '  ! 
TABLE  2.1.a. 
PRICE  IN  NATIONAL  CURRENCY 
Minimum  Average 
5e ll  i ng  Unit  Selling  Unit 
IV  prices  C100gr)  prices  1  OOgr) 
15  13,23  16,4  14,46 
16  14,11  16,7  14,73 
21,16  21,5  18,96  24,5  21,60 
34  29,98  38,8  34,22 
- -
1028  170  971  204  1165 
971  170  971  181  1034 
1142  154  880  204  1165 
1371  200  1142  204  1165 
5,60  190  4,34  2,26  5,16 
5,60  190  4,34  2,28  5,21 
5,60  190  4,34  2,24  5,12 
6,5  225  5,14  2,  71  6,19 RvH/jg 
DEGREE  OF  LOCAL  PRICES  DISPERSION  IN  NATIONAL  CURRENCY 
CFF,  OM,  New  pence,  Lit.) 
~~---- ---
Selling prices 
I  II  III  IV 
,.----
5,40  5,35  5,25  4,95 
5,50  5,48  5,45  5,35 
5,10  5,00  4,95  4,90 
·--~-- -~-1-·-j----
: I  W-+ 
I 
I 
I 
t 
I 
----
'  '  ~---l  _________  _L  __  ~  .. _._. .... __ . 
-----:-----r--
I 
t  I 
Unit  prices  <  1  uu  gr.>  ~ell  i ng  --
I  II  III  IV  prices 
---------------- -
10,80  10,70  10,50  9,90  3,75 
11,0  10,96  10,90  1G,70  3,  75 
10,20  10,0  9,90 1  9,80  3,75 
-r---t-
.. -t---
'"------~-J 
I 
I 
TABLE  2.1.b. 
Unit 
( 1  OOgr) 
7,50 
7,50 
7,50 
f 
I 
CURRENCY  l 
l  Average 
Selling  Unit 
prices  1  OOgr) 
4,75  9,50 
4,  75  9,50 
4,75  9,50 
·- I  I RvH/jg  TABLE  2.2.a. 
DEGREE  OF  LOCAL  FRICES  CISPERSION  IN  EUROPEAN  LNITS  Of  ACCO~NT  (EUA) 
--------------------------- I  PROJUCT  TEA 
f 
·~at;-,-- ----weight/  Consu:~;-:aximum  selli~g  pr~ces  ----------r  Minimum  1  -Average 
I  Coun  E~~  d:sectr~~~":on  £2.1'rnts  Selling prices  u~~-;;,::~-~~~~  "~~:)- [ell  ing  -~ni;~ell~~g I  un;;-
MANUFACTURER  :  PRICE  IN  E.U.A. 
try  qui- of  product  Oz. 1 Gr.  P' 
'-----r--r_y_~-----·---f----=-'-~~-1- II  III  IV  I  li~_::I I IV  jprices  (100grl  prices  l<100gr. 
GB  1.1.76 
1.7.76 
1.1.77 
1.7.77 
TETLEY  Tea  bag5 
(36  bags) 
14  :11~4  0,304~0,2873  0,2612  0,2687  0,2533  0,23031  0,2612  0,2303  0,2856  G,2518 
I 
:,·  0,27~~10,2686  0,2605  0,2441  0,2369  0,2297  0,2605  0,2297  0,2719  0,2397 
,0,41251  0,3638  0,3285  0,2866  0,3744  0,3301 
I  i  I  0,6494t_  I  0,5727  '  t~,5195 0,4581  0,~929  0,5228 
1.1.76  ATI- PILETTI  t17,5 i0,3300  0,3117  0,2445  0,2200  1,89  "1,78  1,40  1,26 
1
..0,2078  1,19  0,2494  1,43 
C10  bustine)  1  1.7.76  0,2396  0,2178  0,1960  0,1851  1,37  '1,24  1,12  1,06  0,1851  1,06  0,1971  '1,13 
I 
1.1.77  I·  ,  0,2538  0,2233  0,2182  0,2030  1,45  1,28  1,25  1,16  0,1563  0,89  0,2070  ~,18 
1.7.77  1,'  10,2958  0,2465  0,2406  0,2366  1,69  1,41  1,37  1,35  .0,1971  1,13  10,2011  1,15 
~-~---~-------~--'-~--~---~--~-----------~--~-~--~---~~---~-·- 1 
D  1.1.76 
1.7.76 
1.1.77 
1.7.77 
TEE FIX 
C25  beute  L) 
14375  0,8838  0,8245  0,8178  0,8080  2,02  1,88  -1,87  1 ,85  0,6266 
I  I  0,9524  0,8852  0,8780  0,8675  2,18  2,02  2.,01  1,98  0,6727 
t  0,9700  0,9327  0,9252  0,9140,  2,22  2,13  -2,11  2,09  0,7088 
I 
1,43 
1,54 
1,62 
1,95 
0,7453 
. 0,8073. 
0,8357 
1,0323 
1,70 
1,85 
1,91 
2,36  ;  11,1389  1,1351 j  1,0970 1,0628  2,60  2,59  2,51  2,43 I  0,8571  I 
~--~-------~--~-~--------~~----~----~----~~---~----~----~----~--·-~-------~----~----~----~~--~ RvH/jg  Tf\~u:  2. 2.b. 
DEGREE  OF  LOCAL  PRICES  DISPERSION  UN  EUROPEAN  LNITS  OF  ACCOUNT  CEUA) 
.--P-R_O_DU_C_T_:_T_E_A------·------·---MA_N_U_F_A-CT_U_R_E--R  -:--·--·-~--·----------------P--R·I--C-E_I_N_E-.U-.-A-.--------tl 
J---....  J~~--...----------~w~e--=-;-g·h::-t-/~----------------------------------T·  - l 
D~!e  I  contents  Consumer  maximum  selling prices  Minimum  Average  I  ro ..  ~ I  tn'- d:sectrai~~e:on  :  Selling pri  c;;-~------Un_i_t  __ p_r_i  c-es  ~;~-00-~g-r-.-)  --~)e_l_l._i  n~U-n_i_t--;i-S-e-l  l  ....  i-ng  Unit 
qui- of  product  Oz.t  Gr. 1----r----~--....-:----t--- J 
___  r_Y_~~-----~--------------~---~'--~--~-+--I-I  ___ ;-_I_II  ____ 
1 
__  I_v__  I  II  III  I_v_~~p_r_i_ce_s-rc-1o_o_g_r  __  );-p-r_i_c_es-;k-·1_o_o_g~r)i 
OK  11.1. 76  THE  MEDOVA  1,  ,:_.  50  0,  7526  0,  7456  0,  7317  0,6899,_'!_,-50_
4
_1--,~-;- -;:4-:-1~:38 
1•7•76  (25  bags) 
I 
0,8134  0,8104  0,8060  0,7912  1,63  1,62  1,61  1,58  .  ,'  1.1.77  ,0,7726  9,7574  0,7499  0,7423  1,55  1,51  1,50  1,48 
1.7.77  1  i 
0,5226 
0,5546 
0,5763 
1,04 
1,10 
1,15 
0,6620  1,32 
0,7024  1,40 
0,693G  1,39 
I  J  --l--T  ------+----+------;......;-.---: 
I  I·  ---~! 
I 
:  - ----+----+-----~----..;.__·----~-r 
:  I  I 
a...-._..._;._._-.1..-______  ......_! _f  _  __.__ _____ l_ ~~~  __  ..._ ___  ___.___~---______  I  --~---=-----=-1  ~-~J DEGREE  OF  DISPERSION  AND  INTERNATIONAL  COMPARISON  OF  RETAIL  UNIT  PRICES 
PROCUCT  :  TEA  :  100  gr. 
TABLE  2.3. 
Date  -,------.-- -------.-~---1------
1
---CON-SUM~;~f',J!~-P-R~CE  Crri nimuin  ~  ri~~-~-~;~-~~-~~-)--------------.---..- ~ R 
Deta1 Led  descn~t1on  ~  --------------------------.----·~-1----~  '- P 
1  cf  of  ~roduct  ! CoL.ntr)' I  Maximum  I  .  .  .  l  (en  %) 
:  .  ;  1  ~  _1 
---r--·-----~  ---,_1  Average  1  M1n1mum  1 
t  En<;u1ry -t------------------1------.--·--~-- I_r __ t lii  IV  ~-----+------f.  __  <_:~--
Januar-)'·  1  TE.EFD:,25  bag!:,43,75  gr. 1  D  l  925  I  862  855  851  1  779  1  655  1 41,0  1 
I, 
1976 
:,  ml!;~~$:~:H,  !!!~~
5
~;~·:,  ~~  i m i m i  !~~  i  :::  j  m I !~~ j'  !i;~  II 
17  5  gr  '  I  J  •  •  I ~~~~t-1  Ide_m ________  _,  ___  __:_t  ..  --~-:- ~  ~6~  ;  ~~~  ~--iii-- -i~*  ---r~,- ~~~--+- ~~i  i- ~!',~ 
I  I  I 
I  !  I iB  I  ~g~  ~~~  1~~  461  1  1~~  !  1~~ (xl i  2~:~  I 
!  Ja;9u;;·y j;de;  ----1--~-:-T  ~i~  ~~~  ~i~  -r- ~~~-~~~~ --t~g  -r,--~*:~2 
l  I  GB  I  150  II  141  139  I  133  I  136  119  25,5 
1  I  I  597  525  513  I  477  I  487  367  62,4 
-::~;--·-7;e-;----- --t--;-j,~-;;-5-;--- 1023  I  991  i  --;~3---~  799  32,9 
1977  I  ~~  '  r.2~9  I  n.a.  n.a.  l  n.a.  ~a~·  ~8~·  25,0 
_I  ----·----------------- ~  I  !  69-~-J--5-~5  ___  _:~---- _  552  j_ :~  460  49,9 
(*)  Minimum  price = 100.  The  minimum  price  corresponds  to  the  Lowest  price  found  in  any  shop  in  any  country  among  all 
the  surveys  carried  out  in  the  given  period  for  the  given  product.  As  concerns  TEA,  the  Lowest  price  has  been 
registered  in  the  United  Kingdom  in  the  enquiry  of  July 1976.  This  price  represents  the  basis  for  the  comparisons. 
(**)  ~  Rp  is  the  difference  between  the  maximum  price  (first maximum)  and  the  minimum  price, this difference  being 
divided  by  the  minimum  price  and  expressed  in  %. 
The  formula  is therefore: E R  Maximum  price  - Minimum  price  x  100_ 
p  minimum  price RvH/jg 
DEGREE  OF  LOCAL  PRICES  DISPERSION  IN  NATIONAL  CURRENCY 
<FF,  DM,  New  pence,  Lit.) 
TABLE  3.1. 
f
LPRoJo'~~~o-~~~!l  ~=~KE_s  -------rw~i-ght,-~~N~~;:rc_~RE~-~--~~L::~~---L-L-~----: _____  ~-----------fPR_:cME.  I~ NArioNlAL _  cuRR~Ncv  l-1 
ate  .  1  cgntents  onsumer  max1mum  se  1ng  pr1 ces  1n1mum  Average 
r-"n  -•  I  d;scctrai~\~~n  J------;  Sel~ing-pr~~-;-- Unit  pricesCKg.)  Jellifunit  Un~  -;;~I 
GB 
(New 
pencE) 
I D 
I  (DM) 
DK  I 
<DKr) 
..,, 
En-
.  I  of  prod~ct  1  Gr.  T-:-:-1  --1-~f-..,.--l  -
~  I  _!_~ _ _j  I I I  IV  _I  __  _!!  ...!!!__  __ ----~ 
76  -K~logg Corn~{ i  37;-·  "22,0  r~-~~~l-;-~,5  20,0  58,66  56,0  54,66  53,3 
qui-
ry  Jprices  (Kg) 
1.1. 
1.7. 
1 • 1 • 
1.7. 
1.1. 
1.7. 
1 • 1 • 
1.7. 
1 .1. 
1. 7. 
1 • 1 • 
1. 7. 
-
3  17,0 
761'  '  25,5  23,5  23,0  22,5  68,00  62,66  61,33  60,0 
77  :  25,5  25,u  24,5  Z4,o  68,00  66,66  65,33  64,0 
0  21,0 
0  23,0 
77  80,00  26,0  I  :  I  30,0 I  l 
76  Kor~;l,.k;.-----f- ) 340-r;~~JO-
1 
2,29  2,28  7,291  7,  76  6,  73  --;;,-;-
76  2,30  8,79  ~  8,47  7,59  6,7 
- I 
0 T-~,18 
6  1,68 
77 
77 
3,05 
2,79  2,40 
2,68 
2,39 
76  KeLLogg  Corn- 1  500  I  4,95  4,88  4,  75 
76  flakes  :  5,15  4,95  4,88 
77  t  5,80  5,15  4,95 
77  I 
2,59 
2,38 
4,69 
4,78 
8,97 
8,20 
9,90 
10,30 
4,85  . 11,60 
8,20 
7,05 
9,76 
9,90 
10,30 
7,88  7,6  2  1,82 
7,02  7,0  0  1,39 
9,50 
9,76 
9,90 
9,5  1~~~  6  4,25 
0  3,48 
9,3 
9,7 
I 
__ 1_ ___  _  I  ---~-·~~-l---- ----- ----~---- _  __;__  I 
45,33 
56,0 
61,33 
69,33 
3,47 
4,94 
5,35 
4,08 
7,90 
8,50 
6,96 
Selling 
prices  (Kg) 
20,59  54,90 
22,20  59,20 
24,00  64,00 
28,00  74,00 
2,11  6,20 
2,20  6,47 
2,38  7,00 
I  2,06  6,06 
I 
I  ---
4,58  9,16 
4,70  9,40 
4,62  9,24 
I __  J RvH/jg  TABLE  3.2. 
DEG~EE  OF  LOCAL  PRICES  DISPERSION  IN  EUROPEAN  LNITS  OF  ACCOLNT  CEUA) 
l  PRO~~~~  CORf\:FLP.;~S------- MANUFACTURER  :  K.E LLOGG  PRICE  IN  E.U.A. 
--------------- -
~~cunf~~~;l~--octailed ---- c~*~~~  c:.:~~~~-:  aximum  selling prices  r·  Minimum  Average 
l  t  \  En- I  descrir:tion  1  Selling prices  I  ry  qui- I  of  product  1 Gr.  ----T~ 
--;J 1  .'f. 76  ~~eL-L  ogg  Co~-n~~ a;e{-:3-;-; --0-:3:3; ;,~:5; ~ 
1.7.76  I  0,4151  0,3825  G, 
U 
:-1.7~  !  ,0,38961?,3820  0, 
=~  __________ l_ lJO,l~  __ l_  __ 
I D  1.1. 76  Kornflakes  : 340 I  0,817810,7585  0, 
l  1.7  .. 76  I  1,05861,0197  0, 
I 
~----~-----..--~.--.- ,_....,. ___ -----------
}eLL  ing  Unit  prices(Kg.)  - ~prices  II  IV  I  II  III  IV 
---- -r-------·-----
3569  0,3483  1,021  0,975  0,952  0,9288  0,2960 
3744  0,3663  1,107  1,020  0,998  0,977  0,3419 
3744  0,3667  1,038  1,018 0,998  0,978  0,3515 
..  1,200  0,3899 
---· -
I  I  .I 
7552  0,7519  2,405  2,230  2,221  :-2,211  T-~,3891 
9135  0,8143  3,114'  2,999  2,686  2,395  0,5948 
1  .. 1  .. 7  7  '  1  , 1  3  79  1  , 04 08  0,  9998  0,9663  3,347  3,061  2,940  2,842  0,679( 
1.7.77  :  11,0627 0,9142  o, 9104  0,9066  3,125  2,689  2,678  2,841  0,5295 
·------- ---~-----}-~-~-· --·-·---
,.__  ·--
, ____ 
·- r--__.__Jr-·--
DK  1.1.76  Kellogg  Cornflakes  t500  0,6890  0,6801  0, 
1  .. 7  .. 76 
1.1.77 
1.7.77 
I 
'  '  I 
0,7616  0,7320  0, 
0,8786  0,7802  o, 
: I  I  ----------·.....£...-.----· ..... -- ---·· ..,.-·--- .... -- -__ __.:..,--
6620 
7217 
7499 
--
0,6537  1,378  1,360  1,324  .1 ,307  . 0,5505 
C,7069  1,523  1,464  1-,443  1,414  0,6285 
0,  734 7. 1,  757  1,560 ·1, 500  1,469  0,5272 
~--'------ ---- I 
Unit  SeLLing  Unit 
(Kg)  prices  (Kg) 
0,789  0,3585  0,956 
0,912  0,3614  0,964 
0,937  0,3667  0,978 
1,039  0,4199  1,120 
---
1,144  0,6959  2,047 
1,  749  0,7789  .2,290 
1,997  0,8879  2,611 
1,557  I I  o, 7847  2,304 
--
1,101  0,6383  1,277 
1,257  0,6950  1,390 
1,054  0,6999  1,400 
I. DEGREE  OF  DISPERSION  AND  INTERNATIONAL  COMPARISON  OF  RETAIL  UNIT  PRICES 
PRODUCT  :  KlLLCG'S  CORNFLAKES  :  1  kg.  '  D:::T-::~  ~:~-:~-::~:=-1-=tr) 
1 
CONSU~ER  ~~~~~~~~~;:~:  ~-r-~~~~~-;~-)--­
~ :::::::.  -GELLO~~;~or~;~:;;;--~~------~--~---1  _!: __ +-~!~-+- IV  -i~ve~~~: 
1976  I  D  I  305  I  283  I  2811  I  280  I  259 
TABLE  3.3  .. 
----;f i:  \---~ 
I  II  (en  %)  I  I  Minimum 
~  ~-~ 
1 
145  i  110,1  1  I  139  2s,3 
I  1 00  (X )  29,  4 
I 
0  340  gr.  OK  ,.  175  '  172  I  168  166  ;  162  I  l  DK  sea gr.  :  GB  129  l  123  121  118  f  121 
1  GB  375  gr.  f  ,  1 
r-ul-t------------------T- ----~-------+---i------ I  :  : 
I  ~  Y  ~  Idem  j  D  '  375  I  361  ;  324  1  289  '  276  211  t  78,0 
1 
I 
1976 
:  I  CK  1184  !  176  '  174  170  I  168  152  I  21,2  I 
I --- --~-----------__  _j_~:__  i  -~:~---t-=-----L~~------~1-18-~16  I  11~  -+-;;-~21  ,4  ! 
l  J anua r-):  l  j  I  I  l  I  I  -:  '  f 
i'  1977  Idem  D  381  1  349  335  :  315  1  297  ~  227 
1 
67,6 
1  I CK  '  2[0  I  178  ;  171  I  167  I  159  I  120  66,7  I  i  I  GB  I  11 8  !  11 6  I  11 4  I  111  i  111  1  0 7  1 0,  9  ! 
r-·Ju~;·--r-----------------1----+-------~-------r------r------+-------~---t--1 
l  1977  !  Idem  ,.  D  !  353  ,
1 
304  !  302  l~  301  I  261  I  176 
1 
100,7  ! 
t  1  .  OK  I  n.a.  ,  n.a.  1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1 
l  ____ _L__________________  l GB  [  135  __!__~~-·~--'  _:~--- __  :~_j_:_6_  I  117  i  15,4  I 
(*)  Minimum  price = 100.  The  minimum  price  corresponds  to  the  lowest  price  found  in  any  shop  in  any  country  among  all 
the  surveys  carried  out  in  the  given  period  for  the  given  product.  As  concerns  Kellogg's  Cornflakes,  the  Lowest 
price  has  been  registered  in  the  United  Kingdom  in  the  enquiry  of  January  1976.  This  price  represents  the  basis 
for  the  comparisons. 
(**)  ~ Rp  is  the difference  between  the  maximum  price  (first  maximum)  and  the  minimum  price,  this  difference  being 
divided  by  the  minimum  price  and  expressed  in%. 
The  formula  is  therefore:  £  RP  Maximum  price - Minimum  price  x  100• 
minimum  price RvH/jg 
·----------
DEGREE  OF  LOCAL  PRICES  DISPERSION  I~  NATICNAL  CURRENCY 
( F  F  ,  L i t  •  DM ) 
TABLE  4.1. 
Indian  tonic  water  MANUFACTURER  ------~--------------~------1 
SCHWEPPES  PRICE  IN  NATIONAL  CURRENCY 
~eight/  lcouJ 
Date  I 
Consumer 
,..<¥.  O~ta'iled  _ntents 
El 
\JI  I 
En- descriJ:tion  Selling prices 
qui- of  product  L 
ry  I  II 
-
F  1.1.76  Schweppes  I  0,20  1,083  1,066 
' 
( F  F)  1.7.76  Indian  tonic  ~.:atert 
I 
1.1.77  1,250  1;150 
I 
1.7.77  I  1,133  1,033 
f 
L  ..:.  --
'  I  1.1.76  Schweppes  10,18  200  170 
I<Lit)  1.7.76  Indian  tonic  water  I  180  163 
1.1.77  _U  200 
185 
1.7.77  1216  200 
I -4-
D  1.1.  76  SchwepJS)es  10,70  1,  79  1,70 
(OM)  1.7.76  Indian  tonic  ~r.•ater  I  1,  79  1,68  I 
1.1.77  t  1,99  1,70 
1.7.77  I  2,29  1,  79  '  i  I 
I 
I  I  I  I  -
- ._,.  ·~---·-·-~ 
maximum  selling prices  .  Minim~:--[ .. Average  T 
~ 
Jpr  III  IV 
1,060  1,050 
1,083  0,975 
1,016 ' '1 ,00 
153  152 
162  160 
180  160 
180  175 
1,68  1,66 
1,66  1,59 
1,69  1,68 
1,69  1,59 
I 
------·--------~---- ...... -.... ..... ________ 
Unit  prices(Liter) 
~-E  - -
5,42  5,33 
6,25  5,75 
5,67  5,16 
1110  943 
999  905 
1110  1026 
1199  1110 
--
2,56  2,43 
2,56  2,4G 
2,84  2,43 
3,27  2,56 
..._ ___ 
III  I IV  ---------
5,30  5,25 
5,40  4,88 
5,08  5,00 
--r----
849  I  844 
899  888 
999  888 
999  971 
I 
T 
1-
----
2,40  2,37 
2,37  2,27 
2,41  2,40 
2,61  2,27 
·--,----------
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
lli1.Unit  Selling 
ices  (Liter)  prices 
---r-·--·--
, 758  3,  79  0,928 
J.792  3,97  0,927 
,775  3,88  0,930 
----
125  694  ':45 
1-c::  t:.. ..  ·  694  151 
110  611  154 
130  722 
I 
171 
---
,38  1,97  1,53 
,28  1,83  1,51 
,38  1,97  1,56 
,16  1,66  1,53 
Unit 
Liter) 
4,68 
4,63 
~·,65 
805 
.838 
855 
949 
,___  __ 
2,19 
2,16 
2,23 
2,19 RvH/jg 
~ 
0'\ 
~ 
I 
D 
1  .. 1  .. 77 
1  .. 7.77 
1.1.76 
1. 7. 76 
1.1 .. 77 
1. 7  .. 77 
1.1.76 
1.7.76 
1.1 .. 77 
1.7.77 
Schweppes 
Indian  tonic 
water 
Schweppes 
Indian  tonic 
~Aater 
DEGREE  OF  LOCAL  PRICES  DISPERSION  IN  EUROPEAN  UNITS  OF  ACCOUNT  CEUA) 
---:.-· 
,145  0,725 
:, 142  0,710 
,139  0,695 
-
,153  0,850 
',  136  0, 756 
,112  0,622 
',  128  0,711 
-
,455  0,650 
,453  0,647 
,515  0, 735 
:,442  0,631 
TABLE  4.2. 
0,178  0,890 
0,166  0,830 
0,167  0,835 
·---· 
0,177  0,983 
0,164  .0,911 
0,156  0,867 
I  a, 169  0,939 
I  ·-----
0,504  0,720 
. 0,535  0,764 
0,582  0,831 
0,583  0,832 
I .  J DEGREE  OF  DISPERSION  AND  INTERNATIONAL  COMPARISON  OF  RETAIL  UNIT  PRICES  TABLE  4.3. 
PRODUCT  :  SCHWEPPES,Indian  Tonic  Water  :  1  liter 
~-D-a-t-e-~-----------1~---- CONSUMER~NI~~~rri~imum~~~~~;---,;~~~
1
-~--l-fi~p---
Detailed  descri~tion 
cf  of  r::roduct  COl  .. ntr}'  Maximum  ~  .  .  I  (en  %) 
Enc;ui r}'  I  r---~~L  Average  I  MlnlffiUm  I 
! Januan·  J Schweppes,  ;nd~;;;------~~  I  1  II  _!!_I~-~--~----- -----t--------1-~~-~~ 
I  1976  l tonic  water  ,  D  I  151  I  144  142  I  140  :  129  1  11"?  I  29,6 
I  I  D  0,70  L.  :  F  I  186  i  184  182  181  I  160  ,·  130  I  42,9  : 
( .  F  C,20  L.  ·,  I  244  I  207  187  185  177  152  160 1  I 
I  0  18  L  '  _j  I  I  I  , 
h,  ~~~~~:~--·  -------r.--:---~~~---l---1-~~--~--~~~---~-;~;---~,-~~~T-:;  il  39,8  tl, 
I 
1  F  •  n.a.  '  n.a.  1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  l  ~~a. 
I  I 
I  :  186  ,.  168  I  167  165  I  156  I  129  I  44,0  l 
~  I  I  I  I  I 
r
1
.  J~;9u;;~-T:d.~----------r-D--r-1-7~--t,- --:~----r-,~:---!----1::----r--,~:--r-1~;  -r,-~4,2--1 
I  I F  I  181  1  66  '  1  5 7  14 1  I  134  I  11 5  5 7  8  0 
h-----L--------------~-~--t--~~~--i'---~68  ---~-16~---+--~46  ----L--~~0--+-100  ~~) I  8,:9-~-l 
!  ~~;~  jrdem  :  D  I  199  1  156  147  !  138  I  133  I  101  ~4  1 
i  i  F  I  163  I  148  144  I  144  133  111  I  46  2  ' 
L  __  _l  ---------- I  170  j  175  --=~--J--~53  ___ j_ ~:  __  j_:~~--J~~~--1 
(*)  Minimum  price = 100.  The  minimum  price  corresponds  to  the  Lowest  price  found  in  any  shop  in  any  country  among  all 
the survey~ carried  out  in  the  given  period  for  the  given  product.  As  concerns  SCHWEPPES,  the  Lowest  price  has  been 
registered  in  Italy  in  the  enquiry  of  January  1977.  This  price  represents  the  basis  for  the  comparisons. 
(**)  E Rp  is  the  difference  between  the  maximum  price  (first  maximum)  and  the  minimum  price,  this  difference  being 
divided  by  the  minimum  price  and  expressed  in  %. 
The  formula  is therefore: E R  Maximum  p~i~e - Mi~imum price  x  , 100• 
p  m1n1mum  pr1ce RvH/jg  TABLE  5.1. 
DEGREE  OF  LOCAL  PRICES  DISPERSION  IN  NATIONAL  CURRENCY 
(New  pence,  DM,  DKr.) 
I  PR~~~T :__:oL~m:~~:;-~----~-;;~-;-~ER  ~--~~cA-~~-----------·--------·--·---;;ICE IN  NATIONAL  CURR~NCY  l 
I  J 
Date 1  wifQht/  ~-c~::~;;-~aximum selling  pr~-::-~-------·---r- Minim:~  Average  } 
I Coun I E
0
n:  I  d;se;:;~~~~n  contents  Selling prices  ---------~::~~-;~~:~---- el~nl-~~it-~l~~gl  U~~ 
~  _!!  __  1!!  _____  :'!.__  prices I< l1terl I prices I l1terll 
try  qui- of  product  fl. 
L  ----r-·  oz  I 
ry  I  I  _  _...._  -
--
Unit  pr 
III  IV  I 
--·  .  -·- ,_...  I  r  GB  1.1.76  Coca-Cola  (car.) 
1
11,510,21  10,5 
(New  1.7.76 
I : 
10,5 
renee  1.1.77  15 
1.7.77  I  I  15 
i  I 
L 
I 
i  '  I  D  1.1.76  '  0,99  Coca-Cola  (can)  1  0,35 
I  (OM)  1.7.76  '  I  0,79 
'  1.1.77  ' 
0,79 
1.7.77  I  I  o, 75  I 
'  :---~-·-- 4 
DK  1.1.  76  Coca-Cola  (can  and  10,25  1,23 
CJ)K r)  1.7.76  bottle)  I  1,62 
I 
1.1.77  t  1,60 
1.7.77  I 
'  '  I 
_L 
1 
1 
9,5 
0 
4 
0,70 
0,70 
0,70 
-
1,20 
1,60 
1,53 
9 
9,5  8,5 
13,5  13 
---------· 
"0,70  0,69 
0,69  0,59 
0,69 I 
0,59 
0,59  0,54 
-------r-----
1,18  1,15 
1,48  1,25 
1,30  1,29 
____  _J_ 
38,88 
38,88 
55,55 
55,55 
2,82 
2,26 
2,26 
2,14 
r----·- .. 
4,92 
6,48 
. 6,40 
35,18  33,33 
37,03  35,18  31,48 
51,85  50,00  48,15 
9 
8,5 
10,5 
10 
2,26 
2,00 
2,00 
---r-----t-
2,00  1 1,97  r 
---: 
0,39 
1,97  1,  69 
1,  97  1,69 
2,00  1,69  1,54 
0,49 
0,49 
0,45 
4,80  4,  72- 4,6~-r---
1,04 
6,40  5,92  5,00 
6,12  5,20  5,16 
I 
1,07 
1,09 
-----------'  . 
33,33  9,4  34,81 
31,48  9,7  35,93 
38,88  12,43  46,04 . 
37,03  12,5  46,30 
----
1,11  0,58  1,66 
1,40  0,54  . 1,54 
1,40  0,57  1,63 
1,29  f  0,53  1,51 
l 
'  I -----r----
4,16  1,17  4,68 
4,28  1,23  4,92 
4,36  1,24  4,96 
I . ~ 
0'\  = 
RvH/jg  TABLE  5.2. 
DEGREE  OF  LOCAL  PRICES  DISPERSION  IN  EUROPEA~ UNITS  OF  ACCOUNT  (EUA) 
--------------------9 
~~~: COL~~  siz_:::._--r---·-"TM_A_N_UFA_CT_UR_E_R_:__:_~_:_~--C_O_L_A _______________  .,._PRICE  IN  E.U.A.  _  ___._ __ l 
I  J 
Da;;-T  c~~!;~~~  Consumer  maximum  selling prices  I -Minim·::---r  Average  l 
Coun  oft::  I  Detailed  ---r 
I  t  ·; l En- I  descri~tion  Fl. 1  L 
~  q~!- of product  Oz.: 
I 
I  I  -
GB  1.1.76  Coca-Cola  (  . ..,) 
1
11,s1o,27  0 
D 
1.7.76  I :  .~ 
1.1.77 
1  ·• 7. 77 
1.1.76  Coca-Cola  (can) 
1  .. 7.76 
I  I  0 
I  '  1 
' 
1o,35 !a 
I  0 
-
Selling prices 
--
I  II  III 
,1828  0,1654  0,1567 
,1709  0,1628  0,1546 
,2292  0,2139  0,2062 
':l~~L 
,3264 f0,2605 
I  0,2308 
1.1.77 
1  .. 7.77 
t-----+----t--------L[  __ f_ 
DK  1.1.76  Coca-C·~·i.a  (can  t0,25  0 
,2797  0,2478  0,2443 
,294  7  0,2611  0,2574 
,2856  0,2666  0,2247 
_,... 
--~·--~-- ___ .... _. 
, 1714  0,1672  0,1644 
1  and  bottle)  t  .7  .. 76  t  0 ,2395  0,2366  0,2188 
1.1.77  t  0 ,2423  0,2317  0,1969 
1.7.77  I 
I 
' 
'--------- . 
------~--~-,-...  _.~------
-----~--+-·1  Unit  prices  (liter)  ~ell  i ng  Unit  Selling  Unit 
I 
I  III  I IV  lpri c~s  (liter)  prices fliter)l  IV  I  II 
--------- . I 
0,1567  0,677  0,613:  0,580  0,1567  0,580  0,.1636  0,605 
0,1383  0,633  0,603  0,573  0,512  0,1383  0,512  o,. 1579  0,585 
0,1986  0,848  0, 792  0,764  0,735  0,1604  0,594  0,1899  0,703. 
0,832  0,1499  0,555  0,1874  0,694 
---r----t- -----
0,2275  0,932 . 0, 744  o,6591 o,650  I.CJ, 1286  0,367  0,1912  0,546 
0,2088  0,799 . 0,  708  0,698  0,597  0,1734  0,495  0,1911  _0,546 
0,2201  0,842  0,  746  0,735  0,629  0,1828  0,522  0,2126  0,607 
0,2057  0,816  0,  761  0,642  0,588  0,1714  0,490 I  o, 2018  0,577 
·------ -- J  I  ------- c--0, 6:;~~~~9  0,1602  0,686  0,669  0,658  0,580  0,1630  0,6520 
0,1848  0,958  0,946  0,875  0,  73 9  0, 1  58 2  0,6328 . 0,1818  0,7272 
0,1954 . 0,969  0,927  . 0,  788  0,782  0,1651  0,6604- 0,1878  0,7512 
I 
- -- I  I  _j TABLE  5.3. 
DEGREE  OF  DISPERSION  AND  INTERNATIONAL  COMPARISON  OF  RETAIL  UNIT  PRICES 
PRCDUCT  :  COCA  COLA  (small  sizes)  :  1  liter 
----,--------------------1------ -------------------~------~~---
Date  .l d  d  .  . 
'1  CONSUMER  uNIT  PRICE  Crrinimum  ~rice = 100  %)  (*) 
Deta1  e  escr1~t1on  -----------·--·--------------------------------~------------~----------~~ 
cf  1  Co~ntr~  Maximum  of  ~roduct  t 
1  -------·Jr--·------------~~-------------~---------------1  Average  Minimum  Enc;uiry 
COLA 
......  R 
'- p 
(en  %) 
D  0,35  l  D  179  177  149  100(x)  15,3 
I  ~~  ~L~~z~  11,5  (0,27  L)  I  ~~  I  ~~r  _j  m  j---~~-~ --- ---
17~ ---+!,;  --~~-~  ---~  ~~- ~~:~ 
h~~~t~:----~--------t- :----~~---~~~---l---~::--j  ~8;- 155  I  141  -- 128  61,1 
I 
I  ~  DK  248  I  245  I  2Z7  191  188  164  51,5 
~  GB  :  164  I  156  I  148  133  151  I  133  23,6 
J-a;9u;;-Y---:de~-----------i--D--j----~:~-t-~~----·--1~:---,---154  -r--::- I 128  61,3 
DK  I  237  227  l  193  191  I  184  161  46,8  : 
'  GB  I  208  I  194  I  187  i  236  i  172  145  42,9  I 
,  DK  n.a.  I  n.a.  1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1977  l J  l  ____  _l __________________ l_:_  _____ ~~~-j_  I  ______ j__:~-- 1=- _5o,o _  _j 
(*)  Minimum  price = 100.  The  minimum  price  corresponds  to  the  lowest  price  found  in  any  shop  in  any  country 
among  all  the  surveys  carried  out  in  the  given  oeriod  for  the  given  product.  As  concerns  COCA  COLA  (small  sizes) 
the  Lowest  price  has  been  registered  in  Germany  in  the  enquiry  of  January  1976.  This  price  represents  the  basis  for 
the  comparisons. 
(**)  ~ Rp  is  the  difference  between  the  maximum  price  (first  maximum)  and  the  minimum  price,  this difference  being  divided 
by  the  minimum  price  and  expressed  in  %. 
The  formula  is therefore:  E R  Maximum  price - Minimum  price 
p  minimum  price  x  100· RvH/jg 
DEGREE  OF  LOCAL  PRICES  DISPERSION  IN  NATIONAL  C~RRENCY 
( F  F  ,  DM ,  L i t  .. ) 
TABLE  6.1. 
I  PRODUCT  :  CCLA  <Large sizes)-----~-M-AN-~FACTURER  COCA  ~COLA  -~-- PRICE  IN  NATIONAL. ~URRENCY  1 
I  J  Date  r  -we_;_g_h--t/--:---·-----~~::mer  maximu:·-:-~Ling  pr~·:es______  r· Minin:~m  1  -~-~er&ge _]  I  Coun l  ~~- I  d;sectr~~~~~n  con~en.-=-t,=s~S-e-·L-L-i-ng_p_r_i_c_e_s__  U~~-;pri~~~-~-~~~~~;-- -----l~~~~  Unit  ~lling  ~Unit  I 
try  ~--o-f_p_r_o_~_·c_t--~-~L-+~r-~_II_~_II_I~  __  Iv  ___  r_-_~--~-~~~-v-~~p-r_i_cesl<Liter)lprices  liter)l 
- I 
--r-· 
35  -1,80  1,  75 
F  1.1.76  Coca-Cola 
I 
1 
<  F  F)  1.7.76 
1.1.77  I 
2, 
I 
1.7.77  i 
2,  50  2,00  1,75 
48  I 1,40  1,19 
40  I  1,12  1,10 
19  1,12  1,00 
J  I  --f  l  D  1.1.76  Coca-Cola  1  11, 
I  (  DM)  1.7.76  r-
I 
1.1.77  1, 
1.7.11  ,1, 12  1,00  0,99 
70  265  260 
00  295  285 
50  340  330  ~~it) 
1.1.76  Coca-Cola  1  2 
1.7.76  3 
1.1.77  ' 
3 
20  410  390 
I 
-----~~'--
1.7.77  I  4 
'  I  ' 
I 
1,70 
j.  1,  70 
1,12 
0,99 
0,99 
0,79 
----·- -------
250 
280 
325 
350 
'  1 
1 
--t------t-
ro 
0 
-1----+----· 
0 
0 
1 
2 
1 
I  2 
,30 
,42 
,99 
,99 
,99 
, 79 
90 
30 
77 
73 
l  --~---·-
_...._ ___ .  _________ ,  ___ _ 
1,56 
1,  73 
·---· 
1,18 
'1,15 
1,09 
t 0,97 
I 
I 
241 
262 
279 
324 
I  J RvH/jg  TABLE  6.2. 
DEGREE  OF  LOCAL  PRICES  CISPERSION  IN  EUROPEA~ UNITS  OF  ACCOuNT  (EUA) 
__  .;,._____._ 
PRICE  IN  E.U.A.  -- I  MANUFACTURER  :  COCA-COLA 
pr~·::---~--------r  Minimum  l  Average  l 
Wei gw---------------------
Consumer  maximum  selling 
c ont  eQt~s'-+--_  ---.---
Se lli  ng  prices 
I~--
I  III 
22  0,323  0,314 
48  0,359  0,314 
88  J 0,462  0,392 
I 
96  0,397  0,389 
L 
F  I  1.1.76  Coca-Cola  J. 
1. 7. 76 
t  1.1.77  I  0,4 
1. 7. 77  '  J  0,4 
I  -------i!---1- .  l  D  1.1.76  Coca-Cola  1  I  0,4 
I  1.7.76  o,4 
44  0,418  0,373 
27  0,381  0,377 
------ --------
30  0,324  0,318 
1 • 1 • 7 7  t.  0,  4 
1. 7. 77  1  t  0,4 
-+~-----------4-----~-~ 
I  1.1.76  Coca-Cola  0,3 
1.7.76  0,3  26  0,321  0,310 
1.1.77  0,3  55  0,345  0,335 
1.7.77  0,4  14  0,404  0,385 
I 
I 
IV 
0,305 
. 0,305 
-
0,369 
0,351 
0,369 
0,301 
-·--
0,306 
0,305 
0,330 
0,345 
lingluni;~l~~J:~I 
----.--... -·_..., _____ --
Unit  prices (liter)  ~el  -
I  II  III  IV  pri  I -----------
~s  I  niter) I prices  lniter>l 
i--· 
---- --
0, 
o, 
!.  t  ,.  T-
I  i.D, 
0, 
0, 
o, 
I 
233 
255 
326 
351 
369 
301 
0,280 
0,310 
0,389 
0,407 
0,407 
0,369 
--;----.w---- -----
~--r.~: 
0,1 
232 
250 
80 
269 
0,295 
0,285 
0,283 
0,319  I  0, 
__  ~..-____  - ·--·-- I  ---!--~-'  __ _j DEGREE  OF  DISPERSION  AND  INTERNATIONAL  COMPARISON  OF  RETAIL  UNIT  PRICES 
PRODUCT  :  COCA  COLA  (large  sizes)  :  1  liter 
TABLE  6.3. 
Date  ~'"'  ,_R  -.....----------- --1-----~-
1
---C-;-N-S;:~; uNIT  PRICE  (rr_i_n  __  i_m_u._m_r_r_i ce  =  100-~~-)--- ==r 
Detailed descrir:tion  ---·  =-1  '- p 
1  cf  !  of  r:roduct  Cot..ntry  MaximumJ' 
1 
(en  %) 
j  En~u~:l---------------l---- I  II  r--~--r  IV 
11  Ave:~_M_i_n_i_m_,u  ...  m~t-1  __  <_*_*_>_----1 
! J an u  a r· y  i C  c c  A C  0  LA  I  I  I 
I  1976  I  L'  1  liter  C  302  286  243  229  241  202 
1  I  F  1  liter  I  F  n.a.  I  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  (  l  I  1  Liter  I  205  201  197  189  182  I  144 
I  ~~~~  td::m--~----~----r 1
'  - :---- ---~~;---t--;~:--,  -~;~----,--;;--i-24~---l- 207  1 
I  .  F  n.a.  1  n.a.  •  n.a.  n.a.  I  n.a.  n.a.  fl 
I  I  193  I  189  I  183  180  168  148 
49,5 
42,6 
41,4 
30,4 
I  !  T  I  I  I  I  i 
~  I  I  ------~----------~----~~,~----------+,------~  Januant  l 
1977  Idem  D  233  208  o  206  226  1  206  I  20,2 
I  i  i~~  i~~ _  ~----~~2  ___  !  __  i~!---~---~-~-~._<_x_)  +---~-~_:_~ __  __. 
~- ~~~~--r::------ -~--~-r~~*  I  -i~~--- ~~~ -t i~~  -T- ~~;- r  i~~  i~:~  j 
t-~-~--- I  ~  J  ~  __  ~:-~--1-91--~-1-7-6--~--14-9-~-53~'-9--
(*)  Minimum  price = 100.  The  m1n1mum  price  corresponds .to  the  lowest  price  found  in  any  shop  in  any  country  among  all 
the  surveys  carried  out  in  the  given  period  for  the  given  product.  As  concerns  COCA  COLA  <large  sizes), the  lowest 
price  has  been  registered  in  Italy  in  the  enquiry  of  January  1977.  This  price  represents  the  basis  for  the 
comparisons. 
(**)  ~ Rp  is  the difference  between  the  maximum  price  (first  maximum)  and  the  minimum  price,  this  difference  being 
divided  by  the  minimum  price  and  expressed  in  %. 
The  formula  is therefore: E R  Maximum  price - Minimum  price  ___  -...~_,;;__ __  :__  _  ___, __  ....1_,;;___  X  1  DO. 
p  minimum  price Conclusions 
The  tables  reveal  that  in  January  1976  a  consumer  who  was  willing  to travel 
to  whichever  Community  country  sold  a  given  product  at  the  lowest  price 
would  have  shopped  around  as  follows: 
(i)  buying  tea  and  instant  coffee,  and  perhaps  also  Kellogg's  Cornflakes 
in  a  British  supermarket; 
(ii)  buying  small  bottles of  Coca  Cola  and  Schweppes  Indian  Tonic  in  a 
German  supermarket; 
(iii)  buying  large  (1  litre)  bottles of  Coca  Cola  in  an  Italian  supermarket. 
But  he  should  have  been  careful  to  avoid  buying  tea or  instant  coffee  in 
Germany,  where  he  would  have  paid  seven  times  and  four  times  the 
British prices  respectively. 
As  for  the  trend of  prices  between  January  1976  and  July  1977,  prices  rose 
more  quickly  in  the  United  Kingdom  than  elsewhere  in  the  Community. 
By  July  1977,  the prices  of  instant  coffee  and  tea  had  almost  tripled there 
in  the  course  of  no  more  than  a  year  and  a  half. 
But  at  the  same  time  the  pound  declined  in  value,  which  cushioned  the 
impact  of  these price  increases  for  foreign  buyers.  In  other  Community 
countries,  however,  during  the  same  eighteen-month  period,  prices  were  fairly 
stable  as  regards tea, Kellogg's  Cornflakes,  Coca  Cola  and  Schweppes 
Indian  Tonic  (the  latter even  went  down  in  Italy). 
In  the  second  half  of  1977  the  price gap  between  the  United  Kingdom  and 
the  other  countries  narrowed  (for  tea,  coffee  and  Kellogg's  Cornflakes). 
Even  so  the  use  of  free  market  exchange  rates  for  international  price 
comparisons  still tends  to  show  that, despite  a  general  pattern  of  price 
alignment  in  the  Communit~ the  United  Kingdom  is still the 
cheapest  country  for  buyers  from  other  Community  countries  seeking  the 
products  we  have  analysed. 
273 APPENDIX  3 
COMMISSION  SCHEjV;E  OF  "TABLE  BY  PRODUCT" It  ap~ears useful  to  conclude  the  present  volume,  by  preparing  a  very  concise 
Generc:1l  Scheme·  of  ''Table  by  Product!',  according  to the guidelines  set  up 
in  the  ~ethodology analysed  above. 
The  sche~e  ~ill  be  applied to each  critical  cr "relevant''  product  to 
be  taken  into  account  by  each  Research  Institute,  namely  : 
"  - canned  garden  pe6s,  (best  quality)  (Hero,  Hak,  Bonduelle,  Cassegrain, ...  , 
- canned  soups  (Ca~pbell,  Unox,  ••• ) 
- chicke~ soup  C~ry)  (Knorr,  Royce,  Maggi,  •••  ) 
- beef tea  (tablets)  (Maggi,  Liebig,  Knorr,  ••• ) 
- baby  foods  (strained desserts  ;  meat  and  vegetables)  (Heinz,  Nutricia, 
Gerber,  Fali,  Olvarit,  ••• ) 
-margarine  (miscellaneous;  from  plants)  (Unilever, ••• ) 
- sunflower  oil, arachide .oil,  etc.  (Becel, •••  ) 
- chocolate  bars  (Nestl~,  Verkade,  Lindt,  ••• ) 
-breakfast  foods  (Cornflakes,  ricecrisp,  etc.  C  Ke l l ogg • s,  •••  ) 
- sugar 
- instant  coffee  powder  CMoccona,  Nescaf~, Maxwell,  Jacobs,  ••• ) 
- tea-bag~  (Ceylon  melange,  Lipton,  Pickwick,  ••• ) 
- ice  crea~s  (Iglo,  Motta,  Artie,  ••• ) 
- frozen  fish  fingers  Ciglo,  Findus,  ••• ) 
- frozen  garden  peas  Ciglo, •••  ) 
- frozen  fried  potatces  Ciglo,  ••• ) 
- other  frozen  vegetables  and  fruits 
-pilsner beer  and  export  beer(canned,  bottled)  CTuborg,  Carlsberg,  DAB, 
Kronenbourg,  Heineken,  Amstel,  Guinness,Skol,  Stella Artois,  ••• ) 
- aperitifsCRicard,  Pernod,  Pastis  Duval,  •••  ) 
- cola  drinks  (Coca-Cola,  Pepsi-Cola,  ••• ) 
- tonic waters  (Schweppes,  Tuborg- Carlsberg.,  '  •••  J 
- mineral  ~aters  (Apollinaris,  Vittel, Badoit,  Perrier,  Evian,  ••• ) 
277 As  concerns  the  data  to  be  outlined  in  the  scheme,  it  is  ~orth noting  that  : 
I)  The  seco~d, the thirc  and  the  fo~rth  ~axima prices  are  tc  be  displayed 
only  ~hen their  values  differ  frcm  the first  ~aximum as  well  as  from  one 
another.  Thus,  it  is cut  of  the question  to  List  more  than  cnE  maximum 
price  at  the  same  Level,  since  one  value  ap~Lies even  to the  case  where 
sever6L  shops  apply  the  same  price  Cor  mark-~p).  So  when,  for  instance, 
price  referring  to  a  given  item  are  identical,  only  three  prices  are  tc 
be  displayed  (first  maximum  only,  minimum  and  average)  and  obviously 
these three  prices  willcoincide. 
II)  The  average  is  the  arithmetic  rrean  of  prices  Cor  mark-ups),  base·d  on  all 
observations  available  Cn)  for  each  given  item  and  it  is  rot  therefore  only 
the  mean  of  the  n1axima  values  and  minimum  outlined  in "the table". 
Ill)  In  order  to  have  a  complete  picture  of  the structure  taken  into  acco~nt, 
the  "tables  by  pr-oduct"  r.ave·  to  be  published and  analyzed  jointl}'·  with 
table  1  of  Chapter  One  ir the  present  volume. 
IV)  This  "Scherr.e"  represents  the  final  result  of the  Commission  experience  up 
to the end  of  1978,  based  on  the enquiries  carriec out  until  this  c'ate. 
This  general  scheme  aims  to outline  the  main  results  emerging  from  these enquiries 
in  order  to stress  the  multiple  aspects  that  are  relevant  for  international  com-
parisons  of  evolution  of  different  prices  Cand  possibly  mark-ups). 
In  order  to  keep  due  account  of  objections  formulated  by  "the professional'',  the 
'Scherre"  does  not  specify  the  names  Cor  the·  code  numbers)  cf  retailers  and  wrole-
salers.  However  the  number  of  shops  applying  the  same  retail unit  price  Cor 
mark-up)  for  an  identical  brand,  is  outlined  in  par·entheses  (points  3  and  5  of 
the  Scheffie),  when  this  price  Cor  mark-up)  coincides  with  one  of the  4  top  maxima 
price·s  Cor  mark-ups)  or  with  the  m1n1mum  price  Ccr  mark-up)  or  with  the  "most 
frequent"  identical unit  price  Cor  mark-up). 
Thus,  the  Scheme  represents  the  sharp "simplification",  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
quantitative  generall  overview,  on  the ether,  of  the sever6l  tables  and  patterns 
cf  analysis  displayed  in  "Chapter  Two"  of  the present  methodology.  These  tables 
are  therefore  progressive  steps and  convergi~paths aiming  to  c~lminate - through 
a  Logical  and  empirical  development  - in this  overall  conclusive  and  dynamic 
"Scheme". 
278 PRODUCT  :  ••• 
Code  number 
Group 
TABLE  1 
COM~ISSION SCHEME  OF 
"TABLE  BY  PRODUCT" 
(according  to the guidelines  of  the  ~resent 
volume  methodology) 
1.  ITEMS  CONSIDERED 
- Brands and  sizes  Cor  weights)  taken  into  account  ; 
- n  =number  of  observations  (number  of shops  ~here a  given  item  has  been  found); 
- Date  O~Jl,9Ui_ry :  for  exampLe  : 
1.  Jan/Feb.78  ;  2.  July/Aug.78  ;  3.  Jan/Feb.79  ;  4.  July/Aug.79  ; 
- List  of  items  (in  parentheses the number of  cbservations  in each  enquir>·) 
- 01  = Brand-size 
- 02  - Branc-size 
and  so  on 
- Own  Label  COL)  of  shop 
- Own  Label  COL)  of  shop 
and  so  on  ; 
- Changes  in  items _o.!_j~---~"~ 
a)  New  items  : 
C1.n  = ;  2.n = ; 
C1.n  = ;  2.n  = ; 
size 
size 
; 
; 
)  ; 
)  ; 
The  following  brands  (and/or  sizes)  have  been  found  in  following  shops 
in  more  recent  surveys 
item  01  in  shops 
i t em  0 2  i n  shops 
and  so  on  ; 
b)  Items  no  Longer  sold 
since 
since 
The  following  brands  (and/or sizes)  have  been  dropped  by  the  following 
shops  during  the  period  under  survey  : 
i t em  01  i n  shops 
item  02  in  shops 
and  so  on.  279 
since 
since 2.  LOCAL  PRICE  DISPERSION  IN  THE  PERIOD  UNDER  SURVEY  -------------------------·------------
(for  instance  :  1.  Jan/Feb.78  ;  2.July/Aug.78  ;  and  so  on) 
,------.,----- -.--~-------------------r--------r--·-------
Date  i  Item  Measures  of  l  Item 
1  Measures  of 
of  (brand  dispersion  (1)  <brand  dispersion  (1) 
·  d  n  and  n  enqu1- ar. 
ry  s~ze) 
!--------
1. 
2. 
3. 
01 
II 
II 
v 
I 
I 
I  I 
size) 
02 
II 
II 
€,R 
p 
SD  v 
---L  __ ---------L_- -~- o...-~- ---------- -·~---
and  so  on. 
3.  EVOLUTION  .Q!  _RI_~A  IJ:..  UNIIJB.!£.~  ( 2) 
(for  instance  :  1.  Jan/Feb.78  ;  2.  July/Aug.78  ;  and  so  on) 
r;::-----------·----·--------------------.  ---~----------; 
I  vate  Item  Maximum.  unit  price  !:Minimum  ilaverage~Mos~  t  J 
of  <brand 
1  requen 
I  en~~;~  -~t~~l  __  r___  II- I;~--- I~=  =--~~i~ce =-- _: 
I  ,_ 
I  2. 
i 
i 
3. 
01 
II 
II 
) 
)  ( 
( 
)  (  ) 
( 
( 
( 
(  ) 
( 
) 
(  ) 
(  ) 
) 
-----·  ------ -------- -----·-·  ------.--'-"------..._-
4.  EVOLUTION  OF  UNIT  PRICE  Pb_!D  BY  RETAILER  (BUYING  UNIT  PRICE) 
See  the  Scheme  under  point  3. 
280 5.  EVOLUTION  O£_f.}TA]~E~S  MARK-Uf~  (3) 
(for  instance  :  1.  Jan/Feb.78  ;  2.  July/Aug.  78  ;  and  so  on) 
--- --~--
Date 
of 
enqui-
ry 
Item 
(brand 
and 
size) 
------------~----------------,...-----~-------TM-----, 
Maximum  m~rk-up  1  Minimum~ Average! f  IVJost  !  re·qL:ent  n 
I  r--~~--~---~;-1--~;- -~:-k-=-~~~-----
....._ ___  ..,____________  ----~  -----,.------
1.  01  )  )  (  (  ( 
2. 
II  (  ) 
3.  ,, 
(  ( 
________ l_ __ 
6.  EVOLUTION  OF  MA~UFACTURERS
1  UNIT  PRICE  (4) 
Date~- It;;;-;.-~-~:e--0~~-~~-i-;l ---~axi~a  ----Min.im~-------Prod~~~--- 1 
.  (brand  of  or  cata- D1scounts  Pr1ce  cons l- and  Manufac- Logue  ------ ----------- ------·- -----
dered  size)  turer  price  Possible  Home  Impor-
--- ----- ·-·--- --- -~------ p_rpj~  __  t~_fJ-
l 
01 
" 
" 
" 
" 
"  ... 
i  l,.._  __ 
'-----------~---------...;  -.....-~.o---J  ____ ----------
7.  INCIDENCE  OF  TAXI:S  AND  .DUTIES 
The  rates  of  value added  tax  (VAT), of  customs duties and  of  all  other  taxes 
- for  a  given  product -will be  displayed.  The  difference of  tax  t~rden ~etween 
home-produced  products  and  imported  ones  ~ill be  outlined.  A break-down  of  the 
tax  turden  according  to  the  stage  of  economic  circuit  (production,wholesaling, 
retailing)  might  be  very  helpful.  , 
281 This  aspect  of  the  "SCHEiv:E"will  be  de·velcpped  as  far  as  possible,  in  relation to 
- the  set  of  140 questions  analysed  in  the~  "Methodclogy"  of  Chapter  Two,  as 
concerns  rrore  partic~Larly the  analysis  by  product  ; 
- the  practices  of  price  fixing  carried out  by  manufscturers,  wholesalers, 
ret a i L  ers  ; 
possible discriminations  in  pricing  carrie~ out  by  some  man~fscturers  Ccr 
whclesalers)  to take  into  c1CCOt.;nt  big  retsilers  bargaining  power  Cor  "demand 
J)Olf.'er")  ; 
-the "loss"7Leader1 '  practices  carriec  out  by  some  retailers; 
the  differences  Cin  retail prices  as  well  as  in  actual  manufacturers'~rices) 
existing  between  the  prices  of  branded  prodt.;cts  and  the  prices  of  unbranded 
ones  <own  Labels:  OL); 
- the  e~clution of  market  shares, as  concerns  the  more  important  brands  and 
manufacturers  Cat  the  Local  Level,  at  the  national  Level),  having  recourse 
to  reasonable  criteria  cf  estimation  ; 
- all  other  aspects  both  of  conduct  and  of  performar:ces,  as  concerns  the  main 
retailers  and  manufacture~s (and  possibly,  wholesalers,  exporters  or  importers), 
in  so  far  as  they  may  be  useful  for  appreciating  the evolution  : 
(a)  of  concentration, with  reference  to  producing  and  distributive structures 
and  systems  ; 
(b)  of  power  reLG~tions  Cbet~o~1een manufacturers and  retaiLing  enterprises,  between 
big  and  small  enterprises,  industrial  as  well  as  commerciaL); 
(c)  of  competition  mechanism  (highlighting  and  qualifying  "multiple  competition") 
282 NOTES 
(1)  Measures  cf dispersion  : 
t:Rp  (in%)  =  Maxi~~~-i:e- ~_i~_t~_l:l!"  Price x  100  M1n1mum  Pnce 
SD  = Standard  Deviation. 
v  = Variation  Coefficient, 
average  unit  price. 
i •.  e.  Stand~rd Deviation divided  by 
( 2)  The  top  4 maxi mum  unit  prices  1.\i ll  be  indicated  in national  currency  by 
decreasing  order.  By  definition  :  1st  MAX  7  2nd  MAX  ~  3rd  IV.AX  :;::.- 4th  IV:AX. 
When  unit  prices  are  uniform,  the  2nd,  3rd  and  4th  MAX  will  be  not  displayed. 
In this  case  only  3  prices  will  be  outlined  :  1st  MAX  =MINIMuM  =AVERAGE. 
In  parentheses  will  be  display~d the  number  of  shops  applying  the  same  identical 
price fer  a  same  identical  item,  when  this  number  is  equal  or superior  to  2. 
It  is  noteworthy  t~at  the  AVERAGE  PRICE  is  the  arithmetic mean  of  all  unit 
prices  observe·d  for  a  given  ide·ntic.al  item  in all  shops  where  thisltem was 
actually available  (n  prices, then being  the number  of  observations  outlined 
in  Last  columm  of  the table>.  <*>-
(3)  See  note  2.  Mark-up  is defined as  the  percentage  of  the  buying  price added 
by  a  retailer fer  fixing his  retail  Cor  selling)  price. 
(4)  The  scheme  of this  ~oint  may  be  changed  by  each  Institut~  in order  to take 
into account  the  information  actually  available. 
It  is  essential  to try tc stress  the  maximum  difference  that  might  exist 
bet  ~1een  officiaL  prices  ar:d  actual  prices  ·a-cro;edb)"7'-~anuf  octurers 
Cor  whclesalers)  to the  big  retailers. 
Quantitative  remarks  to  be  inserted  in  point  8•  of  the  "scheme",  will  help 
in  appreciating  the  role  played  by  manufocturers'  pricing  in the 
evolution  of  the  competition  mechanisrr~ 
IMPORTANT  RE.MARK  -------------
The  present  "Scherr.e·"  has  to  be  published  ond  anal}'·sed  jointl>·with  the basis  Table 1 
of  Chapter  One  <of  the  present  methodological  volume),  outlining all  detailed 
data  by  sales  points  (shops)  and  products.  The  latter one  (Table  1,  Chapter  One) 
reproduces  therefore  the  c'ata  en1ergirg  directly  from  the  surve·ys  1.\ith  t~.e  addition 
1)  Of  the  t~pe of  pricing  (1  :  usual  product  price  ;  2  :  a  special  offer  in  the 
context  of  an  advertising  campaign; 3:  undefined  pricing  psttern). 
II)  Of  the  buying  prices  (paid  by  the  retailer)  and  of  the  retailer  mark-up, 
the  Latter  being  generolly  roughly  estimated on  the  basis  of  several 
sources  cf  information. 
III)  Of  the  name~  and  nationality of  the  actual_!f1~l:l_factu!~.!:. for  any  given  item, 
as  well  as  of  the crigin of  this  item  (home  produced,  imported,  mixed, 
undefinable). 
(*)  In  some  case·s  the·re  l-.'ill  be  displayed not  only  the  1st"most__freq~_e_n.!_l?!·_i~", 
but  c~lso  the  2nd  and  the  3,rd  ••most  f_req~n!_pric~··. 
283 EXAMPLE  OF  A  HTABLE  BY  PRODUCT" 
AS  PROPOSED  BY  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMISSION 
FOR  THE  PRODUCT:  CANNED  GARDEN  PEAS,  VERY  FINE 
by  Hugo  Smies 
Foundation  for  Economic  Research 
of  the  University  of  Amsterdam 1.  ITEMS  CONSIDERED 
1.1  Item List 
A number  of  20  items  was  taken  into account at the  surveys  which  were  carried out 
in  Amsterdam  in  February  and  August  1978.  Table  1.1  shows  these  items. 
Tab I  e  1  . 1  I  terns  Considered 
Code  number  Description 
600101  Hero 
02  Hero 
03  Hak 
04  Hak 
05  Ve I  uco 
06  Bondue I I  e 
07  Bondue II e 
08  Mari be I 
09  Maribel 
10  Daucy 
11  OL  AH 
12  OL  AH 
13  OL  V&D 
14  OL  A&O 
15  OL  Centra 
16  OL  De  Gruyter 
17  OL  De  Gruyter 
18  OL  Vege 
19  OL  4=6 
20  OL  Vivo 
1.:  February  1978 
2.:  August  1978 
tin  can,  560 
, ,  ,  270 
glass,  470 
, ,  ,  230 
tin  can,  550 
, ,  ,  560 
, ,  ,  280 
, ,  ,  560 
, ,  ,  280 
, ,  ,  560 
, ,  ,  570 
, ,  ,  280 
glass,  470 
tin  can,  650 
, ,  ,  600 
, ,  ,  650 
, ,  ,  270 
, ,  ,  530 
, ,  ,  560 
, ,  ,  530 
Region:  Amsterdam,  the  Netherlands 
1.2 Brands/sizes appeared 
Number  of  observations 
1.  2. 
gr.  10  10 
gr.  9  14 
gr.  10  17 
gr.  7  15 
gr.  4  5 
gr.  3  2 
gr.  2  3 
gr.  2  6 
gr.  3  4 
gr.  - -
gr.  2  1 
gr.  2  0 
gr.  1  1 
gr.  0  1 
gr.  0  2 
gr.  2  2 
gr.  2  2 
gr.  1  1 
gr.  1  1 
gr.  1  1 
The  item  I ist was  made  up  in  February  1978  as  a  result of  the first survey  which 
was  a  pi lot enquiry. 
The  following  observations,  which .were  not  in  the first survey,  appeared  in  August  1978. 
287 Table  1.2  Items  appeared  between  February  and  August  1978 
Item  Shops 
01  6,  20,  29 
02  2,  6,  11 ,  14,  20,  26,  19 
03  3,  6,  13,  20,  25,  26,  27,  28,  31,  32 
04  6,  11,  13,  19,  20,  25,  28,  32 
05 
07  3 
08  8,  17,  21,  28,  32 
09  8,  11 ,  17 
14  19 
15  13,  22 
19  20 
1.3 Brands/sizes disappeared 
The  following  observations  from  the first survey at February  1978  did  not  appear 
in  the  survey  of  August  1978. 
Table  1.3  Items  disappeared  between  February  and  August  1978 
Item  Shops 
01 
02 
03 
06 
08 
09 
11 
12 
19 
2,  23, 
21,  22 
19,  23, 
13 
16 
6,  22 
4 
3,  4 
28 
27 
30 
2.  LOCAL  PRICE  DISPERSION 
Table  2.1  shows  some  measures  of  price dispersion  calculatedfor the observations 
of  each  item  over alI  sales  points.  In  the colum  marked  'n'  the  number  of  shops 
in  which  the  item  has  been  found  is  shown. 
The  given  figures  under  ER  are calculated  with  the  formula: 
p 
ER  = 
p 
max.  sel I ing  price -min.  sel I ing  price 
min.  sel I ing  price 
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X  100  % In  the  fourth  colum  the standard  deviation  is given  of  the observations of  each  item 
and  the  last colum  shows  the variation coefficient  V being: 
standard  deviation 
V=· --------- X  100  % 
average  sel I ing  price 
Finally alI  data  are shown  for  the first survey  in  February  1978  (1.)  and  the  second 
survey  in  August  1978  (2.) 
Table 2.1  Local  Price Dispersion 
Item  n  ER  a  v  p 
1.  2.  1.  2.  1.  2.  1.  2. 
600101  10  10  54  27  70.12  15.30  28.50  6.27 
02  9  14  14  32  7.38  9.92  5.13  6.75 
03  10  17  56  12  35.19  12.73  13.96  5.05 
04  7  15  14  10  7.00  5.27  4.83  3.49 
05  4  5  37  43  15.69  16.68  11  .37  11  .91 
06  3  2  40  13  22.88  9.50  14.57  6.01 
07  2  3  12  12  6.00  5.66  5.77  5.55 
08  2  6  23  39  15.00  22.51  10.42  15.31 
09  3  4  11  29  4.50  8.66  4.74  10.31 
11  2  1  0  - - - - -
12  2  0  0  - - - - -
13  1  1  - - - - - -
14  0  1  - - - - - -
15  0  2  - 15  - 12.00  - 7.02 
16  2  2  0  6  - 5.00  - 3.13 
17  2  2  0  0  - - - -
18  1  1  - - - - - -
19  1  1  - - - - - -
20  1  1  - - - - - -
1.  February  1978 
2.  August  1978 
3.  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  RETAIL  UNIT-PRICES 
To  get a  picture of  the  retai I  unit prices and  their evolution,  table 3.1  has  been 
made  up. 
In  this table  is  shown:  the date of  the enquiry,  1.:  February  1978  and  2.:  August  1978, 
the  item  number,  the  four  highest  retai I  sel I ing  prices,  the minimum  unit  price  found, 
the average,  the price which  was  most  frequently  found  in  shops  and  the  number  of 
observations  n. 
289 Between  the parenthesesthe  number  of  shops  in  which  the  price that  is  shown  has  been 
found,  if equal  or more  than  two.  The  unit  prices  have  been  calculated  by: 
se I I i ng  p r i ce 
U.P. =------X  1000 
quantity 
which  gives  a  price  in  Dfl.  0,01  per  kilogram. 
Table  3.1  Evolution  of  the  retai I  unit prices 
Maximum  Min.  Average  Most  n 
Date  Item  No.  Freq.  I  II  III  IV 
1.  600101  601  455  442  426(4)  391  439  426(4)  10 
2.  01  498  462  455  426(6)  391  436  426(6)  10 
1.  02  581  574  548(2)  514  511 (4)  534  511 (4)  9 
2.  02  625  603  574  548(6)  511 (2)  546  548(6)  14 
1.  03  744  563(2)  506(5)  478(2)  478(2)  535  506(5)  10 
2.  03  591 (4)  527 ( 13)  - - 527 ( 13)  542  527(13)  17 
1.  04  686  643(3)  599(3)  - 599(3)  630  (643(3)  7  599(3) 
2.  04  686(6)  647  643(7)  621  621  659  643(7)  15 
1.  05  294  252  245  214  214  251  - 4 
2.  05  307  261  245  214  214  254  245(2)  5 
1.  06  337  266  241  - 241  281  - 3 
2.  06  299  266  - - 266  282  - 2 
1.  07  392  349  - - 349  370  - 2 
2.  07  392  349(2)  - - 349  363  349(2)  3 
1.  08  283  230  - - 230  256  - 2 
2.  08  319  299  283  230(2)  212  262  230(2)  6 
1.  09  353  349  317  - 317  339  - 3 
2.  09  317(3)  246  - 246  299  317(3)  4 
1.  11  226(2)  - - - 226  266  226(2)  2 
2.  11  236  - - - 236  236  - 1 
1.  12  349(2)  - - - 349  349  349(2)  2 
2.  12  - - - - - - - 0 
1.  13  421  - - - 421  421  - 1 
2.  13  421  - - - 421  421  - 1 
1.  14  - - - - - - - 0 
2.  14  259  - - - 259  259  - 1 
1.  15  - - - - - - - -
2.  15  304  264  - - 264  284  - 2 
1.  16  253(2)  - - - 253(2)  253  253(2)  2 
2.  16  253  238  - - 238  245  - 2 
1.  17  366(2)  - - - 366(2)  366  366(2)  2 
2.  17  366(2)  - - - 366(2)  366  366(2)  2 
1.  18  318  - - - 318  318  - 1 
290 Table  3.1  Evolution  of  the  retail  unit prices  (continued) 
Date  Item  No.  Maximum  Min.  Average  Most  n 
I  II  III  IV  Freq. 
2.  600118  299  - - - 299  299  - 1 
1.  19  266  ..  - - 266  266  - 1 
2.  19  299  - - - 299  299  - 1 
1.  20  273  - - - 273  273  - 1 
2.  20  292  - - - 292  292  - 1 
4.  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BUYING  UNIT  PRICES 
Unfortunately  not  much  can  be  said or shown  about  buying  prices.  Retailers  don't  give 
their buying  prices,  and  the  prices  shown  are  advised  prices  by  the manufacturers. 
For  'own  labels'  no  buying  prices are available at alI.  Prices are taken  to  be  the 
same  for  every  retailer which  is  not realistic. 
As  always  date  1.  is  February  1978  and  date 2.  is August  1978. 
Table  4.1  Buying  unit prices 
Item  Buying  unit  n 
Date  No.  Price 
1.  600101  320  10 
2.  01  298  10 
1.  02  430  9 
2.  02  396  14 
1.  03  409  10 
2.  03  409  17 
1.  04  487  7 
2.  04  500  15 
2.  08  223  6 
1.  09  204  3 
5.  EVOLUTION  OF  MARK-UPS 
What  has  been  said  about  buying  prices  in  paragraph  4.  has  of  course  its  impact  on 
the structure of  mark-ups  as  shown  in  table 5.1. 
Care  has  to  be  taken  if  conclusions are drawn,  the table  is  far  from  complete  and 
the picture unrealistic as  a  result of  the assumption  of  equal  buying  prices. 
The  table shows  the top  four  ranking  of  mark-ups,  the minimum  mark-up,  the average, 
the most  frequently  registered one  and  the total  number  of  observations. 
Date  1.  is  February  1978, date  2.  is  August  1978. 
The  mark-ups  are calculated as:  sel I ing  price- buying  price 
X  100  % 
buying  price 
291 Table  5.1  Evolution  of  mark-ups 
Date  Item  No.  Maximum  Min.  Average  Most  n 
I  II  III  IV  Freq. 
1.  600101  88  42  38  33(4)  22  37  33(4)  10 
2.  01  67  55  52  43(6)  31  46  43(6)  10 
1.  02  36  34  28  20  19(4)  24  19(4)  9 
2.  02  57  52  44  39  19  37  38(6)  14 
1.  03  82  38(2)  23(5)  17(2)  17 (2)  30  23(5)  10 
2.  03  44(4)  29 ( 13)  - - 29 ( 13)  32  29 ( 13)  17 
1.  04  41  32(3)  23(3)  23(3)  29  (32(3)  7  - 23(3) 
2.  04  37(6)  29  28(7)  24  24  31  28  15 
-
2.  08  43  34  27  3(2)  1- 4  17  3(2)  6 
1.  09  73  71  56  - 56  66  - 3 
6.  ECONOMIC  REMARKS_,  COMMENTARIES  AND  OVERALL  CONCLUSIONS 
6. 1  Price  Level 
The  average  unit price of  Canned  Garden  Peas  in  February  1978  (alI  items  considered) 
was  Dfl.  4.32  per  kilogram  and  in  August  1978  Of I.  4.59.  The  total  number  of 
observations  (n)  was  62  in  February  and  88  in  August  1978. 
The  average  unit  price of  the  items,  however,  varies  widely  as  indicated  by  the 
standard-deviation  (cr)  which  was  134.48  in  February  and  145.79  in  August1) 
Another  indication  for  the wide  pricing  gap  between  brands  is the difference  between 
maximum  and  minimum  average  unit  price which  is  151%  in  February  and  180%  in  August. 
Which  are the causes  of  this  non-uniform  price-pattern? 
A  look  at table 6.1 .1  shows  that the  large  price differences are mainly  caused  by  the 
Table  6.1 .1  Average  unit prices  by  producers 
Manufacturer  Code  Average  unit  price  cr  n 
No.  Febr.  '78  Aug.  '78  Febr.  Aug.  Febr.  Aug. 
Hero  01  - 02  484  500  65.57  63.76  19  24 
Hak  03  - 04  575  597  76.46  63.65  17  32 
Other  producers  05- 10  294  285  53.38  48.39  14  20 
Own  labels  11  - 20  306  300  61.49  55.20  12  12 
items  of  the manufacturers  HERO  and  HAK  which  have  a  considerably  higher  price  level 
than  alI  other  items.  The  strong  brand  pol icy  of  these  producers  leads  to a  high 
p  r ice  I  eve I . 
1)  Standard  deviation  of  the average of  alI  unit  prices. 
292 Little price difference can  be  found  between  'other producers'  and  'own  labels o 
distributors',  although  both  in  February  and  August  1978  the  price  level  of 
'own  IBbels'  is  higher than  of  the  'other producers'. 
To  take a  further  look  in  the structure of  prices  we  wi  I I  examine  items  Hero,  560  gr. 
(600101)  and  Hak,  470  gr.  (600103)  which  both  have  a  large  number  of  observations 
(see table  1.1,  Items  considered). 
We  wi  I I  consider three types  of  sales  points: 
- mutiples  (warehouse,  supermarket  chains), 
- buying  combines  +  voluntary  chains, 
- independents. 
Table  6.1 .2  Average  unit  prices of  Hak  and  Hero 
Hero  Hak 
Shops  Febr.  Aug.  Febr. 
Unit  Unit  Unit 
price  n  price  n  price n 
Multiples,  wareh.  482  3  426  3  513  4 
Buying  comb.  etc.  429  5  432  5  566  4 
Independents  401  2  462  2  521  2 
Total  439  10  416  10  535  10 
Aug. 
Unit 
price  n 
527  7 
540  5 
522  5 
542  17 
Taken  into account that  HERO  and  HAK  are similar  brandtypes  (strong advertising, 
strong  brand-policy)  it is  remarkable that no  uniform  pricing  pattern  can  be  derived 
from  the table.  It might  be  possible that once  we  have  more  surveys  done,  general 
statements  can  be  made. 
A comparison  of  the unit prices of  'own  labels'  can  not  be  made  for  the  individual 
items,  because  every  shop  has  its own  'own  label'·  The  average  unit  price of  own  labels 
registered  in  'multiples'  and  'buying  combines  etc.'  is  almost  equal,  both  in 
February  and  August. 
6.2 Price  Trends 
The  average  price of  alI  items  of  the  product green  peas  rose  with  1,7%  in  the 
period  between  February  and  August  1978. 
Four  items  decreased  in  price: 
Hero  560  gr.:  -0,7% 
Bonduel le  280  gr.:  -1,9% 
Maribel  280  gr.:  -11,8% 
Two  items  didn't change: 
OL  V&D  470  gr. 
OL  De  Gruyter  270  gr. 
293 Do  differences  in  price variations occur  between  different types of  labels? 
It appears  that the average  price of  alI  manufacturers  labels  decreased  by 
-1,1%  and  the average  price of  own  labels  rose  by  +12%. 
However  as  a  result of  the  higher  number  of  observations of  producers  labels 
the total  average  is  +1,7%. 
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